Dusan T.Batakovic. The Kosovo Chronicles

Published by PLATO, Beograd 1992.
Translated to English by Dragana Vulicevic
Table of Contents:
INTRODUCTION by Milan St. Protic
PART ONE: HISTORY AND IDEOLOGY
THE KOSOVO AND METOHIA QUESTION
Ethnic Strife and the Communist Rule
The CPY as a section of the Comintern and the realizer of its concept
in dealing with the ethnic question
The CPY's ethnic policy in its struggle for power in the civil war
(1941-1945)
Settling accounts with Serbia and the instrumentalization of Kosovo and
Metohia
Centralism in Yugoslavia and the role of the secret police in Kosovo
and Metohia
Kosovo and Metohia in the transition from the centralist to the federal
model
The epilogue of the communist solution to the ethnic question in
Yugoslavia: the example of Kosovo
Continuity and discontinuity
KOSOVO AND METOHIA: A HISTORICAL SURVEY
The Age of Ascent
The Age of Tribulation
The Age of Migrations
The Age of Oppression
The Age of Restoration
The Age of Communism
PART TWO: THEOCRACY, NATIONALISM, IMPERIALISM
FROM THE SERBIAN REVOLUTION TO THE EASTERN CRISIS: 1804-1875
The Serbian Insurrection and Pasha-Outlaws
Time of Reforms in Turkey
Pogroms in Metohia
Population
Political Action of Serbia
Restoration of Religious and Cultural Life
The Economy
ENTERING THE SPHERE OF EUROPEAN INTEREST
Eastern Crisis and the Serbian-Turkish Wars
The Albanian League
Court-Martial in Pristina
Albanians Under the Sultan's Protection
Activities of the Serbian Government
Flaring of Anarchy
Religious, Educational and Economic Conditions
The Decline in Population
ANARCHY AND GENOCIDE UPON THE SERBS
Serbia's Diplomatic Actions
Austria-Hungary and the Expansion of Anarchy
Failure of Reforms
Young Turk Regime
LIBERATION OF KOSOVO AND METOHIA
Albanian Incursions into Serbia
In World War One
SERBIAN GOVERNMENT AND ESSAD PASHA TOPTANI
PART THREE: RELIGION AND CIVILISATION
KOSOVO AND METOHIA: CLASH OF NATIONS OR CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS
FIGURES:
Otoman Vilayets
Serbia 1804-1913
Comunist Yugoslavia: Federal Organization
Settling of Albanian Tribes

AUTHOR: Dusan T. Batakovic (born 1957) is one of the distinguished
Serbian historians. He works in Historical Institute of Serbian Academy of
Sciences and Arts as Research Fellow. Among dozens of articles on Serbian
and Balkan history, he had published several books: Savremenici o Kosovu i
Metohiji 1852-1912 (Contemporaries on Kosovo and Metohia 1852-1912),
Belgrade 1988; Kolubarska bitka (Battle of Kolubara), Belgrade 1989;
Decansko pitanje (The Decani Question), Belgrade 1989; Kosovo i Metohija u
srpskoj istoriji (Kosovo and Metohia in Serbian History), Belgrade 1989
(co-author); Kosovo i Metohija u srpsko-arbanaskim odnosima (Kosovo and
Metohia in Serbo-Albanian Relations), Belgrade 1991; and edited Memoirs of
Gen. P. Draskic, Belgrade 1990 and Portraits by V. Corovic, Belgrade 1990.
This book is the collection of his articles on major topics of history
of Kosovo and Metohia and its recent political consequences.

Dusan T. Batakovic THE KOSOVO CHRONICLES
Izdavac: Knjizara Plato, Beograd, Cika Ljubina 18-20
Za izdavaca Branislav Gojkovic
Urednik Ivan Colovic
Recenzenti: Prof. dr Radovan Samardzic i dr Milan St. Protic
Beograd, 1992.
INDEX 215 THE HISTORY CARDS OF KOSOVO CHRONICLES 219 - 222
QP- Katalogizacija u publikaciji Narodna biblioteka Srbije, Beograd
949.711.5 BATAKOVIC, Dusan T.
[Kosovo Chronicles] The Kosovo Chronicles / Dusan T. Batakovic; prevela
na engleski Dragana Vulicevic.
-Beograd: Knjizara Plato, 1992 | (Beograd: Vojna stamparija).
- 218 Str.; 20 cm.
- (Biblioteka Na tragu)
Tiraz 1000 - Registar. ISBN86-447-0006-5
a) Kosovo i Metohija - Istorija 4986380
INTRODUCTION
by Milan St. Protic
The modern history of Serbia is indeed pregnant with controversial
questions. Probably the most complex one is the history of -- Kosovo and
Metohia. It was only in the last few years that several historiographical
works on Kosovo and Metohia had been written and published. The pioneer in
this field which deals with a particularly important segment of Serbia's
past and present is undoubtedly the author of this book.
This is trully the first serious attempt to cover two centuries of
history of Kosovo and Metohia and to present its complex historical
development in its full. In a series of articles dealing with various
problems of Kosovo and Metohia throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, the
author definitely succeeded to make a complete picture of Kosovo and
Metohia's troubled history. It seems appropriate, therefore, to name his
book -- The Kosovo Chronicles.
The diversity of various topics which form the collection most clearly
shows that the author is the master of the subject he chose to write about.
Mr. Batakovic presented himself as a mature historian of the Balkan history
as a whole as much as the sharp analyst of one specific aspect of it.
One cannot but to welcome this book. For two major reasons at least.
First, for its wide-angle approach to the problem. And second, for its
attempt to avoid typical black and white stereotypes.
Kosovo and Metohia undoubtedly belong to the corpus of the Serbian
history. No question about that. It was the cradle and the center of the
medieval Serbian state, it was the region won by the Serbian army from the
Turks in the First Balkan War (1912), it was incorporated in the Serbian
state territory and thus had entered into Yugoslavia in 1918. It was only
after the victory of the Communist Revolution in Yugoslavia that the
question of Kosovo emerged as a separate problem outside and even against
Serbia. That was the moment in which the political position of Kosovo and
Metohia moved away from Serbia and became a problem of Albanian national
rights in the eyes of very many foreign and Yugoslav observers. That crucial
borderline was rightfully pointed out by the author of this volume.
From the standpoint of form, this book represents a collection of
articles. It is comprised of two major parts. The first entitled, named
History and Ideology, treats the problem of Kosovo and Metohia, within the
framework of the Yugoslav unified state, during the World War Two and the
Communist rule since 1945. The second Theocracy, Nationalism, Imperialism
deals with the different aspects of the 19th century history of Kosovo and
Metohia until the Yugoslav unification of Yugoslavia.
The second part of Mr. Batakovic's book covers the period in which this
particular area belonged to the state territory of the Ottoman Empire, in
which the ethnic Serbs were subjects of constant pressures and abuses by the
Ottoman administrators and, much more, by ethnic Albanians who, under the
Turkish protection, conducted a real terror over the Serbs. The difference
between the Christian Serbs fighting for their national emancipation against
the oriental Islamic and oppressive regime of the Ottomans. As the Ottoman
system crumbled within itself, its peripheral provinces became areas of
abuse rule of the local population. The local Albanians, also Muslims for
the most part, found the best way to suppress the Serbs by putting
themselves in the service of the Turkish authorities. The author's archival
findings clearly proved what was really happening in Kosovo and Metohia
during the 19th century and what were the true origins of ethnic clashes in
that particular area.
This part of Mr. Batakovic's volume represents, in fact, a
comprehensive history of Kosovo and Metohia during the 19th century,
starting from the First Serbian Insurrection against the Turks (1804) to the
First Balkan War (1912) when, after the victory of the Serbian army, the
region of Kosovo and Metohia had been incorporated in the bulk of the
Serbian state. It is essentially a historical analysis of complex ethnic,
religious and political relations in the triangle Serbs-Turks-Albanians
based on a rather deep archival and documentary research. The author managed
to trace down the roots of these conflicts, their nature and development.
Parallel to this, he gave the historical background for the events which
occurred in the 20th century, when the problem of Kosovo and Metohia reached
its peak in both, crisis and international attention. This segment of book
should serve as a textbook of Kosovo and Metohia's history to everyone who
is interested in this particular field.
Mr. Batakovic's collection of articles contains several synthetical
pieces written on the subject of the history of Kosovo and Metohia. This
region of constant clashes needed to be defined in terms of general
categories. In an attempt to discover the real nature of those conflicts the
author searched for the answer to the following questions: what really lays
in the bottom of centuries long clashes in the history of Kosovo and
Metohia, is that the conflict of religions, nations or civilizations? One
will find the author's answers both original and inspiring. Contradictory
problems need to be thought about. And that is exactly what Mr. Batakovic
has done.
A special attention should be paid to the article entitled "The Kosovo
And Metohia Question - ethnic strife and communist rule". It stands as the
pivotal piece among all other articles in this book. It is at the same time
the most important and the most complex attempt to analyze the situation in
Kosovo in Metohia in the last fifty years, since the communists took over in
Yugoslavia.
This is the first time in Serbian and Yugoslav historiography that
someone tried to look on the Kosovo and Metohia question outside the
framework of political and ideological clichs. The article of Mr. Batakovic
represents a pioneer work in a noncommunist approach to contemporary history
of Kosovo and Metohia. Trying to see the problem in the realm of communist
regime and its policies in Yugoslavia, and in Serbia specifically, the
author found a whole new field of research and reasoning. With strong
foundations in his knowledge of Kosovo and Metohia's history, both distant
and recent, Mr. Batakovic made a successful synthesis of Serbo-Albanian
misunderstandings in Kosovo and Metohia, finding a balance between
contemporary politics and traditional differences between ethnicities living
in this region. His final conclusion that the Titoist politics had been
detrimental to the positive solution of this serious problem seems
persuasive and largely acceptable.
One should appreciate the courage of the author to tackle such a
complicated question of history and politics which touches the very essence
of the present day Serbia and Yugoslavia. Mr. Batakovic's writing should
contribute in clarifying many problems which had been heavily misinterpreted
in recent years, both in Yugoslavia and abroad. Escaping numerous traps of
Marxist historiography and reasoning, the author leads us on the road of new
and modern way of thinking about nationalism and statehood. By combining
historical analysis and archival research with original synthesis, the
author left us with a lot of vastly unknown factography and even more
conclusions and assertations which inspire further work and thoughts.
The author of this volume belongs to the new generation of Serbian
historians. To the generation whose intellectual and professional maturity
presently shows itself in full intensity. It is a general hope that these
young people will drive Serbia out of Marxist dogmas not only in their
intellectual work but also in everyday politics. The book we have before us
is one of those important steps in the direction of modern, non-ideological
view of our past and present.
Milan St. Protic
PART ONE: HISTORY AND IDEOLOGY

THE KOSOVO AND METOHIA QUESTION
Ethnic Strife and the Communist Rule
In the 20th-century history of the two southern regions of Serbia --
Kosovo and Metohia -- there are two periods that are clearly separated by
ideological borders. In the first period (1912-1941), in the Kingdom of
Serbia and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, ethnic issues were mainly dealt with
in keeping with the civic standards of inter-war Europe, notwithstanding the
suffering endured during the war and latent political instability. Compared
to ethnic minorities in other countries, the ethnic Albanian minority in
Kosovo and Metohia, despite its open antagonism towards the state, was not
in an particularly unfavorable position. By Saint-Germain Treaty (1919)
minorities on Serbian territory within borders of 1913 (including Kosovo and
Metohia), were formally excluded from international protection but it was
not particularly used against interests of ethnic Albanians in
Serbia.¹
In the second period, commencing with the war (1941-1945) and concluded
after the establishment of communism in Yugoslavia (1945), the question of
Kosovo and Metohia was dealt with in keeping with the Party leadership's
ideological stands regarding the ethnic question. Precisely during this
period solutions were found providing strong impetus to the old ethnic
conflict between Serbs and Albanians, causing deep rifts difficult to
surmount today. Ethnic tension in Kosovo and Metohia thus offers a
paradigmatic example of the ability of the communist rule to completely
change the demographic picture of an area by instrumentalizing existing
ethnic differences.
Kosovo and Metohia, and entire Yugoslavia for that matter, depended on
the rule of the communist leadership, which cunningly used the manipulation
of ethnic differences to consolidate and maintain power. The national policy
of the Yugoslav communists was an ideological and national negation of the
establishment of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, which the Serbs saw as their own
- the heir to the political traditions and democratic institutions of the
Kingdom of Serbia. The Serbs posed the greatest threat for Yugoslav
communists in number and political affiliation: to them, communism was a
foreign ideology viewed slightingly, as a vogue of the small-in-number
deluded youth; but recognized during the war as the gravest threat to
independence and freedom. The communists regarded the Serbs as a nation with
strong politically constructive traditions and a pronounced national
conscience who, spread through the length and breadth of Yugoslav territory,
had learned to conduct foreign policy on their own, without tangible foreign
support, a nation united by a single Orthodox Church - the bearer of an
anti-Soviet mood in the country. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY)
drafted its followers among the Serbs chiefly from the lower social strata
(especially patriarchal communities in Montenegro, Herzegovina, Bosnia and
Vojna Krajina) unestablished in Serbian state and political traditions,
people who in the name of idealistic Yugoslavism and proletarian
internationalism rejected Serbian interests and blindly obeyed the orders of
the Titoist leadership.
The Albanians, a people whose national integration fell a whole century
behind those of the other Balkan nations, remained in communist Yugoslavia
against their will, but found a common interest with the ruling communist
party in an anti-Serbian policy via which to achieve their national goals.
Time was to pass for the backward ethnic Albanian milieu to admit its new
authorities and for the CPY to come to terms with representatives of the
ethnic Albanian minority. The question of Kosovo and Metohia was thus dealt
with in the inter-relation of three gravity centers of political forces -1.
the CPY leadership as the leading factor of might in the country; 2. the
ethnic Albanian national movement which had evident continuity despite the
ideological affiliation of its bearers; 3. Serbian communists who, though
numerically superior in the army, party and politics, as Yugoslavs and
internationalists consistently implemented the Titoist policy. The origin of
this relation can be seen in the chronological sequence of developments of
the CPY's national policy under different political and international
conditions.
1 R. Rajovic, Autonomija Kosova. Politicko-pravna studija, Beograd
1985, pp. 100-105.
The CPY as a section of the Comintern and the realizer of its concept
in dealing with the ethnic question
There is evident continuity in the CPY's policy in dealing with the
position of ethnic minorities which shows that, despite individual
aberrations due to the position of communist Yugoslavia in foreign policy,
basic political principles, outlined in party programs and resolutions in
the inter-war period, were consistently implemented. The CPY coordinated its
program of solutions to the ethnic question in the multi-ethnic Kingdom of
Yugoslavia with the general stands of the Third International (Comintern),
within the framework of which it acted as a separate section, as its work
was prohibited in the country.
The Comintern was an important lever of Soviet foreign policy. The
Comintern's attitude towards the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was determined by the
Soviet policy towards the "Versailles system" of states created under
imperialistic peace accords" after World War I, in which enemies of the
Bolshevik regime - Great Britain and France - were dominant. The Fifth
Congress of the Comintern (1924) abandoned the principle of a federal
restructuring of states, created as a cordon sanitaire primarily as a
defense against the "proletariat revolution" and a struggle against the
Soviet Union, with the explanation that "western imperialists" were
preparing an assault on the "first country of socialism". The new political
platform's starting point was to break up the cordon surrounding the Soviet
Union by singling out and rendering independent the oppressed nations among
those states in the enemy camp, including the Kingdom of Yugoslavia - the
right of Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia to separation was emphasized, and a
special resolution stressed the need to aid the movements of the oppressed
nations for the formation of their independent states and "for the
liberation of the Albanians". The policy of the Yugoslav authorities had
some effect on the Comintern's stand towards Yugoslavia: the royal
authorities had failed to recognize the new Soviet state and provided
shelter to a large number of Russian emigrants and White Guard military
units in the 20s, including the troops of General Vrangel, while Russian
societies frequently greeted their patron, King Aleksandar Karadjordjevic
(related to the Romanov dynasty through his sister Jelena and his
Montenegrin aunts), as the new Slavic tsar.
The CPY, and the Comintern, advocated the stand that the state of
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was an unnatural creation which cannot be
regarded as a homogeneous national state (comprising three tribes which make
up a nation) with a few ethnic minorities, but a state wherein the ruling
class of one (Serbian) nation was oppressing the other nations. The thesis
on a Greater Serbian bourgeoisie and Greater Serbian hegemony owed much to
the theses of the Austro-Hungarian public opinion prior to and during World
War I, whereby the Greater Serbian threat posed a chief obstacle to the
stabilization of political conditions in the Balkans. Similar stands, only
with a more pronounced ideological component, can be found in the works of
Austro-Marxists whence such stereotypes were taken and constructed into the
views of the Third International regarding the ethnic question in the
Balkans.¹
The policy to break up Kingdom of Yugoslavia culminated in the
decisions of the CPY's Fourth Congress, held in Dresden in 1928. The
statement that about one-third of the Albanian nation had remained under the
rule of the Greater Serbian bourgeoisie, which was implementing the same
oppressive regime" against it as in Macedonia, was supplemented by the stand
that its liberation and unification with Albania can be achieved only in a
joint struggle with the CPY. With regard to this, support was extended to
the Kosovo Committee, an organization of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo and
Metohia who, aided by the Albanian government and Mussolini, raided Yugoslav
territory with the aim of winning the annexation of Kosovo, Metohia and
western Macedonia to Albania. Tens of thousands of Serbian colonists -
chiefly volunteers in World War I and indigent families from Montenegro,
Vojna Krajina and Dalmatia, were sealed by the party press as servants of
the Greater Serbian policy, although the land they were allotted was not
taken from ethnic Albanians. Similar stands were reitered at the Fourth
National Conference of the CPY held in Ljubljana in 1934, which stressed the
assessment that the Yugoslav kingdom was nothing but the "occupation of
Croatia, Dalmatia, Slovenia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Kosovo and
Bosnia-Herzegovina by Serbian troops" and that it was thus imperative to
execute the "persecution of Serbian Chetniks from Croatia, Dalmatia,
Slovenia, Vojvodina, Bosnia, Montenegro, Macedonia and Kosovo". Renouncing
these regions any Serbian character at all, the CPY believed that these
provinces should be organized as separate federal units within the frame of
a future communist Yugoslavia. The stand to break up Yugoslavia was changed
in 1935, when the Comintern established a new course of struggle of the
"national front" against the danger looming from Nazism and Fascism in
Europe.²The CPY abandoned its decision on the annexation of
Kosovo and Metohia to Albania in 1940, at the Fifth National Conference in
Zagreb, at a time when Albania had been under Italian occupation for a year,
but even then, the "colonialist methods of the Serbian bourgeoisie" were
condemned and the need for the creation of a separate republic of Kosovo
emphasized - "the ethnic problem can be resolved by the forming of a free
labor-peasant republic of Kosovo after the Greater Serbian fascist and
imperialist regime is overthrown".³ By demonizing Serbian
domination in Yugoslavia, Yugoslav communists distinguished less and less
the bourgeoisie from the people - thus the idea to form a separate party for
Serbia was abandoned, although party organizations for the other Yugoslav
provinces were formed. Maintaining such a stand, the CPY received Nazi
Germany's attack on Yugoslavia in April, 1941.
1 K. Cavoski, KPJ i kosovsko pitanje, in: Kosovo i Metohija u srpskoj
istoriji, Beograd 1988, pp. 361-381. Cf documents in: Istorijski arhiv
Komunisticke partije Jugoslavije, Beograd 1949, vol. I-II, passim;
Komunisticka internacionala, Gornji Milanovac 1982, vol. VIII, passim.
2 K, Cavoski, op. cit., pp. 365-369.
3 V. Djuretic, Kosovo i Metohija u Jugoslaviji, in: Kosovo i Metohija u
srpskoj istoriji, p. 321
The CPY's ethnic policy in its struggle for power in the civil war
(1941-1945)
The Kosovo and Metohia question was raised again when the flames of war
spread on April 6,1941, throughout Yugoslavia: its army was forced to
unconditional capitulation 11 days later and its territory divided among
Hitler's allies. Owing to their loyalty to old allies France and Great
Britain, and for fomenting a putsch on March 27, 1941 (thereby practically
canceling any agreement with the Axis powers), the Serbs were punished as
the Third Reich's chief enemy in the Balkans by a division of the Serbian
territories: most of Kosovo along with Metohia, western Macedonia and
fringing areas of Montenegro were allotted to Albania, which had been under
Italian occupation for two years. Bulgaria was given a small part of Kosovo,
while its northern parts entered the composition of Serbia where a German
protectorate was established. Under a decree by King Vittorio Emmanuele,
dated August 12, 1941, Greater Albania was founded. An Albanian voluntary
militia numbering 5,000 men - Vulnetari - was set up in Kosovo and Metohia
to assist the Italian forces in maintaining order, but which carried out
surprise attacks on the Serbian population on its own.
Ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and Metohia, who were declared by Italian
and communist propagandas as victims of Greater Serbian hegemony, received,
besides the right to hoist their own flag, the right to open schools in
their mother tongue. The patriarchal and tribal ethnic Albanian society in
Metohia and Kosovo, accustomed to extreme subordination and absolute
submission to the local land holders, received the new order wholeheartedly.
The destruction of the Yugoslav state, which they never took as their own,
was received with vindictive ardor. In the first few months of the
occupation, some ten thousand colonist houses were burned in night raids and
their owners and families expelled. Colonist estates were ploughed afresh in
order that every trace of Serbian presence be eradicated and in the event of
their return, to render difficult the recognition of their estates. The
destruction of colonist villages according to a plan was to help show
international commissions after the war, when new borders would be drawn,
that Serbs never lived there. An ethnic Albanian leader from Kosovo,
Ferat-bey Draga, said that the "time has come to exterminate the Serbs ...
there will be no Serbs under the Kosovo sun".¹Orthodox churches
were burnt and destroyed and graveyards desecrated. Ethnic Albanians sought
to eradicate every trace of Serbian presence in these areas. During the war,
some 100,000 colonists and indigenous Serbs fled for Serbia and Montenegro
ahead of Albanian terror, and some 10,000 were killed.² Along
with this, under a plan of the Italian government, adopted before the
occupation of Yugoslavia, began an extensive settlement of Albanians from
Albania on the estates of the expelled colonists. Their number is roughly
estimated at 80,000-100,000; the first postwar estimate put it at about
75,000.³
The insurrection against the occupier in mid-May, 1941, was raised by
Serbian officers under the command of Colonel Draza Mihailovic, who
organized the Chetnik (guerrilla) movement throughout Yugoslavia: his
troops, organized throughout the country, were proclaimed by the government
in exile the Yugoslav army in the homeland, and he was made general and
minister of war. Two weeks after Hitler's assault on the Soviet Union,
Yugoslav communists stirred up an uprising at Moscow's call, which, under
the mask of a people's liberation struggle, was in fact a movement for a
revolutionary shift of power. After initial talks with Mihailovic's
Chetniks, Tito's Partisans set out on a long and bloody civil war. Although
there were several collaborationist regimes in the country with strong
military formations, the Partisans - the military force of the CPY, saw the
Chetniks as their arch-enemy who incorporated the state and political
continuity of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.
In the civil war that ensued, Kosovo and Metohia assumed a secondary
role. The Chetnik movement, organized into two Kosovo corps (about 1,500
men), operated in mountainous regions on the outskirts of Kosovo and
Metohia. Cooperation between the occupational Italian forces and the
Albanian voluntary gendarmery left no room for their stronger military
engagement and protection of the Serbian population. The persecuted Serbs
sought refuge in occupied Serbia, where they were received first by the
commissariat administration and then a special refugees commissariat under
the regime of General Milan Nedic.⁴
Metohia, which was settled by primarily Montenegrin colonists, had many
followers of the CPY, though at the outbreak of the war its membership
comprised a mere 270, including some two dozen ethnic Albanians. Even though
the CPY condemned in numerous declarations prior to the war the Greater
Serbian policy of the bourgeoisie and called during the war on the ethnic
Albanian population to rise together with the colonists and Serbian natives
for the creation of a "new, justice society", the response was negligible. A
party leader, Ali Shukria, tried in 1941 to justify this reaction by saying
that the mere name Yugoslavia provoked unanimous indignation among the
ethnic Albanians. Clashes between Partisan and Chetnik formations on the one
hand and the ethnic Albanian gendarmery on the other showed that ethnic
Albanians saw in both of them only Serbs, their age-old enemies.⁵
The number of ethnic Albanians mustered in partisan units in Kosovo and
Metohia was extremely low, numbering only several dozen. Individual units
were named after prominent ethnic Albanian communists (Zeinel Aidmi, Emin
Duraku), and then after distinguished leaders of the secessionist movement
against Serbia and Yugoslavia (Bairam Cum); agitations among the population
constantly stressed that after the war, the ethnic Albanians would win their
rights, labeling the prewar policy as fascist and maleficent. However,
winning over ethnic Albanians for the restoration of Yugoslavia under a
communist leadership was slow, since among the ethnic Albanian members of
the CPY most had hoped that Kosovo and Metohia would remain in the
composition of Albania after the war.
In the Communist Party of Albania (CPA), which was formed from various
factions on February 8, 1941, under the supervision of Yugoslav instructors
(Miladin Popovic and Dusan Mugosa), were numerous followers of a Greater
Albania under communist rule. Albanian communist leader Enver Hoxha had
taken the first step towards an accord for the creation of a Greater Albania
after the war with a short-lasting agreement reached on August 2,1943, in
the village of Mukaj with representatives of the Balli Kombetar, a very
active organization in Kosovo.⁶ Miladin Popovic held a similar
stand, proposing that ethnic Albanians from Kosovo and Metohia be placed
under the command of the Chief Staff of Albania and that Metohia come under
the organization of the CPA.⁷ Such aspirations attained their
fullest expression in a declaration issued on January 2, 1944 in the village
of Bunaj (Bujan), in a conference attended by 49 political representatives
of the ethnic Albanian and Yugoslav partisan units (43 ethnic Albanians, 1
Moslem and 7 Serbs present):
"Kosovo and Metohia is an area mostly inhabited by ethnic Albanians,
who have always wished to become united with Albania. We, therefore, feel it
our duty to point to the road that is to be followed by the ethnic Albanian
people in the realization of their wishes. The only way for the Kosovo and
Metohia ethnic Albanians to unite with Albania is through a common struggle
with the other peoples of Yugoslavia against the invader and his lackeys. It
is the only way of winning freedom, when all the peoples, including ethnic
Albanians, will be able to make their options with a right to
self-determination, including secession. The guarantee for it is the
National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia and the National Liberation Army of
Albania, with which it is closely linked."⁸
The decisions reached in Bunaj, under which the name Metohia was
replaced by an Albanian term Rrafshe Dukadjini, were contrary to a
declaration by a grand communist assembly held in Jajce in late November,
1943 AVNOJ (the National Antifascist Liberation Council of Yugoslavia -
NALCY) at which it was decided that a new, communist Yugoslavia, headed by
Tito as partisan marshal, be established on a federal principle whereby "all
peoples ... will be fully free and equal", and the ethnic groups guaranteed
all the rights of an ethnic minority.⁹ In his instructions to the
communist leaders in Kosovo and Montenegro, Tito rejected the decisions
reached in Bunaj, believing that they raised issues which should be dealt
with after the war: he realized only too well that his movement would have
lost many followers if he had upheld the demands of the ethnic Albanians, as
he had proclaimed in principle the restoration of Yugoslavia within its
prewar borders. In conditions when the war was not yet over and the
establishment of a communist system uncertain, the decision not to touch the
borders of Yugoslavia was the only possible solution.
The hostility of ethnic Albanians towards Yugoslav partisans did not
wane, despite efforts by party activists to win over fresh adherents. The
membership of the ethnic Albanian Balli Kombetar increased and their
national solidarity proved to be stronger than ideological divisions. After
the capitulation of Italy, the German occupational authorities encouraged
aspirations towards the creation of an ethnic Albania, thus on September 19,
1943, the Second Albanian League was founded on the model of its predecessor
- the First Albanian League (1878), advocating fiercer clashes with the
Serbs in Kosovo and Metohia, and a separate SS-Division Scenderbey was set
up from the local Albanian forces.
A delegate of the partisan Supreme Command, Svetozar Vukmanovic Tempo,
sent in 1943 to reorganize the partisan units in Kosovo, Metohia and
Macedonia, informed of "powerful chauvinist hatred between the ethnic
Albanians and Serbs ... The extent of the Albanian chauvinist animosity
towards the Serbs is evident from the fact that one of our [partisan] units,
comprising ethnic Albanians, was surrounded by 2,000 armed ethnic Albanian
peasants, and after several hours of fighting the latter recognized that the
unit comprised ethnic Albanians. They dispersed, leaving the Italians in the
lurch".¹⁰ Fresh partisan units, set up in September and October
1943, operated outside Kosovo and Metohia, with not more than 800 men in
five battalions. The unit was reorganized in the summer and fall of 1944,
but the number of ethnic Albanians remained the same.
A large-scale revolt of the Balli Kombetar followers and Albanian units
mustered into partisan formations (November-December, 1944), which broke out
after the retreat of the German troops and the establishment of communist
rule (the liberation of Kosovo was assisted at Tito's request by two
brigades of ethnic Albanian partisans) was thus not unexpected. The revolt
was crushed when additional troops were brought in, and military rule was
set up in Kosovo and Metohia from February to May, 1945. A leading ethnic
Albanian communist from Kosovo maintained contact with the outlaws. He was
soon discovered, but A. Rankovic, Tito's closest associate at the time,
assessed that his execution would stir up a fresh revolt, thus he was
appointed minister in the Serbian governament.¹¹ Initial
concessions heralding a lenient attitude towards ethnic Albanians in Kosovo
and Metohia were made immediately after the new authorities were
established: the settlement of at least 75,000 colonists from Albania was
tacitly legalized, and a special decree issued on March 16, 1945, forbade
about 60,000 Serbs settled in the inter-war period from returning to their
estates.¹²
The conflict between the CPY and the ethnic Albanians during the war
was of ideological and state character. The CPY could not allow the fascist
forces in Kosovo to create a Greater Albania and thus disrupt the state
integrality of the newly established communist Yugoslavia. Most ethnic
Albanians continued to support the Balli Kombetar and its solution to the
ethnic question. Albanian communists on both sides had hoped that the
triumph of communism would bring quicker unification to all Albanians into a
single state; thus communist Yugoslavia was regarded as the continuation of
the Kingdom.
1 H. Bajrami, Izvestaj Konstantina Plavsica Tasi Dinicu, ministru
unutrasnjih poslova u Nedicevoj vladi oktobra 1943, o kosovsko-mitrovackom
srezu, Godisnjak arhiva Kosova XIV-XV (1978-1979), p. 313
2 S. Milosevic, Izbeglice i preseljenici na teritoriji okupirane
Jugoslavije 1941-1945, Beograd 1981, p.56-104.
3 V. Djuretic, op. cit., p. 323-325
4 Documents published in R. V. Petrovic, Zavera protiv Srba, Beograd
1990, pp. 137-175, 353-358.
5 Dj. Slijepcevic, Srpsko-arbanaski odnosi kroz vekove sa posebnim
osvrtom na novije vreme, Himelstir 19832, pp. 307-336, 3437-455.
6 The agreement with the CPA was short-lived and the Balli Kombetar
(set up in 1942) entered into cooperation with the German occupational
forces after the capitulation of Italy (1943)
7 Zbornik dokumenata i podataka o narodnooslobodilackom ratu
jugoslovenskih naroda, vol. VII, t. 1, Belgrade 1952, pp. 338-339.
8 A. N. Dragnich and S. Todorovich, The Saga of Kosovo. Focus on
Serbian-Albanian Relations, Boulder Colorado 1984, pp. 143.
9 Prvo i drugo zasedanje AVNOJ-a, Beograd 1953, pp. 227-228.
10 Zbornik dokumenata, vol. X, t. 2, p. 153.
11 S. Djakovic, Sukobi na Kosovu, Beograd 1986, pp. 227-228.
12 V. Djuretic, op. cit. p.
Settling accounts with Serbia and the instrumentalization of Kosovo and
Metohia
However, the ethnic Albanians, both nationalists and communists, failed
to properly assess the CPY's intentions. The question of Kosovo and Metohia
was an important point of support in the CPY's plan to square accounts with
Serbia. The squaring of accounts, outlined in party programs, could start
only with the achievement of full communist domination. Serbia's conduct
during the war provided additional strength to the party's stands: a country
with bourgeois traditions and small peasant landholders, devoted to
politically constructive institutions and the dynasty, leaned towards the
Chetnik movement of Draza Mihailovic. After failing in Serbia in 1941, the
small-in-number communists transferred the weight of their operations to
Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro and the Military Frontier (Krajina) in
Croatia, where the entire Serbian population rose against large-scale terror
wrought by the Ustashas (the authorities of fascist Croatia). Cunningly
manipulating the indigent Serbian hilly population who, void of developed
state and political traditions, cherished a devotion to the cult of "mother
Russia" and patriarchal egalitarianism, the communists managed - by calling
on the authority of Moscow - to win over many of them who had fallen in
numerous Chetnik formations after the capitulation of Italy.
The communists won the bloody civil war, in which ethnic and religious
divisions were the chief instigators of massacres, owing to crucial aid from
the Soviet troops which, in agreement with Tito, crossed over to Yugoslav
territory in the fall of 1944, and helped bring the communists to power and
defeat the Yugoslav army in the homeland - the Chetnik movement of Draza
Mihailovic. The first to be punished then was Serbia: its bourgeoisie and
peasants were exterminated in the "second stage of the revolution", i.e. in
the "squaring of accounts with the class enemy" -without trial and by
summary procedure, while its youth - conscripted into partisan units, was
decimated at the Sremski Front when it was forced to continually storm the
well-fortified German positions without sufficient weaponry and military
training. With the destruction of its potential classes for resistance - the
bourgeoisie, the wealthy peasant layer and the town youth - Serbia's back
was broken: most of its bourgeoisie and intelligentsia were abroad
(officers, politicians and diplomats), while those who remained in the
country were permanently marginated. The raison d'etre of the communist
Yugoslavia was a carefully set balance of power among the peoples and
minorities of Yugoslavia over a potential threat from Serbian predominance.
The importance which the communist authorities attached to the political and
ethnic affirmation of the ethnic Albanian minority could not be understood
if viewed otherwise.
The numerous Serbs in the party, army and police of Tito's regime were
carefully selected by the criterion of blind obedience and complete devotion
to the leader, and by their readiness to fully subject Serbian interests to
the interests of the CPY. Most of them, through a negative selection of
cadres, were recruited from patriarchal Serbian milieus in Croatia,
Herzegovina and Montenegro or lower classes in Serbia, as lacking commitment
to the national and state traditions of Serbia. Their major task during the
entire period of Tito's reign was to fight against "Serbian nationalism and
chauvinism" which, considering the Serbs were the predominant nation,
constituted the gravest threat to the regime. These Serbs thus mercilessly
destroyed everything even resembling the traditions of the Kingdom of
Yugoslavia and the Kingdom of Serbia. They were forerunners in the
persecution of dignitaries and the clergy of the Serbian Orthodox Church.
Under such circumstances, the communist authorities in Yugoslavia were able
to deal with the ethnic question in keeping with their designs without
fearing for their rule.
The predominance of Serbs in the military units of the new authorities
demanded, for the sake of precaution, that the question of the status of
Kosovo and Metohia be brought up prudently, as the party there - due to
stubborn ethnic-Albanian resistance - had no other followers but Serbs and
Montenegrins (i.e. Serbs who accepted the CPY's ideological precept on the
existence of a separate Montenegrin nation). The decision that Kosovo and
Metohia be annexed to Serbia was made after the abolition of military rule
on July 10,1945, perhaps under the influence of a large-scale ethnic
Albanian resistance towards the new authorities. There is evidence that
owing to mistakes made in the ethnic Albanian uprising in December, 1944,
the Regional Committee of Kosovo and Metohia was replaced after the First
Congress of the CP of Serbia in May 1945, and placed under the direct
subordination of the headquarters in Belgrade, though the decision was soon
repealed after a protest voiced by the ethnic Albanian communists. Under the
1946 Constitution, the Autonomous Region of Kosovo-Metohia within the
composition of Serbia was established, though the communists of Kosovo
worked directly under the instructions of the state leadership. Fearing an
outbreak of fresh revolts, the CPY ordered that the officials in Kosovo
suppress the followers of a unification with Albania. Enver Hoxha was
dissatisfied with the attitude of Miladin Popovic, a CPY instructor in
Albania who, upon returning to Kosovo, reneged on his promise that after the
war Kosovo and Metohia would be annexed to Albania. He was assassinated by
followers of the Balli Kombetar in March, 1945, and the assassin - who
committed suicide immediately upon executing the task - had with him a
standard with the inscription "Kosovo united with Albania".¹
The reasons for deep discontent were not ideological but national in
nature: in the new, communist Yugoslavia, their aspirations for the
annexation of Kosovo, Metohia and western Macedonia to Albania were
betrayed. Nevertheless, international political ambitions called for a
special relationship towards the ethnic Albanian population: the CPY
displayed an open intent to establish domination in Albania. Beyond that
aspiration lay plans for a Balkan federation. Tito nurtured grandiose plans
- to set up a three-member Balkan federation with support from the Bulgarian
leader Georgi Dimitrov, wherein Albania would be one of the three federal
units, with the possibility of Greece entering, if the communist guerrillas
should win there.
Though not always a reliable memoirist, Enver Hoxha claimed that in
summer, 1946, Tito had accepted in principle his proposal for Kosovo and
Metohia to be annexed to Albania, with the qualification that the time was
not yet ripe, "as the Serbs would not understand us" and that, within the
context of the plan for a Balkan federation, Tito had said, "We have agreed
on the creation of a Balkan federation. The new Yugoslavia can serve as an
example and experience towards that aim. I am referring to this since we are
discussing Kosovo. With the creation of a Balkan federation, the question of
Kosovo's annexation to Albania would be easily resolved within its
framework."² The fact that plans for the ceding of Kosovo and
Metohia to Albania truly existed is evident from the report of talks
conducted in Moscow, 1947, between E. Kardelj, Tito's chief advisor for
constitutional and ideological questions, and Stalin, when the former
explicitly stated that once the Yugoslav-Albanian community was
consolidated, Kosovo would be ceded to Albania.³ Owing to the
plans for a Balkan federation and fears that a revolution might break out in
Albania - that power may be seized by a faction inclined towards life in
union with Yugoslavia, the settlement of Albanian immigrants in Kosovo,
Metohia and western Macedonia was not stopped after relations were broken
off with the CPA, thus an additional 40,000 Albanians established permanent
residence there from 1948-1956.⁴
Tito abandoned the idea of a Balkan federation because Stalin objected
to it. The Information Bureau of the Cominform adopted a resolution in July,
1948, which marked a radical break with the Soviet Union and its satellites
and the commencement of Tito's independent course, tightly girdled by
pro-Soviet regimes. The centralization of power in Yugoslavia was
conditional on the threat of a Soviet invasion, thus support was sought
again among Serbian communist cadres. When the threat of a Soviet
intervention was waning, Tito set out on an extensive reconstruction of the
country's social and state organization, wherein the strengthening of
federal units (the autonomy of Kosovo and Metohia was enlarged under the
1963 Constitution) was vital in order for him to maintain power.
In order to comprehend Tito's political stands on a solution to the
ethnic questions in the Balkans and Yugoslavia, it is important to learn of
his basic ideological and national commitments. Shaped during the
Austro-Hungarian period, he viewed the Serbian issue with the typical bias
of the Austro-Hungarian press on the Greater Serbian threat, which was in
the interwar period supplemented by Croatia's view of the struggle against
Greater Serbian hegemony. As far as Tito was concerned, "Versailles
Yugoslavia was born in Corfu, London and Paris... the most typical country
of national oppression in Europe" in which the "Croats, Slovenes and
Montenegrins were subordinate, and the Macedonians, Albanians and others
enslaved and without any rights".⁵ He spoke of the prewar
authorities disparagingly, "A handful of petty hegemonic Greater Serbs,
headed by a king, ruled Yugoslavia for 22 years in their greed for wealth,
setting up a regime of gendarmes and prisons, a regime of social and
national enslavement".⁶ The federalization of Yugoslavia, in
which only Serbia had two provinces (Vojvodina and Kosovo and Metohia)
showed that the breaking up of Serbian territory was the ultimate objective
of Yugoslavia's communist leadership, inner Serbia (without the provinces)
was slightly bigger than the Serbia set up by Hitler's Germany after its
occupation of Yugoslavia. The CPY provided the state and ideological bases
for the creation of new nations (first the Montenegrin nation from an
ethnically pure Serbian population, the Macedonian nation - where some
200,000 Serbs in western and northern Macedonia were forcibly assimilated,
and the Moslem nation - on a religious basis - from a mainly Serbian
population, who declared themselves as Serbs in the first few censuses
conducted after the war), in order to lay the foundations for the
constitution of Kosovo and Metohia into another Albanian state in the
Balkans as the final decision to the constitutional decisions of
1974.⁷
Ideologically shaped as a supporter of the Comintern, Tito remained all
his life a victim to the stand that Yugoslavia could survive only if the
threat of the Greater Serbian hegemony in the new social and communist
system was decisively and forever dispelled. His fierce struggle with the
Chetniks, the defenders of the old regime who advocated a reorganization of
Yugoslavia wherein a large federal Serbian unit would be created, could only
further consolidate his commitments. The model of Austria-Hungary, which was
bound together by the Habsburg dynasty, and strong suspicions of the Serbs
as the disorderly factor in the Balkans, were transplanted in a new shape to
Yugoslavia, where the state was based on a communist regime. An observation
by a British historian, A. J. P. Taylor, on the occasion of Tito's death in
1980, that the "last Habsburg" had passed away, has proved far-sighted and
historiographically justified.
1 Ibid.
2 E. Hoxha, Titistt: Shnime historike, Tirane 1982, p. 260-261. In
the book Shminet mbi Kinen, Tiran 1981, Hoxha gave a different version of
Tito's reply: the Greater Serbian reaction could not comprehend a demand for
the annexation of Kosovo and other parts of Yugoslavia to Albania" (Zri i
popullit, 17. 05. 1981. The official interpreter of these talks Josip
Gjerdja claimed that there was talk of a Balkan federation, in which Greece
would be included in the event of the victory of the communist movement, but
said that the annexation of Kosovo to Albania was not discussed. (Danas,
March 3,1987)
3 V. Djuretic, Kosovo u Jugoslaviji, pp.; Further documentation in:
Kosovo. Past and Present. Belgrade 1989, passim.
4 Cf. P. Zivancevic, Emigranti. Naseljavanje Kosova i Metohije iz
Albanije, Beograd 1989, passim.
5 J. B. Tito, Nacionalno pitanje u svetlosti NOB, Zagreb 1945, p. 5.
6 J. B. Tito, Temelji demokratije novog tipa, Beograd 1948, p. 28.
7 S. K. Pavlowitch, The Improbable Survivor. Yugoslavia and its
Problems, London 1988, pp. 34-47. Cf. N. Beloff, Tito's Flawed Legacy,
London 1980; K. Cavoski, Tito - tehnologija vlasti, Beograd 1990.
Centralism in Yugoslavia and the role of the secret police in Kosovo
and Metohia
In the centralist stage of communist Yugoslavia (1945-1966), for
purposes of consolidating and maintaining power, the new regime implemented
a particular policy of internal repression which was stepped up after ties
with Moscow were broken in 1948. The structure of the CPY remained the same
as well as its policy in dealing with the ethnic question. The affirmation
of the Albanian minority group remained a major task of the party in Kosovo
and Metohia. A. Rankovic informed in 1949, that there were many
discrepancies and mistakes in the party's work, though he set out that
"ethnic Albanians in the Autonomous Region of Kosovo-Metohia, who had been
oppressed in the old Yugoslavia, have now been completely guaranteed a free
political and cultural life and development and an equal participation in
all the bodies of the popular authorities. After the liberation, they
acquired their first primary schools - 453 primary schools, 29 high schools
and 3 advanced schools. Studying from textbooks in their native tongue, some
64,000 ethnic Albanian children have so far received an education and about
106,000 ethnic Albanian adults in Kosovo and Metohia have learned to read
and write".¹
The international political threat, ideological disintegration within
the country and the infiltration of demolition teams stepped up the work of
the State Security Service (SSS), which supervised ideological orthodoxy
throughout the country, including Kosovo and Metohia. Fearing the enemies of
socialism, the secret police brutally settled accounts with ideological
adversaries among the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes alike. The large number of
Serbs who declared themselves for the 1948 Informburo Resolution (they
upheld Stalin's call to overthrow Tito's regime) were convicted to years in
prison in the island of Goli Otok (the Yugoslav GULAG), which serves to
prove that the SSS, headed by Aleksandar Rankovic, operated as an
ideological police and not a service that advanced from Serbian positions as
might be deduced by the number of Serbian cadres in it: until 1966, Serbs in
the state security comprised 58.3% of the cadres, 60.8% in the militia and
23.5% in the total population; Montenegrins made up 28.3% of the cadres in
the security service, 7.9% in the militia and 3.9% of the total population;
ethnic Albanians comprised 13.3% in the state security, 31.3% in the militia
and 64.9% in the total population.²Absolute loyalty to the
security service, Tito and the party leadership was never questioned, and
its chief Rankovic remained loyal to Tito even after his replacement in 1966
(contemporaries testified that Rankovic believed a mistake had been made and
that the great leader would realize this one day; he awaited rehabilitation
his entire life).
In Kosovo and Metohia and the neighboring areas, the secret police on
several occasions discovered that ethnic Albanian officials were making
contact with the leadership of communist Albania, but they were never
arrested or convicted because the party leadership believed this would repel
the small-in-number ethnic Albanian communists from the CPY. Thus, as
generally proposed by Rankovic, instead of being put to trial, they were
awarded ministerial posts in the Serbian or federal government: from these
posts contact with Albania was impossible and the precious ethnic Albanian
cadres remained intact. The SSS in Kosovo and Metohia persecuted remnants of
Ballist formations and infiltrated agents from Albania for years, not as
Albanians but dangerous ideological enemies who were working in team with
Enver Hoxha's Albania and the headquarters in Moscow. The armed resistance
of outlaws and their aides proved that large quantities of war material were
in private possession, thus an extensive operation for the collection of
these weapons was carried out in winter 1955/56. Both Serbs and ethnic
Albanians suffered equally, though larger quantities of weaponry were found
with the ethnic Albanians. The fact that the persecution was not carried out
on a national basis (the SSS did not implement it in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Croatia and Montenegro) is evident from numerous complaints lodged by
dignitaries of the Serbian Orthodox Church about the abuses of the secret
police. The SSS kept arresting and harassing Serbian monks and priests, and
with its knowledge a monumental Orthodox church was demolished in Djakovica
in 1950, in order that a monument to the partisans of Kosovo be erected in
its place.
Since the SSS operatives in Kosovo were recruited mainly from the ranks
of Serbs and Montenegrins, special care was taken to include a certain
number of ethnic Albanians in every operative unit, and wherever they were
in the minority, ethnic Albanian cadres were entrusted with the management
of these units. At the Prizren Trial (1956), agents of a spy demolition
team, linked with the emigrants and secret Albanian police (Sigurimi), were
forbidden from revealing the high-ranking ethnic Albanians from Kosovo and
Metohia who were involved in the organization of these teams, although
conclusive evidence had been unearthed.³
The freezing of ethnic strife in the centralist period was the effect
of the purely ideological character of the SSS as the system's defender.
Therefore, no large-scale demographic or political changes took place in
Kosovo and Metohia. The birth-rate remained high with both the Serbs and
ethnic Albanians. The ethnic Albanian milieu took advantage of the
20-year-long respite to entrust the leadership of its national movement, in
keeping with the new circumstances, to the ethnic Albanian communist
power-holders rather than to organizations of fascist inclination. It is
important to note that the character of the still backward ethnic Albanian
community essentially remained the same: its adjustment to communism was not
reflected in social stratification but in a new patron of their national
interests.
1 A. Rankovic, Izabrani govori i clanci, Beograd 1951, pp. 184-185.
2 Intervju, 04. 09. 1978. Cf. Kosovski cvor. Dresiti ili seci? Izvestaj
nezavisne komisije, Beograd 1990, pp. 18-19.
3 V. Djuretic, Der politisch-historische Hintergrund Der Tragœdie
der Serben aus Kosovo und Metohija in der periode nach dem Zweiten
Weltkrieg, in: Kosovska bitka 1389. godine i njene posledice, Beograd 1991,
pp. 413-433; Cf. Lj. Bulatovic, Prizrenski proces, Beograd 1988.
Kosovo and Metohia in the transition from the centralist to the federal
model
The inter-party squaring of accounts, which ended with the replacement
of A. Rankovic and his associates at the Fourth Plenum held in the Brioni
islands (1966), marked a fresh consolidation of Tito's personal power which
had been threatened by the omnipotent State Security Service. Tito purged
the SSS of cadres loyal to Rankovic and initiated the country's further
decentralization. By rousing national differences and strengthening the
federal authority of each republic, Tito reestablished his sacrosanct rule.
In those aspirations, ethnic Albanian communists from Kosovo emerged as
important allies, blazing the trail with their criticism of the abuses of
the secret police. The assembly of Kosmet reached the decision that owing to
the SSS's manipulation with the conclusive evidence against high-ranking
ethnic Albanian officials (the so called Djakovica Group, lead by Fadil
Hoxha and Xhavid Nimani, made up of communists from Kosovo and Albania which
in the postwar development lead the party's organization in Kosovo) all acts
pertaining to the Prizren Trial be destroyed; the proceedings were stopped,
and an emigrant from Albania was appointed chief of police in Kosovo.
In discussions on the constitutional changes, stress was laid on the
enlargement of the autonomy of Kosovo: the demands of the ethnic Albanian
communists ranged more or less openly from the demand for the status of
republic to the right to sovereignty and self-determination, including
secession. Kosovo was not granted the status of a separate federal unit
owing to the balance of forces in the party, but the Albanian minority was
granted extensive concessions: the name Metohia was removed from the name of
the province owing to its Serbo-Orthodox connotation, and the ethnic
Albanians were allowed to freely hoist their flag; the province's autonomy
was considerably enlarged under the 1968 and 1971 constitutional amendments,
while most of the federal funds for development went to Kosovo and
Metohia.¹
The new political course in Kosovo and Metohia emboldened the
nationalists and advocates of a unification with Albania. The fall of
Rankovic was interpreted as the defeat of the Greater Serbian forces within
the party. The demonstrations of the ethnic Albanian students in Pristina
and several other towns in late November, 1968, in which Greater Albanian
slogans were heard, were hushed up in public, though they heralded a more
aggressive stand of the ethnic Albanian movement in Kosovo and Metohia. Only
two high-ranking officials in the Serbian party, the writer Dobrica Cosic
and the historian Jovan Marjanovic, had the courage to warn of the
increasing ethnic Albanian nationalism. Cosic openly warned:
"We can no longer ignore the extent to which the conviction of the
strained relations between ethnic Albanians and Serbs has spread in Serbia,
the threat felt by the Serbs and Montenegrins, the pressures to move out,
the systematic removal of Serbs and Montenegrins from high positions, the
aspirations of experts to leave Kosovo, the unequal treatment in courts and
disregard for the law and bribery in the name of ethnic
affiliation".² Both critics of the situation in Kosovo were
severely reprehended by both Serbian and ethnic Albanian communists, and
they were replaced from their positions. This was the first case where, in
keeping with the new ethnic policy and the decentralization of the communist
party, Albanian nationalism and Greater Albanian claims were deliberately
neglected owing to continual pressure on Serbia, in keeping with the stands
of a necessary balance between the federal units in Yugoslavia. The new
concept of a decentralized state demanded a change in relations within the
party. Control could no longer be exerted over Serbia through a centralized
ideological police but out-voting and pressure within the party's Central
Committee. The role of Kosovo was of particular importance since, as a
militant ethnic group in the territory of Serbia, it could be effectively
used as a means of state and party pressure on Serbia. Precisely for these
reasons further changes in the state organization strove to transfer the
model of the federalization of Yugoslavia onto Serbia - thus the Serbian
party was federalized. The framework of relations, established in Serbia and
Yugoslavia under the 1968 and 1971 amendments, testifies to the need of the
highest priest of Yugoslav politics for the strongest and most consistent
political milieu in Yugoslavia - Serbia - to be controlled, by manipulating
the deep-rooted fears inherited from the Austro-Hungarian and inter-war
periods, and the young and violent ethnic Albanian movement from the
professed Greater Serbian threat. Threats of the professed Greater Serbian
danger were a suitable excuse for turning the official federal units of the
then centralized Yugoslavia into national and state feuds between the
communist power-wielders.
The ethnic Albanian population in Kosovo, demographically continually
increasing (from 1961-1971, it rose by 42% compared to the Serbian
population which increased by 0.7%, the Montenegrin population which dropped
by 16% and the ethnic Turkish one which fell by 53%) despite evident
advancement in terms of education and culture which lead to romantic pathos
and an uncritical approach in the interpretation of history and culture, was
still a backward peasant milieu where the local dignitaries were obeyed
without question. The national and political interests of the Albanian
minority coincided with the interests of the party for the first time. Their
alliance was particularly strengthened by an ideological threat imperilling
Tito, i.e. the new reform-oriented communist leadership in Serbia which
introduced certain western standards in the economy, endeavored to establish
control throughout the republic and to bring the cadre-ruled party down to
the masses. The new organization of political rule in the country was
conducive to the liberalization of the economy, thus decision-making was
gradually shifted from the party to the economy. The loss of financial and
economic power according to the Serbian model jeopardized the communist
party's power throughout Yugoslavia. A follower of the Marxist and Leninist
concept of a party, Tito saw his position shaken by the re-organized
inter-party relations, a danger perhaps greater than even the police
omnipotence during the period of centralist rule. By instigating constant
sources of instability - national tensions in Yugoslavia - Tito strove to
prove the unfeasibility of Serbia's new political course. Tito saw the
ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and Metohia and the nationalist leadership in
Croatia as dealing the hardest blows in the destruction of the new
ideological adversaries - the "liberals" in Serbia.
By instigating nationalist movements in the country, Tito strove to
create conditions in which he would again emerge as the supreme arbiter in
internal conflicts. His support to the Croatian leadership had as its goal
to create a counter-weight to the Serbian leadership. The long-term conflict
between the Serbs and the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo was used as additional
pressure on Serbia. Fearing Serbia's economic supremacy, a coalition was
created between the leaderships of Kosovo and Croatia, and the Croatian
press wrote about a secret emigration of ethnic Albanians to Turkey (from
1953-1956 the emigrants were mainly ethnic Turks while the number of ethnic
Albanians was negligible). By replacing the Serbian and Croatian leaderships
(for the sake of "symmetry") with men who owed their power solely to his
grace, Tito again became the indisputable master of the country. In the plan
to re-establish a protectorate over Serbia, the lifetime dictator decisively
upheld the ethnic Albanian communists in Kosovo and Metohia. Relations with
Albania (which was openly hostile towards Yugoslavia since 1948), were
normalized at the request of Yugoslavia in 1971. One-way cooperation between
Kosovo and Albania was established, which, due to the language barrier,
remained confined to the southern Serbian province. Some 240 university
professors and teachers from Albania, then the last hard-core Stalinist
ideological bastion, indundated the University in Pristina (founded in
1970), and scientific and educational institutions opened by the Yugoslav
state in order to speed up the cultural emancipation of the Albanian
minority. However, cooperation with Albania was used most for the purpose of
ideological indoctrination - among the professors from Albania were many
Albanian secret service agents, and textbooks imported from Tirana
propagated the "Greater Albania" idea, condemned "Titoistic revisionism",
instigating 19th-century national romanticism but only in the ideological
prism of Enver Hoxha's "Marxism-Leninism". A warning to the local leadership
by Hasan Kaleshi, a reputable Orientalist from Pristina, that leading
historians in Kosovo were "obviously falsifying history" and had a "directly
negative effect on young historians, the detrimental consequences of which
may not be apparent today, but will in the future become more and more
evident", was interpreted as "national treason".³
The confederal Constitution of 1974 legalized the transformation of
Kosovo's autonomy (initiated by the 1968 and 1971 constitutional amendments)
into virtually an independent state directly linked to the federation
without any ties with Serbia. Consequently, this rounded off Tito's vision
of national equality with careful supervision over Serbia and Serbs
throughout Yugoslavia. Turning Yugoslavia into a confederal country
according to Tito's model, whereby the republican borders had become a
framework for the creation of homogeneous national states, rendered the
Serbs a culturally isolated and politically unprotected minority group,
especially in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The loose community of six
republics and two provinces was held together only by Tito's authoritarian
rule.
The new leadership in inner Serbia, entirely dependent on Tito, watched
silently Kosovo's growing political independence. The atmosphere of neglect
and yielding to the environment's lowest instincts completely neutralized
economic trends in Serbia, while a small group of opposition-oriented
intellectuals in Belgrade, which, owing to its cosmopolitan nature, Tito
regarded as the "hotbed of hostility", tried to bring up taboos such as
political relations and national strife. Critical remarks on the draft
Constitution of 1974 arrived from Belgrade, particularly from the Faculty of
Law, indicating that such an order would reduce Serbia to a subordinate
position and be a source for fresh national conflicts. The critics of the
draft were severely reprimanded and then either discharged, convicted or
isolated. The ideologists of Titoism, Croatian and Slovenian communists,
carefully watched every move in science and culture, never failing to point
out any ideological deviations in Belgrade.⁴
Comprehensive and systematic Albanization in Kosovo and Metohia,
bolstered by the top, gained fresh impetus: the University in Pristina
enrolled an ever increasing number of students in order to produce cadres
capable of replacing Serbian officials in the administration, judiciary,
schools and science, while the federation's funds for the development of
Kosovo were increasing by geometric progression: since the early 70's, some
70% of all the federation's funds for underdeveloped regions were allocated
to Kosovo (most of the funds were provided by inner Serbia), attaining the
figure of around a million dollars a day in the early 80's. A vast part of
foreign credits were also targeted towards Kosovo. The hastily educated
cadres proved incapable and inexpert in managing the economy, while the
local political bureaucracy strove to redirect a large part of the
federation's money to finance megalomaniac projects that were to openly
display the ethnic Albanians' national domination in Kosovo and Metohia.
Demographic explosion - the highest birth rate in Europe (an average
6.9-member family) plus 30 students per 1,000 citizens, rendered all
financial measures insufficient. Kosovo remained a primarily peasant
environment where society was organized on the basis of tribal traditions,
strongly influenced by the Islamic concept of society. Chiefly agrarian,
with large families, the ethnic Albanian community craved land. The conflict
with the Serbs had social besides national causes: hunger for land for the
ever growing peasant population. Another feature of the Albanian milieu was
the large percentage of young people educated at faculties of the humanities
where they were directly indoctrinated with the national romantic rapture
orchestrated from Tirana. A large number of students and academic citizens,
most of them without a chance of finding a job, were, owing to the language
barrier, bound to Kosovo, and thus transposed their personal discontent into
national frustration. The low level of education among the intelligentsia in
Kosovo and Metohia had created a particular sort of semi-intellectuals
capable of taking in only a limited number of ideas, restricted by the
national horizon and ideological model of Albania, an extremely uncritical
provenance. The growing number of ethnic Albanian peasants acquired land by
persecuting Serbs with the authorities' blessing, and the disproportionate
number of semi-intellectuals saw themselves in the persecution of Serbs as
executors of the mission - national unification of all Albanians.
As a community relentless to itself (blood feuds were still above than
the law), ethnic Albanians attacked the Serbs with specific brutality. By
taking over all bodies of authority, the Albanian minority began their
planned suppression accompanied by various forms of psychological and
physical pressures. State coercion became hard to bear as the state had
become Albanian. Outvoting the Albanian language in official use, the
creation of typically state institutions, such as a national library and
academy of sciences, along with the judiciary, police and administration,
showed that a surrogate national state had been created in which the Serbs
felt as the persecuted ethnic minority without any protection from Serbia.
Tens of thousands of emigrants sought refuge in Serbia proper; even peasants
were forced to emigrate, selling off their lands to ethnic Albanians
(usually for next to nothing), while the authorities settled the abandoned
lands with many-membered emigrant families from Albania.
Serbian communists in whose hands was the fate of the republic made
feeble and pathetic attempts in the late 70's to improve within the
framework of the existing system the position of Serbs in Kosovo. The nature
of their rule, which emanated from the capricious benevolence of Tito, and
the limited personal traits of Serbia's leading communists, resulted in
their aspirations going no further than inter-party red-tape memorandums
(1977). Unable and unwilling to bring the convenient stagnation of Serbia
under their rule, the Serbian communists reduced their concern for their
fellow citizens in Kosovo and Metohia to sporadic disputes with ideological
like-minded person from other republics, believing that, being in the
minority in such discourses, incapacitated any further action.
1 M. Misovic, Ko je trazio republiku Kosovo, Beograd 1987, passim. 24
2 Ibid., pp. 120-121
3 Ibid, pp. 150-78-93.
4 R. Stojanovic, Jugoslavija, nacije i politika, Beograd 1988.
The epilogue of the communist solution to the ethnic question in
Yugoslavia: the example of Kosovo
Until Tito's death (1980), the varying balance of the nationality
contrasts in Kosovo and Metohia was maintained mainly owing to the
inviolability of his power. Fresh large-scale demonstrations a year after
Tito's death, when it was assessed that conditions for winning a republic
(which by the Leninist formula has the right to self-determination,
including secession), revealed the substance of the national movement in
Kosovo: the annexation of Kosovo to Albania: cheers for Enver Hoxha, the
return to the Marxism and Leninism of the Albanian type, the creation of the
"Socialist Republic of Kosovo". Dozens of secret ethnic Albanian
organizations for the liberation of Kosovo and its unification with Albania,
composed chiefly of students, were ideologically linked to the Stalinist
regime of Enver Hoxha.¹ The extent to which the ethnic Albanian
intelligentsia in Kosovo and Metohia owed its views about the world to
dogmatic Marxism imported from Tirana became apparent. It attained absurd
limits in the theory of "Albanianism" as the sole national religion (Enver
Hoxha forbade the work of all religious communities in 1966) which sought
its roots in the remote past - in the need to show that Albanians are of
Illyrian descent and thus the oldest and only "indigenous" people in the
Balkans - therefore natives, compared to the Slavs who were settlers and
intruders on Albanian soil. Thus a cabinet and scientific question on the
origin of the Albanians was reduced to a powerful means of national
homogenization ²
After bloody clashes between demonstrators and the police in the 1981
uprising, the Federal authorities condemned the entire movement using
typically communist vocabulary -, counter revolutionary The usual procedure
of replacing the leadership, making ideological purges and adopting new
programs produced no tangible results ³ The demonstrations
continued in waves, many young people suffered in clashes with the police,
but the balance of forces in Kosovo remained the same the emigration of
Serbs, of which the press wrote more freely did not stop, instead, it gained
fresh impetus, and delegations of Serbs in quest of protection paid frequent
visits to the federal parliament The party and state leaderships promised to
provide protection when the delegations lodged complaints of abuses,
physical persecution, usurpation of estates, language and national
discrimination before court, rape on a national basis and the desecration of
graves, but failed to undertake efficient steps
Discontent in Serbia and among Serbs elsewhere in Yugoslavia in creased
particularly after support was extended to the Kosovo leadership by the
Croatian, Slovenian and some Bosnian communists Tito s successors (the
collective presidency) were insignificant politicians loyal to the narrow
interests of their federal units Incapable of coping with the subtle
frisking of the national and Yugoslav, and surprised by the ethnic Albanian
uprising in Kosovo and Metohia, they failed to further conceal the essence
of the problem and undertake decisive steps in Kosovo fear from the re
emergence of Serbian nationalism and chauvinism , displayed through open
support offered to the ethnic Albanian national movement in Kosovo and
Metohia, revealed the main cause of the whole dispute the inequality of the
Serbian nation in the Yugoslav federation Despite official condemnations,
the support offered by the Slovenian, Croatian and Moslem part of the
Bosnian leadership to the Albanian minority in Kosovo could not be concealed
for long the skillfully concealed inequality of the Serbian people in
confederal Yugoslavia became an issue on which the state and ideological
foundations of Tito's Yugoslavia began to crumble As a reaction, the
national integration of Serbs, halted in 1918 and checked in 1945, rose
again in the mid-80's into a widespread national movement demanding that the
1974 Constitution be changed, as the people did not wish to reconcile to the
tacit support extended by the federal party bodies and republican
leaderships to the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo ⁴
The blockade of the system in Yugoslavia did not allow for the
intervention of the leadership of Serbia in the federation thus a subversion
was carried out within the Serbian communist party (1988), in which a
dogmatic trend assessed that by playing the card of wounded national pride
and obvious discrimination, it would win power and maintain it by changing
the 1974 Constitution The Kosovo frustration of Serbs, wisely
instrumentalized in conflicts of the local political oligarchy in Serbia,
soon became the legitimation of the new authorities lead by Slobodan
Milosevic The pressure on Serbia from all the federal and republican
institutions was so strong that the new leader was greeted as a savior a
mythical hero who would retrieve equality in Yugoslavia for the Serbs and
bring again Kosovo and Metohia, by hook or by crook, under the sovereignty
of Serbia The demonization of the new authorities in Serbia, accused of
"Bolshevism", "Great Serbianism", Stalinism and of having aspirations
towards hegemony in the media of all the other communist leader ships in
Yugoslavia, particularly in Croatia and Slovenia was so great and deafening
that it decisively affected the homogenization of the Serbian people around
the new power holders
The raising of the Serbian question in Yugoslavia had the entire
country seething, which soon proved to exceed ideological differences and
shades in the interpretation of Tito's way ', disputes between advocates of
socialism with a human face ' and adherents of the dogmatic line The
ideological screen suddenly collapsed, forbidden political subjects
inundated the press, reexaminations of the interpretations of contemporary
history began, justifications of the existing organization, showing that the
national question was being opened anew on which depended the survival of
the country's present political, ideological and state organization
Serbia found itself in a paradoxical situation, to have its national
interests saved by the communist party - the chief culprit of all its
troubles The process of the growth of the communist leadership into the
patron of the mother nation's national interests had been implemented under
Tito's rule since the late 60's by all the leaderships except the Serbian
one When, because of the conflicts in Kosovo and Metohia, this took place in
Serbia, processes instigated by the detante, Perestroika and Glasnost, which
heralded the advent of the post-communist epoch, were already under way in
Europe. What had not been possible during Tito's reign was being implemented
by Serbian communists seven years since his death: in the still communist
Southeastern and Eastern Europe, political wills and national aspirations
could only be expressed through the communist party. Communism emerged as a
protector of the national interests of the Serbs at a time when, ahead of
growing democratic processes in the entire international public, it must
have appeared anachronous. Thanks to the dangerous identification of the
people and leadership, Serbia, due to measures implemented by the communists
in their protection of the endangered national and human rights of Serbs and
the state territory in Kosovo and Metohia, was soon branded in the
international public opinion as a state of undemocratic and aggressive
communist repression.
The situation in Kosovo continued to deteriorate. Clashes between the
police and ethnic Albanian secessionists did not stop, while the province
institutions, from the police and judiciary, to finances and the economy,
were still controlled by the local ethnic Albanian bureaucracy which,
supported by the other Yugoslav national-communist lites (particularly
Slovenian and Croatian), resisted the demands of "inner Serbia". The
measures undertaken by the new Serbian authorities in Kosovo again proved to
be a neocommunist delusion on the possibility of an ideological partnership
to overcome the existing national conflicts, and that police and economic
measures can stop a strong national movement in which all ideological
differences began to disappear. The former Marxists and Leninists of Enver
Hoxha's type began to adapt to the new political trends in the Eastern and
Southeastern European countries which were paved by the Soviet Perestroika
and Glasnost, endeavoring to win the sympathies of the foreign public by
advocating reforms in socialism and presenting the nationalist conflict in
the light of a struggle for human rights. Every new ethnic Albanian
leadership, appointed with approval from Belgrade, proved unfit to curb and
disinclined to condemn the nationalist movement of its people. Subversions
in Serbia's northern Vojvodina province and in Montenegro, which returned to
its Serbian identity, were directly provoked by the Kosovo and Metohia
question, and the new balance of political forces in the party helped Serbia
retrieve its say in the matter concerning its provinces. The congruity of
these events nearing the 600th anniversary of the battle of Kosovo (1989),
the Serbs' main national holiday, consolidated the authority of the new
leadership in Serbia in which the people, unaccustomed to differences in
political opinion, gave priority to the saving of national territory. With
the disintegration of the Titoist order in Yugoslavia fresh uprisings broke
out in Kosovo and Metohia followed by bloody clashes with the police,
strikes and diversions which, after an attempt by the communist assembly in
Kosovo, in which ethnic
Albanians predominated, resulted in the abolition of the state of
Kosovo and the introduction of a state of emergency, after the proclamation
of the Albanian state of Kosovo in during 1990.
The failure of the Serbian communists in late eighties to comprehend
the extent of the international repercussions of the ethnic strife in
Yugoslavia, and pretentious in the worst Titoistic manner, incapacitated an
active communication of Serbia with the centers of political and economic
power in the world. Due to a negative view of "Serbia's Bolshevik
repression", the aggressive and Orientally brutal ethnic Albanian national
movement in Kosovo and Metohia was able to present its goals as an authentic
and pacific movement of an unusually numerous ethnic minority (it accounts
for 15-20% of Serbia's population) which is striving to realize its
legitimate human and social rights. However, open support extended to the
Democratic Alliance of Kosovo (a party which rallies ethnic Albanians in
Kosovo) by the new communist leader of Albania, Ramiz Aliu (both before and
after the first democratic elections in Albania), with considerable
participation by agents of the Albanian secret service Sigurimi in the
organization of strikes and armed conflicts (some 200-400 Albanian agents
were infiltrated into Yugoslavia in 1990 alone), clearly reveals that a
centuries-long ethnic, national and inter-state conflict cannot be justified
by ideological differences or a human rights struggle. The fact that the
ethnic Albanian question in Kosovo and Metohia is not in reality an issue of
ideological differences and human rights is evident from the stands of
Serbian opposition parties which are waging a bitter struggle with the
former communists and present socialists for the democratization of the
country. They are all willing to negotiate with the leadership of the ethnic
Albanian national movement about all controversial issues except the one on
which the ethnic Albanian side insists: the change of the state borders of
Serbia and Yugoslavia.⁵ The ethnic Albanians' refusal to take
part in the December 1990 multi-party elections and be registered in the
regular Yugoslav census (April 1991) shows the unwillingness of their
leadership to find a democratic solution.
1 S. Hasani, Kosovo. Istine i zablude, Zagreb 1985, p, 175
2 Cf Albanians and their territories Tirana 1985
3 Sta i kako dalje na Kosovu. Dalja drustveno politicka aktivnost SSRNJ
u realizaciji politicke platforme za akciju SKJ u razvoju socijalistickog
samoupravljana, bratstva i jedinstva i zajednistva na Kosovu Beograd 1985,
Cf documents on Serbian complaints in Noc oporih reci. Kompletan stenogram o
svemu sto se govorilo na zboru u Kosovu Polju u noci izmedju 24. i 25.
aprila 1987. Specijalno izdanje Borba, maj 1987.
4 K. Magnusson The Serbian Reaction Kosovo and Ethnic Mobilization
Among the Serbs Nordic Journal of Soviet & East European Studies vol. 4
3 (1987) pp. 3 30, A Dragnich, The Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia The Omen of
the Upsurge of Serbian Nationalism in East European Quarterly vol. XXIII No
2 (1989) pp. 183 198, Cf A. Jeftic, Od Kosova do Jadovna Beograd 1988; idem,
Stradanja Srba na Kosovu i Metohiji od 1941 do 1990, Pristina 1990; R
Stojanovic, Ziveti s genocidom, Hronika kosovskog bescasca, Beograd 1989; A
Djilas (ed.), Srpsko pitanje, Beograd 1991
5 Demokratija, 3. 08. 1990.
Continuity and discontinuity
Ethnic intolerance between the Albanians and Serbs, deepened by
centuries of confrontation, was expressed through religious intolerance
(Albanians as Moslems and Serbs as Christians in the Ottoman Empire),
acquiring at the turn of the 20th century vague contours of a national
conflict. Unequal degrees of national integration provoked additional
tensions in the old conflict: while the Serbs conceived the renewal of their
state in the 1804 national revolution, and gained independence in 1878
(Serbia and Montenegro), the Albanians were the last in Europe to begin an
organized national movement in 1878 through a small in number national
elite, but even then with deep social and religious differences which were
not surmounted, not even after the proclamation of the Albanian state in
1912, nor in the interwar period. The national integration of the Serbs,
though incomplete, stopped in 1918 with the creation of the Kingdom of
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, in which the majority of Serbs lived in one
state and conceded their national ideology to institutions of Yugoslav
character. Discontinuity in the development of the Serbian national
movement, deepened during the 1941-1945 war, turned under communist rule
into a 50-year-old vacuum whose effects on the protection of primary
national interests proved almost fatal. The Albanian national integration
had continuity, as opposed to the Serbian one. The young, aggressive and
expansive national movement, closed within itself, developed without a
standstill, regardless of whether it was lead by feudal lords, outlaws,
foreign patrons, Albanian or Yugoslav communists. In a society which
harmoniously accepted both in Albania and Yugoslavia the ideological monism
of xenophobic isolation which suited its internal tribal structure and a
certain intolerance that was racial as well as ethnic. After receiving
political asylum in France, the Albanian writer Ismail Kadare pithily
explained the nature of the internal resistance of the Albanian society to
all ideological challenges. "Communism has not really penetrated into the
depths of Albanian society. The Albanians are, as it were, racists: they
consider those who do not share their moral customs amoral, as the classic
Greeks considered other peoples Barbarians. This racism probably played a
role in the Albanian resistance to socialism."¹ From this
perspective, the depth of the conflict and the mutual misunderstanding of
Serbs and Albanians is shown in brighter light. However, it is important to
note that in this centuries-old conflict to which their seems no end, in the
second half of the 20th century Albanians in Kosovo and Metohia won crucial
support from Yugoslav communists to the detriment of Serbs.
1 Ismail Kadare Interview in Le Monde, 26. 10. 1990. 34
PART ONE: HISTORY AND IDEOLOGY

KOSOVO AND METOHIA
A HISTORICAL SURVEY
In the thousand year long-history of Serbs, Kosovo and Metohia were for
many centuries the state center and chief religious stronghold, the
heartland of their culture and springwell of its historical traditions. For
a people who lived longer under foreign rule than in their own state, Kosovo
and Metohia are the foundations on which national and state identity were
preserved in times of tribulation and founded in times of freedom .
The Serbian national ideology which emerged out of Kosovo's
tribulations and Kosovo's suffering (wherein the 1389 St. Vitus Day Battle
in Kosovo polje occupies the central place), are the pillars of that grand
edifice that constitutes the Serbian national pantheon. When it is said that
without Kosovo there can be no Serbia or Serbian nation, it's not only the
revived 19th century national romanticism: that implies more than just the
territory which is covered with telling monuments of its culture and
civilization, more than just a feeling of hard won national and state
independence: Kosovo and Metohia are considered the key to the identity of
the Serbs. It is no wonder, then, that the many turning-points in Serbian
history took place in the and around Kosovo and Metohia. When the Serbs on
other Balkan lands fought to preserve their religious freedoms and national
rights, their banners bore as their beacon the Kosovo idea embodied in the
Kosovo covenant which was woven into folk legend and upheld in uprisings
against alien domination. The Kosovo covenant - the choice of freedom in the
celestial empire instead of humiliation and slavery in the temporal world -
although irrational as a collective consciousness, is still the one
permanent connective tissue that imbues the Serbs with the feeling of
national entity and lends meaning to its join efforts.¹
1 Cf. D. Slijepcevic, Srpsko-arbanaski odnosi kroz vekove posebnim
osvrtom na novije vreme, (Himelstir 1983); D. Bogdanovic, Knjiga o Kosovu,
Beograd 1985; Zaduzbine Kosova, (Prizren-Beograd 1987); Kosovo i Metohija u
srpskoj istoriji, (Beograd 1989);German translation: Kosovo und Metochien in
der serbishen Geschichte, (Lausanne 1989); Kosovo. Proslost i sadasnjost,
Beograd 1989 English translation: Kosovo. Past and present, (Belgrade 1989).
R. Mihaljcic, The Battle of Kosovo in History and in Popular Tradition,
(Belgrade 1989).
The Age of Ascent
Kosovo and Metohia, land lying in the heart of the Balkans where viutal
trade routes had crossed since ancient times, was settled by Slav tribes
between the 7th and 10th centuries. The Serbian medieval state, which under
the Nemanjic dynasty (12th to 14th century) grew into a major power in the
Balkan peninsula, developed in the nearby mountain regions, in Raska (with
Bosnia) and in Duklja (later Zeta and then Montenegro). The center of the
Nemanjic slate moved to Kosovo and Metohia after the fall of Constantinople
(1204). At its peak, in the early the 14th century, these lands were the
richest and the most densely populated areas, as well as state and its
cultural and administrative centers.¹
In his wars with Byzantium, Stefan Nemanja conquered various parts of
what is today Kosovo, and his successors, Stefan the First Crown (became
king in 1217), expanded his state by including Prizren. The entire Kosovo
and Metohia region became a permanent part of the Serbian state by the
beginning of the 13th century. Soon after becoming autocephalous (1219), the
Serbian Orthodox Church moved its seat to Metohia. The heirs of the first
archbishop Saint Sava (prince Rastko Nemanjic) built several additional
temples around the Church of the Holy Apostles, lying the ground for what
was to become the Patriarchate of Pec. The founding of a separate
bishophoric (1220) near Pec was indicative of the region's political
importance growing along with religious influence. With the proclamation of
the empire, the patriarchal throne was permanently established at the Pec
monastery in 1346. Serbia's rulers alotted the fertile valleys between Pec,
Prizren, Mitrovica and Pristina and nearby areas to churches and
monasteries, and the whole region eventually acquired the name Metohia, from
the Greek metoch which mean an estate owned by the church.
Studded with more churches and monasteries than any other Serbian land,
Kosovo and Metohia became the spiritual nucleus of Serbs. Lying at the
crossroads of the main Balkan routes connecting the surrounding Serbian
lands of Raska, Bosnia, Zeta and the Scutari littoral with the Macedonia and
the Morava region, Kosovo and Metohia were, geographically speaking, the
ideal place for a state and cultural center. Girfled by mountain gorges and
comparatively safe from outside attacks, Kosovo and Metohia were not chosen
by chance as the site for building religious centers, church mausoleums and
palaces. The rich holdings of Decant monastery provided and economic
underpinning for the wealth of spiritual activities in the area. Learned
monks and religious dignitaries assembled in large monastic communities
(which were well provided for by the rich feudal holdings), strongly
influenced the spiritual shaping of the nation, especially in strengthening
local cults and fostering the Orthodox doctrine.
In the monasteries of Metohia and Kosovo, old theological and literary
writings were transcribed and new ones penned, including the lives of local
saints, from ordinary monks and priors to the archbishops and rulers of the
house of Nemanjic. The libraries and scriptoria were stocked with the best
liturgical and theoretical writings from all over Byzantine commonwealth,
especially with various codes from the monasteries of Mounth Athos with
which close ties were established. The architecture of the churches and
monasteries developed and the artistic value of their frescoes increased as
Serbian medieval culture flourished, and by the end of the 13th century new
ideas applied in architecture and in the technique of fresco painting
surpassed the traditional Byzantine models. With time, especially in
centuries to come, the people came to believe that Kosovo was the center of
Serbian Orthodoxy and the most resistant stronghold of the Serbian
nation.²
The most important buildings to be endowed by the last Nemanjices were
erected in Kosovo and Metohia, where their courts which became their
capitals were situated. From King Milutin to emperor Uros, court life
evolved in the royal residences in southern Kosovo and Prizren. There rulers
summoned the landed gentry, received foreign legates and issued charters.
The court of Svrcin stood on the banks of Lake Sazlia, and it was there that
Stefan Dusan was crowned king in 1331. On the opposite side was the palace
in Pauni, where King Milutin often dwelled. The court in Nerodimlje was the
favourite residence of King Stefan Decanski, and it was at the palace in
Stimlje that emperor Uros issued his charters. Oral tradition, especially
epic poems, usually mention Prizren as emperor Dusan's capital, for he
frequently sojourned there when he was still king.³
Among dozens of churches and monasteries erected in medieval Kosovo and
Metohia by rulers, ecclesiastical dignitaries and the local nobility, Decani
outside of Pec, built by Stefan Uros III Decanski, stands out for its
monumental size and artistic beauty. King Milutin left behind the largest
number of endowments in Kosovo, one of the finest of which is Gracanica
monastery (1321) near Pristina, certainly the most beautiful medieval
monument in the Balkans. The monasteries of Banjska dear Zvecan (early 14th
century) and Our Lady of Ljeviska in Prizren (1307), although devastated
during Ottoman rule, are eloquent examples of the wealth and power of the
Serbian state at the start of the 14th century. Also of artistic importance
is the complex of churches in Juxtaposition to the Patriarchate of Pec. The
biggest of the royal endowments, the Church of the Holy Archangels near
Prizren, erected by Tsar Stefan Dusan in the Bistrica River Canyon, was
destroyed in the 16th century.⁴
Founding chapter whereby Serbian rulers granted large estates to
monasteries offer a reliable demographic picture of the area. Fertile plains
were largely owned by the large monasteries, from Chilandar in Mount Athos
to Decant in Metohia. The data given in the charters show that during the
period of the political rise of Serbian state, the population gradually
moved from the mountain plateau in the west and north southward to the
fertile valleys of Metohia and Kosovo. The census of monastic estates evince
both a rise in the population and appreciable economic progress. The estates
of the Banjska monastery numbered 83 villages, and those of the Holy
Archangels numbered 77.⁵
Especially noteworthy is the 1330 Decani Charter, with its detailed
list of households and of chartered villages. The Decant estate was an
extensive area which encompassed parts of what is today northwestern
Albania. Historical analysis and onomastic research reveal that only three
of the 89 settlements were mentioned as being Albanian. Out of the 2,166
farming homesteads and 2,666 houses in cattle-grazing land, 44 were
registrated as Albanian (1,8%). More recent research indicates that apart
from the Slav, i.e. Serbian population in Kosovo and Metohia, the remaining
population of non-Slav origin did not account for more than 2% of the total
population in the 14th century.⁶
The growing political power, territorial expansion and economic wealth
of the Serbian state had a major impact on ethnic processes. Northern
Albania up to the Mati River was a part of the Serbian Kingdom, but it was
not until the conquest of Tsar Dusan that the entire Albania (with the
exception of Durazzo) entered the Serbian Empire. Fourteenth century records
mention mobile Albanian mobile cattle sheds on mountain slopes in the
imminent vicinity of Metohia, and sources in the first half of the 15th
century note their presence (albeit in smaller number) in the flatland
farming settlements.
Stefan Dusan's Empire stretched from the Danube to the Peloponnese and
from Bulgaria to the Albanian littoral. After his death it began to
disintegrate into areas controlled by powerful regional lords. Kosovo and
parts of Metohia came under the rule of King Vukasin Mrnjavcevic, the
co-ruler of the last Nemanjic, Tsar Uros. The earliest clashes with the
Turks, who edged their way into Europe at the start of the 14th century,
were noted during the reign of Stefan Dusan. The 1371 battle of the Marica,
near Crnomen in which Turkish troops rode rougshod over the huge army of the
Mrnjavcevic brothers, the feudal lords of Macedonia, Kosovo and neighboring
regions, heralded the decisive Turkish invasion of Serbian lands. King
Vukasin's successor King Marko (the legendary hero of folk poems, Kralyevich
Marko) recognized the supreme authority of the sultan and as vasal took part
in his campaigns against neighboring Christian states. The Turkish onslaught
is remembered as the apocalypse of the Serbian people, and this tradition
was cherished during the long period of Ottoman rule. During the Battle of
the Marica, a monk wrote that "the worst of all times" had come, when "the
living envied the dead".⁷
Unaware of the danger that were looming over their lands, the regional
lords tried to take advantage of the new situation and enlarge their
holdings. On the eve of the battle of Kosovo, the northern parts of Kosovo
where in possession of Prince Lazar Hrebeljanovic, and parts of Metohia
belonged to his brother-in-law Vuk Brankovic. By quelling the resistance of
the local landed gentry, Prince Lazar eventually emerged as the most
powerful regional lord and came to dominate the lands of Moravian Serbia.
Tvrtko I Kotromanic, King of Bosnia, Prince Lazar's closest ally, aspired to
the political legacy of the saintly dynasty as descendant of the Nemanjices
and by being crowned with the "dual crown" of Bosnia and Serbia over St.
Sava grave in monastery Mileseva.⁸
The expected clash with the Turks took place in Kosovo polje, outside
of Pristina, on St. Vitus day, June 15 (28), 1389. The troops of Prince
Lazar, Vuk Brankovic and King Tvrtko I, confronted the army of Emir Murad I,
which included his Christian vassals. Both Prince Lazar and emir Murad were
killed in the head-on collision between the two armies (approximately 30,000
troops on both sides). Contemporaries were especially impressed by the
tidings that twelve Serbian knights (most probably led by legendary hero
Milos Obilic) broke through the tight Turkish ranks and killed the emir in
his tent.⁹
Military-wise no real victor emerged from the battle. Tvrtko's
emissaries told the courts of Europe that the Christian army had defeated
the infidels, although Prince Lazar's successors, exhausted by their heavy
losses, immediately sought peace and conceded to became vassals to the new
sultan. Vuk Brankovic, unjustly remembered in epic tradition as a traitor
who slipped away from the battle field, resisted them until 1392, when he
was forced to become their vassal. The Turks took Brankovic's lands and gave
them to a more loyal vassal, Prince Stefan Lazarevic, son of Prince Lazar
thereby creating a rift between their heirs. After the battle of Angora in
1402, Prince Stefan took advantage of the chaos in the Ottoman state. In
Constantinople he received the title of despot, and upon returning home,
having defeated Brankovic's relatives he took control over the lands of his
father. Despite frequent internal conflicts and his vassal obligations to
the Turks and Hungarians, despot Stefan revived and economically
consolidated the Serbian state, the center of which was gradually moving
northward. Under his rule Novo Brdo in Kosovo became the economic center of
Serbia where in he issued a Law of Mines in 1412.¹⁰
Stefan appointed as his successor his nephew despot Djuradj Brankovic,
whose rule was marked by fresh conflicts and finally the fall of Kosovo and
Metohia to the Turks. The campaign of the Christian army led by Hungarian
nobleman Janos Hunyadi ended in 1448 in heavy defeat in a clash with Murad
II's forces, again in Kosovo Polje. This was the last concertive attempt in
the Middle Ages to rout the Turks out of this part of Europe.¹¹
After the Fall of Constantinople (1453), Mehmed II the Conqueror
advanced onto Despotate of Serbia. For some time voivode Nikola Skobaljic
offered valiant resistance in Kosovo, but after a series of consecutive
campaigns and lengthy sieges in 1455, the economic center of Serbia, Novo
Brdo fell. The Turks then proceeded to conquer other towns in Kosovo and
Metohia four years before the entire Serbian Despotate collapsed with the
fall of new capital Smederevo. Turkish onslaught, marked by frequent
military raids, the plunder and devastation of entire regions, the
destruction of monasteries and churches, gradually narrowed down Serbian
state territories, triggering off a large-scale migration northwards, to
regions beyond reach to the conquerors. The biggest migration took place
from 1480-1481, when a large part of the population of northern Serbia moved
to Hungary and Transylvania, to bordering region along the Sava and Danube
rivers, where the descendants of the fleeing despots of Smederevo resisted
the Turks for several decades to come.¹²
1 For a more complete picture of Kosovo and Metohia's medieval past
see: D. Kojic-Kovacevic, Kosovo od sredine XII do sredine XV veka, in:
Kosovo nekad i sad (Kosova dikur e sot), (Beograd 1973), pp. 109-128; S.
Cirkovic, Kosovo i Metohija u srednjem veku, in: Kosovo i Metohija u srpskoj
istoriji, pp. 21-45 (with earlier bibliography)
2 R. Samardzic, Kosovo i Metohija: uspon i propadanje srpskog naroda,
in: Kosovo i Metohija u srpskoj istoriji, pp. 6-10; D. Bogdanovic, Rukopisno
nasledje Kosova in: Zbornik okruglog stola o naucnom istrazivanju Kosova,
Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, Naucni skupovi, vol. XLII, Belgrade
1988, pp. 73-80. For more details see: Istorija srpskog naroda, vol. I
(Belgrade 1981).
3 S. Cirkovic, Vladarski dvorci oko jezera na Kosovu, in: Zbornik
Matice srpske za likovne umetnosti, 20 (1984), pp. 72-77.
4 V. S. Jovanovic, Arheoloska istrazivanja srednjovekovnih spomenika i
nalazista na Kosovu, in: Zbomik okruglog stola o naucnom istrazivanju
Kosova, pp. 17-66.
5 D. Bogdanovic, Knjiga o Kosovu, pp. 34-39; Zaduzbine Kosova, pp.
313-358.
6 D. Bogdanovic, Knjiga o Kosovu, pp. 39-41; S. Cirkovic, Kosovo i
Metohija u srednjem veku, pp. 34-36. More details in: B. Ferjancic, Les
Albanais dans les sources byzantines, in: Iliri i Albanci, Serbian Academy
of Sciences and Arts, Naucni skupovi vol. XXXDC (Belgrade 1988), pp.
303-322; S. Cirkovic, Les Albanais la lumiere des sources historiques des
Slaves du Sud, ill: Iliri i Albanci, pp. 341-359.
7 D. Bogdanovic, Knjiga o Kosovu, pp. 75. More details in: R.
Mihaljcic, Kraj Srpskog Carstva, Boj na Kosovu II, (Belgrade 1989).
8 S. Cirkovic, Istorija srednjovekovne bosanske drzave, (Beograd 1964),
pp. 133-140.
9 S. Cirkovic, Kosovo i Metohija u srednjem veku, pp. 39-41.
10 M. Purkovic, Knez i despot Stefan Lazarevic, (Beograd 1978).
11 Ibid. More details: R. Mihaljcic, Lazar Hrebeljanovic. Istorija,
kult, predanje, Boj na Kosovu II, (Belgrade 1989).
12 Istorija srpskog naroda, vol. II (Beograd 1982), pp. 260-265; D.
Bogdanovic, op. cit. p. 72.

The Age of Tribulation
For the Serbs as Christians, their loss of state independence and fall
to the Ottoman Empire's kind of theocratic state, was a terrible misfortune.
With the advent of the Turks and establishment of their rule, the lands of
Serbs were forcibly excluded from the circle of progressive European states
wherein they occupied a prominent place precisely owing to the Byzantine
civilisation, which was enhanced by local qualities and strong influences of
the neighboring Mediterranean states. Being Christians, the Serbs became
second-class citizens in Islamic state. Apart from religious discrimination,
which was evident in all spheres of everyday life, this status of rayah also
implied social dependence, as most of the Serbs were landless peasants who
paid the prescribed feudal taxes. Of the many dues paid in money, labor and
kind, the hardest for the Serbs was having their children taken as tribute
under a law that had the healthy boys, taken from their parents, converted
to Islam and trained to serve in the janissary corps of the Turkish army.
An analyse of the earliest Turkish censuses, defters, shows that the
ethnic picture of Kosovo and Metohia did not alter much during the 14th and
15th centuries. The small-in-number Turkish population consisted largely of
people from the administration and military that were essential in
maintaining order, whereas Christians continued to predominate in the rural
areas. Kosovo and parts of Metohia were registrated in 1455 under the name
Vilayeti Vlk, after Vuk Brankovic who once ruled over them. Some 75,000
inhabitants lived in 590 registrated villages. An onomastic analysis of
approximately 8,500 personal names shows that Slav and Christian names were
heavily predominant.¹
Along with the Decani Charter, the register of the Brankovic region
shows a clear division between old-Serbian and old-ethnic Albanian
onomastics, allowing one to say, with some certainty which registrated
settlement was Serbian, and which ethnically mixed. Ethnic designations
(ethnic Albanian, Bulgarian, Armenian, Greek) appeared repeatedly next to
the names of settlers in the region. More thorough onomastic research has
shown that from the mid-14th to the 15th centuries, individual Albanian
settlements appeared on the fringes of Metohia, in-between what had until
then been a density of Serbian villages. This was probably due to the
devastation wrought by Turks who destroyed the old landed estates, thus
allowing for the mobile among the population, including ethnic Albanian
cattlemen, to settle on the abandoned land and establish their settlements,
which were neither big nor heavily populated.²
A summary census of the houses and religious affiliations of
inhabitants in the Vucitrn district (sanjak), which encompassed the one-time
Brankovic lands, was drawn in 1487, showed that the ethnic situation had not
altered much. Christian households predominated (totalling 16,729, out of
which 412 were in Pristina and Vucitrn): there were 117 Muslim households
(94 in Pristina and 83 in rural areas). A comprehensive census of the
Scutari district offers the following picture: in Pec (Ipek) there were 33
Muslim and 121 Christian households, while in Suho Grlo, also in Metohia,
Christians alone lived in 131 households. The number of Christians (6,124)
versus Muslim (55) homes in the rural areas shows that 1% of the entire
population bowed to the faith of the conqueror. An analysis of the names
shows that those of Slav origin predominated among the Christians. In Pec,
68% of the population bore Slav names, in the Suho Grlo region 52%, in Donja
Klina region 50% and around monastery of Decani 64%.
Ethnic Albanian settlements where people had characteristic names did
not appear until one reached areas outside the borders of what is today
Metohia, i.e. west of Djakovica. According to Turkish sources, in the period
from 1520 to 1535 only 700 of the total number of 19,614 households in the
Vucitrn district were Muslim (about 3,5%), and 359 (2%)in Prizren district.
In regions extending beyond the geographic borders of Kosovo and
Metohia, in the Scutari and Dukagjin districts, Muslims accounted for 4,6%
of the population. According to an analysis of the names in the Dukagjin
district's census, ethnic Albanian settlements did not predominate until one
reached regions south of Djakovica, and the ethnic picture in the 16th
century in Prizren and the neighboring areas remained basically
unchanged.³
A look at the religious affiliation of the urban population shows a
rise in the Turkish and local Islamized population. In Prizren, Kosovo's
biggest city, Muslims accounted for 56% of the households, of which the
Islamized population accounted for 21%. The ratio was similar in Pristina,
where out of the 54% Muslim population 16% were converts. Pec also had a
Muslim majority (90%), as did Vucitrn (72%). The Christians compromised the
majority of the population in the mining centers of Novo Brdo (62%), Trepca
(77%), Donja Trepca and Belasica (85%). Among the Christians was a
smattering of Catholics. The Christian names were largely from the calendar,
and to a lesser extent Slav (Voja, Dabiziv, Cvetko, Mladen, Stojko), and
there were some that were typically ethnic Albanian (Prend, Don, Din,
Zoti).⁴
After the fall of Serbia in 1459, the Pec Patriarchate soon ceased to
work and the Serbian eparchies came under the jurisdiction of the Hellenic
Ochrid Archbishophoric. In the first decade following Turkish conquest, many
large endowments and wealthier churches were pillaged and destroyed, while
some turned into mosques. The Our Lady of Ljeviska Cathedral in Prizren was
probably converted into a mosque right immediately following the conquest of
the town; Banjska, one of the grandest monasteries dating from the age of
King Milutin, suffered the same fate. The Church of the Holy Archangels near
Prizren, Stefan Dusan's chief endowment was turned into ruins. Most of the
monasteries and churches were left unrenewed after being devastated, and
many village churches were abandoned. Many were not restored until after the
liberation of Kosovo and Metohia in 1912. Archeological findings have shown
that some 1,300 monasteries, churches and other monuments existed in the
Kosovo and Metohia area. The magnitude of the havoc wrought can be seen from
the earliest Turkish censuses: In the 15th and 16th centuries there were ten
to fourteen active places of Christian worship. At first the great
monasteries like Decani and Gracanica, were exempt from destruction, but
their wealthy estates were reduced to a handfull of surrounding villages.
The privileges granted the monastic brotherhoods by the sultans obliged them
to perform the service of falconry as well.⁵
The restoration of the Pec Patriarchate in 1557 (thanks to Mehmed-pasha
Sokolovic, a Serb by origin, at the time the third vizier at the Porte)
marked a major turn and helped revive the spiritual life of the Serbs,
especially in Kosovo and Metohia. Mehmed-pasha Sokolovic (Turkish:
Sokollu) enthroned his relative Makarije Sokolovic on the patriarchal
throne. Like the great reform movements in 16th century Europe, the
restoration of the Serbian Orthodox Church meant the rediscovery of lost
spiritual strongholds. Thanks to the Patriarchate, Kosovo and Metohia were
for the next two centuries again the spiritual and political center of the
Serbs. On an area vaster than the Nemanjic empire, high-ranking
ecclesiastical dignitaries revived old and created new eparchies endeavoring
to reinforce the Orthodox faith which had been undermined by influences
alien (particularly by Islamic Bekteshi order of dervishes) to its authentic
teachings.
Based on the tradition of the medieval Serbian state, the Pec
Patriarchate revived old and established new cults of the holy rulers,
archbishops, martyrs and warriors, lending life to the Nemanjic heritage.
The feeling of religious and ethnic solidarity was enhanced by joint
deliberation at church assemblies attended by the higher and lower clergy,
village chiefs and hajduk leaders, and by stepping up a morale on the
traditions of Saint Sava but suited to the new conditions and strong
patriarchal customs renewed after the Turkish conquest in the village
communities.
The spiritual rebirth was reflected in the restoration of deserted
churches and monasteries: some twenty new churches were built in Kosovo and
Metohia alone, inclusive of printing houses (the most important one was at
Gracanica): many old and abandoned churches were redecorated with
frescoes.⁶
Serbian patriarchs and bishops gradually took over the role of the
one-time rulers, endeavoring with assistance from the neighboring Christian
states of Habsburg Empire and the Venetian Republic, to incite the people to
rebel. Plans for overthrowing the Turks and re-establishing an independent
Serbian state sprang throughout the lands from the Adriatic to the Danube.
The patriarchs of Pec, often learned men and able politicians, were usually
the ones who initiated and coordinated efforts at launching popular
uprisings when the right moment came. Patriarch Jovan failed to instigate a
major rebellion against the Turks, seeking the alliance of the European
Christian powers assembled around Pope Clement VII. Patriarch Jovan was
assassinated in Constantinople in 1614. Patriarch Gavrilo Rajic lived the
same fate in 1659 after going to Russia to seek help in instigating a
revolt.
The least auspicious conditions for an uprising were actually in Kosovo
and Metohia itself. In the fertile plains, the non-Muslim masses labored
under the yoke of the local Turkish administrators, continually threatened
by marauding tribes from the Albanian highlands. The crisis that overcome
the Ottoman Empire in the late 16th century further aggrovated the position
of the Serbs in Kosovo, Metohia and neighboring regions. Rebellions fomented
by cattle-raising tribes in Albania and Montenegro, and the punitive
expeditions sent to deal with them turned Kosovo and Metohia into a bloody
terrain where Albanian tribes, kept clashing with detachments of the local
authorities, plundered Christian villages along the way. Hardened by
constant clashes with the Turks, Montenegro gradually picked up the torch of
defending Serbian Orthodoxy; meanwhile, in northern Albania, particularly in
Malesia, a reverse process was under way. Under steady pressure from the
Turkish authorities, the Islamization of ethnic Albanian tribes became more
widespread and the process assumed broader proportions when antagonistic
strivings grew within the Ottoman Empire in the late 17th and early 18th
century.⁷
It is not until the end of the 17th century that the colonization of
Albanian tribes in Kosovo and Metohia can be established. Reports by
contemporary Catholic visitators show that the ethnic border between the
Serbs and Albanians still followed the old dividing lines of the Black and
White Drim rivers. All reports on Kosovo and Metohia regard them as being in
Serbia: for the Catholic visitators, Prizren was still its capital city. In
Albania, the first wave of Islamization swept the feudal strata and urban
population. Special tax and political alleviations encouraged the rural
population to convert to Islam in larger number. Instead of being part of
the oppressed non-Muslim masses, the converts became a privileged class of
Ottoman society, with free access to the highest positions in the state. In
Kosovo and Metohia, where they moved to avoid heavy taxes, Catholic tribes
of Malesia converted to Islam. Conversion to Islam in a strongly Orthodox
environment rendered them the desired privileges (the property of Orthodox
and of the Catholics) and saved them from melting with Serbian Orthodox
population. It was only with the process of Islamization that the ethnic
Albanian colonisation of lands inhabited by Serbs became
expansive.⁸
The ethnic picture of Kosovo did not radically change in the first
centuries of Ottoman rule. Islamization encompassed part of a Serbian
population, although the first generations at least, converted as a mere
formality, to avoid heavy financial burdens and constant political pressure.
Conversion constituted the basis of Ottoman policy in the Balkans but it was
les successfull in Kosovo and Metohia, regions with the strongest religious
traditions, than in other Christian areas. The Turks' strong reaction to
rebellions throughout the Serbian lands and to the revival of Orthodoxy,
embodied in the cult of Saint Sava, the founder of the independent Serbian
church, ended in setting fire to the Mileseva monastery the burial place of
the first Serbian saint. The Turks burned his wonder working relics in
Belgrade in 1594, during a great uprising of Serbs in southern Banat. This
triggered off fresh waves of Islamization accompanied by severe reprisals
and the thwarting of any sign of rebellion.
Apart from Islamization, Kosovo and Metohia became the target of
proselytizing Catholic missionaries at the end of 17th century, especially
after the creation of the Sacra Congregazione de Propaganda Fide (1622). The
ultimate aim of the Roman Catholic propaganda was to converts the Orthodox
to Graeco-Catholicism as the initial phase in completely converting them to
the Catholic faith. The appeals of patriarchs of Pec to the Roman popes to
help the liberatory aspirations of the Serbs were met with the condition
that they renounce the Orthodox faith. In spreading the Catholicism, the
missionaries of the Roman Curia had the support of local Turkish
authorities; a considerable number of the missionaries were of Albanian
origin. Consequently, the propagators of Catholic proselytism persisted in
inciting Catholic and Muslim Albanians against the Serbs, whose loyalty to
Orthodoxy and their medieval traditions was the main obstacle to the
spreading of the Catholic faith in the central and southern regions of the
Balkans.⁹
Catholic propaganda attempts at separating the high clergy of the
Serbian Orthodox Church from the people prompted the Pec Patriarchate to
revive old and create a new cults with even greater vigor. In 1642 Patriarch
Pajsije, who was born in Janjevo, Kosovo, wrote The Service and The Life of
the last Nemanjic, the Holy Tsar Uros, imbuing old literary forms with new
content reflecting the contemporary moment. By introducing popular legends
(which gradually took shape),into classical hagiography Patriarch Pajsije
strove to establish a new cult of saints which would have a beneficial
impact on his compatriots in preserving their faith.
Parallel with the Orthodox Church national policy in traditionally
patriarchal societies, popular tales gradually matured into oral epic
chronicles. Nurtured through epic poetry, which was sung to the
accompaniment of the gusle, epic tales glorified national heroes and ruler,
cultivating the spirit of non-subjugation and cherishing the hope in
liberation from the Turkish yoke. Folk poems about the battle of Kosovo and
its heroes, about the tragic fate of the last Nemanjices, the heroism of
Prince Lazar and his knight Milos Obilic, and, especially, about Kraljevic
Marko (King Marko Mrnjavcevic) as the faultless and dauntless legendary
knight who was always defeating Turks and saving Serbs, were an expression
not only of the tragic sense of life in which Turkish rule was a synonymous
to evil, but a particular moral code that in time crystalized into a common
attitude towards life, defined in the first centuries of Ottoman rule. The
Serbian nation's Kosovo covenant is embodied in the choice which, according
to legend, was made by Prince Lazar on the eve of the battle of Kosovo. The
choice of freedom in the kingdom of heaven instead of humiliation in the
kingdom of earth constituted the Serbian nation's spiritual stronghold.
Prince Lazar's refusal to resign to injustice and slavery, raised to the
level of biblical drama, determined his unquenchable thirst for freedom.
Together with the cult of Saint Sava, which grew into a common
civilisational framework in everyday life, the Kosovo idea which, in time,
gained universal meaning. With its wise policy the Patriarchate of Pec
carefully built epic legend into the hagiography of old and new Serbian
saints, glorifying their works in frescoes and icons.¹⁰
1 O. Zirojevic, Prvi vekovi tudjinske vlasti, in: Kosovo i Metohija u
srpskoj istoriji, pp. 47-113 (with earlier bibliography).
2 Ibid
3 M. Pesikan, Zetsko-raska imena na pocetku turskog doba, II, in:
Onomatoloski prilozi, vol. IV (1983), pp. 218-243; 0. Zirojevic;, op. cit.,
pp. 90-92.
4. O. Zirojevic, op. cit., pp. 92-94.
5 Ibid, pp. 94-96.
6 R. Samardzic, Mehmed-pasa Sokolovic, (Beograd 1975); Idem, Ideje za
srpsku istoriju, (Beograd 1989), pp. 125-128; Dj. Slijepcevic, Istorija
Srpske pravoslavne crkve, I, Dusseldorf 1878, pp. 328-321.
7 R. Trickovic, U susret najtezim iskusenjima, in: Kosovo i Metohija u
srpskoj istoriji, pp. 119-126.
8 J. Radonic, Rimska kurija i juznoslovenske zemlje od XVI do XIX veka,
(Beograd 1950)
9 J. Radonic, op. cit., pp., 8-11; Further documentation in: M. Jacov,
Spisi Tajnog vatikanskog arhiva XVI-XL veka, (Beograd 1983)
10 R. Samardzic, Usmena narodna hronika (Novi Sad 1978).
The Age of Migrations
The Serbs stepped again onto the historical scene in the years of the
European wars that swept the continent from the forests of Ireland to the
walls of Constantinople in the late 17th century. The Turks finally withdrew
from Hungary and Transylvania when their Ottoman hordes were routed outside
Vienna in 1683. The disintegration of Ottoman rule in the southwest limbered
up the Serbs, arousing in them hope that the moment was ripe for joint
effort to break Turkish dominion in the Balkans. The neighboring Christian
powers (Austria and Venice) were the only possible allies. The arrival of
the Austrian army in Serbia after the fall of Belgrade in 1688 prompted the
Serbs to join it. Thanks to the support of Serbian insurgents, the imperial
troops penetrated deep into Serbia and in 1689 conquered Nis: a special
Serbian militia was formed as a separate corps of the imperial
troops.¹
After setting fire to Skoplje (Uskub), which was raging with plague,
the commander of Austrian troops Ennea Silviae Piccolomini withdrew to
Prizren where he was greeted by 20,000 Serbian insurgents, and with whom he
reached an accord on fighting the Turks with joint forces. Shortly
afterwards, Piccollomini died of the plague, and his successors failed to
prevent their troops from marauding the surrounding regions. Disappointed by
the conduct of the Christian troops from which they had expected decisive
support, the Serbian insurgents abandoned the agreed alliance. Patriarch
Arsenije III Crnojevic tried in vain to arrive at a new agreement with the
Austrian generals. The restorer of the Ottoman Empire, Grand Vizier
Mustafa-Pasha Koporilli, an Albanian by origin, took advantage of the lull
in military operations, mustered Crimean Tatars and Islamized Albanians and
mounted a major campaign. Despite assurances of help, Catholic Albanian
tribes deserted the Austrian army on the eve of the decisive clash at
Kacanik in Kosovo, on January 1690. The Serbian militia, resisting the
Sultan's superior hordes, retreated to the west and north of the
country.²
Turkish retaliation, in which the Serbian infidels were raided and
viciously massacred lasted a three full months. The towns of Prizren, Pec,
Pristina, Vucitrn and Mitrovica were hit the worst, and Serbs from Novo Brdo
retreated from the Tatar saber. Fleeing from the brutal reprisal, the people
of Kosovo and the neighboring areas moved northwards with Patriarch Arsenije
III. The decision to end the massacre and declare an amnesty came belately
as much of the population had already fled for safer areas, moving towards
the Sava River and Belgrade. Other parts of Serbia were also targets of
ghastly reprisals. In the Belgrade pashalik alone, the number of taxpayers
dropped eightfold. Grand old monasteries were looted from Pec Patriarchate
to Gracanica, and the Albanian tribe Gashi pillaged the Decani monastery,
killing the prior and seizing the monastery's best estates.
At the invitation of emperor Leopold I, Patriarch Arsenije III led part
of the high clergy and a sizeable part of the refugees (tens of thousands of
people) to the Habsburg Empire to the territory of southern Hungary, having
received assurances that the Serbs would there be granted special political
and religious status. Many Serbs from Kosovo and Metohia followed him. The
new churches built along the Danube they named after those left in old
homeland.
The Great 1690 Migration was a important turning point in the history
of the Serbs. In Kosovo and Metohia alone, towns and some villages were
abandoned to the last inhabitant. The population was also decimated by the
plague, whatever remained after the Turkish troops. The physical
extermination along with the mass exodus, the burning of grand monasteries
and their rich treasuries and libraries, the death and murder of a large
number of monks and clergy wreaked havoc in these regions. The position of
the Pec Patriarchate was badly shaken; its highest clergy went with the
people to Austria, and the confusion wrought by the Great Migration had a
major influence on its abolition (1766).³
The hardest consequence of the Great Migration was demographic upheaval
it caused, because once the Serbs withdraw from Kosovo and Metohia,
Islamized Albanian tribes from the northern highlands started settling the
area in greater number, mostly by force, in the decade following the 1690
Great Migration of Serbs, ethnic Albanian tribes (given their incredible
powers of reproduction) was posing a grave threat to the biological survival
of the Serbs in Kosovo and Metohia. Colonies set up by the ethnic Albanians
in Kosovo, Metohia and the neighboring areas provoked a fresh Serbian
migration toward the north, encouraged the process of conversion and upset
the centuries-old ethnic balance in those areas. Supported (depending on
circumstances) by the Turks and the Roman Curia, ethnic Albanians, abyding
by their tribal customs and hajduk insubordination to the law, in the coming
centuries turned the entire region of Kosovo and Metohia into a bloody
battleground, marked by tribal and feudal anarchy. The period following the
Great Migration of Serbia marked the commencement of three centuries of
ethnic Albanian genocide against Serbs in their native land.
The century after the Great Migration saw a fresh exodus of the Serbs
from Kosovo and Metohia, and a growing influence of ethnic Albanians on
political circumstances. Ethnic Albanians used the support they received
from the Turkish army in fighting Serbian insurgents to seize the ravaged
land and abandoned mining centers in Kosovo and Metohia and to enter in
large numbers the Ottoman administration and military. More and more
Catholic ethnic-Albanians converted to Islam, thereby acquiring the right to
retain the estates they had seized and to apply the might-is-right principle
in their dealings with the non-Muslim Serbs. The authorities encouraged and
assisted the settlement of the newly Islamized ethnic-Albanian tribes from
the mountains to the fertile lands devastated by war. The dissipation of the
Turkish administrative system encouraged the ethnic-Albanian colonisation of
Kosovo and Metohia, since with the arrival of more of their fellow tribesmen
and compatriots, the local pashas and beys (most of whom were ethnic
Albanian) acquired strong tribal armies which in times of trouble helped
them hold on to their position and illegally pass on their power to their
descendents. The missionaries of the Roman Curia did not heed to preserve
the small ethnic Albanian Catholic population, but endeavoured instead to
inflict as much harm as possible on the Pec Patriarchate and its
dignitaries, and, with the help of bribable pashas, to undermine the
cohesive power of Serbian Orthodoxy in these areas.⁴
The next war between Austria and Turkey (1716-1718) marked the
beginning of a fresh persecution in Kosovo and Metohia. Austrian troops,
backed by Serbian volunteers, reached the Western Morava River where they
established a new frontier. Ethnic Albanians collectively guaranteed to the
Porte the safety of the regions in the immediate vicinity of Austria, and
were in return exempted from the heaviest taxes. Towards the end of the war
(1717), a major Serbian uprising broke out in Vucitrn and its surroundings:
it was brutally crushed and the troops sent to allay the rayah and launch an
investigation, perpetrated fresh atrocities. Excessive dues, robbery and the
threat of extermination put before the Kosovo Serbs the choices of either
converting to Islam or finding a powerful master who would protect them if
they accepted the status of serfs. Many opted for a third solution: they
moved to surrounding regions where life was more tolerable.⁵
The following war between Austria and Turkey (1737-1739) ended with the
routing of the imperial troops from Serbian territory. The border was
reestablished at the Sava and Danube rivers, and Serbs set out on another
migration. Patriarch Arsenije IV Jovanovic, along with the religious and
national leaders of Pec, drew up a plan for cooperation with the Austrian
forces, and contacted their commanders. A large-scale uprisings broke out
again in Kosovo and Metohia, engaging some 10.000 Serbs. They were joined by
Montenegrin tribes, and Austrian envoys even stirred up the Kliments, a
Catholic tribe from northern Albania. A Serbian militia was formed again,
but the Austrian troops and insurgenta were forced to retreat in the face of
superior Turkish power: reprisals ensued, bringing death to the insurgents
and their families. Serbs withdrew from the mining settlements around
Janjevo, Pristina, Novo Brdo and Kopaonik. In order to keep the remaining
populace on the land, the Turks declared an amnesty. After the fall of
Belgrade, Arsenije IV moved to Austria. The number of refugees from Serbia,
including Kosovo and Metohia, along with some Kliments has yet to be
accurately determined, as people were moving on all sides and the process
lasted for several months. The considerably reduced number of taxpayers in
Kosovo and Metohia and in other parts of Serbia points to a strong migratory
wave.⁶
Unrest in the Ottoman empire helped spread anarchy in Kosovo and
Metohia and rest of Serbia. Raids, murder, rape against the unarmed
population was largely committed by ethnic Albanian outlaws, who were now
numerically superior in many regions. Outlaw bands held controll over roads
during Turkey's war with Russia (1768-1774), when lawlessness reigned
throughout Serbia. Ethnic Albanian outlaws looted and fleeced other regions
as well, which sent local Muslims complaining to the Porte seeking
protection.
During the last Austro-Turkish war (1788-1791); a sweeping popular
movement again took shape in northern Serbia. Because of the imperial forces
swift retreat, the movement did not encompass the southern parts of Serbia:
Kosovo, Metohia and present-day northern Macedonia. The peace treaty of
Sistovo (1791) envisaged a general amnesty for the Serbs, but the ethnic
Albanians, as outlaws or soldiers in the detachments of local pashas,
continued unhindered to assault the unprotected Serbian population. The wave
of religious intolerance towards Orthodox population, which acquired greater
proportion owing to the hostilities with Russia at the end of 18th century,
effected the forced conversion to Islam of a larger number of Serbian
families. The abolition of the Pec Patriarchate (1766), whose see and rich
estates were continually sought after by local ethnic Albanian pashas and
beys, prompted the final wave of extensive Islamization in Kosovo and
Metohia.⁷
Those who suffered the most during these centuries of utter lawlessness
were the Serbs, unreliable subjects who would rise every time the Turks
would wage war against one of the neighboring Great Powers, and whose
patriarchs led the people to enemy land. Although initially on a small
scale, the Islamization of Serbs in Kosovo and Metohia began before the
penetration of ethnic Albanians. More widespread conversion to Islam took
place in the 17th and the first half of 18th centuries, when ethnic
Albanians began to wield more influence on political events in these
regions. Many Serbs accepted Islamization as a necessary evil, waiting for
the moment when they could revert to the faith of their ancestors, but most
of them never lived to see that day. The first few generations of Islamized
Serbs preserved their language and observed their old customs (especially
slava - the family patron saint day, and the Easter holiday). But several
generations later, owing to a strong ethnic Albanian environment, they
gradually began adopting the Albanian dress to safety, and outside their
narrow family circle they spoke the Albanian language. Thus came into being
a special kind of social mimicry which enabled converts to survive.
Albanization began only when Islamized Serbs, who were void of national
feeling, married girls from ethnic Albanian tribal community. For a long
time Orthodox Serbs called their Albanized compatriots Arnautasi, until the
memory of their Serbian origin waned completely, though old customs and
legends about their ancestors were passed on from one generation to the
next.⁸
For a long time the Arnautasi felt neither like Turks nor ethnic
Albanians, because their customs and traditions set them apart, and yet they
did not feel like Serbs either, who considered Orthodoxy to be their prime
national trait. Many Arnautasi retained their old surnames until the turn of
the last century. In Drenica the Arnautasi bore such surnames as Dokic,
Velic, Marusic, Zonic, Racic, Gecic, which unquestionably indicated their
Serbian origin. The situation was similar in Pec and its surroundings where
many Islamized and Albanized Serbs carries typically Serbian surnames:
Stepanovic, Bojkovic, Dekic, Lekic, Stojkovic, etc. The eastern parts of
Kosovo and Metohia, with their compact Serbian settlements, were the last to
undergo Islamization. The earliest Islamization in Upper Morava and Izmornik
is pinpointed as taking place in the first decades of the 18th century, and
the latest in 1870s. Toponyms in many ethnic Albanian villages in Kosovo
show that Serbs had lived there the preceding centuries, and in some places
Orthodox cemeteries were shielded against desecrators by ethnic Albanians
themselves, because they knew that the graves of their own ancestors lay
there.⁹
In the late 18th century, all the people of Gora, the mountain region
near Prizren were converted to Islam. However they succeeded in preserving
their language and avoiding Albanization. There were also some cases of
conversion of Serbs to Islam in the second half of 19th century, especially
during the Crimean War, again to save their lives, honor and property,
though far more pronounced at the time was the process of emigration, since
families, sometimes even entire villages, fled to Serbia or Montenegro.
Extensive anthropogeographic research indicates that about 30% of the
present-day ethnic Albanian population of Kosovo and Metohia is of Serbian
origin.¹⁰
1 N. Samardzic, Savremena strana stampa o Velikoj seobi Srba,
Istorijski Casopis, vol. XXXII (1985), pp. 79-103; R. Trickovic, Velika
seoba Srba 1690. godine, in: Kosovo i Metohija u srpskoj istoriji, pp.
127-141.
2 N. Samardzic, op. cit., pp. 136-139.
3 R. Trickovic, Ustanci, seobe i stradanja u XVIII veku, in: Kosovo i
Metohija u srpskoj istoriji, pp. 149-169
4 Ibid
5 Ibid
6 Ibid
7 Ibid
8 J. Cvijic, La peninsule balkanique. Geographic humaine, (Paris 1918),
pp. 343-355.
9 A. Urosevic, Kosovo, (Beograd 1965); D. Slijepcevic, Srpsko-arbanaski
odnosi kroz vekove, pp. 95-127.
10 J. Cvijic, Osnove za geografiju i geologiju Makedonije i Stare
Srbije, I-III, (Beograd 1906-1911).
The Age of Oppression
The series of long-scale Christian national movements in the Balkans,
triggered off by 1804 Serbian revolution, decided more than in the earlier
centuries, the fate of Serbs and made ethnic Albanians (about 70% of whom
were Muslims) the main guardians of Turkish order in the European provinces
of Ottoman Empire. At a time when the Eastern question was again being
raised, particularly in the final quarter of 19th and the first decade of
20th century, Islamic Albanians were the chief instrument of Turkey's policy
in crushing the liberation movements of other Balkan states. After the
congress of Berlin (1878) an Albanian national movement flared up, and both
the Sultan and Austria-Hungary, a power whose occupation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina heralded its further expansion deep into the Balkans,
endeavored, with varying degrees of success, to instrumentalize this
movement. While the Porte used the ethnic Albanians as Islam's shock cutting
edge against Christians in the frontier regions towards Serbia and
Montenegro, particularly in Kosovo, Metohia and the nearby areas,
Austria-Hungary's design was to use the Albanians national movement against
the liberatory aspirations of the two Serbian states that were impeding the
German Drang nach Osten. In a rift between two only seemingly contrary
strivings, Serbia and Montenegro, although independent since 1878, were
powerless (at least until the Balkan wars 1912-1913) without the support of
Russia or other Great Power to effect the position of their compatriots
within the borders of Ottoman Empire.¹
During the Serbian revolution, which ended with the creation of the
autonomous Principality of Serbia within the Ottoman empire (1830), Kosovo
and Metohia acquired special political importance. The hereditary ethnic
Albanian pashas, who had until then been mostly renegades from the central
authorities in Constantinople, feared that the flames of rebellion might
spread to regions they controlled thus they became champions for the defense
the integrity of the Turkish Empire and leaders of many military campaigns
against the Serbian insurgents, at the core of the Serbian revolution was
the Kosovo covenant, embodied in the "revenge of Kosovo", a fresh, decisive
battle against the Turkish invaders in the field of Kosovo. In 1806 the
insurgents were preparing, like Prince Lazar in his day, to come out in
Kosovo and weigh their forces against the Turks, However, detachments of
Serbian insurgents reached only the fringes of northern Kosovo. Metohia, Old
Raska (Sandzak), Kosovo and northern Macedonia remained outside the borders
of the Serbian principality. In order to highlight their importance in the
national and political ideologies of the renewed Serbian state, they were
given a new collective name. It was not by chance that Vuk Stefanovic
Karadzic, the father of modern Serbian literacy, named the central lands of
the Nemanjic state - Old Serbia.²
Fearing the renewed Serbian state, Kosovo pashas engaged in ruthless
persecution in an effort to reduce number of Serbs living in their spacious
holdings. The French travel writer F.C.H.L Pouqueville was astounded by the
utter anarchy and ferocity of the local pashas towards the Christians.
Jashar-pasha Gjinolli of Prishtina was one of the worst, destroying several
churches in Kosovo, seizing monastic lands and killing monks. In just a few
years of sweeping terror, he evicted more than seventy Serbian villages
between Vucitrn and Gnjilane, dividing up the seized land among the local
Islamized population and mountain folk that had settled there from northern
Albania. The fertile plains of Kosovo became desolate meadows as the Malisor
highlanders, unused to farming knew not to cultivate.
The revolt of the ethnic Albanian pashas against the reforms introduced
by the sultans and fierce clashes with regular Turkish troops in the
thirties and forties of the 19th century, emphasized the anarchy in Kosovo
and Metohia, causing fresh suffering among the Serbs and the further
devastation of the ancient monasteries. Since neither Serbian nor
Montenegro, two semi-independent Serbian states, were able to give any
significant help to the gravely endangered people, Serbian leaders form the
Pristina and Vucitrn regions turned to the Russian tsar in seeking
protection from their oppressors. They set out that they were forced to
choose between converting to Islam or fleeing for Serbia as the violence,
especially killings, the persecution of monks, the raping of women and
minors, had exceeded all bounds. Pogroms marked the decades to come,
especially in period of the Crimean War (1853-1856) when anti-Slav
sentiments reached their peak in the ottoman empire: ethnic Albanians and
the Cherkeses, whom the Turks had resettled in Kosovo, joined the Ottoman
troops in persecuting Orthodox Serbs.
The brotherhood of Decani and the Pec Patriarchate turned to the
authorities of Serbia for protection. Pointing to the widespread violence
and increasing banditry, and to more frequent and persisted attempts by
Catholic missionaires to compel the impoverished and spiritually discouraged
monk communities to concede to union. Prior Serafim Ristic of Decani loged
complaints with both the sultan and Russian tsar and in his book Plac Stare
Srbije (Zemun 1864) he penned hundreds of examples of violence perpetrated
by the ethnic Albanians and Turks against the Serbs, naming the
perpetrators, victims and type of crime. In Metohia alone he recorded over
one hundred cases in which the Turkish authorities, police and judiciary
tolerated and abetted robbery, bribery, murder, arson, the desecration of
churches, the seizure of property and livestock, the rape of women and
children, and the harassment of monks and priests. Both ethnic Albanians and
Turks viewed assaults against Serbs as acts pleasing to Allah acts that
punishing infidels for not believing in true God: kidnapping and Islamizing
girls were a way for true Muslims to approach Allah. Ethnic Albanian outlaws
(kayaks) became heroes among their fellow-tribesmen for fulfilling their
religious obligations in the right way and spreading the militant glory of
their clan and tribe.
Eloquent testimonies to the scope of the violence against the Serbs in
Kosovo and Metohia, ranging from blackmail and robbery to rape and murder,
come from many foreign travel-writers, from A. F. Hilferding to G. M.
McKenzie - A. P. Irby. The Russian consul in Prizren observed that ethnic
Albanians were settling the Prizren district underhidered and were trying,
with the Turks, to eradicate Christians from Kosovo and Metohia. Throughout
the 19th century there was no public safety on the roads of Metohia and
Kosovo. One could travel the roads which were controlled by tribal bands,
only with strong armed escort. The Serbian peasant had no protection in the
field where he could be assaulted and robbed by an outlaw or bandit, and if
he tried to resist, he could be killed without the perpetrator having to
face charges for the crime. Serbs, as non-Muslims, were not entitled to
carry arms. Those who possessed and used arms in self-defence afterwards had
to run for their life. Only the luckiest managed to reach the Serbian or
Montenegrin border and find permanent refuge there. They were usually
followed by large families called family cooperatives (zadruga), comprising
as many as 30-50 members, which were unable to defend themselves against the
numerous relatives of the ethnic Albanian seeking vengeance for his death in
a conflict with an elder of their clan.
Economic pressure, especially the forced reducing of free peasants to
serf, was fostered by ethnic Albanian feudal lords with a view to creating
large land-holdings. In the upheavals of war (1859, 1863) the Turkish
authorities tried to restrict enterprising Serbian merchants and craftsmen
who flourished in Pristina, Pec and Prizren, setting ablaze entire quarters
where they worked and had their shops. But it was the hardest in rural
areas, because ethnic Albanians, bond together by tight communities of blood
brotherhoods or in tribes, and relatively socially homogeneous, were able to
support their fellow tribesman without too much effort, simply by
terrorizing Serbs and seizing their property and livestock. Suppression in
driving of the Serbian peasantry, space was made for their relatives from
northern Albania to move in, whereby increased their own prestige among
other tribes. Unused to life in the plains and to hard field-work, the
settled ethnic Albanians preferred looting to farming.
Despite the hardships, the Serbs in Kosovo and Metohia assembled in
religious-school communes which financed the opening of schools and the
education of children, collected donations for the restoration of churches
and monasteries and, when possible, tried to improve relations with the
Turkish authorities. In addition to monastic schools, the first Serbian
secular schools started opening in Kosovo from mid-1830s, and in 1871 a
Seminary (Bogoslovija) opened in Prizren. Unable to help politically, the
Serbia systematically aided churches and schools from the 1840s onwards,
sending teachers and encouraging the best students to continue with their
studies. The Prizren seminary the hub of activity on national affairs,
educated teachers and priests for all the Serbian lands under Turkish
dominion, and unbeknownst to authorities, established contact on a regular
basis with the government in Belgrade, wherefrom it received means and
instructions for political action.
Ethnic circumstances in Kosovo and Metohia in the early 19th century
can be reconstructed on the basis of data obtained from the books written by
foreign travel writers and ethnographers who journeyed across European
Turkey. Joseph Miller's studies show that in late 1830s, 56,200 Christians
and 80,150 Muslims lived in Metohia; 11,740 of the Muslims were Islamized
Serbs, and 2,700 of the Christians were Catholic Albanians. However, clear
picture of the ethnic structure during this period cannot be obtained until
one takes into account the fact that from 1815 to 1837 some 320 families,
numbering ten to 30 members each, fled Kosovo and Metohia ahead of ethnic
Albanian violence. According to Hilferding's figures, Pec numbered 4,000
Muslim and 800 Christian families, Pristina numbered 1,200 Muslim, 900
Orthodox and 100 Catholic families with a population of 12,000.³
Russian consul Yastrebov recorded (for a 1867-1874 period) the
following figures for 226 villages in Metohia: 4,646 Muslim ethnic Albanian
homes, 1,861 Orthodox and 3,740 Islamized Serbs and 142 homes of Catholic
Albanians. Despite the massive departure of the population for Serbia,
available data show that until Eastern crisis (1875-1878), Serbs formed the
largest ethnic group in Kosovo and Metohia, largely owing to a high birth
rate.
The biggest demographics upheaval in Kosovo and Metohia occurred during
the Eastern crisis, especially during the 1876-1878 Serbo-Turkish wars, when
the question of Old Serbia started being internationalized. The Ottoman
empire lost a good deal of territory in its wars with Russia, Serbia and
Montenegro, and Austria-Hungary occupied Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the
second war with the Turks, Serbian troops liberated parts of Kosovo: their
advance guard reached Pristina via Gnjilane and at the Gracanica monastery
held a memorial service for the medieval heroes of Kosovo battle... After
Russia and Turkey called a truce, Serbian troops were forced to withdraw
from Kosovo. Serbian delegations from Old Serbia sent petitions to the
Serbian Prince, the Russian tsar and participants of the Congress of Berlin,
requesting that these lands merge with Serbia. Approximately 30,000 ethnic
Albanians retreated from the liberated areas (partly under duress), seeking
refuge in Kosovo and in Metohia, while tens of thousands of Serbs fled
Kosovo and Metohia for Serbia ahead of unleashed bashibozouks, irregular
auxiliaries of Ottoman troops.⁴
On the eve of the Congress of Berlin in the summer of 1878, when the
great powers were deciding on the fate of the Balkan nations, the Albanian
League was formed in Prizren, on the periphery of ethnic Albanian living
space. The League called for the preservation of Ottoman Empire in its
entirety within the prewar boundaries and for the creation of autonomous
Albanian vilayet out of the vilayets of Kosovo, Scutari, Janina and Monster
(Bitolj), regions where ethnic Albanians accounted for 44% of overall
population. The territorial aspirations of the Albanian movement as defined
in 1878, became part of all subsequent national programs. The new sultan
Abdulhamid II (1878-1909) supported the League's pro-Ottoman and pro-Islamic
attitude. Breaking with the reformatory policy of his predecessors, sultan
adopted pan-Islamism as the ruling principle of his reign. Unsatisfied with
the decisions taken at the Congress, the League put up an armed opposition
to concession of regions of Plav and Gusinje to Montenegro, and its
detachments committed countless acts of violence against the Serbs, whose
very existence posed a permanent threat to Albanian national interests. In
1881, Turkey employed force to crush the League, whose radical wing was
striving towards an independent Albanian state to show that it was capable
of implementing the adopted reforms. Notwithstanding, under the system of
Turkish rule in the Balkans, ethnic Albanians continued to occupy the most
prominent seats in the decades to come.
The ethnic Albanians' religious and ethnic intolerance of the Serbs
took on a new, political tone. The strategic objective of their national
policy was to systematically edge the Serbs out of these regions. The
sultan's policy of forming a chain of ethnic Albanian settlements to secure
a new border towards Serbia and to let ethnic Albanians, as advocates of
Islam, crush all unrest by Serbs and other Christians in the Empire's
European provinces, turned Kosovo and Metohia into a bloody battle-ground in
which the persecution of the Serbian populace assumed almost apocalyptic
proportions. From 1876 to 1883, approximately 1,500 Serbian families fled
Kosovo and Metohia for Serbia ahead of Albanian violence.⁵
Surrounded by his influential guard of ethnic Albanians, the Abdulhamid
II became increasingly lenient toward Islamized Albanian tribes who used
force in quelling Christian movements: they were exempt from providing
recruits, paying the most of the regular taxes and allowed at times to
refuse the orders of local authorities. This lenient policy towards the
ethnic Albanians and tolerance for the violence committed against the
Serbian population created a feeling of superiority in the lower strata of
Albanian society. The knowledge that no matter what the offense they would
not be held responsible, encouraged ethnic Albanians to ignore all the
lesser authorities. Social stratification resulted on increasing number of
renegades who lived solely off banditry or as outlaws. The policy of failing
to punish ethnic Albanians led to total anarchy which, escaping all control,
increasingly worried the authorities in Constantinople. Anarchy received
fresh impetus at the end of the 19th century when Austria-Hungary, seeking a
way to expand towards the Bay of Salonika, encouraged ethnic Albanians to
clash with the Serbs and disobey the local authorities. Ruling circles in
Vienna saw the ethnic Albanians as a permanent wedge between the two Serbian
states and, with the collapse of the system of Turkish rule, a bridge
enabling the Dual Monarchy to extend in the Vardar valley. Thus, Kosovo and
Metohia became the hub of great power confrontation for supremacy in the
Balkans.
The only protection for the Serbs in Kosovo and Metohia until the end
of 1880s came from Russian diplomats, Russia being the traditional guardian
of the Orthodox and Slav population in the Ottoman Empire Russia's waning
influence in the Balkans following the Congress of Berlin had an unfavorable
impact on the Serbs in Turkey. Owing to Milan and Alexander Obrenovic's
Austrophile policy, Serbia lost valuable Russian support at the Porte in its
efforts to protect Serbian population In Kosovo and Metohia, Serbs were
regarded as a rebellious, treasonous element, every move they made was
carefully watched and any signs of rebellion were ruthlessly punished. A
military tribunal was established in Pristina in 1882 which in its five
years of work sent hundreds of national leaders to prison.
The persistent efforts of Serbian officials to reach agreement with
ethnic Albanian tribal chiefs in Kosovo and Metohia, and thus help curb the
anarchy failed to stem the tide of violence. Belgrade officials did not get
a true picture of the persecutions until a Serbian consulate was opened in
Pristina in 1889, five centuries after a battle in Kosovo. The government
was informed that ethnic Albanians were systematically mounting attacks on a
isolated Serbian villages and driving people to eriction with treats and
murders: "Go to Serbia -you can't survive here!". The assassination of the
first Serbian Consul in the streets of Pristina revealed the depth of ethnic
Albanian intolerance. Until 1905, not a single Serbian diplomat from
Pristina could visit the town of Pec or tour Metohia, the hotbed of the
anarchy. Consuls in Pristina (who included the well-known writers Branislav
Nusic and Milan M. Rakic) wrote, aside to their regular reports, indepth
descriptions of the situation in Kosovo and Metohia. Serbia's sole
diplomatic success was the election of a Serbian candidate as the
Raska-Prizren Metropolitan in 1896, following a series of anti-Serbian
orientated Greek Bishops who had been enthroned in Prizren since 1830.
Outright campaigns of terror were mounted after a Greaco-Turkish war in
1897, when it appeared that the Serbs would suffer the same fate as the
Armenians in Asia Minor whom the Kurds had wiped out with blessing from the
sultan. Serbian diplomats launched a campaign at the Porte for the
protection of their compatriots, submitting extensive documentation on four
hundred crimes of murder, blackmail, theft, rape, seizure of land, arson of
churches. They demanded that energetic measures be taken against the
perpetrators and that the investigation be carried out by a joint
Serbo-Turkish committee. But, without the support of Russia, the whole
effort came to naught. The prime minister of Serbia observed with
resignation that 60,000 people had fled Old Serbia for Serbia in the period
from 1880 to 1889. In Belgrade, a Blue Book was printed for the 1899 Peace
Conference in the Hague, containing diplomatic correspondence on acts of
violence committed by ethnic Albanians in Old Serbia, but Austria-58
Hungary prevented Serbian diplomats from raising the question before
the international public. In the ensuing years the Serbian government
attempted to secretly supply Serbs in Kosovo with arms. The first larger
caches of guns were discovered, and 190l saw another pogrom in Ibarski
Kolasin (northern Kosovo), which ended only when Russian diplomats
intervened.⁶
The widespread anarchy reached a critical point in 1902 when the
Serbian government with the support of Montenegrin diplomacy again raised
the issue of the protection of the Serbs in Turkey, demanding that the law
be applied equally to all subjects of Empire, and that an end be put to the
policy of indulging ethnic Albanians, that they be disarmed and that Turkish
garrisons be reinforced in areas with a mixed Serbian-ethnic Albanian
population. Russia, and then France, supported Serbia's demands. The two
most interested parties, Austria-Hungary and Russia, agreed in 1897 to
maintain the status quo in the Balkans, although they initiated a reform
plan to rearrange Turkey's European provinces. Fearing for their privileges,
ethnic Albanians launched a major uprising in 1903; it began with new
assaults against Serbs and ended with the assassination of the newly
appointed Russian consul in Mitrovica, accepted as a protector of the Serbs
in Kosovo.
The 1903 restoration of democracy in Serbia under new King Petar I
Karadjordjevic marked an end to Austrophile policy and the turning towards
Russia. In response, Austria-Hungary stepped up its propaganda efforts among
ethnic Albanians. At the request of the Dual Monarchy, Kosovo and Metohia
were exempt from the Great Powers Reform action (1903-1908). A new wave of
persecution ensued: in 1904,108 people fled for Serbia from Kosovo alone.
Out of 146 different cases of violence, 46 ended in murder; a group of
ethnic Albanians raped a seven-year-old girl. In 1905, out of 281
registrated cases of violence, 65 were murders, and at just one wedding,
ethnic Albanians killed nine wedding guests.⁷
The Young Turk revolution in 1908, which ended the "Age of Oppression"
(as Turkish historiography refers to the reign of Abdulhamid II), brought no
changes in relations between ethnic Albanians and Serbs. The Serbs' first
political organization was created under the auspices of the Young Turk
regime, but the ethnic Albanian revolt against the new authorities'
pan-Turkish policy triggered off a fresh wave of violence. In the second
half of 1911 alone, Old Serbia registrated 128 cases of theft, 35 acts of
arson, 41 instances of banditry, 53 cases of extortion, 30 instances of
blackmail, 19 cases of intimidation, 35 murders, 37 attempted murders, 58
armed attacks on property, 27 fights and cases of abuse, 13 attempts at
Islamization, and 18 cases of the infliction of serious bodily injury.
Approximately 400,000 people fled Old Serbia (Kosovo, Metohia, Raska,
northern and northwest Macedonia) for Serbia ahead of ethnic Albanian and
Turkish violence, and about 150,000 people fled Kosovo and Metohia, a third
of the overall Serbian population in these parts. Despite the persecution
and the steady outflow of people. Serbs still accounted for almost half the
population in Kosovo and Metohia in 1912. According to Jovan Cvijic's
findings, published in 1911, there were 14,048 Serbian homes in Kosovo, 3,
826 in Pec and its environs, and 2,400 Serbian homes with roughly 200,000
inhabitants in the Prizren region. Comparing this statistics dating from the
middle of the century, when there were approximately 400,000 Serbs living in
Kosovo and Metohia, Cvijic's estimate that by 1912 about 150,000 refugees
had fled to Serbia seems quite acceptable.⁸
The Serbian and Montenegrin governments aided the ethnic Albanian
rebels against Young Turks up to a point: they took in refugees and gave
them arms with a view to undermining Turkish rule in the Balkans, dispelling
Austro-Hungarian influence on their leaders and curbing the violence against
Serbs. But it was all in vain as intolerance for the Serbs ran deep in all
Albanian national movements. Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria and Greece
realized that the issue of Christian survival in Turkey had to be resolved
by arms. Since Turkey refused to guarantee the Christians the same rights it
had promised the ethnic Albanian insurgents, the Balkan allies declared war
in the fall of 1912.
1 D. T. Batakovic, Od srpske revolucije do istocne krize: 1804-1878,
in: Kosovo i Metohija u srpskoj istoriji, pp. 172-208.
2 D. T. Batakovic (ed.), Savremenici o Kosovu i Metohiji 1852-1912,
(Beograd 1988), Forward, pp. XVII-XXXVII.
3 Ibid
4 D. T. Batakovic, Ulazak u sferu evropskog interesovanja, in: Kosovo i
Metohija u srpskoj istoriji, pp. 216-231.
5 V. Bovan, Jastrebov u Prizrenu, (Pristina 1984), pp. 180-185.
6 Documents diplomatoques. Correspondence concernant les actes de
violence et de brigandage des Albanias dans la Vielle Serbie (Vilayet de
Kosovo) 1898-1899, (Belgrade MDCCCXCIX), pp. 1-145
7 List of violence, in. Zaduzbine Kosova, pp. 672-697.
8 D. T. Batakovic, Anarhija i genocid u Staroj Srbiji, in: Kosovo i
Metohija u srpskoj istoriji, pp. 271-280.
The Age of Restoration
Serbia and Montenegro, states whose national ideologies were based on
the Kosovo covenant, welcomed the war as a chance to fulfill their
centuries-old desire to avenge Kosovo. Volunteers from all the Serbian lands
rushed to join the army. Carried by the feeling that they were fulfilling a
historic mission, Serbian troops set out for Kosovo. Attempts to isolate
ethnic Albanians from the war actions failed: the leaders of their movement
had decided to defend their Ottoman homeland in arms. The Serbian army,
together with Montenegrin, liberated Kosovo without much fight, and its 3rd
army stopped in Gracanica to hold a commemoration for the heroes of 1389
Kosovo battle. Montenegrin troops marched into Pec, Decani and met Serbian
troops in Djakovica. Leaders of the ethnic Albanian movement fled to Albania
where an independent state had been pro-clamed under the auspices of the
Austro-Hungarian diplomacy. Seeking an outlet to the Adriatic sea in order
to save themselves from the over-tightening grip of Austria-Hungary, Serbian
troops entered norther Albanian ports, but under the decisions of the
Conference of Ambassadors in London (1912-1913), they were forced to
withdraw. Austria-Hungary struggled to win as big an Albanian state as
possible to counter-balance Serbia and Montenegro, but both delegations
stressed that under no conditions would they agree to let Kosovo and
Metohia, as holy lands of Serbs, remain outside their borders. Raids on
Serbian territory by armed Albanian detachments in 1913, protected by
Turkish and Austro-Hungarian services, were aimed at destabilizing the
administration in the newly liberated regions, heralding Austria-Hungary's
imminent setting of accounts with Serbia, the chief obstacle to the German
Drang nach Osten.
World War I hindered not only the stabilization of the Serbian
administration in Kosovo and Montenegrin in Metohia, but also the creation
of a union between the two Serbian states. Austria-Hungary helped the
revanchist aspirations of fugitive ethnic Albanian leaders and fanned plans
for the creation of a Greater Albania inclusive of Kosovo, Metohia and
western Macedonia. Organized by Austro-Hungarian military and diplomatic
services, detachments comprising ethnic Albanian refugees from Kosovo and
Macedonia were formed in Albania (where civil war was raging), with a view
to provoking an uprising in Kosovo and opening an another front toward
Serbia. In the summer of 1914, the Serbian government helped Essad-Pasha
Topfani, a supporter of the Balkan cooperation and the Entente powers, to
assume power in Albania and with him signed a treaty on military cooperation
and one on a real union. In the summer of 1915, following the letter of the
treaty, the Serbian army intervened in Albania to protect Essad-pasha's
regime and crush an uprising by supporters of the Triple Alliance. After a
joint Austro-Hungarian, German and Bulgarian offensive against Serbia in the
fall of 1915. The initial plan had been to put up decisive resistance in
Kosovo, but the view that it was better to reach the allied forces on the
Albanian coast prevailed. Owing to hunger, disease, a bad winter and clashes
with Albanian tribes in areas not controlled by Essad-Pasha, approximately
70,000 of the 220,000 soldiers died in Albania, and only a third (about
60,000) of the 200,000 civilian refugees made it to Corfu and
Bizerte.¹
After penetrating the Salonika front in the fall of 1918, the allied
troops liberated Kosovo and Metohia and turned over power to the Serbian
administration. There were sporadic revolts, especially after the founding
of the Kosovo Committee in Albania which called men to fight for the
creation of a Greater Albania. Serbian troops occupied Albanian border areas
and tried to put in power Essad-Pasha, who was at the allied camp in Athens.
Italy, having assumed the role of Albania's protector after the
collapse of Austria-Hungary, became the chief opponent of the newly
proclaimed Yugoslav-state. Owing to a dispute over supremacy along the
Adriatic littoral, Italy set up a puppet regime in Albania, encouraged its
aspirations in Kosovo, Metohia and northwestern Macedonia, with the aim of
turning Albania into a foothold for its advance and expansion into the
Balkans.
At the Peace Conference in Paris, the Yugoslav delegation upheld the
stand that Albania should be an independent state within the borders of
1913, but in the event such a solution was rejected, it demanded territorial
compensation from the Drim River to Scutari. After strong external pressure
and internal upheaval, the question of Albania's independence was resolved
at the Conference of the Great Powers ambassadors in 1921, and the border
with the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was finally drawn in 1926.
Kosovo emigrants in Albania worked to expand the movement for the creation
of a Greater Albania. Guerilla detachments were infiltrated into Yugoslav
territory and, clashing with Yugoslav troops and the authorities, they
created an unsafe border area which had to be placed under a special regime.
The involvement of Yugoslav diplomacy in internal tribal, religious and
political struggles in Albania was aimed at edging out a foreign influence
and helping to establish a regime that would sever the continual subversive
activities.
Owing to new political factors within the Yugoslavia and new
international circumstances, the creation of Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and
Slovenes (which in 1931 became Kingdom of Yugoslavia), lent a fresh
dimension to Serbo-Albanian relations in Kosovo and Metohia, and to state
relations between Yugoslavia and Albania (although they had been defined by
the inherited ethnic strife). The Albanian question once again became a
means of political pressure on the new state, especially against Serbs as
its driving force. With fascism and Nazism emerging, revanshist states
defeated in World War I, unsatisfied with the set borders and the
distribution of political power, rallying around Italy, tried to undermine
the foundations of Yugoslavia in its most vulnerable spots - Kosovo, Metohia
and Macedonia, lands where burden of five centuries of Ottoman rule opened
the deepest civilisational chasms.²
The new state had the difficult task of severing feudal relations in
Kosovo, Metohia and Macedonia, of carrying out the agrarian reform and of
populating the area. The settlement of Serbs from the passive regions of
Montenegro, Bosnia and Vojna Krajina in Croatia, was meant to bring about
the desirable ethnic balance in the sensitive border region. The first step
in pulling these regions out of their centuries-old backwardness was the
abolition of the feudal system in 1919, when an end was put to serfdom and
the serfs were declared owners of the lands they tilled. For the first time,
native Serbs and many poor ethnic Albanian families obtained their own land.
Colonization began in 1920 without being adequately prepared, thus the
earliest settlers were on their own, and the authorities in charge of
carrying out the task took advantage of rough edges of the reform to engage
in various forms of abuse. After the first decade, the agrarian reform and
colonization proved to suffer from major shortcomings, which were hardest on
the settlers themselves. In principle, taking land away from private owners
for the purpose of settlement was forbidden, though small lots of land were
thus obtained for the purpose of reallocating holdings, and the owners were
alloted land elsewhere. The pseudo-ownership rights of some ethnic Albanians
who could not prove their ownership of the land they had been using after
its real owners had left, created some confusion. Initially, settlers were
mostly alloted untitled land, pastures, clearings, barren or abandoned land,
forests and, to a lesser extent, lands of fugitive outlaws. Only 5% of the
total amount of land was arable. During the two waves of colonisation, from
1922-1929 and from 1933-1938, 10,877 families, some 60,000 people settled on
120,672 hectares of land (about 15, 3% of the land). Another 99,327 hectares
planned for settlement were not alloted. For the incoming settlers, 330
settlements and villages were built with 12,689 houses, 46 schools and 32
churches.³
The kacak (renegade, outlaw) movement, which posed a growe threat to
personal safety of settlers living in border areas during the 1920's was a
major obstacle to efforts at stabilizing the political situation. The kacak
movement, a remaining from the Turkish times, was mostly coordinated by
ethnic Albanian emigrants from Kosovo, as a movement for the unification of
Kosovo and Metohia with Albania. Operating separately were a number of
outlaw bands which plundered the remote and poorly protected border areas,
evading taxes and military service. The border military authorities
responded to the perpetual assaults and murders of local officials,
gendarmes, priests and teachers, to the looting of and setting fire to
isolated Serbian estates, by driving out the perpetrators, using artillery
in the worst of cases. The estates of the most dangerous outlaws were
confiscated and the homes of their accomplices set afire as a warning. The
1921 amnesty for all crimes excepting murder produced only partial results:
the outlaws surrended just before winter, but were back in the forests by
spring. From 1918 to 1923,478 kacaks surrendered, 23 were captured and 52
killed. Most of those (231) who were captured or who surrendered were sent
to military commands (they evaded regular military service), 195 were turned
over to the courts, and 75 were acquitted. The kacak movement began tapering
off in 1923 when on of the more liberal governments issued a decree on
amnesty inclusive of more serious crimes. The amnesty and good relations
with Albania helped bring an end to the kacak movement.⁴
The ethnic Albanian and Turkish population in Kosovo and Metohia were
reluctant to reconcile with living in a European-organized state where,
instead of the status of the absolutely privileged class they had enjoyed
during the Turkish rule, they acquired only civil equality with what had
previously been the infidel masses. In 1919 the leading ethnic Albanian beys
from Kosovo, Metohia and northwestern Macedonia founded the Dzemijet,
political party which in 1921 had 12 seats in Parliament and 14 two years
later. The Dzemijet was banned in 1925 because of its ties with kacaks and
the government in Tirana, but in continued to operate clandestinely. Besa, a
secret student organization financed by Tirana and then by the Italian
legation in Belgrade, propagated the annexation of Kosovo and Metohia to
Albania. Because of their support to the kacaks and ties with Kosovo migr
circles, ethnic Albanians were regarded with suspicion in Yugoslavia, as a
subversive element ready to revolt at a given opportunity and annex certain
regions to Albania. Under the Constitution, ethnic Albanians, as a national
minority, were guaranteed the use of their mother tongue in elementary
schools, but everything was reduced to education in religious schools. The
Yugoslav government wished to resolve the rights of minorities reciprocally,
with the Serbian minority in Albania being allowed to open its own schools
and the question of the Orthodox eparchy in Albania being resolved, but
agreement was never reached. Not even the leading beys from the Dzemijet,
who looked out solely for their own privileges, raised the question of the
schooling for their compatriots. They were satisfied with religious schools
for ethnic Albanian youth. Out of 37,685 pupils in 252 compulsory schools in
1940/1941, 11, 876 ethnic Albanian pupils attended classes in the
Serbo-Croatian language.⁵
Discontent with the new state among the ethnic Albanian masses stepped
up emigration to Turkey, in whose Muslim environment they felt at home. Many
openly admitted that they could not bear being ruled over by members of the
former infidel masses, Serbs, whom they pejoratively called Ski (Slavs).
Emigration started right after the Balkan wars and many refugees who had
fled to Albania to avoid conflicts with the authorities, returned to their
homes after the war and the quelling of kacak operations. By the 1930's,
thousands of ethnic Albanian and Turkish families had voluntarily moved to
Turkey, and in 1938, after lenghtly negotiations, the Yugoslav and Turkish
governments prepared a convention on the emigration of some 200,000 Muslims
(ethnic Albanians and Turks) from Kosovo-Metohia and Macedonia to Turkey.
Because the Turkish government abandoned the agreement and a lack of funds
to dispatch the emigrants, the convention was never implemented. According
to official figures, from 1927 to 1939, the number of ethnic Albanian
emigrants in Turkey numbered 19,279, and 4,322 in Albania. In comparison
with the 30,000 Serbs, Creates and Slovenes who emigrated annually for
economic reasons to the United States and other transoceanic countries,
migrations from far more backward regions to Turkey and Albania were not a
remarkable phenomenon.⁶
Population census covering the inter-war period shows no major
emigration of ethnic Albanians. According to the 1921 census there were 439,
657 ethnic Albanians in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (accounting for 3,67 of
the country's total population), 15,000 less than prior to the liberation in
1912, and they lived in Kosovo, Metohia and in Macedonia. The 1931 census
gives following figures: 505,259 ethnic Albanians (3,62% of the total
population), lived in three administrative units (banovina): in Zetska
banovina 150,062 (16%), in Moravska banovina 48,300 (3,36%), in Vardarska
banovina 302,901 (19,24 %). Figures from the 1939 census show that the
non-Slav population (ethnic Albanians, Turks, Gypsies, etc.) numbered
422,828 people, or 65,6%, the native Slav population accounted for 25,2% and
the settlers (mostly Serbs) for 9,2% .⁷
After the Yugoslav army capitulated in the April war of 1941, the
Kingdom of Yugoslavia was torn asunder: Serbia came under direct German
occupation, and its individual parts divided among the allies of the Third
Reich. During the April war, armed groups of ethnic Albanians attacked the
army, unarmed settlers and native Serbs. Because of the Trepca mines, the
district of Kosovska Mitrovica remained under German occupation, while the
eastern parts of Kosovo where given to Bulgaria, and on August 12, 1941, the
rest of Kosovo along with Macedonia and parts of Montenegro and Macedonia
were annexed to Greater Albania under Italian protectorship. Almost all
settlers houses were set afire within just a few days, their owners and
families killed or forced to leave for Montenegro and Serbia. Forced
migration is believed to have encompassed some 100,000 Serbs from Kosovo and
Metohia. From 1941 to 1944, ethnic Albanians serving the Italian and German
occupation authorities killed some 10,000 Serbs; the worst of suffer were
Serbs in Pec and Vitomirica where ethnic Albanian volunteers formations
wrought terror: before executing their victims they gouged out their eyes,
sliced off their ears and severed other parts of their bodies. Dozens of
Orthodox churches were destroyed, set afire and looted, priests and monks
were arrested and killed and many Orthodox cemeteries desecrated. Divided up
into several police and paramilitary formations, ethnic Albanians were in
the forefront of the massacres, and the German command was forced to
intervene to stop them. Ethnic Albanians used various forms of intimidation
in an effort to drive away the remaining Serbs from Kosovo. After the
collapse of Italy in 1943, Kosovo and Metohia came under German
administration, which supported the Greater Albanian ideology of national
leadership, helping the forming of the Second Albanian League at the and of
1943. The 21st SS "Scanderbey" division was formed out of ethnic Albanian
volunteers in the spring of 1944. The Balli Kombelar, Greater Albanian
organization, took the lead in ethnically purging Kosovo, warning the
Serbian population to move out of Kosovo and Metohia before it was too late.
The last migratory wave was registrated in the first months of
1944.⁸
Civil war in Yugoslavia (1941-1945) raged in Kosovo between the
Chetniks, regular royalist forces, led by general Dragoljub Mihailovic,
which operated mainly in northern parts of Kosovo, and partisan units of the
Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) led by Josip Broz Tito. Both armies
dashed with the occupational troops and ethnic Albanian formation. The CPY
condemned the "the Serbian bourgeoisie's policy" in inter-war period, thus
there were a few hundred ethnic Albanians in the partisan detachments. The
policy of winning over ethnic Albanians and aid provided by CPY instructors
in the forming and developing of Communist Party in Albania did not produce
the expected results. Moreover, representatives of ethnic Albanian
communists from Yugoslavia and Albania meeting at a conference in Bunaj (on
Albanian territory), January 1-2,1944, adopted a resolution on the
annexation of Kosovo and Metohia to Albania after the end of the war. The
common ethnic Albanians saw both the partisans and Chetniks as Serbs, their
age-old enemies.⁹
1 D T Batakovic, Oslobodjenje Kosova i Metohije, in: Kosovo i Metohija
u srpskoj istoriji, pp. 249-280
2 D. Bogdanovic, Knjiga o Kosovu, pp. 178-182.
3 V. Djuretic, Kosovo i Metohija u Jugoslaviji, in: Kosovo i Metohija u
srpskoj istoriji, pp. 95-106; N. Gacesa, Naseljavanje Kosova i Metohije
posle Prvog svetskog rata, in: Kosovo. Proslost i sadasnjost, pp. 95-106;M.
Obradovic, Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija na Kosovu (1918-1941), Pristina
1981.
4 B. Gligorijevic, Fatalna jednostranost. Povodom knjige B. Horvata
"Kosovsko pitanje", Istorija XX veka, 1-2 (1988), pp. 179-193.
5 R. Rajovic, Autonomija Kosova. Istorijsko-pravna studija, (Beograd
1985), pp.
6 B. Gligorijevic, op. cit., pp. 185-192
7 Ibid, pp. 187-191.
8 D. Bogdanovic, Knjiga o Kosovu, pp. 199-210; V. Djuretic, op cit.,
pp. 311-318; A. Jeftic, Hronika stradanja Srba na Kosovu i Metohiji
(1941-1989), in Kosovo i Metohija u srpskoj istoriji, pp. 405-414.
9 V. Djuretic, op. cit., pp. 320-325
The Age of Communism
With the arrival of Soviet troops in Yugoslavia, partisan units,
well-armed and their ranks freshly recruited, liberated Kosovo and Metohia
in the late fall of 1944, and established their rule. Local ethnic Albanian
communists were entrusted with setting up power, and thousands of ethnic
Albanians were drafted and sent to the front (two mutinies occurred in Vrsac
and Bar). Few weeks after the establishment of communist rule major armed
revolt broke out among the newly mobilized ethnic Albanian units unsatisfied
with the solution that Kosovo will remain within the borders of Yugoslavia.
For the quelling of ethnic Albanian revolt troops had to be brought in from
other areas and in February 1945 military rule was imposed in Kosovo and
Metohia.
By decree of the new communist authorities (March 16, 1945), Serbian
and Montenegrin settlers who had been expelled during the war were banned
from returning to their abandoned estates as they were considered exponents
of the inter-war "Greater Serbian hegemonistic policy" On the other hand,
international circumstances and particularly close ties with the communist
leadership in Albania, prompted Tito to take a lenient attitude towards the
ethnic Albanian minority: ethnic Albanians settled in Kosovo by the Italians
and Germans during the war were not expelled; on the contrary, the border
was open to new immigrants from Albania until 1948. The precise number of
ethnic Albanians who settled in Kosovo during and after the war is yet
unknown: estimates range from 15,000 to 300,000, but the first figures after
the war were from 70,000-75,000. Compared with the 100,000 Serbs who had bee
forcibly moved out and forbidden to return after the war, these figures show
that acceptance of the situation created under the occupation created major
disturbance in the ethnic structure of Kosovo and Metohia.¹
The evolution of Kosovo and Metohia political status in communist
Yugoslavia cannot be comprehended without some knowledge about the CPY's
national policy in the inter-war period. As a section of the Communist
International (Comintern), the CPY worked after World War I to destroy the
Kingdom of Yugoslavia as a "Versailles creation" in which "Greater Serbian
hegemony" oppressed the other nations in the state. Following Moscow's
instructions, the CPY adopted the stand in 1924 that Yugoslavia's
non-Serbian nations should be allowed to create their own separate national
states and that minorities should be allowed to join their parent states:
Albania, Hungary and Bulgaria. The policy of destroying the "Versailles
system" in Europe, as an instrument of imperialist powers -Great Britain and
France, was to be completed in the case of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia by the
breaking up of the Serbian lands.
When the Comintern changed its political course in 1935, deciding to
preserve the Yugoslav community with the a view to grouping together
anti-fascist forces, the CPY changed its course too, leaving the question of
settlement of position and status of the minorities for a later date.
Contrary to the prewar thesis that a strong Serbia guaranteed a strong
Yugoslavia, the communists upheld the view that the only way to establish a
stable state was by federalizing Yugoslavia and breaking the supremacy of
the Serbs. In its proclamations to the people of Kosovo and Metohia, the CPY
blamed the Serbian bourgeoisie for the mistreatment and persecution of the
ethnic Albanian population, thus indirectly shifting the blame from the
ruling structures of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia to the entire Serbian
nation.²
Communist rule was thus established in 1945 with such stands regarding
the national question. After a strong ethnic Albanian revolt in the winter
of 1944/1945, representatives of the new authorities voted in July 1945 that
Kosovo and Metohia remain within Serbia. In September that same year, a
separate autonomous region called Kosmet was formed, and in northern Serbia,
the autonomous province of Vojvodina. This solution set the precedent only
in Serbia: the borders of other Yugoslav republics were drawn so as to
remedy as much as possible the "injustices" done in the inter-war period,
although their ethnic structures gave cause for creation of autonomous
units. The policy of pacifying Serbia and the Serbs as a hegemonic nation
was implemented by the CPY leadership, headed by Josip Broz Tito, with the
slogan "brotherhood and unity" of all Yugoslav nations, Serbian communists,
imbued with Yugoslavism and the proletarian internationalism, followed
Tito's political conceptions to the last without realizing its far-reaching
effects.³
The extent to which Serbian lands were of the disposal of Yugoslavia's
communist leadership is evident from conceptions about the internal borders
in the projected Balkan federation of communist countries. In negotiations
with the leader of the Albanian communists, Enver Hoxha, Tito promised to
concede Kosovo and Metohia to Albania if it entered the Balkan federation.
After Yugoslavia broke with Stalin and Cominform in 1948, Enver Hoxha's
Albania became a dangerous center of propaganda and subversive activities
against regime in Yugoslavia, ultimately aimed at annexing Kosovo, Metohia
and parts of Macedonia to Albania, where "Albanianism", embodied in the idea
of creating a Greater Ethnic Albania, entered the foundation of state
ideology.⁴
Established under the 1946 Constitution, the autonomy of Kosovo and
Metohia was considerably by the 1963 Constitution, and after inter-party
strife and fall of Tito's deputy and chief of the State Security Service,
party strife and fall of Tito's deputy and chief of the State Security
Service, Aleksandar Rankovic (1966), accused in Kosovo and Metohia of taking
a discriminatory attitude towards ethnic Albanians, the purging on a
large-scale of Serbian cadres in high offices in the administration and
police started. They were accused by ethnic Albanian communists of
persecution and abuse of innocent people, particularly in drives of Security
Service to confiscate weapons, although Serbs suffered from the persecutions
just as much as ethnic Albanians. The Serbian Orthodox church suffered most
of all. Church lands came under the blow of agrarian reforms, monastic
property was confiscated, priests and monks were arrested and convicted and
in 1950 in Djakovica, one of the biggest churches in Metohia was destroyed
in order that a monument for Kosovo partisan be erected.⁵
Mass demonstrations by ethnic Albanians (mostly students) in Kosovo and
Metohia in November 1968 (under the slogan "Down With The Serbian
Oppressors"), showed that the struggle against abuses by the state security
bodies was turning into a revanchist policy towards Serbs and Serbia, and
that at its roots lax the idea of a Greater Albania. The demonstrations were
staged during a major political upheaval over the reorganization of the
Yugoslav federation, changes resulting from the 1974 Constitution, when the
federal status of Kosovo and Metohia (renamed the Province of Kosovo, since
Metohia had a Serbian and Orthodox connotations) was legally sanctioned as a
constitutive element of the Yugoslav state. The autonomous province of
Kosovo, a political community with many elements of statehood (it was even
granted the right to a Constitution), and only formally dependent on Serbia,
served the plans of secessionists who wanted to drive the Serbian population
out of these regions and create an ethnically pure Kosovo. The policy of
ethnically purging a territory is racist, and the means to effect it are
always violent.⁶
The normalization of Yugoslavia's relations with Albania in 1971 and
the free exchange of ideas, teachers and school books encouraged the
Albanization of Kosovo and Metohia. In less than a decade, Kosovo's leaders
managed to impose the ethnic Albanian language as the official language in
the province and impose, though the system's legal institutions,
discriminatory attitude to the Serbian population. The extent of the
discrimination was most evident when the so-called principle of ethnic
representation was applied: job hiring and enrolment at higher institutes of
learning were done according to the size of the population. For instance,
out of five job vacancies only one Serb could be hired, regardless of the
applicant's qualifications and abilities. The same principle was applied at
the University: only one out of every five registrated students could be a
Serb. The 1981 population census showed a drastic decline in the Serbian and
Montenegrin population, but also in the Turkish, Gypsy and Islamized Slav
minorities in Kosovo and Metohia. While Serbs were leaving their native land
for northern Serbia, many members of non-Slav minorities were pressured into
declaring themselves as ethnic Albanians. Along with growing number of
emigrants from Albania, this substantially increased the total number of
ethnic Albanians in the Province and their representation in the local
administration, schooling and culture.
The majority of Serbs (with the exception of the thin layer of
high-ranking officials) were subjected to various forms of pressure, ranging
from being deprived of employment and promotion, to threats and blackmail;
in villages, as in the last century of Ottoman rule, by the usurping of
property, physical assault, the setting of fire to houses and harvests,
stealing livestock, attacks and rape of women and children, murder at one's
doorstep. The local administration gave out lands abandoned by resettled
Serbs to emigrants from Albania, and many lots were illegally taken over by
neighboring ethnic Albanian families. Since all administrative power, from
the judiciary to the police, was in hands of ethnic Albanians, they passed
verdicts in favor of their compatriots whenever deciding on
inter-nationality disputes. The injured Serbian parties had no one to
complain to because the Republic of Serbia did not have judicial
jurisdiction over Kosovo, and when they wrote to the federal bodies, their
appeals remained unanswered. Dignitaries of the Serbian Orthodox Church
were, from 1945 onwards, the most persistent in lodging complaints to the
highest state bodies aboud the stepped-up physical and psychological
pressures suffered by Serbs, citing hundreds of examples, from the
desecration of graves to the raping of nuns, but their petitions had no
impact.
The attacks culminated with the March 1981 attempt to set fire in the
Pec Patriarchate, when the large living quarters burned down, together with
the furniture and library. The arsonists were never discovered and the
investigating authorities kept claiming that the fire had broken out because
of a breakdown in the electrical installations. The handful of Serbian
communist officials who did speak out against Kosovo's overt Albanization
during the 1968-1981 period were dismissed from their posts on charges of
being chauvinists and hegemonists. The Serbs who collaborated with the
ethnic Albanian communist leadership in the Province were rewarded with high
posts in the federal bodies.⁷
The Albanization of Kosovo and Metohia was especially bolstered by the
Province's unhindered communication with Albania, from where professors came
to the Pristina University in the seventies, spreading Greater Albanian
propaganda. With the import of textbooks from Tirana, whole generations of
young Albanians were raised in the spirit of Greater Albanianism and in
hatred for Serbia and Yugoslavia. Political officials and scholars from
Tirana moved freely about Kosovo, spreading sentiments and calling for the
creation of a large ethnic Albania. Huge sums of money allocated by the
Yugoslav federation for Kosovo's economic growth (Serbia's was the biggest
share) were spent on building large state institutions for the local
bureaucracy which tried to set up national institutions as swiftly as
possible: the Academy of Science of Kosovo, the University, institutes for
Albanian language, history and folklore, museums, the theater, television,
radio, newspaper and publishing houses. Paradoxically the Yugoslav state
financed the secessionist movement in Kosovo and Metohia itself.
Assessing that, with the death of Josip Broz Tito (May 1980), the
Yugoslav state was on The verge of collapse, Kosovo's ethnic Albanians
staged large-scale demonstrations in March and April 1981, with the blessing
of the Province's authorities, glorifying the regime of Enver Hoxha and
demanding that Kosovo be declared a republic, since, under the Yugoslav
Constitution, only republics have the right to secede. The establishment of
Kosovo as a republic would denote a transitional phase toward full
independence and then unification with Albania.⁸
Ethnic Albanian national and political dominance in Kosovo and Metohia
was enhanced by a large demographic explosion, as their number tripled from
about 480,000 in 1948 to 1,227,000 in 1981. Meanwhile, from the early
sixties onwards, the number of Serbs in Kosovo and Metohia steadily
declined. According to official figures, 92, 197 Serbs and 20, 424
Montenegrins (Serbs from Montenegro) moved to Serbia and other regions from
1961 to 1980. After the secessionist revolt of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo
and Metohia in the spring of 1981, another 38,000 Serbs and Montenegrins
moved out under duress. Their emigration has still not been stemmed.
The injuriousness of the policy of narrowing Serbia's sovereignty and
deliberately neutralizing Serbs in communist Yugoslavia is best illustrated
in the case of Kosovo and Metohia, where the Serbs, although formally in
their own state (Republic of Serbia) were forcibly reduced to a minority
with limited civil and national rights. Thanks to the organized actions of
the Province's local administration, which had backing from federal bodies,
the Serbs in Kosovo and Metohia were forced in many cases to leave, owing to
the atmosphere of unsafety, fear and persecution. After almost a decade of
waiting in vain for the federal Yugoslav bodies to stop Kosovo's further
Albanization and halt the exodus from Kosovo and Metohia, a large-scale
Serbian movement erupted, aided by the ecclesiastical circles and the
Belgrade liberal intelligentsia, demanding that the 1974 Constitution be
changed and Kosovo returned to Serbian sovereignty. The movement, which
spread to encompass Serbs from all over Yugoslavia, regardless of their
ideological convictions, emerged (afterwards carefully manipulated by new
leadership in Serbia), prior to the 600th anniversary of the Battle of
Kosovo (1989), heralding, not only symbolically, the return to the eternal
foothold of Serbian national entity - the Kosovo covenant.
1 V. Djuretic, op. cit., pp. 326-335.
2 K. Cavoski, Komunisticka partija Jugoslavije i kosovsko pitanje, in:
Kosovo i Metohija u srpskoj istoriji, pp. 361-375.
3 K. Cavoski, Uspostavljanje i razvoj kosovske autonomije, in: Kosovo i
Metohija u srpskoj istoriji, pp. 379-383
4 V. Djuretic, Kosovo i Metohija u Jugoslaviji, pp. 329-333; More
details in: B. Tonnes, Sonderfall Albanien - Enver Hoxhas "Einiger Weg" und
die historischen Ursprung seiner ideologic, Munchen 1980.
5 V. Djuretic, op. cit., pp. 334-341.
6 Large documentation in: R. Rajovic, Autonomija Kosova.
Istorijsko-pravna studija, Beograd 1985
7 Kosovo. Proslost i sadasnjost, pp. 151-257. Cf. J. Reuter, Die
Albaner in Jugoslawien, Munchen 1982, pp. 43-101; S. K. Pavlowitch, The
Improbable Survivor. Yugoslavia and its Problems 1918-1988, London 1988, pp.
78-93.
8 M Misovic, Ko je trazio republiku Kosovo 1945-1985, Beograd 1987.
PART TWO: THEOCRACY, NATIONALISM, IMPERIALISM

FROM THE SERBIAN REVOLUTION TO THE EASTERN CRISIS: 1804-1875
At the beginning of the 19th century, the Serbs in Kosovo and Metohia
lived under extremely unfavorable circumstances. Toward the end of the 18th
century, the general position of Christian subjects in the European
provinces of the Ottoman Empire was becoming worse with authority
deteriorating in the Turkish administration. A country in which affiliation
to Islam marked the foundation of state ideology, Christians were citizens
of a lower order. The empire was overcome by refeudalization. The
timar-sipahi system was turning into the chiflik-sahibi system, thus
affecting mostly Christian farmers. Arrogation of peasant land and the
imposition of additional taxes were carried out by force. The destruction of
free peasant estates, thus constraining farmers to the position of tenant
farmers (chiflik farmers), the evacuation of entire villages and forceful
Islamization made life insufferable for the Christian people of the Balkans.
Uprisings and movements at the beginning of the century announced a struggle
for the restoration of national states on the Balkan Peninsula.¹
The unique religious, ethnic and political character had made life more
difficult for the Serbs in Kosovo and Metohia than in other European
provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Aside to the misfortune common to all
Christians of the European parts of the empire (religious intolerance, legal
and economic unprotectedness) was an arduous struggle for physical and
national survival. The Serbs of Kosovo and Metohia had intercepted the path
leading to the biological expansion of the powerful Albanian populace living
in neighboring regions or admixed with the Serbs. The Albanians were an
ethnic element with strong tribal organization only consolidated through
Islam. Sloping the grey mountains circumscribing Kosovo and Metohia on the
south, armed Albanian herdsmen descended to the plains of Kosovo and
Metohia, routing native Serbian inhabitants to make space for the settlement
of their fellow tribesmen. Albanian settlements sprouted in Kosovo and
Metohia like freely growing weeds. Wedging themselves like pegs into compact
Serbian settlements, the armed ethnic Albanians imposed upon the unarmed
Serbs an unequal struggle over the land.
On the plane of political determination, ethnic Albanians were the most
conservative element on the Peninsula, loyal to the shenat. Headed by
illiterate and xenophobic tribal chiefs (krenas) and feudal lords, without
true national awareness, the Albanian highlander was doubly intolerant
toward the Orthodox Serbian. As Islamic believers and representatives of a
privileged class in the state, they defined themselves to the Serbs
confessionally, calling them infidels (djaurs), thus underscoring religious
intolerance and social inequality. Certain racial intolerance was older than
Islamization. ethnic Albanians of all confessions living in regions composed
of an intermingled populace, called the Slavic inhabitants derogatorily Ski,
thus emphasizing an ethnic distinction and their superiority.
In the mid-17th century, when Muslim ethnic Albanians more often occupy
the highest positions in Constantinople, the rise of their fellow tribesmen
to the high military and administrative hierarchy of the Ottoman state
began. Their influence on the policies of the Porte was wielded through the
sultan's personal guard comprised mostly of select ethnic Albanians. From
the second half of the 19th century until the beginning of the 20th century,
mostly during the reign of Sultan Abdulhamid II (1878-1909), they largely
attained eminent positions in the army and administration.
Surrounded by companies of their fellow tribesmen, at times when the
authority exercised by the central government was sinking, Albanian Muslims
became autocratic, hereditary feudal lords, and often sinewy outlaws of the
Turkish authorities. During the Napoleonic wars, the rule of independent and
semi-independent pashas marked the political circumstances in the Ottoman
Empire: beginning with the Belgrade pashalik, where power was usurped by
four dahis, proceeding through Vidine and Janina, where Osman Pasha
Pasvanoglu and the famous All Pasha Tepellena ruled, ending with Syria and
Egypt; provincial governors rose to independent and insubordinate rulers.
The feudal lords of Kosovo and Metohia ruled completely independent of
the central government. Following long struggles for dominion in some
regions, several notable families that gave hereditary regents to the
provinces distinguished themselves. In Pristina and Gnjilane the Dime family
ruled until the end of the 18th century, in the Prizren sanjak the
Rotulovices, originally from Ljuma, and in Pec the powerful Mahmudbegovices,
lords of Metohia from mid-18th century. The ethnic Albanians of Muslim
faith, under the leadership of feudal lords or outlawed regents, were
considered followers of the old regime founded on the sheriat law and
liberal tribal privileges. Their rule was tolerated because they secured
Ottoman legitimacy in regions densely populated by Christian Serbian
inhabitants.²
Independent pashas were also carriers of a proselyte policy in the
central countries of the former Nemanjic state. A surge of religious
intolerance, especially from the end of the 18th century, tossed the
systematic persecution of Christians throughout the Ottoman Empire. When
they grew to heavy pogroms, a large part of the already thinned and deeply
inflamed populace in Kosovo and Metohia adopted Islam to save their bare
existence and family hearths. At the end of the 18th century and the
beginning of the 19th century almost all the Orthodox Serbs from Gora, a
zhupa near Prizren, were compelled to convert to Islam.³
Even though the Serbs always regarded conversion as a temporary and
inevitable evil, the second and third generations were already taking wives
from Muslim Albanian families. Thus Islamization became permanent. Among the
descendants who entered Albanian clans through marriage alliances, accepting
the language and gradually becoming Albanized, old family names were an
admonition of the Serbian past, a token to the glory of the cross. The
ethnic Albanians, as the Orthodox Serbs referred to them, became in time the
most extreme tyrants.⁴
1 The following works provide a synthetical survey on the life of
Serbian people in Kosovo and Metohia in the 19th and the beginning of the
20th century:
Kosovo nekad i sad (Kosova dikur e sot), chapter: Kosovo pod turskom
vlascu, (H, Kalesi), Beograd 1973, pp. 145-176; Istorija srpskog naroda V/1,
Beograd 1981, pp. 14-16, 133-148 (N. Rakocevic, Dj. Mikic); D. Bogdanovic,
Knjiga o Kosovu, Beograd 1983, pp. 126-195; D. Mikic, Drustveno-politicki
razvoj kosovskih Srba u XIX veku, Glasnik Muzeja Kosova, XIII-XIV (1984),
pp. 231-260. Most informative on the first half of the century is a
monography by V. Stojancevic, Juznoslovenski narodi u Osmanskom Carstvu od
Jedrenskog mira 1829 do Pariskog kongresa 1856 godine, Beograd 1971; On
economy see Dj. Mikic, Drustvene i ekonomske prilike kosovskih Srba u XIX i
pocetkom XX veka, od cifcijstva do bankarstva, Beograd 1988; on territorial
organization in the administrative apparatus see H. Kalesi - H-J. Kornrumpf,
Prizrenski vilajet, Perparimi, 1 (1967), pp. 71-124.
2 Istorija srpskog naroda, V/1, A. Urosevic, Etnicki procesi na Kosovu
tokom turske vladavine, Beograd 1987.
3 M. Lutovac, Gora i Opolje, Antropogeografska istrazivanja, Naselja i
poreklo stanovnistva, 35 (1955), pp. 230-279.
4 J. Cvijic, Osnove za geografiju i geologiju Makedonije i Stare
Srbije, III, Beograd 1911, pp. 1162-1166; Todor P. Stankovic, Putne beleske
po Staroj Srbiji 1871-1898, Beograd 1910, pp. 111-140.
The Serbian Insurrection and Pasha-Outlaws
The attempts of Sultan Selim III (1789-1807) to change and modernize
the administrative system of the Ottoman Empire with reforms ended in
failure. Resistance to the reforms was exceptionally strong throughout the
empire. Reform plans to improve the position of Christians turned the
Albanian feudal lords and tribal chiefs of Kosovo against the Orthodox
Serbs - chiflik farmers on their large sipahiliks. Efforts undertaken by the
Sublime Porte to win over support from Albanian lords in Kosovo against
outlawed provincial regents had no apparent effect. Albanian pashas,
availing themselves of a favorable opportunity to greater gain by imposing
new taxes upon the rayah, took no heed to orders from
Constantinople.¹
The Serbian Insurrection against the dahis in the Belgrade pashalik in
1804, under the leadership of Karadjordje (Black George), moved the Serbs in
all regions of the Ottoman Empire. Beginning as an uprising against the
dahis, the insurrection soon grew into the first national revolution of
Balkan Christians, opening the perspectives of a total national liberation.
At that moment, the Serbs in Kosovo and Metohia, remote from the Belgrade
pashalik, unarmed and without immediate contact with the leadership of the
insurrection, had no opportunity to rise and join the insurgents. The feudal
lords of Kosovo used the beginning of the Serbian national revolution to
consolidate and expand their power. The Porte needed their assistance both
to curbe the rebelling forces and as a warrant against any moves the Serbs
might make in regions under their control.
Chronic lawlessness, perpetual danger from possible incursions of
Albanian outlaws, religious intolerance and the unbearable clench of feudal
lords all created an impenetrable wall separating the Serbs of Kosovo and
Metohia from rebelling Serbia. Hardly any testimony remains from individual
participants of the Serbian national revolution. Nevertheless, some
documentation was preserved from the boldest among them, whose affairs took
them to Belgrade and the bordering Austrian regions, and who found
themselves in the center of events.²
An important role in preparations for the rebellion was played by
Andrija, a wealthy merchant from Prizren (father of Sima Andrejevic
Igumanov, a renown Serbian benefactor and founder of the Seminary in
Prizren), who had extensive business ties in Belgrade, Pest and Vienna. On
the eve of the uprising against the dahis, he secretly transported gunpowder
from Zemun to Belgrade. When the uprising began, Andrija continued to supply
the rebellious companies with arms and ammunition. Two of his four sons,
Kraguj and Petar, fought in the insurgent lines with several other Serbs
from Prizren, until the fall of the insurrection in 1813.³
Beside Andrija, the most prominent Serbian from Prizren to take part in
the First Serbian Insurrection was Anta Colak Simonovic, who moved to
Belgrade when he was a young man, and dealt in furs. On the eve of the
insurrection, the Belgrade dahis ordered several loads of guns from him.
Colak Anta obtained the arms in Prizren, but on his return he handed them
over to Karadjordje at Topola. When the surrounding Turkish provinces rose
together with Sumadija (regions between the Drina and Tara rivers, the
tribal regions of Drobnjak, Moraca and Albanian Kliments) in 1805, the
number of volunteers joining Karadjordje's troops from Kosovo, Metohia, Old
Raska and other regions increased.
From the beginning of the uprising, void (supreme leader) Karadjordje
aimed to raise in arms, beside the Belgrade pashalik, as many lands of
Serbia as possible. From 1806, the insurgent army penetrated toward Stari
Vlah, Bosnia and Macedonia. The following year the insurgents reached
Kursumlija, and in 1809, using their alliance with Russia, then at war with
Turkey, the insurgent companies extended to Sjenica, Nova Varos, Prijepolje
and Bijelo Polje. According to the estimates of a French travel writer,
Henri Pouqueville, who passed through Kosovo in 1807, areas around Banjska
were encompassed by the insurrection, while Gerasim, the bishop of Sabac,
left testimony on the area of upper Ibar, on the space between Josanica,
Kopaonik and Vucitrn, where battles were waged with aid from the local
Serbian populace. Historian Stojan Novakovic even believed that the whole
region was under Serbian control until the fall of the Insurrection in
1813.⁴
Karadjordje's endeavor to establish contact with Montenegrin tribes
through the Sjenica instigated a considerable number of Serbs from Kosovo to
join the insurgent forces and caused fermentation among the Serbs of the
northwestern parts of Kosovo. In the Ibarski Kolasin, a wooded and
impassable area, inhabited mostly by Serbians, a movement was formed to aid
Karadjordje's campaign at the Sjenica. However, the Turks discovered their
intentions and captured the most famous leaders of Kolasin, banishing them
to exile in Egypt.⁵
Karadjordje's victorious campaign toward Montenegro and Kosovo was
severed by the defeat of Serbian insurgents at the battle of Kamenica near
Nis, in 1809. The army at the southwest of Serbia was forced to retreat
north; the endeavor to expand the uprising to Montenegro and the northern
regions of Kosovo came to an end.
The victories of the Serbian troops during the first years of waging
seriously imperilled the feudal privileges and estates of Albanian pashas in
Metohia and Kosovo, where the rayah was mostly Serbian. When the flame of
the uprising spread to the surrounding countries, commotion arose even among
Albanian leaders in north Albania. The Belgrade dahis and representatives of
the Turkish government in Serbia, of whom a considerable number were ethnic
Albanians, strove since 1804 to win over Albanian pashas in the neighboring
regions for the struggle against a common enemy.
Turkish forces engaged to wage Serbian troops on the southern and
southwestern battlefield were composed mainly of ethnic Albanians lead by
pashas and tribal chiefs. In 1806, the bashibazouk (irregular) troops of the
pashas of Scutari, Leskovac, Vranje, Pristina, Djakovica, Prizren and
Skoplje, a force numbering 33,800 men, assembled at the Morava, at a front
toward the Serbs. Many of them fought Serbian insurgents in the years to
follow. The Turkish army, composed of ethnic Albanians, checked the Serbs at
Prijepolje and Nova Varos. In the battles at the Sjenica and Suvodol in
1809, the decisive role in defeating the Serbs was played by troops
belonging to the pashas of Scutari and Pec. In battles waged at Rozaj, the
pasha od Djakovica was defeated. Muktar Pasha, son of the most influential
independent Albanian feudal lord, Ali Pasha Tepellena of Janina, fought
against the Serbs at Deligrad. Battling together with Albanian feudal lords
against the Serbs were influential tribal chiefs - krenas. At the battle of
Kamenica alone four standard bearers of one clan were killed at Drenica.
Mehmed Pasha Rotulovic and his army took part at the battle of Kamenica and
returned to Prizren with loads of spoil and Serbian slaves -women and
children.⁶
The hereditary pashas of Kosovo, Metohia and north Albania were a
constant threat to Karadjordje and his successor Knez (Prince) Milos
Obrenovic. When possibilities for resuming the struggle were discussed prior
to the 1813 fall of the Serbian Insurrection, Karadjordje counted on the
possibility of all ethnic Albanians being dispatched to Serbia. He thus
entreated Prince-Bishop Petar I of Montenegro to execute a demonstration on
the Albanian border to compel their neighbors to remain on their land. A
similar entreaty was again sent by prince Milos to the Metropolitan of
Cetinje in 1821, for fear that the uprising in Greece might be followed by a
Turkish preventive incursion on Serbia.
The number of armed men under the command of Albanian pashas displayed
the dimensions of their military capabilities, as well as deep fear [or the
possibility of the insurrection expanding to their regions. The victories of
the insurgents caused the exertion of great pressure upon the subjugated
Serbian populace under Albanian lords. Lord Malic Pasha Dzinic of the
Pristina region, moved Serbian chiflik farmers from the northern areas of
Lab, and settled ethnic Albanians to secure the boundaries of his territory
from incursions of insurgent Serbian companies. Passing in 1807 through
Pristina, estimating around 1,500 homes in it, Henri Pouqueville noted:
"From its narrow and muddy streets, poor trade, wretched people and the
bloodthirsty rule of Malic Pasha, who then commanded, a distinct aura of
terror and woe emanated. It did not seem appropriate to pay a visit to the
Albanian, a sworn mortal enemy of the Christians".⁷
Anarchy created through the rule of independent pashas was favorable to
the raiding parties of Albanian outlaws. They attacked passengers and
merchant caravans from their hideouts, plundered and blackmailed the
Christian rayah, assaulted and dishonored their wives and daughters. In
Gnjilane, Pouqueville saw passengers raided by outlaws and learnt that some
merchants were killed just at the entrance to the town. As a result, at
orders given by pashas, entire forests were burnt in spaces between
Pristina, Gnjilane, Novo Brdo and Kumanovo, where the outlaws
hid.⁸
The position of the Serbs in Kosovo and Metohia did not change even
when comparative peace prevailed in Serbia. Kosovo was governed by Jashar
Pasha, nephew of Malic Pasha, inviolable lord of the Pristina sanjak during
the second and third decades of the 19th century. He was engraved in the
memory of the people on account of his merciless persecution of the Serbs,
the destruction of their free estates, confiscation of church and monastic
lands, and, above all, for demolishing Serbian villages. For less than a
decade, Jashar Pasha succeeded in destroying or evacuating 32 Serbian
villages in the Pristina nahi, 22 in the Vucitrn nahi, and another 25
settlements in other parts of Kosovo. Jashar Pasha distributed a large
amount of the seized lands among newcome Albanian settlers and local Muslims
of Serbian origin, while also appropriating some himself. The newcome ethnic
Albanians, mainly herdsmen, had no experience in farming so the fertile
plains of Kosovo soon became neglected pastures.⁹
Faced with the terror of the Pristina pasha, the Serbs fled to the
nearby sanjaks of Vranje or Leskovac, or crossed over to Serbia under the
wing of knez Milos. Similar examples where deliberate change in the
demographic picture of certain Turkish provinces were carried out existed in
southern Albania and northwestern Greece, where the brutal Ali Pasha of
Janina mercilessly destroyed Christian villages, forcefully executed
Islamization and reduced farmers to tenant, chiflik farmers. During the
twenties of the 19th century (1821-1825), armies of feudal lords utterly
devastated vast lands from Moreja to Epirus and Thessaly while fighting
Greek insurgents.¹⁰
The reform action of Sultan Mahmud II (1808-1839), the introduction of
a regular army and abolition of the Janissary Corps (1826) infuriated the
independent pashas in Metohia and Kosovo. Intentions to grant certain rights
to the Christians inflamed the hatred of Muslim ethnic Albanians. Anarchy,
marking a period of unlimited power for independent pashas, suited many
outlaws. "During the reigns of these pashas, any Muhammedan could, if he
desired, murder any Serb without due consequence, only if he sought refuge
under a mosque or tekke. In those days, Prizren, Kosovo, Pec, Djakovica and
Scutari were governed by harshest oppression."¹¹
To survive, the Serbs turned to collective mimicry. The men wore
Albanian clothes, and the women veiled their faces. Jashar Pasha attacked
Serbian churches, especially the Gracanica monastery and the Samodreza
church. He demolished four Serbian churches (in Batus, Skulanovac, Rujan and
Slovinja and the Lipljan church parvis) and built a bridge from their stone
over the Sitnica river near Lipljan. The clergy also bore the brunt of
independent pashas. In 1820, two monks from the Decani monastery were hanged
in Novi Pazar, and one in Pristina.¹²
As soon as imminent danger from the expansion of the Serbian, and then
Greek insurrection was past, rivalry among Albanian lords for dominion over
the surrounding territories revived. The Serbs were the greatest victims:
they were compelled to receive them for overnight stay, supply food and
provide field trains for the armies of warring provincial regents. In these
campaigns, requisition, imposition of additional taxes and the looting of
Christian villages, through which the army passed, was habitual. At the end
of the conflict, the Christians would be overwhelmed by both the rage of the
defeated and the plunder of the victorious.
In March 1827, a small provincial war began, when regent of Scutari,
Mustafa Pasha Bushatli (the so-called Shkodra Pasha), ventured to subjugate
Numan Pasha of Pec. The clash spread when the regents of neighboring regions
were hauled into it, being troubled, like Jashar Pasha, by insubordinate
tribes in their own regions.¹³
The need for fresh forces was imposed by the Russo-Turkish war
(1828-1829), in which the sultan's troops on the battleground of the
Bulgarian Danube Basin, were faced with great temptations. The Porte granted
Mustafa Pasha of Scutari dominion over Scutari, Elbasan, Debar and Dukadjin,
expecting him, in return, to muster and dispatch a large army to the Danube
front. Meanwhile, Prince Milos acquired through money and sage advice, a
considerable number of admirers among north Albanian tribal chiefs, and
strove to dissuade the powerful Scutari pasha from sending 60,000 warriors
to assist the sultan's army. The Prince warned him that the reforms of
Mahmud II were directed mainly against hereditary pashas. However, the
belligerent disposition of his fellow tribesmen compelled Mustafa Pasha to
dispatch his army to the Russian front, but instead of 60,000, he sent only
2,000 warriors. The powerful Scutari pasha was then able to establish his
rule in Metohia.¹⁴
The Peace Treaty of Edime, signed in 1829, under conditions extremely
unfavorable for the Ottoman Empire, deepened its internal crisis. The
Christian populace, the uprisings of which, owing to Russia's support,
developed into movements for national liberation, was faced with novel
temptations. In Kosovo and Metohia, where conflicts between provincial
regents were frequent, and autocracy toward the Christians was acquiring a
more immediate physical and fiscal pressure, anarchy was widely expanding
its dimensions.
The news that Prince Milos intended to establish the borders of his
recently recognized Principality (Knezevina) in 1830, according to the
decrees of the Bucharest Peace Treaty of 1812, disturbed the pashas and beys
of six nahis, formerly under Karadjordje's rule. Jashar Pasha of Pristina
secured the borders of his regions from the territorial pretensions of the
Serbian Prince by compelling the evacuation of Serbs through terror. He
settled ethnic Albanians from Malissia, Metohia and the vicinity of Scutari
in their place.¹⁵
When the imminent danger of new wars was past, Mahmud II was determined
to intercept the obstinacy and disloyalty of hereditary pashas. The educated
Sultan particularly disliked Albanian chiefs, followers of the conservative
Islamic order, who hindered the realization of his aspirations to end feudal
anarchy and create a modern, centralized state. His reforms anticipated the
abolition of all feudal and tribal autonomies, the formation of a regular
army, introduction of military duties, equation of tax payments and
improvement in the position of Christians.
Strongest objection to the reforms came from Bosnia, Albania, Metohia
and Kosovo. The ethnic Albanians saw in these reforms a most serious threat
to their privileges. The Porte counted on their objection beforehand, since
they could easily turn against Turkish authorities armed to the full. The
most difficult part was compelling them to join the regular army. Thus the
most important reform task for the ethnic Albanians was crushing the power
of numerous independent pashas who would not recognize central government,
and by refusing to acknowledge modern judiciary, remained loyal to the
common law according to the Law of Leka Dukagjinit.
Albanian leaders were not only against the introduction of novel
reforms but requested of the Porte to recognize all their benefits and
tribal independence: "The new army was introduced to destroy the old feudal
one. The regular army and the prohibition to carry arms - aimed to destroy
Albanian condottieres enabling ethnic Albanians to attain privileged
positions in Turkey - since, like military castes, they had a free hand
concerning the Christian tribes they brutally exploited without bearing any
legal consequences. Thus, the reform deeply cleaved Albanian tribal
relations [...]".¹⁶
The Albanian pashas objected to the orders of the Porte to surrender
their arms. In 1831, a large assembly of Albanian leaders, ulems and tribal
chiefs in Scutari, rejected the Sultan's decrees as contrary to Islamic law,
determined to defend the existing system by force. Mustafa Pasha refused to
obey the sultan's order to receive a garrison of a regular army in Scutari
and to submit territories granted him during the war for governing over to
the grand vizier. He was supported by independent pashas in Prizren, Pec,
Djakovica, Pristina, Debar, Vranje, Tetovo, Skoplje and Leskovac, who had
every reason to be worried about their positions if the reforms were to be
implemented. Mustafa Pasha, the last Bushatii, found new allies in Bosnia
where the beys decidedly opposed the introduction of reforms.
The empire was so endangered that Grand Vizier Mahmud Reshid Pasha lead
his army against the ethnic Albanians in person. A large number of Albanian
leaders from south Albania were killed upon encountering him at Bitolj in
1830. At orders from the Porte, the grand vizier introduced "many beneficial
decrees" in Pristina and Vucitrn in summer 1832, thus improving the up till
then insufferable position of the Serbian Christian rayah in villages
throughout Kosovo.
In 1835-1836, after crushing the power of insubordinate Bosnian
captains, the Turkish army finally eliminated the independent pashas of Old
Serbia - Mahmud Pasha Rotulovic of Prizren, Arslan Pasha of Pec, Seifudin
Pasha of Djakovica, and finally the heirs to the Pristina Dinices, by
warring rebellious tribes in mid and south Albania, on whose side the feudal
lords of Pec, Debar and Djakovica fought. The law on the timar system was
abrogated. The administration was entrusted to army commanders, and measures
were implemented to centralize the administration and tax system. The
sanjaks of Scutari, Prizren and Pec were under the control of the Rumehan
vilayet seated at Bitolj. The established regime was considerably more
endurable for the Serbian rayah than the brutal reign of independent
pashas.¹⁷
1 D. Mikic, Drustveno-politicki razvoj kosovskih Srba u XIX veku, p.
231.
2 D. Mikic, Oslobodilacka aktivnost kosovskih Srba u svetlosti srpske
revolucije 1804-1813, Obelezja, 11 (1981), pp. 39-46; idem.,
Drustveno-politicki razvoj kosovskih Srba u XIX veku, pp. 231-232.
3 D. Mikic, Drustveno-politicki razvoj kosovskih Srba u XIX veku, p.
232.
4 St. Novakovic, Manastir Banjska u srpskoj istoriji, Beograd 1892, pp.
35-41; A. Popovic, Ustanak u gornjem Ibru i Kopaoniku 1806-1813, Godisnjica
Nikole Cupica, 27 1908), p. 229.
5 Several years hence only few people of Kolasin returned from exile in
Egypt. M. Lutovac, Ibarski Kolasin, Naselja i poreklo stanovnistva, 34
(1958), pp. 8-10.
6 Albanians of Catholic and Orthodox faith fought against the Turkish
authorities at the time. The Catholic Albanian tribe Kliment fought with
Montenegrin tribes Kuci, Piper and Bjelopavlici against vizier of Scutari,
Ibrahim Pasha in 1805. South, the Toskas - Orthodox Albanians, fought with
the Greeks and Tzintzars against Ali Pasha of Janina. See D. Mikic,
Drustveno-politicki razvoj kosovskih Srba u XIX veku, 234; I. Dermaku, Neki
aspekti saradnje Srbije i Albanaca u borbi protiv turskog feudalizma od
1804-1868. godine Glasnik Muzeja Kosova, XI (1971-1972), pp. 236-238.
7 S. Novakovic, Iz godine 1807. srpske istorije, Iz belezaka s
putovanja H. Pukvilja kroz Bosnu i Staru Srbiju, Godisnjica Nikole Cupica, 2
(1878), p. 275.
8 Ibid., pp. 276-277.
9 V. Stojancevic, Juznoslovenski narodi u Osmanskom Carstvu, pp.
115-117.
10 V. Stojancevic, Drzava i drustveno obnovljenje Srbije (1815-1839),
Beograd 1986, pp. 38.
11 Savremenici o Kosovu i Metohiji 1852-1912, fed. D. T. Batakovic),
Beograd 1988,300.
12 V. R. Petkovic - D. Boskovic, Visoki Decani, I, Beograd 1941,p. 16;
J. Popovic, Zivot Srba na Kosovu 1812-1912, Beograd 1987, p. 220.
13 V. Stojancevic, Juznoslovenski narodi u Osmanskom Carstvu, pp.
45-46.
14 Mustafa Pasha's army included 150 Montenegrins from the Vasojevic
tribe, headed by voivode Sima Lakic (ibid., pp. 46-47.)
15 V. Stojancevic, Juznoslovenski narodi u Osmanskom Carstvu, pp. 46,
332.
16 D. M. Pavlovic, Pokret u Bosni i Albaniji protivu reforama Mahmuda
II, Beograd 1913, pp. 73-74.
17 Ibid., pp. 80-89; V. Stojancevic, Juznoslovenski narodi u Osmanskom
Carstvu, pp. 117-128.
Time of Reforms in Turkey
The successor to Mahmud II, Sultan Abdul Mejid (1839-1861) issued, in
1839, the famous Hattisherif of Gulhane that was to become some sort of a
"charter of freedom" for subjects of the Ottoman Empire. The Christians were
officially equated with the Muslims. The imperial letter warranted their
lives, protection, honor and property. It anticipated the introduction to a
regular military obligation, centralization of government and fiscal
reorganization, as well as the Europeanization of judiciary and education.
In Kosovo, Metohia and Albania, however, the Tanzimat reforms were
never effected to the full. At the beginning of the reforms, the mainly
Serbian populace was left without its self-governing community, previously
renewed by the firmans of erstwhile sultans, but it benefited from the calm
by renewing devastated fields. The reforms brought the revival of business
for the merchants and handicraftsmen in towns throughout Kosovo, and the
right to erect churches and schools. The comparatively quiet years brought
some relief to the Serbs, but not for long.
Discontent growing in Bosnia and Rumelia due to the reforms, encroached
Kosovo and Albania. The ethnic Albanians would not concede to centralization
and the abolition of their feudal and tribal privileges. In 1839, the ethnic
Albanians of Prizren rebelled, routing the local sanjak-bey.
The aggravated position of Serbs in Turkey incited a great Christian
insurrection in the Nis sanjak in spring, 1841. The insurrection,
preparations of which were known in Belgrade, spread to southern Serbia and
western Bulgaria. Kosovo and Metohia did not have the conditions to rise
although some preparations were made in the Prizren, Djakovica and Pec
regions. The insurrection was brutally suppressed by Albanian Muslims.
Representatives of Great Powers, especially Russia and France, surprised at
the dimensions of violence, requested from the Porte information on the
position of Serbs in rebelling regions.¹
Again fermentation swarmed over Kosovo in 1843 with the collection of
taxes and regular military recruits. The Albanian insurrection against the
Turkish authorities began in 1844, broke out in Pristina and soon spread to
Prizren, Djakovica, Skoplje and Tetovo. It was seated at Skoplje and headed
by Dervish Tzara. At the beginning, the insurgents overmastered part of
Kosovo, occupied Skoplje, Tetovo, Pristina, Veles and the vicinity of
Bitolj. The Turkish army managed to suppress the insurrection in summer
1844, after several severe clashes.
During the insurrection, the Serbs were cleaved between the ethnic
Albanians and Turkish troops, like they had been so many times before. In
Vranje, the rebels roasted Serbian youths on fire only because they took
part in the construction of a new church. After driving out the state tax
collector (muhasil) in Pristina, 1841, the ethnic Albanians exacted taxes
from the Serbs by employing weapons, even though they were explicitly
forbidden to do so under the firman. In the vicinity of Pec, according to
the testimony of Gedeon Josif Jurisic, a monk from the Decani monastery, the
highlanders of Malissia were public outlaws. Supported by local district
chiefs (zabits), they wreaked terror upon the Serbs without any
disturbance.²
In a complaint lodged to the French consul at Belgrade, sent by 19
leaders of the Pristina and Vucitrn kaza in the name of the Serbs, seven
points include many examples of suffering due to Albanian violence. In a
petition to the Russian Tzar Nicholas I, official protector of Orthodox
inhabitants in the Ottoman Empire, the Serbs of Prizren entreated, at the
end of 1844, for protection against innumerable oppressions: "Allow not, you
most Honored liberator, for heaven's sake, allow not us paupers and people
to become Turkized, and flee to lands unknown! Our children were Turkized,
our wives and daughters dishonored, raped; our brothers gunned down in
uncountable numbers, treading on our law [faith], and dishonoring our
priests, pulling them by their beards. Fleecing us immeasurably, each in his
own manner; the pasha fleeces, the bey fleeces, and the sipahi, the master
and sub-pasha, the qadi and oppressors - all fleece!"³
Devastation and murder did not bypass the monasteries Visoki Decani and
the Pec Patriarchate, where Albanian outlaws murdered several monks.
1 Istorija srpskog naroda, V/1, pp. 241-243.
2 Savremenici o Kosovu i Metohiji 1852-1912, pp. 6-7.
3 Zaduzbine Kosova, Prizren - Beograd, 1987, pp. 612-613; D. Mikic,
Drustvene i ekonomske prilike kosovskih Srba, pp. 21.

Pogroms in Metohia
The fifties of the 19th centuries passed in the dispersion of anarchy,
while the sixties marked new Albanian revolts in the political scene of
Kosovo and Metohia, with new Serbian suffering. When Serbia endeavored to
prepare a widespread uprising of Balkan Christians against the Turks, Kosovo
and Metohia were totally out of reach to Serbian national and political
propaganda. The control of Muslim ethnic Albanians over Serbian inhabitants
excluded any possible cooperation with Serbia. Periodical Albanian revolts
against the new measures of the Porte in the Pristina region in 1855, in the
area of Djakovica 1866, in the Prizren, Pec and Djakovica region in
1866-1867, again in Pec in 1869, and operations carried out by the Ottoman
army against them, resulted in heavy pogroms of the Serbian populace.
¹
After the Crimean War (1853-1856), anti-Orthodox and anti-Serbian
feelings in the southwestern parts of the Ottoman Empire culminated;
Serbian pogroms attained wider dimensions. Albanization of the Serbs,
stimulated by independent pashas during the first decades of the 19th
century, reached their peak during the Crimean War. The Albanian language
was then accepted in many Islamized Serbian villages. The Cherkezes,
colonized then in Kosovo, surpassed in the devastations and murders of the
Christian populace.
The monastic fraternities of Visoki Decani and the Pec Patriarchate
lodged a complaint to the Serbian government and church dignitaries of the
Principality of Serbia, warning them of the dimensions of violence and the
frequency of banditry. The monks of Decani entreated the Serbian government
in 1856 to somehow intermediate with the Turkish authorities to put an end
to the violence. Archimandrite Hadji Serafim Ristic of Decani entreated
Prince Milos in 1859 to aid the monastery and intercede to the Porte for the
protection of the Decani laura. He warned that "since the last war until
today we are more concerned with armed defense from the perpetual attacks of
ethnic Albanians and Turks, and the papists [French Catholic missionaries],
luring us by various wiles."²
Attestations of Serbian origin evincing the position of Christian Serbs
in Metohia and Kosovo exhibit detailed portrayals of the horrifying pogroms.
Attempts to draw attentions to the arduous sufferings of the Serbs with the
sultan and the government of the Serbian Principality, the Russian court and
the European public were particularly expressed by the learned Archimandrite
Hadji Serafim Ristic, prior of the Visoki Decani monastery.
When Grand Vizier Kirbizli Mehmed Pasha called on the European
provinces of the empire in 1860, establishing order by punishing the
insubordinate Christians at the borders, Hadji Serafim, together with local
Serbian leaders, submitted to him people's complaints in Pristina. Their
hopes that the vizier's visit would wield influence in curbing Albanian
anarchy dispersed: the grand vizier saw the Christians only as rebels and
malcontents.³
The Prior of Decani, however, did not abate in his attempts to help he
people. His petitions to Sultan Abdulaziz, Russian Tzar Alexander II and
Serbian Prince Mihailo contained lists of countless brutalities committed by
ethnic Albanians upon the Serbian populace in Metohia. In the book Plac
Stare Srbija (Wails of Old Serbia, Zemun 1864) - which he dedicated to the
British pastor William Denton - aiming to demonstrate "that evil deeds
committed by the Turks upon the rayah had gone one step too far", Ristic
submitted a complaint to the sultan from 1860, in which he included several
hundred examples of violence committed by ethnic Albanians over the Serbs -
fires, plunders, murders, blackmail, fleecing, confiscation of property and
cattle-raiding, raping of women and children, destroying churches and
abusing priests and monks - naming the doers and victims.
Addressing the sultan, the Archimandrite of Decani entreated that his
quiet complaint "against brutal Albanian oppressors" be heard, for if they
were not stopped, the Serbs would be compelled to leave their fatherlands
wherever the sultan ordered: "Pec and the Pec nahi indescribably scourged
day after day, with increasing evils on the part of ethnic Albanians, with
no errors committed, God only knows why, afore the eyes of Your councils and
pashas wailing upon their bitter destiny in bondage.'⁴
Russian diplomat and historian AF. Hilferding, while sojourning Metohia
in 1858, penned numerous examples of oppression upon the Serbian
inhabitants. He remarked that there were few parishioners in the Gorioc
monastery, "all poor men horribly oppressed by the ethnic Albanians". He was
convinced that Serbian Christians in Pec endured insults and injuries from
the unbridled and hot-tempered ethnic Albanians every day, and that measures
undertaken by the township chief (mudir) "who strives to bridle and punish
the Albanian obstinacy" had no effect, since his small in number policemen
(zaptijas) were drafted from Albanian lines: "What could one man with the
best of intentions do against an armed mass ignorant of law and judgment,
habituated to unlimited obstinacy and tyranny, in other words, as the local
saying goes, one that fears God a bit, the Emperor not at all'."⁵
Almost exact observations on the position of Serbs in Old Serbia were
noted by two Englishwomen, Miss Irby and Miss MacKenzie, in their famous
traveling account of the Slavic countries of European Turkey. Their
description on the position of ethnic Albanians in Pec reads: Their
indifference to authority and the importance of the Porte is as harsh as
their insolence and cruelty against the Christians. A Turkish mudir in
Vucitrn complained to the two ladies that with a dozen zaptijas there was
little he could accomplish against the self-will of ethnic Albanians: there
are 200 Christian houses and 400-500 Muslim ones, so the ethnic Albanians do
as they please. They seize from the Christians whatever and whenever they
desire; so many times they would walk into a man's store, require some goods
and then leave by simply saying they would pay another time, and often
without saying as much. Even worse in the affair is their wholly savage,
stupid and unrestrained living that retains the entire society to a state of
barbarism and since the Christians receive no help against them and no
education from Constantinople, they thus turn to Serbia for everything - to
the Serbia of the past, inspiring themselves to enthusiasm by its memories,
and to the Principality for hope, advice and enlightenment.⁶
Official reports of Yevgeny Timayev, the first Russian consul to
Prizren - representative of the power that had been the traditional
protector of Orthodox subjects in the Ottoman Empire - complete the picture
of the situation in Metohia and the dimensions of suffering endured by the
Serbian population in the second half of the sixties. At the end of 1866,
Timayev reported on the severity of violences inflicted by ethnic Albanians
of the Pec nahi. Devastating about a dozen Serbian villages, they murdered
the male progeny and assaulted the women, and even desecrated the graves of
their forefathers. In Pec, as cited by Timayev, government representatives
aided the ethnic Albanians in their maltreatment of Serbian Christians:
"They receive letters from Pec informing me that crimes committed by the
ethnic Albanians are countless, that the destruction of the Christians is
immeasurable and unexpressible, while the local Turkish authorities give
assurance of peace, stating that nothing unusual is happening. These
assurances cannot be trusted, by no means, because I have irreprovable
evidence of an irregular and disquieting situation in the
country."⁷
Parallel to the extent of oppression, observed Timayev, was the
forceful colonization of ethnic Albanians to Old Serbia: "The Albanian
people overmastering more and more of the lands they settle, and will
perhaps soon play a role in the destiny of Europe, notwithstanding the
current illiterate and almost savage condition of the majority. [...] Mass
Albanian settlings of the Prizren sanjak meet with no obstacles. The Turkish
government, it seems, would be very happy if there were no more Christians
in the province, there is no way the Christians could withstand the Albanian
deluge, since here they are small in number and very disunited [Orthodox and
Catholics]. In normal circumstances one might say that upon one Christian
come at least six Muslims ethnic Albanians, except in the western and
southern outskirts of the Prizren sanjak."⁸ Reports of the
Russian consul show that the position of Orthodox Serbs did not differ in
regions to the other side of Mount Sara, in Tetovo, Debar, Ohrid, Prilep and
the vicinity of Bitolj (Monastir).
The pogroms of the Serbs in Metohia resulted in the dissipation of the
Serbian population. Villages were most often the targets of violent
inflictions. According to a research carried out by Ivan Stepanovich
Yastrebov, between 1855 and 1860, twenty Serbian villages in the vicinity of
Decani contained 165 houses, whereas their number in 1870 diminished to only
50 Serbian homes.⁹
At the beginning of the 70's, until the opening of the Eastern crisis
and the Serbian-Ottoman wars, the position of Serbian inhabitants did not
alter drastically. Even though there were no large Albanian moves nor
Turkish campaigns, the Christian Serbs were confronted with high taxes,
unpaid labor (kuluk), attacks and blackmail. The main targets were usually
Serbian girls seized by ethnic Albanians who then forced them accept Islam.
Religious intolerance and thirst for land and property were causes for much
blackmail, conflagration estates and cattle raids. The custom of the ethnic
Albanians was first to warn the Serbian family the property of which was to
be arrogated, by leaving a bullet on the hearthrug. The choice was limited
to evacuating the entire family, or, in case of resistance, killing the men
and kidnapping or Islamizing the girls.¹⁰
1 Kosovo nekad i sad, 154; A. Lainovic, Prizrenski pasaluk polovinom
XIX veka na osnovu izvestaja francuskih konzula u Skadru, Kosovo, 3 (1974),
pp. 3-7.
2 Zaduzbine Kosova, pp. 613.
3 J. Hadzi-Vasiljevic, Srpski narod i turske reforme (1852-1862),
Bratstvo, XV (1921), pp. 187-188.
4 Savremenici o Kosovu i Metohiji 1852-1912, pp. 20-21. The plea sent
to the Russian tzar in 1859, to help the Decani brotherhood published in
Decanski spomenici, Beograd 1864; ibid., pp. 423-426.
5 A. F. Giljferding, Putovanje po Hercegovini, Bosni i Staroj Srbiji,
Sarajevo 1972, pp. 154-155,165.
6 Putovanje po slovenskim zemljama Turske u Evropi by G. Mjur
Makenzijeve and A. P. Irbijeve, Beograd 1868, pp. 188, 210.
7 M. Seliscev, Slavianskoe naselenie v Albanii, Sofia 1931, pp. 7-10.
8 Ibid., pp. 43-46; D. Bogdanovic, Knjiga o Kosovu, pp. 134-136.
9 I. Jastrebov, Stara Serbia i Albanija, Spomenik SKA, XLI, 36 (1904),
pp. 86.
10 V. Stojancevic, Prvo oslobodjenje Kosova od strane srpske vojske u
ratu 1877-1878, in: Srbija u zavrsnoj fazi velike istocne krize (1877-1878),
Beograd, 1980, pp. 461-462. J. Muller, Albanien, Rumelien und die
Osterreichisch-montenegrinische Granze, Frag 1944; A. Ivic, Rumelijski
vilajet u godini 1838, Prilozi za knjizevnost, jezik, istoriju i folklor,
XIII, 1-2 (1933), pp. 117-126. An elaborate analysis of data provided by V.
Stojancevic, Etnicke, konfesionalne i demografske prilike u Metohiji 1830-ih
godina, Zbornik okruglog stola o naucnom istrazivanju Kosova, Beograd 1988,
pp. 99-114.
Population
More detailed information concerning the number, ethnic and religious
affiliation of the inhabitants of Kosovo and Metohia is contained in lists
dating from the thirties of the 19th century.¹ The traveling
account of Joseph Muller, based on official Turkish data and personal
inquiries, and a detailed roll of the Rumelian vilayet in 1838 from the
Kriegsarchiv in Vienna provide a precise demographic and confessional
picture of the population in Kosovo and Metohia:²

District
Muslims
Christians
Total

Prizren
49,000
29,000
78,000

Pec
34,000
31,000
65,000

Djakovica
31,000
21,000
52,000

According to Muller, in Pec, 12,000 inhabitants lived in 2,400 houses,
of which 130 were Orthodox and 20 Catholic. The Slavs comprised the majority
of the population, 62 families were Turkish, 100 Albanian and 28
Tzintzar.³ Almost identical data on the populace in Pec is
provided by the list of the War Archives in Vienna.⁴
Djakovica, according to Muller, had 21,050 inhabitants: 18,000 Muslim,
450 Catholic, 2,600 Orthodox. Among them 17,000 were Albanian, 3,800 were
Slavic (Serbian), 180 were Turkish, and a few Tzintzar houses.⁵
In Prizren, as noted in the same source, 24,950 people inhabited 6,000
houses. Among them 4,000 were Muslim, 2,150 Catholic and 18,000 Orthodox.
According to Muller's estimate, Serbs comprised 4/5, ethnic Albanians 1/6,
Tzintzars 1/12 and Turks 1/60 with the military company.⁶
Thus, the ethnic composition, considering many among the Muslims in
Metohia were of Serbian origin and spoke the Serbian language, and that
among the Christians few were Albanian Catholics, the ethnic picture based
on Muller's research would look like the following:

All town-dwelling Serbs
All town-dwelling ethnic Albanians

Catholics
Muslims
Catholics
Muslims

Pec
510
10,540
100
400

Djakovica
2,600
1,200
450
16,500

Prizren
16,800
-
2,150
4,000

All:
19,900
11,740
2,700
20,950

Total
Serbs: 31,650
ethnic Albanian: 23,650

Based upon Muller's data, V. Stojancevic calculated the total number of
village dwellers in three Metohian districts:⁷
district
Muslims
Christians

Pec
22,750
30,250

Djakovica
13,000
17,950

Prizren
44,400
8,050

Total:
80,150
56,250

The cited data exhibits that in Metohia, despite being the most
endangered from violence, devastation and blackmail, the Serbian populace
composed the most numerous ethnic group at the end of the 1830's. Even
though no precise data exists on the then demographic situation in Kosovo,
considering subsequent rolls, one could suppose that the relationship
between the Serbian and Albanian population was at least close to the ethnic
disposition in Metohia.
A more complete picture of the demographic disposition in Metohia and
Kosovo in the first decades of the 19th century could be attained only if
the aforesaid data was compared with available information on the evacuation
of Serbs from Kosovo and Metohia, from Prince Milos. In keeping with a
preserved incomplete documentation of Serbian origin, 180 families moved to
Serbia from the Prizren, Pristina, Pec and Scutari pashalik, and another 160
from the northern regions of Kosovo, all in the period between 1815-1837.
Most of them were farmers; following were handicraftsmen and several
merchants. Keeping in mind the sizes of families, particularly the extended
family groups in Metohia (10-30 persons), the number of Serbs fleeing to
Serbia was considerable.⁸
The total number of Serbs in Kosovo and Metohia during the first half
of the 19th century is hard to determine. Turkish annual censuses
(sal-namas) were generally unreliable, since the real number of family
members was concealed due to taxes, and the Muslims especially refused to
have their wives and female children listed.
Information also varies in the traveling accounts of contemporaries,
foreigners mostly. The data is mainly comprised of the inhabitants of towns
and surrounding areas. A somewhat more voluminous and reliable source is the
traveling account of Russian diplomat and scientist A. F. Hilferding.
Conforming to his data and estimates, there were 4,000 Muslim and 800
Christian families in Pec in 1858; in Podrima 3,000 Albanian and 300
Orthodox families; in Orahovac 50 Albanian and 100 Serbian homes; in the
Sredska zhupa 200 Albanian and 300 Serbian families; in the
Prizren Podgora more than 1,000 Albanian Muslims, 20 Albanian Catholics
and around 300 Orthodox homes; in Pristina 1,500 homes with around 1200
Muslim and 300 Orthodox inhabitants, in Vucitrn 250 Muslim and 150 Orthodox
houses. Furthermore, Hilferding noted 3,000 Muslim, 900 Orthodox and 100
Catholic families with 12,000 inhabitants.⁹
The relativity of data provided by the travel writers is demonstrated
by the statistics of Austrian consul Johan Georg von Hahn (1863), who relied
on official information when he cited that Prizren contained 11,540 houses
with 46,000 inhabitants, of whom 8,400 were Muslim, 3,000 Orthodox and 140
Catholic. The salnama of 1874 noted 3,687 homes in Prizren whereas data of
the then Russian consul, Ivan Stepanovich Yastrebov, in reference to the
same year, recorded 4,089 houses.¹⁰
Yastrebov was the most reliable researcher; he spoke Albanian, Turkish
and Serbian well, and as consul to Prizren had the opportunity to personally
check on official documents and determine the exact results. Between 1867
and 1874 Yastrebov provided information regarding Serbs and ethnic Albanians
in Metohia, classifying them in relation to the traditional territorial
division between Albanian tribes and religious affiliation:¹¹

bairak
villages
Albanians
Serbs
Serbs
Albanians

Mala Hoca
24
827
284
-
30

Poluzje
28
434
4
223
22

Suva Reka
42
691
294
-
45

Ostrozub
33
1,052
5
-
45

Sredska
32
502
488
900
-

Opolje
21
985
-
-
-

Gora
31
-
-
2,167
-

Sirinic
15
157
786
-
-

Total
226
4,646
1,861
3,740
142

All this data exhibits that, notwithstanding the emigration of the
Serbian populace to Serbia, Islamization and Albanization, still in progress
(excluding only Gora), the Serbs in Kosovo and Metohia still comprised the
largest ethnic group.
1 J. Muller, Albanien, Rumelien und die Osterreichisch-montenegrinische
Granze, Frag 1944; A. Ivic, Rumelijski vilajet u godini 1838, Prilozi za
knjizevnost, jezik, istoriju i folklor, XIII, 1-2 (1933), pp. 117-126. An
elaborate analysis of data provided by V. Stojancevic, Etnicke,
konfesionalne i demografske prilike u Metohiji 1830-ih godina, Zbornik
okruglog stola o naucnom istrazivanju Kosova, Beograd 1988, pp. 99-114.
2 J. Muller, op. cit,. p. 12; V. Stojancevic, Etnicke, konfesionalne i
demografske prilike, p. 102.
3 J. Muller, op. cit., pp. 73-74.
4 A. Ivic, op. cit., pp. 122.
5 J. Muller, op. cit., pp. 77-78; same data stated by the Kriegsarchiv
in Vienna (A. Ivic, op. cit., p. 122).
6 J. Muller, op. cit., pp. 82-83; A. Ivic, op. cit., p. 122.
7 V. Stojancevic, Etnicke, konfesionalne i demografske prilike, pp.
104-104.
8 V. Stojancevic, Drzava i drustvo obnovljene Srbije (1815-1839), pp.
45-63.
9 A. F. Giljferding, op. cit, pp. 157,183,193, 214.
10 J. G. Hahn, Putovanje kroz porecinu Drina i Vardara, Beograd 1876,
pp. 127-128; I. Jastrebov, op. cit., p. 40.
11 I. Jastrebov, op. cit., pp. 52-91; V. Stojancevic, Juznoslovenski
narodi u Osmanskom Carstvu, p. 331.
Political Action of Serbia
From the Middle Ages, until the First Serbian Insurrection of 1804, the
lands comprising Serbia were considered to range from Belgrade to Veles, and
from Kladovo to the plateau of Malissia. However, the creation of an
insurgent state in north Serbia (1804-1813), brought on a new apprehension
of its frontiers. Ever since the downfall of the Insurrection, Milos
Obrenovic strove, with patience, perseverance and cunning diplomatic
actions, to create an autonomous principality of the subjugated pashalik (of
which the foundations for restoring the Serbian state were laid under
Karadjordje), within the boundaries of the Bucharest treaty (1812), giving a
new name to those Serbian regions remaining beyond its range. Vuk Karadzic
united all spacious lands south and southwest of Milos's Serbia, close to
the courses of the Drina and Lim rivers, and the river basin of the Juzna
Morava (regions that were seats of the Nemanjic state), under a common name
- Old Serbia.¹
The growing political independence of Serbia, that by 1833 formed an
autonomous Principality under Turkish sovereignty, territorially and
politically, revived the hopes of Serbs in Metohia and Kosovo. French travel
writer Ami Boue remarked that the Serbs in Metohia, even though oppressed by
all sorts of brutalities, looked upon Prince Milos as their messiah who
would one day liberate them of the harsh bondage of Turkish rule. The
Principality of Serbia, during the first reign of Prince Milos (1830-1839),
became an attractive place for all Serbs who lived in lands under Turkish
domain.²
Prince Milos never disregarded the severe destiny of Serbs in Kosovo.
Even during the reigns of independent pashas, he undertook efforts to
mitigate the position of his compatriots through ties with the Rotulovic
family of Prizren and the Mahmudbegovic family of Pec. The Prince received
and bestowed gifts upon the monks of Old Serbia, gave them permission to
collect donations for their monasteries in Serbia, and sent gifts whenever
he could to the impoverished fraternities in Metohia and Kosovo. He is to be
credited for the restoration of the Visoki Decani palace in 1836. In
complaints lodged to him, mostly from Visoki Decani, monks bewailed that
ethnic Albanians were arrogating monastic lands, notwithstanding the firmans
of former sultans, giving warrant for their estates. They pleaded for him to
intermediate with the Porte, requesting that a new firman be issued for the
fraternity of Decani. Sultan Abdul Mejid confirmed all monastic estates in
1849, but nothing changed, since in the mountains, no one heeds for the
firman".³
During the reign of the constitutionalist and Prince Aleksandar
Karadjordjevic (1842-1858), Serbia continued to aid churches, monasteries
and schools in Old Serbia, but was unable to improve the position of the
unprotected rayah. In the mid-19th century, little was known about the
political situation of Serbs in Kosovo and Metohia. Sporadic connections
were made through monks and teachers, who drew attention to the unbearable
position of the Serbian populace by sending pleas to the Prince, government
or metropolitan. The harsh fate of the people in Old Serbia, as far as the
public of the Principality and the Serbian intelligentsia in Austria were
concerned, fell into a vague picture of hard life under Turkish rule.
The mid-19th century saw no solid grounds enabling closer contact with
Albanian chiefs in Kosovo and Metohia. The Nacertanije, by Ilija Garasanin
(1844), the first modern Serbian national program within the framework of a
foreign-policy plan, spoke of "liberating all non-Ottoman people of the
Balkan Peninsula from this bitter bondage through a well-conceived plan";
winning over the ethnic Albanians was part of the plan, as a potential to
rely on for the entire Christian uprising against the Turks. The aim to
secure a free trade route for the future state by way of Ulcinj and Scutari
to the Adriatic shores, compelled Garasanin to cooperate with Albanian
Catholics in north Albania.
Serbian political propaganda in north Albania was administrated by
Matija Ban. According to the Ustav politicke propagande (Constitution of
Political Propaganda) of 1849, north Albania belonged to the Southern
region". Several agents were assigned to work on winning over north Albanian
tribes but most of the burden fell upon the Catholic miter bearer, abbot don
Caspar Krasnik, of Albanian nationality, who, after his first successes, was
named an agent, receiving annual payment of 270 talers from the Serbian
government. Owing to his efforts, Bib Doda, heir to the great Catholic tribe
Mirdit, had been won over for cooperation with Serbia. At the time, Bib Doda
told Krasnik "that he, with the Mirdits, would be ready to join in the rise
for liberation, so the Mirdits would have an autonomy and the freedom to
practice their religion under Serbian rule". Abbot Krasnik arrived at
Belgrade in 1849, informed Garasanin of the situation in north Albania and
confirmed the readiness of the Mirdits to start an uprising against the
Turks if they were given gunpowder and flints.
Due to Garasanin, lord of Montenegro, Prince-Bishop Petar II Petrovic
Njegos, established tolerable relations with the Mirdits, there until in
hostile relations with Montenegrin tribes. Prince-bishop of Montenegro and
Bib Doda contracted an alliance at the end of 1849 for attack and defense
against the Turks. In 1851, a relative of Bib Doda, Marko Prokljes, arrived
at Cetinje and in Belgrade, promising "the Prince and Serbian government up
to 2,000 soldiers any time they may require them". Cooperation with the
Mirdits soon evolved through Montenegrin ties. At the same time, Krasnik won
over Domazen, the Catholic bishop in Scutari.⁴
International circumstances, especially the political situation on the
European side of the empire, would not allow for a great Serbian uprising,
nor military cooperation with the Mirdits. The campaigns of Omer Pasha Latas
in Walachia, Old Serbia and Bulgaria, from 1849-1851, the great rise of the
Serbs in Herzegovina under the leadership of Luka Vukalovic in 1852, and the
1853 war between Montenegro and Turkey, brought on new campaigns and a
concentration of Turkish troops in Albania, Old Serbia and at its borders
with Montenegro. The Mirdits did not, for the first time in long while,
respond to a call to war with Montenegro. The Turks blamed and arrested
Abbot Krasnik for this weak response; he evaded penalty due to French
intervention.
At the same time, in 1853, Ilija Garasanin, the instigator of national
action in Turkey, was replaced. Prince Aleksandar Karadjordjevic, pressured
by the Porte, which regarded Serbia as the source of all subversive action
on the Peninsula, ceased all national action outside the boundaries of the
Principality and prohibited public anti-Turkish manifestations. At the
beginning of the Crimean War, 1853, the loyalty of Prince Aleksandar to the
Porte grew, thus incurring the cessation of all propaganda actions. The
Mirdits were compelled to join the Danube Ottoman army.⁵
Following several years of slowdown, particularly during the reign of
Prince Mihailo, when Garasanin occupied the seat of prime minister and
minister of foreign affairs (1861-1867), plans revived for the Balkan
uprising against the Turks. Garasanin believed, with the cooperation of
Montenegro and Greece, that Serbia, as the most powerful Balkan force,
should bear the heaviest load in the organization and in preparations for
the uprising. Following the plan, Serbia was to encompass, through
propaganda, a larger part of Bulgaria, Macedonia, Old Serbia and the
northern and mid-regions of Albania. In a memoir addressed to Prince Mihailo
in 1860, Garasanin underscored the explicit necessity for the ethnic
Albanians to be politically neutralized. The aim was to separate them from
the Turks, to prevent them from hindering the Serbian-Greek alliance. He
intended to exert influence over their clans and prominent tribal chiefs,
warning him that the people were mostly illiterate, had no national center,
and were segregated by three religions.
Anticipating the creation of a common Serbian-Bulgarian state,
Garasanin believed that Albania, after liberating itself from the Turks, as
well as Greece, should be an independent country, allied with the new Slavic
state for purposes of defending common and special interests. In
negotiations with Greece, in 1860, Serbia agreed, in principle, to divide
Albania, whereby the northern territories, Durazzo and Elbasan, would be
annexed to Serbia, and Berat and Korea, to the Greek state. However, this
contract was never signed. The final text of the contract on the alliance
between Greece and Serbia (1866) allowed for the creation of an independent
Albania, or its annexation to either Serbia or Greece.⁶
Both Serbian and Greek statesmen observed how important Albanian
determination was in case of a total Christian uprising on the Balkans, due
to Albania's geopolitical position and the role of Albanian warriors in the
Turkish army. According to a belief of the contemporary French minister to
Athens, the stand of the ethnic Albanians was a knot in all controversial
matters regarding Turkey and the Christian population.
The formation of the Balkan alliance for a joint struggle against the
Turks helped reestablish contacts with north Albania. Gaspar Krasnik was
interned at Constantinople in 1865, so Garasanin assigned a Slovenian
priest, Franz Mauri, secretary of the bishop of Scutari, to be the agent
instead. However, cooperation was soon severed due to suspicions that he was
working for Austria and Turkey.
Albania most severely opposed the Forte's reforms; this discontent was
thus used for contracting new alliances. In 1866, Djelal Pasha, member of
the powerful Zogu clan and influential chief of the Mati region, who was
interned at Constantinople, was won over for cooperation. For the first
time, contacts, though only in principle, were established with ethnic
Albanians of the Muslim faith. Since there were no Serbian settlements in
Mati, no intolerance existed like in Old Serbia. Djelal Pasha was to head
the great uprising against the Turks. When it was learnt in Constantinople
that the Porte was working on winning over and arming the ethnic Albanians
for the Christian uprising, the Serbian government, bolstered by the until
then reserved Russian diplomacy, activated its tasks among the ethnic
Albanians. In Belgrade in 1868, six Albanian chiefs were sojourning. After
being won over by gifts, they were familiarized with the preparations for
the uprising and sent to Albania to await the beckon to rise. Cooperation
with Dzelal Pasha was not realized for his instability and the unreliability
of his nearest retinues. There could be no political nor military
organization, for everything depended upon the competence of a handful of
chiefs.⁷
Serbia had high hopes for the Albanian revolt against Turkish
authorities, until abandoning the idea of rising in Turkey in 1868. However,
Belgrade did not apprehend that the readiness of ethnic Albanians to rise
evolved out of the desire to resist Turkish reforms and retain tribal
privileges. During the sixties of the 19th century, the ethnic Albanians
were void of national awareness, in the modern sense of the word, nor did
they comprehend, excepting a small number of educated tribal chiefs, their
problems as national, beyond narrow tribal and confessional frameworks. As
soon as imminent danger from the introduction of reforms was past, the
ethnic Albanians would again respond to calls from the sultan to defend
Islam and pay their dues of loyalty with abundant spoils and devastated
Christian countries.
1 V. Karadzic, Danica za 1827, Budim 1827. G. J. Jurisic considered the
following nahis part of Old Serbia in 1852: Novi Pazar, Pec, Djakovica,
Prizren, Skoplje, Kosovo, Pristina, Vucitrn, Vranje, Leskovac and Nis. A. F.
Giljferding, nevertheless, included the Novi Pazar nahis with Kosovo and
Metohia as part of Old Serbia (More detailed analysis in: V. Stojancevic,
Jugoslovenski narodi u Osmanskom Carstvu, p. 327).
2 A. Bou, Recueil d'itinraires dans la Turquie d'Europe, Paris 1854,
p. 198.
3 Zaduzbine Kosova, 611-612; V. Stojancevic, Juznoslovenski narodi u
Osmanskom Carstvu, p. 235.
4 D. Stranjakovic, Juznoslovenski nacionalni i drzavni program
Knezevine Srbije iz 1844. god., Beograd 1931, pp. 3-29; idem, Politicka
propaganda Srbije u juznoslovenskim pokrajinama 1844-1858. godine, Beograd
1936, pp. 20-25.
5 V. Stojancevic, Juznoslovenski narodi u Osmanskom Carstvu, pp.
292-293.
6 D. Stranjakovic, Albanija i Srbija u XIX veku, Srpski knjizevni
glasnik, 52 (1937), pp. 624-627; G. Jaksic - V. J. Vuckovic, Spoljna
politika Srbije za vlade kneza Mihaila. Prvi balkanski savez, Beograd 1963,
pp. 137.
7 G. Jaksic, Jedan izvestaj o Albaniji, Arhiv za Arbansku stranu, jezik
i etnologiju, II (1924), pp. 169-192; G. Jaksic - V. J. Vuckovicic, op.
cit., pp. 240-246, 413-416, 468, Srbija i oslobodilacki pokret na Balkanu od
Pariskog mira do Berlinskog kongresa (1856-1878), I (ed: V. Krestic- R.
Ljusic), Beograd 1983, pp. 435-444, 558-563.
Restoration of Religious and Cultural Life
National life evolved under the wing of the church. After the
abolishment of the Pec Patriarchate in 1766, gone was the only national
institution around which the Serbs congregated; gone was the guider of
national living. It was in 1807, by the edict of Sultan Mustafa, that the
Serbian Janicije was named metropolitan of the Raska-Prizren Eparchy. Owing
to himself and his successor, Hadzi-Zaharije (1819-1830), during the first
three decades of the 19th century, the Raska-Prizren Eparchy helped maintain
national awareness with the assistance of lower clergy of Serbian
nationality, even though remaining under the Patriarchate of Constantinople.
The people in Kosovo and Metohia were bound, perhaps more strongly than
those in other Serbian lands, to their national heritage. Living memories of
the sacred rulers and heroes of Kosovo, of past glory and the unfortunately
lost empire were kept alive by priests and monks from the fraternities of
medieval endowments. In Visoki Decani and the Pec Patriarchate, in Gracanica
and Devic, the most powerful seats of national and spiritual life, the cults
of ruler-martyrs, patriarchs and ascetics were cherished. Beside the
tradition of the once glorious Serbia under the Nemanjices, the minds of the
people were kept alive with the memories of uprisings and migrations of
centuries past. The endurance sustaining the Serbs despite all their
miseries, evolved out of a profound attachment to the spiritual and national
heritage of the medieval Serbian state.
Not with standing the raging anarchy that shook Old Serbia, waning only
from time to time, the Serbs in Metohia and Kosovo were able to organize and
restore their spiritual and educational lives with assistance from official
Serbia. Continuity of work, with periodical suspensions during times of
turbulence, was maintained by monastic schools in the Pec Patriarchate,
Visoki Decani, Devic and Gracanica (containing a press at one time). Here
pupils from different areas of Serbia under Turkish rule were being taught
the clergyman's vocation. The first more deeply felt financial support given
to the monastic schools, began to arrive from Prince Milos during the third
decade. During the reign of Prince Aleksandar Karadjordjevic and the
constitutionalist regime in Serbia (1842-1858), financial aid began to
arrive more regularly for the restoration of churches and the maintenance of
monasteries, and gifts were sent in books for religious service. Excluding
the most renown medieval endowments, aid from the Serbian government also
arrived to fraternities of the monasteries St. Marko and the Holy Trinity
near Prizren, the Holy Transfiguration near Pec, and to priests of the
Prizren and Djakovica churches.
Since the mid-18th century, Serbian church-school communities operated
in Metohia and Kosovo, founded first in towns and then in village parishes,
the cores of township and village self-government. Until the Rasko-Prizren
metropolitans were of Serbian nationality, they nominated members for the
governing bodies of church-school communities, usually for no limited time.
The selection was limited to the most noted priests, wealthy merchants and
guild representatives. Communities saw to the maintenance of religious
schools and the education of monastic progeny, strove to establish contact
with Serbia and effect relations with Turkish authorities, both on religious
and educational grounds, and when possible, on economic ones, too. Members
of church-school boards collected contributions for the repairement of
monasteries and churches. Beside many monasteries and churches (Gracanica,
Visoki Decani, Devic, Duboki Potok, Vracevo, Draganac), palaces were built
for the operation of monastic or religious schools, and subsequently secular
ones.
At the beginning of the 19th century, the inauguration of schools was
urged by Raska-Prizren Metropolitans Janicije and Hadzi Zaharije. When the
bishopric chair was taken over in 1830 by Greek bishops, endeavors were
undertaken, especially during Metropolitan Ignjatije's time (1840-1849), to
open Tzintzar schools where lessons in Greek would also be attended by
Serbian children.¹ The Phanariot bishops strove to sustain the
subjugation and ignorance of the Serbian clergy, so as to facilitate their
manipulation of The flock. Some of them sold their clerical positions for
money and fined the people with large church taxes. Being of open
anti-Serbian determination, they impeded or hampered the restoration or
construction of new churches, attempted to Hellenize the populace by
imposing the celebration of the name-day feast, instead of the Slava
(Serbian family feast for its patron saint), a definitely Serbian
custom.²
In the first half of the 19th century, religious schools existed in all
major towns (Pristina, Pec, Mitrovica, Vucitrn, Gnjilane, Djakovica) and in
some villages (Musutiste, Vitina, Korminjan). Private schools were opened
usually under the name of a notable leader who was to finance its operation,
but the burden of maintenance usually fell upon church-school communities
and guilds. Private schools provided lessons in subjects both religious and
secular. The best among them were at Prizren, Vucitrn, Mitrovica, and the
Donja Jasenovo and Kovaci villages. The inauguration of new private schools
falls with the Turkish reforms at the middle of the century. Merchant and
craftsmen guilds in Pec, Prizren and Gnjilane introduced funds for opening
new schools and obtaining better teaching staff. The constitutionalist
government sent the schools money, books and other facilities through
merchants and other members of church boards. According to available data,
several dozens of schools in Metohia and Kosovo were attended by around
1,300 pupils during the sixties.
The oldest and most renown Serbian church-school community was in
Prizren, the economical center of Serbs in Metohia, where a community school
aiming to prevent Greek propaganda was established in 1836. Hilferding
recorded that the male school had 200 pupils in 1857. Other important seats
of scholastic life were at Pristina (150 pupils in 1865) and Pec (150 pupils
in 1866), in which Serbian teachers from different regions (Srem, Serbia,
Croatia) lectured according to secular programs from Serbia. Special schools
were opened for female children. The highest degree of education was
provided by an extensive school at Prizren, a kind of high school, though of
lower level.³
A number of talented pupils from Kosovo and Metohia aspiring to the
teaching vocation, were being prepared in Serbia from the beginning of the
sixties, owing to scholarships received from wealthy Prizren merchant Sima
Andrejevic Igumanov (1804-1882). Their number greatly increased already
after 1868, when in Belgrade, at the proposition of Serbian Metropolitan
Mihailo, an Educational Board was formed for schools and teachers in Old
Serbia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Under the patronage of the Board,
works on the improvement of teaching conditions soon produced significant
results. New schools were opened and old ones given financial support, and
the curriculum contained better programs. The tasks of teachers educated in
Serbia were not solely to educate, but were, above all, aimed to maintain
national awareness of the people, prevent conversions and prepare the
progeny to carry on the duties of national enlightenment.
The turning point in the educational life of Serbs in the Ottoman
Empire, was marked by the Bogoslovija (Seminary), founded in Prizren in
1871. Even though some suggestions for its inauguration were directed at
Pec, the prevailing attitude in Belgrade was that Prizren was the most
favorable place, being the center of economical life for Serbs in Old Serbia
and seat of the vilayet. Sima Andrejevic Igumanov lived in Prizren, the
contemporaneously greatest benefactor who bequeathed his riches obtained by
trades in Russia, to the people. He was a Russian subject and was thus able,
with assistance from the Russian consulate at Prizren, to obtain a license
from the Turkish authorities to found a Seminary. It soon became the seat of
the overall spiritual and educational life and the stronghold for political
work on national affairs. More important was the fact that for the first
time, contact had been established with the government in Belgrade, able
thus to exert immediate influence on national operations amongst Serbs in
Old Serbia.
From its inauguration in 1871, until the liberation in 1912, the
Seminary worked according to instructions given by the Serbian government.
At the beginning, its operation was under the jurisdiction of the Ministry
for Education and Religious Affairs, and then the Ministry for Foreign
Affairs. All expenses of the Seminary were paid by the Serbian government,
but important means for its maintenance came from various funds founded by
the church and from the endowment of Sima Igumanov. The first rector of the
Theological college was a monk from Decani, Sava Decanac, a graduate of the
Spiritual Academy in Kiev.⁴
Owing to the Bogoslovija, primary schools operated in all larger
settlements in Metohia and Kosovo until 1912, and graduated theologians from
Prizren became teachers and priests all over the Ottoman Empire, from
Macedonia to Bosnia. According to incomplete data, around 480 students
graduated from the Seminary (subsequently transformed to a
theological-teaching school) until 1912, among whom 196 were from Metohia
and Kosovo.
The inauguration of the Seminary in Prizren proved to be a secure dam
against any attempts undertaken by the Constantinople Patriarchate to
Hellenize the Serbian populace through Tzintzar oases in Metohia and against
the aims of the Bulgarian Exarchate (1870) to build strongholds in the
Gnjilane region. Until the Serbian consulate was opened in Pristina in 1889,
the Seminary was the center of Serbian political life in Metohia and Kosovo.
From Belgrade, by way of the School, books, journals and newspapers were
delivered, for expanding liberational ideas and consolidating national
awareness. From the beginning of its operations, the Turkish authorities and
ethnic Albanians suspected the School of being the center of Serbian
national action, thus political contacts with Belgrade were carried out
through the Russian consulate in Prizren which secured the transmission of
confidential mail.⁵
In Prizren (seat of the vilayet from 1868-1874), from 1871, until the
abolition of the vilayet, the paper Prizren was published in two languages,
Turkish and Serbian, in which official news, laws, orders, new regulations,
verdicts over violators, and columns on events taking place in Turkey and in
other countries were published. The Serbian section of the paper was
editored by Ilija Stavric, rector of the Seminary, and texts were translated
into Serbian by a distinguished national worker and subsequent Serbian
consul to Pristina, Todor P. Stankovic. In Pristina, where the Kosovo
vilayet was formed in 1877, a similar vilayet paper Kosovo was instigated,
also in the Serbian and Turkish language. When the seat of the Kosovo
vilayet was moved to Skoplje in 1888, the paper resumed its publication only
in Turkish.⁶
1 See most important works: P. Kostic, Crkveni zivot pravoslavnih Srba
u Prizrenu i njegovoj okolini u XIX veku, (with writer's memories), Beograd
1928; idem, Prosvetno-kulturni zivot pravoslavnih Srba u Prizrenu i njegovoj
okolini u XIX veku i pocetkom XX veka, (with writer's memories), Skoplje
1933; J. K. Djilas, Srpske skole na Kosovu od 1856. do 1912. godine,
Pristina 1969.
2 J. Popovic, Zivot Srba na Kosovu 1812-1912, pp. 222-226.
3 The most distingushed teachers during the sixties were Nikola Musulin
and Milan Novicic in Prizren, Milan D. Kovacevic in Pristina, and Sava
Decanac in Pec.
4 J. K. Djilas, op. cit., pp. 53-104.
5 Spomenica Sezdesetogodisnjice prizrenske Bogoslovske uciteljske Skole
1871-1921, Beograd 1925, pp. 133-160; J. K. Djilas, op. cit., pp. 105-110.
6 T. P. Stankovic, Putne beleske po Staroj Srbiji 1871-1897, pp. 67-72;
H. Kalesi - H.J. Kornrumpf, op. cit., pp. 117-122.
The Economy
The essence of Serbian economy in Metohia and Kosovo lay in the town
and village handicrafts and trades. Centers of Serbian society in Metohia
and Kosovo were the towns Prizren, Pristina and Pec, and during the last
quarter of the century - Mitrovica. In Prizren, a large town on an important
crossroad toward Scutari and Salonika, trade and craftsmanships flourished
in the preceding centuries. The local Serbs called it "small
Constantinople", since most of the trade and crafts traditionally belonged
to Serbian citizens.
According to available sources, life in Serbian towns evolved under
irregular circumstances during the entire 19th century. The perpetual shifts
of anarchy, wars and uprisings, and continual peril upon one's life and
property, compelled the small-in-number Serbian citizens in Kosovo to adapt
to the existing conditions with haste. Using bribes and tips, common means
with bribable government representatives, they somewhat expanded narrow
economic frameworks, and discovered, always coinciding with momentous
political conditions, new opportunities for work and ways to protect their
estates and families. Life in the Serbian towns of Kosovo and Metohia
continued parallel to the Turkish and Albanian ones dictating the terms.
Even though corroded by irregular conditions, Serbian tradesmen and
craftsmen, gathered in church-school communities and parishes, united in
times of hardship, succeeded in organizing their lives. Acted as a unity
toward the authorities and tyrants, they often quarreled when settling
matters in local communities. The obstinacy with which they resisted
temptations to move to Serbia - a land that soon trod the path of national
and economic emancipation by European standards - proves that among the best
national representatives, a high degree of awareness existed on the need for
survival on Kosovo grounds.
Anachronic methods of trade, insecurity on roads and competition of
cheap European goods impeded the development of trade and handicrafts among
Serbs. The Muslims forbade the Christians to deal in crafts of wider
significance, for instance, the gunsmiths', leather dealers', and even the
barbers' trade. Beside the Muslims, who were mostly Turks, the Tzintzars,
Jews and Catholic Slavs of Janjevo were also in the handicraft business. Yet
the Serbs did very well in all the permitted trades. A larger part of their
produces satisfied their domestic needs and provided for nearby bazaars in
Old Serbia and Macedonia. Only a smaller portion of handicraft produces,
particularly of the goldsmiths', leather dealers' and tailors' guild
(especially in Prizren, Pristina and Pec), were vended on larger markets.
Costly decorative pieces of silver and gold, as well as saffian, had their
buyers on markets in Salonika, Constantinople and other Levant towns. Bulk
traders of Prizren, Vucitrn and Pristina sold various articles in Serbia,
mostly produces of different guilds, and purchased larger livestock. The
Vucitrn tradesmen of the Camilovic family had successful dealings with
Sarajevo, while merchants from Pec and Pristina traded with other towns in
Bosnia. Enterprising Prizren tradesmen held warehouses with leather and wool
in Belgrade from where their goods were delivered to Pest, Vienna and
Constantinople.¹
The dynamic development of enterprises accomplished by Serbian
merchants in the mid-19th century provoked religious intolerance in
conservative competitive circles - tradesmen of Muslim faith. The commercial
successes of Serbs also disturbed the Turkish authorities, who reckoned them
to be signs of national rising. As a result, in 1859 and 1863, Serbian shops
were burnt in Prizren, Pec and Pristina, which incurred a sudden economic
downfall in these towns. Hadji Serafim Ristic recorded that when the army
occupied Prizren in 1860, 12 shops were burnt, and in Pristina, at two
strokes, 90 shops belonging to reputable merchants blazed, with values
amounting to almost a million coins.² Yet, commerce remained in
Christian hands in Prizren, according to the attestation of Austrian Consul
J. G. von Hahn.³ A new commercial swing came with the opening of
the railway track from Mitrovica to Salonika in 1873-1874, while handicrafts
recorded a decrease in sales due to competition from cheap European goods
brought to Kosovo by Jewish merchants from Salonika. Nevertheless, the
revival of handicrafts and trade among the Serbs in the mid-19th century,
despite irregular conditions, considerably influenced the slowdown of
emigration to Serbia. In towns, contrary to the villages, a certain amount
of legal security existed and a possibility for developing ventures.
The position of Serbs living in villages was incomparably harder.
ethnic Albanians of Muslim faith organized raiding parties and mercilessly
sacked Serbian villages. Being Muslims, being privileged in every way, they
united into compact communities of blood brotherhoods or tribes, socially
homogeneous, maintaining their clans by terrorizing the Serbs, seizing their
lands or exacting taxes. By curbing Serbian farmers from certain regions,
they made space for the settlement of their fellow tribesmen living in the
indigent plateaus of north Albania. Unused to life in the plains and hard
work in the fields, the ethnic Albanians who settled from the hilly regions
rather picked up guns than hoes.⁴
There was no public safety on the roads of Kosovo and Metohia during
the 19th century. Passageways were controlled by bands of outlaws or tribal
companies, thus roads could be passed only with military escorts of the
Turkish police or with protection from Albanian clans supervising parts of
tribal territory, lurking about for an opportunity to fleece merchants and
passengers.
The Serbian peasant could not hope to be protected even in the fields,
where he could be assaulted at any moment by a wandering outlaw, or
blackmailed, and if he resisted, killed. Being the rayah, the Serbs had no
right to carry weapons, and when they contrived to obtain them, they had
nowhere to hide from the vengeance of the Albanian clan with which they
clashed. The haiduk tradition, characteristic of Serbs living in all regions
under Turkish domain, had no effect in the plains of Kosovo and Metohia.
Haiduk activity occurring from time to time on the ranges of Mount
Prokletije, in the vicinity of the Decani and Pec monasteries, took place
with the assistance and protection of Serbs from Montenegro, but still it
could not be sustained. In times of peace, rule in towns was maintained by
Turkish military garrisons. Passage through roads depended upon the will of
numerous Albanian clan companies until 1912. Villages inhabited by ethnic
Albanians and situated along the roads of Metohia where interspersed with
high stone towers, small fortresses from where passengers were attacked and
where concealment lay from members of other companies.
Both day and night, Serbian homes, made of glued mud, were open to
attack by individuals or bands of outlaws without fear of sanctions. French
travel writer Ami Boue recorded that his escort terrorized and robbed the
inhabitants of a Serbian village. When the host opposed the assailant with
an axe, the latter threatened to notify Pristina, from where the
"janissaries" and the tax collector would pop out. Under such threats, the
head of the Serbian home was compelled to comply to the demands of the
assailant, and even to part with him on "friendly" terms.⁵
During the second and third decade of the 19th century, when
independent pashas reigned, the position of Serbian village populaces was
extremely difficult. Agrarian-legal relations depended not on Turkish
regulations but on physical force. Feudal lords forced free farmers to the
position of chiflik farmers, especially in Drenica, and the Pec, Vucitrn and
Pristina nahis. Many free farmers fled to Serbia, while Islamization and
Albanization decreased the resistance of Serbian villages toward chiflik
labor. The seized estates were returned to some of the Serbs in 1832, owing
to the merit of Grand Vizier Reshid Pasha. The vizier then attempted to
permanently settle agrarian-legal relations in Rumelia with a decree issued
in Vucitrn, but in practice it was all different. Agas and subpashas settled
in villages to control the division of incomes of Serbian chiflik laborers.
Fearing sanctions, the Serbs were forbidden to collect income from the lands
they tilled unless given permission.
By the Hattisherif of Gulhane, the chiflik-sahibi system was legalized;
private ownership of land was recognized legally. The chiflik-laboring Serbs
tilled the lands of their lords and gave them part of their income. In
Kosovo and Metohia, until the Tanzimat reforms, the transformation of
sipahiliks to chifliks was executed by force. Chiflik-laboring was most
expressed in districts where Serbs and ethnic Albanians lived admixed.
Landowners were mostly Muslim ethnic Albanians and Turks, free farmers -
ethnic Albanians, and chiflik-laborers mainly Serbs with a small portion of
Catholic ethnic Albanians.⁶
Pressure exerted upon the Serbian chiflik inhabitants following 1839
was so great that when a large Christian uprising was prepared in Bosnia and
Rumelia, serious thought was given to rising. When the plans to rise were
divulged, the position of farmers grew worse. Muslims in Prizren routed the
tax collector in 1841, but Christian Serbs were compelled to pay. Having no
one to seek protection from, the Serbs of the Vucitrn and Pristina nahis
addressed the government in Belgrade in 1842, requesting help. Weighed down
by high taxes, which in some areas amounted to half of their total incomes,
Serbian farmers became impoverished. Economic pressure did not exclude
violent deeds which became daily events at the end of the fifth and sixth
decade. Blackmail, fleecing, arrogation of incomes and estates were followed
by countless acts of violence over Serbian inhabitants under Albanian
raiding bands. Only a part of these oppressive acts were divulged by
archimandrite of the Decani monastery, Hadji Serafim Ristic, in his
complaints to the sultan, Serbian Prince and Russian ruler.⁷
1 D. Mikic, Drustvene i ekonomske prilike kosovskih Srba, pp. 235-260.
2 Savremenici o Kosovu i Metohiji 1852-1912, D. Mikic,
Drustveno-politicki razvoj kosovskih Srba, pp. 236-237.
3 J. G. Hahn, Putovanje kroz porecinu Drina i Vardara, 130.
4 T. P. Stankovic, op. cit., pp. 131-138.
5 D. Mikic, Drustvene i ekonomske prilike kosovskih Srba, p. 90.
6 D. Mikic, Drustveno-politicki razvoj kosovskih Srba, pp. 236-239
(with earlier bibliography).
7 Savremenici o Kosovu i Metohiji 1852-1912, pp. 22-52. 104
PART TWO: THEOCRACY, NATIONALISM, IMPERIALISM

ENTERING THE SPHERE OF EUROPEAN INTEREST
The Albanian national movement was born during the great Eastern crisis
(1875-1878). The basis for its gathering contained the direct denial of
liberatory aims of Serbian states and of the political and national rights
of the Serbs in Kosovo and Metohia. Bound, in its matrix course, to the
Islam concept of tribal autonomy within the framework of the Ottoman state,
the Albanian movement radiated a peculiar intolerance toward European
comprehensions of society. The movement for autonomy was, to the Muslim
masses of Kosovo and Metohia, synonymous to the preservation of tribal and
feudal privileges; to the conservation of the anachronous regime in which
the Serbs had no place.
The outcome of the Eastern crisis brought Kosovo and Metohia under the
direct influence of Great Powers. Subsequent to the occupation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina and the entrance of Austro-Hungarian troops in the northern
parts of the Kosovo vilayet, the remote Turkish province became the key of
dominion on the Peninsula. In Vienna, strong argumentation underscored that
the Ottomans conquered the Balkan Peninsula only after the battle of Kosovo
in 1389.
The formation of oppositional power blocks in Europe, with
Austria-Hungary and Russia as their main exponents in the Balkans, was
conducive to a clearer refraction of their mutual conflicting interests in
Kosovo, Metohia and Macedonia than in other Ottoman provinces.
Internationalization of the problem of Old Serbia, which intercepted German
penetration to the east, heavily affected the local Serbian populace.
Russia's influence on political issues in the Balkans, since the Congress of
Berlin until the Young Turk Revolution (1908), was diminishing despite aims
for its restoration and consolidation. Austro-Hungarian supremacy on the
Balkans, destroyed in World War I, was based on mercilessly checking Serbian
national interests and liberatory aims (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Novi Pazar
sanjak, Old Serbia, Macedonia). Favorizing the ethnic Albanians and the
conservative regime of Abdulhamid II, the Dual Monarchy made the Serbs of
Kosovo and Metohia victims of a policy aiming to a total expulsion of Serbs
in areas between the Una river and the Vardar river basin, mid Hungary and
the Adriatic Sea.
Eastern Crisis and the Serbian-Turkish Wars
The great Eastern crisis inaugurated the issue on the survival of the
Ottoman Empire in the Balkans. Uprisings in Bosnia and Herzegovina compelled
the Porte, fearing interference from the Great Powers, to issue a firman of
reforms for the whole Empire. The following year a reform plan, designed by
Austria-Hungarian Foreign Affairs Minister Count Gyula Andrassi, was imposed
upon the Porte to prevent Russian intervention. Serbia and Montenegro,
emboldened by successful insurrections and the rebellion in Bulgaria,
prepared for a liberation war and the unification of the Serbs. Crucial
support was expected from Russia, but a somewhat larger response came only
from Slavophile circles which sent around 3,000 volunteers to Serbia.
Heading a Serbian army (subsequently the entire army), entirely devoid of a
trained military cadre, was Russian General Mihail Grigorievich Chernaiev.
With the agreement in Reichstadt (1876) and the military convention in
Budapest (1877), Russia negotiated with Austria-Hungary: with free action
and the declaration of war to Turkey the Dual Monarchy would be able to
occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina at the appropriate time. The destiny of the
liberation movement was thereby settled beforehand.
The beginning of the uprising in Herzegovina and Bosnia in 1875 revived
the hopes of Serbs in Kosovo and Metohia that the time of liberation was
drawing near. Harbingers voicing the approaching liberation were seen in
dreams, interpreted by portents and extraordinary occurrences, while Serbian
merchants demanded the payment of their dues before deadlines.¹
Unfamiliar passengers seen in various parts of Metohia and Kosovo were
regarded as Serbian Prince Milan in disguise, observing the battlefields of
the upcoming combats. Shortly before the war, emissaries did actually arrive
from Serbia. In Nis in 1874, a secret committee was formed with the task of
preparing an uprising against the Turks. Before the commencement of war, a
general of the Serbian army, Franz Zach, sent Todor P. Stankovic, member of
the Nis committee and an authority on the local situation to Kosovo, to
confer with notables in Pristina, Vucitrn, Gnjilane and Prizren on the
upcoming war. The report was submitted to General Chernaiev who disapproved
of the Serbs rising in Kosovo, expounding that Russia had not yet decided to
engage in war. Several notables from Kosovo did, however, arrive in Serbia
with the desire to obtain detailed instructions for the Joint action.
Aksentije Hadzi Arsic, a merchant from Pristina, contacted the Russian
diplomacy in Belgrade, endeavoring, with its assistance in Constantinople,
subsequently in Odessa, to organize a course for transferring volunteers to
Serbia.²
When the war began in June 1876, masses of Serbs from Kosovo and
Metohia crossed over to Serbian territory, and with Macedonian volunteers,
fought within the composition of the Serbian army. Numerous refugees fleeing
Albanian terror sought shelter in Serbia. Serbs in Prizren and other places
were called to join the Ottoman army in the composition of irregular troops
(bashibazouk) and war with Serbia. Most of them saved themselves by paying
high ransoms.
The ethnic Albanians and Turks received the declaration of war vexed
and anxious. Around 35,000 (72 units with 550 men) Albanian volunteers
responded to the sultan's call to defend their homeland. The first to
advance to the front towards Serbia were ethnic Albanians of the Ljuma
mountainous region. On their way toward the border, at the beginning of
July, around 3,000 of them descended to Prizren, sacking the Serbian town.
The Albanian volunteers took every advantage to pillage regions lying on
their way. Again Kosovo and Metohia became a battleground where ethnic
Albanians settled their accounts with the Serbs, blaming them for the
outbreak of war.
Serbia and Montenegro fought with unequal success. The Montenegrins won
two great victories whereas the poorly armed and insufficiently trained
Serbian troops suffered defeats. Serbia soon agreed to a truce and then a
peace treaty with Turkey on a status quo basis. In Constantinople the insane
Murad V was deposed and Abdulhamid II proclaimed sultan. At the end of 1876,
the Constitution was proclaimed, warranting freedom of religion and civil
equality for all subjects of the Ottoman Empire.
Yet, nothing changed in Kosovo and Metohia. Terror upon the Serbs did
not abate. At the end of December 1876, the church-school community of Pec
complained to the pasha of Prizren that fifty Serbs were killed in the town
and its vicinity from May to December. Complaints of oppression were sent to
the grand vizier and Russian and Austro-Hungarian consuls in Prizren. An
English Committee received refugees returning from Serbia to Kosovo
following the unsuccessful war.³
A conference of ambassadors of the Great Powers disputed the destiny of
the Ottoman Empire in Constantinople, at the beginning of January in 1877.
The destiny of Serbs in other Balkan provinces except in Bosnia and Bulgaria
was not mentioned. Thus a "Committee for the Liberation of Old Serbia and
Macedonia" was founded in Belgrade presided by Archimandrite Sava Decanac.
National notables composed a petition at the end of February with a hundred
signatures, thus authorizing the Board was able to represent them with the
Great Powers. The petition demanded that all countries in which Serbs lived
be annexed to Serbia so as to sustain their faith and nationality. An
alternate demand was to found a Serbian Exarchate, following the example of
the Bulgarian one, with its seat at Pec, and encompassing Bosnia and
Herzegovina.⁴
Russia's entrance to war with Turkey in April 1877, which Serbia and
Montenegro were to join, had delayed the submission of the petition, but,
nonetheless, the Committee resumed its work. Shortly before Serbia's
repeated engagement in war, the Serbian prince and the Russian tzar received
news from Kosovo on the slave-like treatment of the Turkish authorities upon
the Christians.
At Russia's demand, after lengthy hesitation, Serbia entered war at the
end of December, 1877, but only after Russia's conquest of Plevna, which
sent off an unfavorable echo to the ruling Russian circles. A favorable
condition for a move to liberate Skoplje and emerge in Kosovo was missed.
The Kosovo ethnic Albanians advanced once more toward the border. The
regular Turkish troops were engaged at the front with the Russians, while
ethnic Albanians comprised the main force against the Serbs. Anxiety among
them was higher than military enthusiasm. Fear of Russian victory
("Moskovits") and of its allies wrought commotion upon the ethnic Albanians,
anxious about their future religious and tribal rights. Life in a Christian
and Slavic state was inconceivable for the majority of ethnic Albanians; in
combats with the Serbian army they put up stubborn resistance, especially in
struggles for Prokuplje and Kursumlija.
But the Serbs were advancing steadily. Liberating Nis, Leskovac, Vranje
and Prokuplje, the Serbian army emerged in Kosovo. Not knowing that Russia
and Turkey had agreed to a truce, the voluntary regiment of Major Radomir
Putnik took Gnjilane, while the advance guard of the Serbian army, under the
command of Lieutenant Milos Sandic, reached the Gracanica monastery near
Pristina toward the end of January 1878. On January 25, a solemn liturgy was
performed in Gracanica to honor the victory of the Serbian army and Prince
Milan, and a commemoration was held for the heroes of Kosovo in 1389.
However, the concluded truce was inclusive of the Serbian army. The units
were compelled to withdraw from Kosovo.⁵
According to the Peace Treaty between Russia and Turkey concluded in
San Stefano on March 3rd, 1878, a bulk of the liberated territories,
including those liberated by the Serbian army, were alloted to Bulgaria.
prince Milan informed the Russian supreme command that "the Serbian army
will not abandon Nis even if it were attacked by the Russian army". As a
compensation, Serbia's border was extended to Mitrovica on Kosovo. Old
Serbia remained under Ottoman rule. By the agreement, the Porte was
obligated to issue a special reglment organique for Albania.⁶
The Committee of Sava Decanac then expanded its actions. Signatures for
petitions were collected and sent to the Serbian prince, Russian tzar and
delegates of the European powers. All the petitions demanded the annexation
of Old Serbia and Macedonia to Serbia. The news that the Congress of Berlin
had been convoyed for the revision of the San Stefano Peace Treaty was
received by the Serbs in Kosovo and Metohia as a possibility of emphasizing
again the demands for annexation to Serbia. Delegates of the Pristina,
Prizren, Djakovica, Pec and Vucitrn regions sent a petition to the
participants of the Congress with 272 signatures, stamped with 126 county
and monastic seals. On June 28, the Serbs of Gnjilane, Skoplje and Tetovo
sent to the Russian tzar and British delegate in Berlin an appeal with
nearly 400 signatures. A similar authorized appeal was sent to the Serbian
knez. In a memorandum submitted to Russian Tzar Alexander II, national
representatives complained of unbearable violence and the inferior position
of the Orthodox people.⁷
Sava Decanac set off to Berlin with a petition signed by around 2,000
national representatives - priests, serfs, merchants and craftsmen. He
submitted the petition to the German Chancellor Prince Otto von Bismarck who
promised that the participants of the Congress would be told about the
demands. Archimandrite Sava wrote a general appeal to every other delegate
of the Great Powers, demanding the annexation to Serbia, or, at least, if
possible, the restoration of the Pec Patriarchate. His memorandum dated June
3, 1878, reads: "This nation has been enduring sufferings unheard-of because
it was left to the mercy of Turkish and Albanian renegades. Now, since the
position of all the peoples of the Balkan Peninsula has improved, is it
right that we should remain shackled to tyranny, is it right that we should
further endure butchery from the Turks, that our homes should be burnt by
ethnic Albanians, is it right that we should be subject to deeds worse than
those committed upon animals in Europe. Considering we took part in the war
for liberation, considering we rebelled against exploitation, considering we
expressed our desires for freedom and unification with our brothers; if the
old system is restored, Muslim fanaticism will be without limit, more
brutal, we will be forced to endure sufferings never experienced before. We
raise our voices once more to the European assembly, asking for mercy, not
to leave us to this gory and cruel bondage. If it is unable to grant us
freedom, let at least autonomy and personal safety be secured."⁸
Austria-Hungarian and Russian rivalry for dominance over the Balkans
was not favorable to Serbia's requests. Delegates from Serbia and Montenegro
delegates were not permitted to take part in the Congress. The Serbian
government, relying upon Austria-Hungary, requested of Gyula Andrsssi the
annexation of the Gnjilane region, beside the Nis sanjak. Minister of
Foreign Affairs Jovan Ristic, in a memoir submitted to participants of the
Congress, underscored that if Old Serbia were to remain under Turkish rule,
the Serbs would be left to the merciless revenge of Muslims, which would
bring Serbia to an unenviable position and only incur new
troubles.⁹ Even though both countries acquired independence at
the Congress of Berlin, the decision that Old Serbia was to remain under
Turkish rule was received with great disappointment by the Serbs in Kosovo
Metohia. Liberation from the Turkish yoke was delayed
indefinitely.¹⁰
The decisions of the Congress of Berlin caused great discontent in
Serbia. In a public proclamation, announced after the Congress, Prince Milan
underscored: "Within a brief time of six weeks, you penetrated to Kosovo at
the speed of lightning, where the victorious song of Serbia was sung at the
gloomy church of Gracanica five hundred years later. [...] Your brilliant
leap needed only a step further and victorious Serbian banners would have
unfurled in Pristina, Skoplje and Prizren, the old capitals of the
Nemajices, but alas, a truce concluded on January 19, [31] this same year,
forestalled and stopped you."¹¹
Fighting along with Serbia against the Turks, Montenegro tried to win
over the Catholic Mirdits. In 1874 the Serbian agency in Constantinople
contacted the Mirdit captain Marko, cousin of Bib Doda. In mid-1876 the
Mirdits were ready to engage in war against the Turks if Montenegrin Prince
Nikola warranted, in writing, that he would recognize their independence
after the war. Receiving from Belgrade the reply "we accept completely", the
Montenegrin Prince made his promise. Even though of anti-Slavic disposition,
the. Mirdit Prince Prenk Bib Doda entered into conflict with Turkish
authorities well rewarded.¹²
In the second war with the Turks, Montenegro came into conflict with
north Albanian Catholic tribes, the Grudas and Hotis, and waged major
battles with the Muslim bashibazouks. ethnic Albanians and Muslims of
Serbian origin, on the stretch from Ulcinj on the Adriatic Sea to Plav and
Gusinje in the mountainous region toward north Albania, severely clashed
with Montenegrin forces. At the Congress of Berlin, aside to the
independence granted it, Montenegro's territorial expansion had been
confirmed: among other territories, Plav and Gusinje had been alloted to it,
with strong resistance incurring from the Albanian populace. ¹³
1 V. Topic, Istocno pitanje, Sarajevo 1966 , pp. 168-170. J. H.
Vasiljevic, Pokret Srba i Bugara u Turskoj posle srpsko-turskih ratova 1876.
1877-1878. godine i njegove posledice (1878-1882), Beograd 1908, pp.
266-274.
2 D. Mikic, Srbi Kosova u istocnoj krizi 1875-1878, Obelezja, 5 (1982),
pp. 98-111; ibid., Kosovo prema radu Berlinskog kongresa i realizovanju
njegovih odluka, Pristina 1980, pp. 243.
3 D. Mikic, Drustveno-politicki razvoj kosovskih Srba u XIX veku, pp.
243-345.
4 Ibid.
5 V. Stojancevic, Prvo oslobodjenje Kosova od strane srpske vojske u
ratu 1877-1878, in: Srbija u zavrsnoj fazi velike istocne krize (1877-1878),
Beograd, 1980, pp. 462-468; J. Popovic, op. cit., pp. 230-233; Savremenici o
Kosovu i Metohiji 1852-1912, pp. 286-292.
6 D. Mikic, Albansko pitanje i albansko-srpske veze u XIX veku (do
1912), M. misao, 3 (1985), p. 143.
7 J. Hadzi-Vasiljevic, Pokret Srba i Bugara u Turskoj, pp. 17-36;
Srbija 1878, Documents (edited by M. Vojvodic, D. R. Zivojinovic, A.
Mitrovic, R. Samardzic), Beograd 1978, pp. 322-327.
8 Srbija 1878, 503; Istorija srpskog naroda, VI/1, pp. 291-292.
9 "In provinces located on this side of the rivers [Drina and Lim],
events have created an entirely new situation. The Princedom [Serbia] was
compelled to take up arms for the second time, and due to continual
advancements, the region of its action covered almost all of Old Serbia. How
was it to withdraw from the region and leave its populace to the revenge of
Musloman without the land sinking again to another horrifying state by which
no one would gain? The best way to secure the benefits of eternal peace in
the region would be to satisfy the legitimate wishes of the people, to
liberate and conjoin it to mother Serbia. "(Srbija 1878, pp. 449.)
10 Istorija srpskog naroda, VI/1, pp. 291-292.
11 B. Perunicic, Zulumi aga i begova u kosovskom vilajetu, Beograd
1989, p. 43.
12 D. Mikic, Prizrenska liga i austrougarska okupacija Bosne i
Hercegovine i zaposedanje novopazarskog sandzaka (1878-1879. godine),
Balcanica, IX (1978), p. 294; D. Bogdanovic, Knjiga o Kosovu, 137-138; more
elaborate in: B. Hrabak, Katolicki Arbanasi za vreme istocne krize
(1875-1878), Istorijski zapisi, XXXV, 1-2 (1978), pp. 5-59.
13 N. Raznatovic, Crna Gora i Berlinski kongres, Cetinje 1979; D.
Bogdanovic, Knjiga o Kosovu, pp. 141.
The Albanian League
Military operations during the 1877-1878 war brought demographic
disturbances in Old Serbia. From 1875, a surge of refugees from Kosovo and
the neighboring areas crossed over to Serbian territory. At the bordering
regions of Serbia, stretching between Mount Kopaonik and Jastrebac, around
200,000 Serbs sought shelter from the terror of ethnic Albanians, Turks and
Cherkezes.
The triumph of the Serbian army and the liberation of southern Serbia
caused a contrary migratory process. In the spaces from Prokuplje to
Leskovac and Vranje, during the 19th century, the ethnic Albanians had
settled, and, like their compatriots in Kosovo and Metohia, had supremacy in
political relations, occupying frontal positions in the governing apparatus.
When Serbian units liberated the Nis sanjak, withdrawing ahead of them,
together with the defeated bashibazouks, were Albanian inhabitants of that
region. In accordance with the consecrated Turkish traditions, in case of
defeat, Muslims were called to leave the lost territories with the army.
From Toplica and southern Pomoravlje, around 30,000 ethnic Albanians
retreated with the Turkish troops, seeking refuge on the plains of Kosovo
and Metohia. These refugees (muhadjirs), looking for space to settle, bereft
of their belongings and lands, began to take vengeance upon local Serbian
inhabitants, to plunder property and arrogate lands. The administrative
authorities existed only nominally, since power was held by local ethnic
Albanians who also attacked the Serbian inhabitants.¹ In a
complaint lodged to Prince Milan, the Serbs of Gnjilane stated that
following the retreat of the Serbian army from Kosovo, acts of violence were
tripled: "The exasperated ethnic Albanians broke into our houses and estates
on the day the Serbian army withdrew from Gnjilane, devastating everything,
fleecing us to our bare skin! And, alas, there is more! Every day one our
brothers is killed, either secretly or in public."²
The ethnic Albanians were disturbed by the military fiasco, the arrival
of muhadjirs and decisions brought by the San Stefano Peace Treaty. The
penetration of the Serbian army caused panic and the flight of many ethnic
Albanians further into Ottoman territory, toward Djakovica and Pec. Albanian
leaders considered the expansion of Serbia and Montenegro, particularly
their evident aspirations to acquiring Old Serbia, perilous to Albanian
interests. Tribal chiefs from Pec, Djakovica, Gusinje, Ljuma, Debar and
Tetovo conferred upon whether to accept, in peace, their in war lost lands,
which they believed were "Albanian" territories, or to resist in arms the
alteration of former frontiers, despite the Forte's standpoint. Toward the
end of April, precautionary measures were undertaken in Djakovica in case of
another Serbian, Montenegrin or Russo - Bulgarian offensive and to protect
the supplies of arms, ammunition and food.³
The news of the Berlin Congress being convoked accelerated the national
assemblage of ethnic Albanians. Even in the preceding decades, Albanian
migrs in Italy, Bulgaria and Romania pledged for the educational and
national emancipation of their people, but their influence among the
illiterate commoners of Muslim faith, bound to the tradition of the sheriat
and tribal privileges, was entirely negligible. The "Italo - Albanian
Committee" acted under the patronage of the Italian government, which saw it
as a means of economic and political penetration to the Balkans. In
Constantinople, an influential literary-political circle of Albanian
intellectuals grew to become, in 1877, the "Central Committee for Defending
Albanian Rights", propagating territorial-administrative autonomy within the
framework of the Ottoman Empire. The plan of the Committee, published in the
Tercuman - i Sark paper, anticipated the founding of a single Albanian
vilayet that would encompass the Kosovo, Bitolj, Scutari and Janjevo
vilayets. Plans were then already voiced for including even of the Salonika
vilayet.⁴
For the first time since their foundation, the activities of Albanian
committees met with some response from wider Albanian circles, due to a
perilous psychosis on account of aspirations arising from the neighboring
Serbian countries. Around 300 delegates assembled in Prizren from different
regions, but mostly big landholders (pashas and beys), tribal chiefs and
religious heads. At a congregation in the Prizren mosque, a "League for
defending the rights of the Albanian people", more widely known as the
Albanian League, was founded. The main board, composed of 60 members,
presided over by Abdul Bey Frasheri, sent a memorandum to the Great Powers
in Berlin on June 15, requesting for the territorial integrity of the
Ottoman Empire to be preserved with its borders as they were prior to the
war.⁵
The statute of the League, called Kararname (Book of Decisions)
underscored fidelity to the sheriat law, Islam and the Porte, and the
determination to defend in arms the totality of Ottoman territories. The
first article of the Kararname underlines the League's "aim not to accept
and to remain distanced from any government except that of the Porte and to
struggle in arms to defend the wholeness of the territories". Article 2
states: "Our aim is to preserve the imperial rights for his revered majesty
the sultan, our lord." Article 6 states a definite attitude toward the
neighboring Balkan countries: "Having Balkan soil before us, we should not
allow foreign armies to tread our land. We should not recognize Bulgaria's
name. If Serbia does not leave peacefully the illegally occupied countries,
we should send bashibazouks (akindjias) and strive until the end to liberate
these regions, including Montenegro."⁶
The main demand of the Albanian League was to form from the territories
of four vilayets: Scutari, Janjevo, Kosovo and Bitolj, a single "Albanian
vilayet" in the Ottoman Empire. With its first step, the Albanian national
movement defined the range of its territorial pretensions. The spaces of
these four vilayets contained 44% ethnic Albanians, 19,2% Macedonian Slavs,
11,4% Serbs, 9,2% Greeks, 6,5 Walachs, 9,3% Ottoman Turks, 0,4% Jews,
Armenians and Gypsies.⁷ The territorial demands of the national
movement expanded to Old Serbia and Macedonia, regions where ethnic
Albanians did not comprise the majority of the populace, thus bearing the
germ of new clashes with the two Serbian states. It was based on extremely
anti-Slavic and anti-Serbian determination.
The activities of the League pointed to a breach in religious beliefs,
varying degrees of national awareness and opposing conceptions of national
future, all within the Albanian national movement.
The political activities of the League were controlled by notable
landholders, religious heads and tribal chiefs who were by their positions,
faith and conceptions profoundly bound to the Ottoman state and its
ideology. Relying upon the lower layers of the Albanian and Muslim people,
whose hostility for the Serbs paralleled the victories of Serbian armies,
they gave the whole movement a pro-Islamic and legitimist character in the
first year of its work. Abdul Bey Frasheri and delegates from south Albania,
advocates of the so-called "radical movement", remained a minority in their
propositions to sever all ties with the Porte. Yet, they coincided in
designating the territorial extension of "Albanian countries":
the new independent state was to be composed of four principalities: 1)
south Albania with Epirus and Janina; 2) north and mid Albania with the
regions around Scutari, Tirana and Elbasan; 3) Macedonia with the towns
Debar, Skoplje Gostivar, Prilep, Veles, Bitolj and Ohrid; 4) Old Serbia with
the towns: Prizren, Pec, Djakovica, Mitrovica, Pristina, Gnjilane, Presevo,
Kumanovo, Novi Pazar and Sjenica.⁸
In the conceived "Great Albania", their privileged position was taken
for granted. Until the Eastern crisis, it was based upon their place in the
system of the Ottoman state organization which allowed for the heedless
exploitation of the subjugated populace. In the national programs of the
League, preserving religious, tribal and political privileges, there was no
room for non-Albanian peoples: their political inequality was not
anticipated nor legal and economic protection warranted. Religious and
ethnic intolerance acquired, on the other hand, a new content. The Serbs in
Prizren were even compelled to sign and seal the petition of the League sent
to the Berlin Congress.
The leadership of the Albanian national movement, originating mainly
from feudal circles, saw, in the activities of the League, a means to
preserve the existing privileges, an opportunity to liberate the lower
strata from paying taxes, a continuity for free tribal self-government and
space for demographic expansion. Common interests soon made the League an
instrument of the new Sultan Abdulhamid II (1876-1909), inspirator of the
pan-Islamic ideology. Its anti-Slav disposition was to benefit the sultan in
revising the San Stefano Peace Treaty, to prevent international confirmation
of territorial losses or new concessions at the Berlin Congress. The League
was to act as a deterrent through which to preserve the totality of the
Ottoman state. Thus, at the inaugural assembly of the Albanian League, there
were delegates from Bosnia and Muslims from the sanjak of Novi Pazar, and
subsequently, though with little success, Albanian volunteers were mustered
to resist Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁹
The pro-Islamic and pro-Turk character of the League met with
disapproval among Catholic Albanians in north Albania. Italian consul to
Scutari, Bernardo Berio, believed that only the Catholics were true carriers
of the idea of Albanian autonomy and breakup with the Turks. Prenk Bib Doda,
hereditary prince of the Mirdits, did not wish to participate in the
activities of the League for the preponderance of Albanian Muslims in its
orders, beside holding different claims. A council in Scutari, independent
of the League in Prizren, addressed the British Premier Benjamin Disraeli
with the request for the formation of an independent Albania to bar Slavic
invasion toward the Adriatic sea.
Diplomats of Great Powers with consulates in Prizren and Scutari
(Russia, Austria-Hungary, Great Britain, Italy) reported that the formation
of the Albanian League was urged directly through aid from the Porte and
haste from vilayet officials and military commanders. The Italian consul to
Scutari observed "strange connections between the official bodies of Turkish
authorities and a lawfully illegal movement", since the Turkish authorities
paid for the arrival of Albanian delegates to Prizren and supplied the
followers of the League with arms and ammunition.¹⁰ The same
conclusions were drawn by a diplomat of the Dual Monarchy who warned that
the activities of the League's local committee in Prizren evolved through
conference with the highest officials in the vilayet, who "[...] armed the
local Muslim Albanians with excellent guns, provided them with ammunition
and granted authority upon their leaders exceeding the authorities of
government bodies [...]". He had anticipated that the Porte "would no longer
be able to induce the people to lay down their arms, and the consequences
soon to arise will be situations on which the Porte will have to
count".¹¹
The decisions of the Berlin Congress sanctioned the expansion of Serbia
and Montenegro, and, among other things, obligated the Porte to cede Plav
and Gusinje. The failure of the Turkish state to defend its interests before
the European powers caused the leadership of the League to gradually turn to
ideas of total autonomy. Councils and branches had around 16,000 men in arms
directed toward the Turkish authorities and army, being discontented by the
outcome of events. The first attempt of the Porte to restore order caused a
massive Albanian rebellion. The Empire's emissary, Marshall Mehmed Ali
Pasha, who arrived to interpret the decisions of the Berlin Congress, was
killed at the end of August 1878 in Djakovica.¹²
Resistance to the Porte increased with its attempts to collect taxes
from the ethnic Albanians and carry out recruitment. In May 1879, the
leadership of the League, overcome by the so-called "autonomous movement",
demanded judicial and complete administrative autonomy from the Porte, and
already in July, the decision was set to depose Turkish rule. Bodies of the
League took over rule in Djakovica, Prizren, Pec, Mitrovica and Vucitrn.
This kind of parallel rule lasted until 1880, when the demand for the total
independence of Albania was underscored. All attempts made by Constantinople
to pacify the ethnic Albanians were futile. The Porte then resorted to
military measures. As it no longer needed favors from the League, a military
campaign under the command of Dervish Pasha was dispatched to the rebelling
regions. Beside sporadic conflicts with the ethnic Albanians, it took the
towns controlled by the League and established Turkish rule. Instead of Plav
and Gusinje, Ulcinj and its shores were ceded to Montenegro. Destroyed by
military force, the League soon ceased to exist, while its most prominent
leaders were arrested and deported to Asia Minor.¹³
Cautiously encroaching upon the political vacuum created after the idea
for Albanian independence was expressed, was Austria-Hungary. To bar the
expansion of the Slavic states, it defended the rights of ethnic Albanians,
mainly the Mirdits. Count Andrassi believed that it was in the best interest
of the Monarchy to direct Albanian resistance against the Serbs and
Montenegrins, thereby sustaining traditional hostility between the ethnic
Albanians and Slavs. Plans were discussed in Vienna for the creation of
autonomous Albania to dam up Italian consolidation on the shores of the
Adriatic.
Even though feudal layers abhorred the aspirations of the Dual Monarchy
regarding the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the military
occupation of the Novi Pazar sanjak, the ethnic Albanians received these
decisions comparatively peacefully. The Austria-Hungarian diplomacy aided
Albanian requests in its border dispute with Montenegro, while its agents,
infiltrated from Bosnia, commended the order, security and improved living
conditions introduced by the new government in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The
Forte's emissaries were convincing the ethnic Albanians that the
Austria-Hungarian troops in the Novi Pazar sanjak arrived at the invitation
of padishah. As it already had secure political strongholds in the Catholic
missions in north Albania, the Dual Monarchy strove to win over the ethnic
Albanians of Muslim faith. Its further penetration into the depths of the
Ottoman Empire by way of the Novi Pazar sanjak depended mostly upon the
ethnic Albanians and their political orientation. The destruction of the
League was the first encouraging step in that direction.¹⁵
1 R. Pavlovic, Seobe Srba i Arbanasa u ratovima 1876 i 1877-1878.
godine, Glasnik etnografskog instituta, 4-6 (1955-1957), pp. 53-104; D.
Bogdanovic, Knjiga o Kosovu, 137-138.
2 Srbija 1878, p. 324.
3 B. Hrabak, Prvi izvestaji diplomata velikih sila o Prizrenskoj ligi,
Balcanica, IX (1978), p. 237.
4 B. Hrabak, Ideje o arbanaskoj autonomiji i nezavisnosti 1876-1880.
godine, Istorijski casopis, XXV-XXVI (1978-1979), pp. 160-165.
5 S. Skendi, Albanian National Awakening 1878-1912, Princeton 1967, pp.
31-53.
6 B. Hrabak, Prvi izvestaji diplomata velikih sila o Prizrenskoj ligi,
pp. 238-239. Article Kararname in: A. Hadri, Prilog rasvetljavanju
Prizrenske lige (1878-1881), Perparimi, 1 (1967), 36-37; useful survey on
the Albanian League by D. Bogdanovic, Knjiga o Kosovu, pp. 142-148; cf.
Lidhja Shqiptare ne dokumentet osmane 1878-1881, Tirane 1978; P. Bartl. Die
Albanische muslime zur Zeit der Nationalen Unabhngigkeitsbrewegung
(1878-1912), pp. 115-192.
7 By confessions, 52.8% were Muslim, 27.8% Orthodox, 15% Catholic.
Among the Albanians 77% were of Muslim faith (H. D. Schanderl, Die
Albanienpolitik Osterreich Ungarns und Italiens 1877-1908, Wiesbaden 1971,
pp. 9-10). A statistics of the population in Old Serbia complied prior to
the wars, by Austro-Hungarian consul to Prizren, Lipic, indicated that
Albanians were not the ethnic majority in the Nis sanjak liberated by
Serbia. In Leskovac 48.58% of Albanians lived, in Vranje 27.55%, whereas in
Nis they were not even listed in the statistics. The Albanians were the
majority in Toplice only in Prokuplje (57.86%) and Kursumlija (92.68%); B.
Hrabak, op. cit., pp. 256-257.
8 B. Stulli, Albansko pitanje 1878-1882, Rad JAZU, 318, (1959), pp.
321-323; D. Bogdanovic, Knjiga o Kosovu, pp. 144.
10 B. Stulli, op. cit., pp. 337-341; B. Hrabak, Arbanasi i njihova liga
prema okupaciji Bosne i Hercegovine, Prilozi instituta za istoriju u
Sarajevu, 16 (1979), pp. 37-48; Cf. H. Kalesi, Napredne ideje nekih ideologa
albanskog nacionalnog pokreta u drugoj polovini XIX veka o saradnji
balkanskih naroda, in: Oslobodilacki pokreti jugoslovenskih naroda od XVI
veka do pocetka Prvog svetskog rata, Beograd 1976, 225-242; D. T. Batakovic,
Osnove arbanaske prevlasti na Kosovu i Metohiji 1878-1903, Ideje, 5-6
(1987), pp. 36-38.
11 B. Hrabak, Italijanski konzul u Skadru B. Berio o arbanaskom pitanju
1876-1878. godine, Casopis za suvremenu povijest 3 (1978), pp. 32-33.
12 B. Hrabak, Prvi izvestaji diplomata velikih sila o Prizrenskoj ligi,
pp. 252, 262-263; B. Stulli, op. cit., p. 323.
13 B. Hrabak, Prvi izvestaji diplomata velikih sila o Prizrenskoj ligi,
pp. 268-270.
14 J. Hadzi-Vasiljevic, Arbanaska liga, pp. 100-102,109-127; B. Stulli,
op. cit., pp. 343-348; S. Skendi, op. cit., pp. 93-107.
15 D. Mikic, Prizrenska liga i austrougarska okupacija Bosne i
Hercegovine, 297- 328; H. D. Schnaderl, op. cit., pp. 43-47.
Court-Martial in Pristina
The entire activity of the Albanian League was of clear and explicit
Anti-Serbian character. The motives for its formation and the decisions of
the Berlin congress caused severe oppression upon the Serbian populace.
Albanian attacks on the Serbian border ended, as a rule, by depredating
Serbian villages on the Turkish side. From the beginning to mid June 1878
alone, according to the information of French diplomats, 112 Christian Serbs
were killed, mostly distinguished village hosts. Serbian houses were burnt,
and those who attempted to escape were ambushed. In Gnjilane nine women were
abducted and brutally tortured. Shortly before convoking the Congress of
Berlin, at least 60 Serbs escaped terror from Pristina alone, even though,
at the time, the bashibazouk leaders officially spoke favorably of Christian
Serbs in petitions sent to the Porte.¹
Fanaticized followers of the League believed the Serbs of Kosovo and
Metohia to be the major cause for all Albanian misfortunes. An Albanian
leader openly stated to Russian Consul Yastrebov: "We will attack the
Montenegrins on Christmas and kill them. And if we fail - we will return to
Pec and the vicinity and burn and saber all the Christians."²Yastrebov's following report indicated that these were not mere
threats:
"Three Albanians raped a thirteen-year-old girl from Dobrotin. The
Serbs dare not complain to the authorities. Those who complained paid with
their heads, and none of them trust the protection of a foreign government
any longer. People are saying that atrocities as these [1879] were not
committed even after the Crimean war, the general impression is that all
have conspired to crush the Serbian element."³ In a complaint
lodged to the Russian tzar in July 1879, the Serbs of Pec stated that since
the beginning of the Eastern crisis, over 100 people were killed in the Pec
district alone and that many atrocities were committed. The citizens of Pec
pleaded with Alexander II to take them under his wing and help the Visoki
Decani monastery in the Pec Patriarchate against plunder and blackmail
committed by outlaws at the orders of Pec agas.⁴
Terror over the Serbs did not wane during the entire period of the
Albanian League rule. Since 1880, when its leadership severed all tied with
the Porte, the position of the Serbian populace was aggravated, since
tribute had to be paid to both the Turks and ethnic Albanians: "The Serbs
had two lords; they paid tribute to two rulers, maintained two armies,
without having any protection or security."⁵ Yastrebov's reports
dating 1880 and 1881 are filled with information on the plight of the Serbs
- murders, robberies, arsons of houses and estates, and attempts to forceful
conversion to Islam. One characteristic report reads: "The situation of the
Christians in these regions is gloomy everywhere. Refugees from Serbia and
Bosnia (muhadjirs) pillage Christian houses, especially in the Pristina,
Gnjilane and Pec district. The same atrocities are committed by local ethnic
Albanians, even though they gave their bessa not to disturb them, but the
bessa is valid only for Muslims, it holds no obligation toward the
Christians."⁶
Incursions into Serbian state territory were at full swing during the
Albanian League, when the new Serbian frontiers were not yet secured.
Military advance guards were attacked, cattle was raided and Serbian
villages along the demarcation line were burnt. Following the Berlin
Congress, Albanian incursions into Serbia increased: their raiding
companies, sacking and burning everything in their wake, reached even
Kursumlija. On their return, all Serbian villages on the Turkish side were
attacked. Expecting an outcome and avoiding new conflicts, the Serbian
government did not persecute the assailants out of territory. The petitions
it sent to the Porte to stop the incursions remained without
response.⁷
The ethnic Albanians assaulted the teachers of the Serbian Seminary at
Prizren. They looked all over town seeking to kill one of them, someone
named Petar Kostic, for writing a letter on the political situation in
Prizren. Kostic was saved from certain death be fleeing to the Russian
consulate; following a hearing in front of the Turkish authorities in the
presence of Yastrebov, he was sent to Bitolj, since the Prizren authorities
could nor warrant him safety.⁸
The reign of the Albanian League left hard consequences on the position
of the Serbs in Old Serbia: "Created upon a reaction to the realization of
the national liberational programs of Balkan Christians, especially the
Serbs" - underscored Dimitrije Bogdanovic - "it was laid on the foundations
of the Great Albania ideas, ignoring the rights of Serbs and other Slavic
peoples of the Balkans, and of the Greeks, to live on their lands protected
under the law. A clash was inevitable, and the aggressive anti-Serbian
concept of the League permanently placed a burden upon the relations of
these two peoples. Simultaneously, the Great Albanian concept of the League
was offering itself to certain European powers as an instrument for their
own penetration to the Balkans."⁹ Violence upon the Serbs had
become, owing to the political programs of the League, one of the strategic
determinations in the Albanian national movement. Until the Eastern crisis,
violence upon the Serbs had been elemental rather than the result of a
conceptualized policy. Routing Serbs from their hearths by perpetual
oppression had become, owing to the political will of the League, a kind of
religious and national duty obligatory to all ethnic Albanians in the Kosovo
vilayet. The target of Albanian crimes in the decades to come were the Serbs
of the Pec, Pristina and Prizren sanjaks.¹⁰
After the Serbo-Ottoman wars the Serbs were looked upon with distrust
by both the Turks and ethnic Albanians. Even though they were unarmed,
decimated and pressured by the surge of newly settled muhadjirs, the Serbs
were considered an unreliable and potentially revolutionary element.
Following the 1878 war, Turkey promised a pardon by a general decree for all
subjects who had in any way violated authority. The Empire's amnesty was
officially proclaimed, but the movements and behavior of the Serbs were
regarded very suspiciously.
A false tip that the Serbs were preparing to rise in Kosovo on the very
day Serbia was proclaimed a kingdom, resulted in the formation of a drumhead
trial in Pristina, 1882. During five years of active work, based on
suspicion but without substantial evidence, around 7,000 Serbs were
butchered "for seditious conduct", and another 300 were sentenced to hard
labor from 6 to 101 years. The most respected people were convicted,
teachers and merchants, priests and serfs. Upon the pronouncement of a
sentence, they were sent to prisons in Salonika or exiled to Asia Minor.
Only in 1888, some of convicts that survived in prison were pardoned owing
to the intermediation of the Russian and British diplomacy.¹¹
Sima Andrejevic Igumanov published a book in 1882 Sadanje nesretno
stanje u Staroj Srbiji (The currently unfortunate times in Old Serbia)
filled with information on atrocities committed by the Turks and ethnic
Albanians at the beginning of the drumhead trial's activities. Disturbed
because Serbia would pay more attention to the sufferings of its compatriots
in Turkey, he attempted to draw the public eye to the new swing of violence:
"Our homeland has been turned into hell by dark crazed blood-suckers and
masses of melting Asian tyrants, since banditry, violence, deletion,
espionage, denunciation, daily arrests, accusations, trials, sentences,
exiles, arrogation of property and life in many ways, the wails, mourns and
burial of the executed, all these have become ordinary events everywhere in
Old Serbia and Macedonia."¹² Since Dervish Pasha's campaign
against the League, the position of the Serbs in Pec and Djakovica has
continually deteriorated; thus the people were preparing to emigrate to
Serbia. From the Pec region alone, according to data collected by Yastrebov,
around 1,500 families emigrated to Serbia since the wars to 1883. Upon
collection of the tribute and tithe, the Serbs in Metohia were compelled to
pay, beside for themselves, for those who moved, and often a part instead of
Albanian Muslims. Their complaints to the authorities remained unanswered.
¹³
1 B. Hrabak, Prvi izvestaji diplomata velikih sila o Prizrenskoj ligi,
p. 253.
2 V. Bovan, Jastrebov u Prizrenu, Kulturno-prosvetne prilike u Prizrenu
i rad ruskog konzula I. S. Jastrebova u drugoj polovini devetnaestog veka,
Pristina 1983, p.147.
3 Ibid., p. 146.
4 V. Stojancevic, Zalbe Srba Pecanaca na turske zulume 1876-1878.
godine Arhivski pregled, 1-2 9 (1978) pp. 151-160.
5 J. Hadzi-Vasiljevic, Arbanaska liga, pp. 109.
6 V. Bovan, op. cit., pp. 160.
7 J. Hadzi-Vasiljevic, Arbanaska liga, pp. 6-10.
8 R. M. Grujic, Dva izvestaja konzula Jastrebova o akciji Albanske lige
u Prizrenu 1880. god., Zbornik za istoriju Juzne Srbije, I (1936), pp.
403-406.
9 D. Bogdanovic; Knjiga o Kosovu, pp. 147-148.
10 P. Orlovic [Svetislav St. Simic], Pitanje o Staroj Srbi]i, Beograd
1901, pp. 3-11; D. T. Batakovic, Osnove arbanaske prevlasti, p. 37.
11 J. Popovic, op. cit., pp. 247-248; V. Bovan, op. cit., 168-171;
Istorija srpskog naroda, VI/1, pp. 323-326
12 Savremenici o Kosovu i Metohiji 1852-1912, pp. 101.
13 Around 60 Serbian families from the Pec nahi that had returned to
Turkey refused to resettle in the Pec nahi but instead, inhabited the
villages on the slopes of Kopaonik where there were not many Albanians (V.
Bovan, op. cit; pp. 174,178).
Albanians Under the Sultan's Protection
Abdulhamid II discontinued the reform tradition of his predecessors,
encouraged refeudalization and underscored pan-Islamism as the basic
principle of his reign. As supreme head of Islam, he strove to consolidate
the country internally through pan-Islamic ideology, and by restoring
religious fanaticism had hoped to create a counterbalance to all national
movements in the ethnically heterogeneous Empire. He believed the Muslim
Albanians were natural enemies of the Orthodox Slavic population -Serbs
above all - not wholely by religion, but also by race, historical traditions
and national aspirations. Thus Muslim Albanians had imposed themselves as
the best allies in crushing all Christian movements; the Christian revolts
and national movements were, according to the sultan's most profound
conviction, the basic cause of all unrest in the Ottoman Empire.
The padishah sought support for the new policy with the conservative
feudal circles. He invited the most prominent Albanian chiefs of Old Serbia
to Constantinople with the aim of binding them to him by bestowing gifts,
decorations and promotions. Among his followers from Kosovo, the most
outstanding were Ah Pasha of Gusinje and Hadzi Mula Zeka of Pec. Religious
heads, the mullahs and softas, stirred up religious fanaticism among the
illiterate and ignorant believers. Together with the feudal notables and
upper classes of Albanian society, they blamed the Serbs as the source
hazardous to Albanian interests and the stability of the Ottoman Empire. The
formation of the drumhead court martial in Pristina marked the opening of a
joint activity of Turkish authorities and Albanian notables in routing the
Serbian populace of the Kosovo vilayet.¹
The sultan's policy to use ethnic Albanians as the striking force in
weakening the Serbian ethnicon in spaces neighboring Serbia and Montenegro,
began to take on the form of a long-term political program toward the end of
the eighties of the 19th century. With the chain of new muhadjir settlements
the dense network of Serbian habitats was severed. The sultan and the Porte
were creating a sort of Albanian military frontier toward
Serbia.²
The settlement of the muhadjirs was encouraged by the Porte, while the
Albanian feudal lords of Kosovo saw to their being properly settled in new
habitats. Supporting them, however, was another burden upon the Serbs. Lab
soon became an ethnically pure Albanian region. Along the northern borders
of the Kosovo vilayet, in the Novo Brdo rivers, Kriva Reka and Gornja Morava
with Izmornik, new muhadjir settlements were springing. In Kriva Reka alone
the number of Albanian homes increased from 52% to 65%. The demographic
situation was rapidly improving to the advantage of the ethnic Albanians;
the muhadjirs had inundated mountainous rims hovering over the valley of
Kosovo. Serving as an impenetrable rampart, Albanian villages provided a
safeguard for the northern borders of Turkey.³
The policies of the Porte and the sultan's protection contributed to
the consolidation of a belief held among the ethnic Albanians that a
division of Turkish provinces in Europe would cause a division of the four
vilayets they considered their own territory. Such policy promoted a
stronger bondage of Muslim Albanians to the Ottoman state ideology. The
destruction of the League did not raise the question of joint
Albanian-Turkish resistance against the enemies of the Empire. Vali of
Kosovo, Abdi Pasha, estimated, in 1883, that in case of war, the faithful
ethnic Albanians would be sufficient in defending Old Serbia. Albanian and
Turkish relations toward the Serbs as the seditious element encouraged new
acts of violence. When a Serbian monk Martirije was murdered on his way to
Pec, Albanian outlaws announced their scheme - all Serbian priests and noted
people in Pec should be murdered. Then, they believed, there would be no
fear in case they were to fall under Serbian of Austro-Hungarian rule. The
vali came to Pec, but they told him there that the complaints of Christian
Serbs were unfounded.⁴
Aside to practical political tasks assigned to them, the ethnic
Albanians had partly to thank the immense influence of the padishah's body
guards for the sultan's mercy and protection during his entire reign.
Abdulhamid II rarely left his court in Yildiz, and in time became kind of a
prisoner of his own personal guards, a fact observed at the Porte by all
diplomats of Great Powers. Under its influence and owing to the
intermediation of high officials of Albanian origin, the sultan tolerated
all the unlawful acts committed by ethnic Albanians in Old Serbia - refusal
to pay tribute, to provide recruits for the regular army, to respect the
local vilayet authorities and answer to court for offences committed.
In Kosovo, Metohia and in the neighboring areas a division of
government was tacitly established. Corrupt Turkish officials gladly agreed
to cooperate with Albanian feudal and tribal circles. Due to high protection
from Constantinople enjoyed by the ethnic Albanians, the few conscientious
government officials in the Kosovo vilayet did not even try to pursue
Albanian perpetrators and rebels since they were liable to be punished and
replaced after their complaints were lodged directly to the sultan. Albanian
feudal circles secured full economic and political dominance in the Kosovo
vilayet without much effort.⁵
The policy of dtente toward the ethnic Albanians and the toleration of
violence committed upon the Serbian populace created a peculiar sense of
might in the lower classes of Albanian society. The knowledge that they
would not be punished whatever their offence, emboldened ethnic Albanians to
an appreciable disregard for Turkish authorities. Social division increased
the layer of outlaws (kacaks) who lived solely of banditry and raiding.
Since their attacks were directed mostly to the Serbs, the Turkish
authorities did not pursue them, except when required to do so by
representatives of Great Powers, and subsequently, by Serbian diplomatic
officials. However, even in then the perpetrators were not severely
punished. The policy of impunity exercised upon the ethnic Albanians during
the eighties, particularly the nineties, turned into anarchy, causing thus
anxiety to both the vali of Kosovo and the Sublime Porte.⁶
Albanian risings, usually local ones breaking out from time to time
characterized the whole period until the Young Turk Revolution. At the end
of September, 1884, in the Prizren region, particularly in Ljuma, an
Albanian rebellion broke out against an attempt of the Turkish authorities
to list the population and its properties to determine the amount of new
taxes. The rebelling ethnic Albanians of Ljuma drove out the administrative
officials from Prizren and devastated the town. They dispersed only when the
sultan promised them there wold be no listings nor tax-paying. The Turkish
authorities attempted neither to pursue nor disarm them.⁷
The 1885 war of Serbia and Bulgaria, which soon ended with the defeat
of the Serbian troops at Slivnica, upset the ethnic Albanians. Fearing
danger, they gave their bessa (word of honor) which obligated all the tribes
to discontinue mutual conflicts over estates and blood feuds. Fermentation
was at its peak in Djakovica and Mitrovica, since ammunition was smuggled
out of their arsenals in case of new international clashes. Large
conferences of tribal chiefs were held in Vucitrn. Any implication of
foreign peril or international crises in the vicinity of the Empire's
autonomous regions (the unification of Bulgaria and East Rumelia in 1885,
the Serbian-Bulgarian war), brought together Albanian tribes and Turkish
administrative and military officials. ⁸
1 D. Mikic, Albansko pitanje i albansko-srpske veze u XIX veku (do
1912), pp. 144-146.
2 D. T. Batakovic, Osnove arbanaske prevlasti, p. 38.
3 D. Bogdanovic, Knjiga o Kosovu, p 148.
4 V. Bovan, op. cit., pp. 180,183-184.
5 Ibid , p 39; Dj. Mikic, Drustvene i ekonomske prilike kosovskih Srba,
pp. 24-25.
6 B Perunicic, Pisma srpskih konzula iz Pristine 1890-1900, Beograd
1985, pp. 306-359.
7 V. Bovan, op. cit., pp. 185-187
8 Istorija srpskog naroda, VI/1, pp. 274-277.
Activities of the Serbian Government
All attempts made by the Serbian government to establish contact with
ethnic Albanians in Old Serbia were futile. The administration of Milutin
Garasanin, incited by the rising in the Prizren sanjak, tried to approach
the Albanian chiefs. The initiative came from the Serbian county chief in
Nis who came into contact with certain Albanian chiefs of Prizren, Pec,
Djakovica and Novi Pazar. Todor Stankovic, the county chief of Vranje,
proposed to win over Albanian leaders first in areas along the Serbian
borders, and then others, by promises that Serbia would liberate them from
the Turks. The plan was to establish contact with all notable tribal chiefs
from the Serbian border to Scutari. The cooperation particularly counted on
was that of Montenegrin duke and writer Marko Miljanov was, renowned in
north Albania as a hero and a friend of ethnic Albanians. Competent circles
in Serbia strove, with Albanian cooperation, to end Austro-Hungarian
influence among them. It soon proved that Albanian chiefs would not respond
to offers for cooperation. Negotiations ended when the Bulgarian-Serbian war
began.¹
Serbia knew little of the happenings in Kosovo and Metohia in the
eighties of the 19th century. News arrived from merchants and refugees,
border guards and through the Prizren Seminary. Until the mid-80's, Serbia's
activities on the national affairs in Turkey were discontinued due to
internal unrest and war with Bulgaria.
By a secret convention with Austria-Hungary in 1881, Serbia was
obligated to carry out its external affairs only in agreement with Vienna.
The Dual Monarchy allowed for the possibility of expansion to the south,
excepting the Novi Pazar sanjak. The friendly orientation of Prince Milan
toward Austria, which had blessed his proclamation of king in 1882,
displayed Serbia's helplessness to act on its own accord toward other
countries. Its defeat with Bulgaria considerably weakened its positions on
the Balkans.²
The national activities of Serbia toward Old Serbia could only develop
within the narrow framework of ecclesiastical and educational actions. The
first steps were taken in 1885 by widening the networks of educational and
ecclesiastical institutions. Garasanin's government had been preparing books
to be sent to Old Serbia since spring 1885. For the free distribution of
books about Turkey, regarded by the authorities as a perilous means of
anti-state propaganda, the Serbian books carried the seal of Sima
Andrejevic's Fund in Belgrade. Rector of the Prizren Seminary Petar Kostic,
was sent to Constantinople to obtain a license from the Turkish censors for
the free distribution of books.³ A patriotic association St.
Sava's Society" was founded in Belgrade, 1887, to revive national activities
in Serbian countries under Turkish rule and promote a systematic search of
the past and of contemporary political and ethnographic conditions. In 1887
the Ministry of Education opened a department for Serbian schools outside of
Serbia to serve as contacts for the St Sava's Society. Since 1889, this
department was taken over by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Serbian
government has taken over the operation of national actions in
Turkey.⁴
Following the Serbian-Bulgarian war a new era began with more active
work on the national affairs. The defeat at Slivnica sealed the autocratic
reign of King Milan (abdicated in 1888), issuing forth a breath of
enthusiasm for the task of collecting national forces for activity in
occupied Serbian countries.
The arrival of Stojan Novakovic, a notable diplomat and one of the most
renown scientists of his time, at the head of the Serbian legation in
Constantinople in 1886, marked the beginning of a widely set
educational-political activity in Serbian countries under Turkish rule. The
whole national activity was switched over to diplomatic service. That very
year Novakovic concluded a temporary consular convention with Turkey. By
1887, the first Serbian consulates were opened in Skoplje and Salonika. To
crown the national activity, the network of new Serbian diplomatic missions
was encircled by the opening of consulates in Pristina and Bitolj in
1889.⁵
The Serbian government sent the most able men into diplomatic service,
educated at the best foreign universities (Paris, Vienna, St. Petersburg).
In the consulate of Pristina alone diplomats with doctorates served
(Miroslav Spalajkovic, Milan D. Milojevic, Milan Pecanac) and writers
(Vojislav Ilic, Branislav Nusic and Milan Rakic) whose works, of which many
were written during their stay in Kosovo, comprise the present-day classics
of Serbian literature. These young highly patriotic men, delegates of a new
generation of the Serbian intelligentsia, accepted distasteful tasks to help
the mission of national liberation at the hardest place for a diplomatic
position, in Pristina.⁶
Ties with Serbia and its attendance to the national affairs had immense
importance in preserving national awareness with the people. An intensive
action for education followed. Money for these educational activities in
Kosovo arrived regularly, and new teachers were engaged. Within a short time
a large number of new schools were opened and work was resumed in many of
the old ones. The administration of Greek metropolitans over the
Raska-Prizren Eparchy, which encompassed almost all of Old Serbia, hindered
Serbia's aims to encircle its work on the national affairs. In 1885, Serbia
began negotiations with the Patriarchate of Constantinople, requesting for a
Serb to be the metropolitan in Prizren and for Serbian archpriests to take
over bishopric chairs in Skoplje, Veles, Debar, Bitolj and Ohrid. However,
negotiations with the ecumenical patriarch were not successful. The Serbian
government had, nevertheless, begun to prepare a monastic progeny for high
ecclesiastical duties in Turkey. The monks selected accepted Turkish
subjugation and went to study theology in Constantinople. ⁷
1 D. Mikic, Nastojanje Srba 1885. godine da saradjuju sa Arbanasima,
posebno preko Marka Miljanova, Obelezja, 4 (1982), pp. 89-102.
2 V. Popovic, Istocno pitanje, p. 182.
3 P. Kostic, Prosvetno-kulturni zivot pravoslavnih Srba u Prizrenu, pp.
70-73.
4 S. Jovanovic, Vlada Aleksandra Obrenovica, I, Beograd 1929, p. 98;
Dj. Mikic, Delatnost "Drustva Sv. Save" na Kosovu (1886-1912), Nasa
proslost, VII-IX (1973-1974), pp. 61-87.
5 Spomenica Stojana Novakovica, Beograd 1921, pp. 171-173; daily
reports on the position of Serbs and the political situation in the Kosovo
vilayet were sent from Serbian consulates in Skoplje and Pristina until
1912. Several thousand documents of which only a part have been published
were stored at the Archive of the Serbian Foreign Ministry: Arhiv Srbije,
Beograd, Ministarstvo inostranih dela, Prosvetno-politicko i politicko
odeljenje 1878-1912; Prepiska o Arbanaskim nasiljima u Staroj Srbiji
1888-1889, Beograd 1889; V. Corovic, Diplomatska prepiska Kraljevine Srbije,
I, Beograd 1933; B. Perunicic, Pisma srpskih konzula iz Pristine 1890-1900,
Beograd 1985; ibid., Svedocanstvo o Kosovu 1901-1912, Beograd 1988; ibid.,
Zulumi aga i begova u kosovskom vilajetu, Beograd 1988; Zaduzbine Kosova,
Prizren - Beograd, 1987, (edited by R. Samardzic) pp. 607-738; Milan Rakic,
Konzulska pisma 1905-1911, Beograd 1985 (ed. by A. Mitrovic).
6 J. M. Jovanovic, Nusic kao konzul, Srpski knjizevni glasnik, LIII
(1938), 259- 269; M. M. Rajic, Konzulska pisma 1905-1911, pp. 8-23.
7 Istorija srpskog naroda, VI/1, p. 302.
Flaring of Anarchy
Already the first reports from the consulate in Skoplje showed that the
position of Serbs was harder than it had been supposed in Belgrade
diplomatic circles. In fall 1887, the government was informed of anarchy
flaring on the stretch from Pristina and Prizren to the Montenegrin border.
ethnic Albanians controlled the roads, attacked passengers and assailed
Serbs in villages. Prior Rafailo of Decani sent the following message to the
consul: "Sir! Old Serbia is lost! The Christians are being killed like
animals; there are victims of death every day; we are like prisoners
deprived of freedom - no one dares to move."¹
The waning power of the Turkish authorities strengthened the obstinacy
of ethnic Albanians. Their clans clashed in blood feuds. When the conflicts
came to inter-tribal bloodshed, they ended by agreements confirmed by the
bessa, not valid for Christian Serbs. Incursions into Serbian territory
continued with increasing anarchy. Serbian garrisons were reinforced at the
frontier. Serbian notes sent to the Porte demanding an end to these
incursions remained unreplied. Stojan Novakovic believed "that the Turkish
authorities themselves feared the Albanians; they were never able to
undertake decisive measures against them; particularly the small authorities
who carry out their orders in the rear lines, thus frequently good orders
sent by older authorities remain without consequences".²
In an elaborate annual report on the position of the Serbian population
in Serbia, 1888, Rector of the Prizren Seminary Petar Kostic underscored the
danger of anarchy and violence upon the Serbs spreading. Certain villages,
unable to defend themselves, sought protection from outlaws and their
companies, paying in return high annual monetary compensations and often
working for free (kuluk). Similar to the ancient endowments, Visoki Decani
and the Pec Patriarchate which hired local Albanian clans for considerable
material compensation and gifts in kind to protect them against bandits from
other regions, the villages too soon felt the bitter side attending this
protection - various additional expenditures. Without license and special
monetary payments, local protectors would not approve weddings. Protecting
villages soon became such a lucrative business that the raiding companies
frequently battled over who would guard Serbian villages. Most of the
Serbian villages, however, could not afford continual protection. A frequent
occurrence, stated Kostic, was "for one family to bury two of its deceased
killed by the rage of Albanians, at the same time".³
Again, like many times before, Serbian shrines bore the brunt of
Albanian bandits. A dispute between two Albanian clans over the estate of
the Decani monastery ended in an armed clash with many killed on both sides.
The dispute arose over who would use the arrogated monastic land, cut down
the trees in the Decani forests and benefit from the bans. The authorities
would not get involved, while the monastic fraternity was compelled to feed
and provide for both tribal armies. When the energetic Prior Rafailo of
Decani attempted to oppose them, he was thrown out of the monastery and
arrested by Turkish authorities who interned him in
Constantinople.⁴
The beginning of activity undertaken by the Serbian consulate in
Pristina (1889) coincided with a period of great pressure exerted upon the
Serbs and open hostility toward everything that was Serbian. The opening of
the consulate itself was interpreted by the ethnic Albanians as a policy of
provocation and an intolerable attempt to supervise their activities. The
seat of the Kosovo vilayet was moved to Skoplje in 1888, thus the Serbian
consulate remained a solitary diplomat watchtower in a weakly supervised
district.
Reports from Pristina were filled with information on innumerable
atrocities - murders, arsons, blackmail, abduction of women, rapes,
cattle-raids and so on. A petition sent by the Serbian consul to the
district chief received an answered that Albanian tyrants were shielded by
the vali of Kosovo himself: "Evil comes by itself, emanating form disharmony
originating in Skoplje. I send all the guilty Albanians to Skoplje from
where they are soon discharged with arms."⁵ Marinkovic warned
that the ethnic Albanians were systematically assailing certain Serbian
villages, urging them to move by threats and murders. A common slogan was:
"Go to Serbia - there is no survival for you here." It was the hardest in
the Pec nahi. Reports demonstrate that ethnic Albanians forcibly invaded
Serbian houses. On their way to the Serbian frontier, the refugees were
fleeced as a rule. Seven families of 73 members on their way to Serbia from
a village near Pec were robbed of both their cattle and movables by the
ethnic Albanians.⁶
The anarchy soon took on the form of a movement to drive out the Serbs.
The Russian consul to Prizren, Teodosie Lisevich, upon evaluating the
anarchy in Kosovo and Metohia, concluded that the ethnic Albanians aimed to
squeeze in between Serbia and Montenegro and thus deprive Old Serbia of its
Serbian character. Albanian terror spread toward the Novi Pazar sanjak,
where the inhabitants were almost all Orthodox and Islamized Serbs. In April
and May 1889 alone, around 700 persons fled Kosovo and Metohia to Serbia.
All refugees gave warnings that the remaining Serbs would also be compelled
to seek salvation by flight.⁷ All these events were followed by
the decreasing number of Serbs who owned estates. The Turks imposed taxes so
high, thus compelling the Serbs to sell their estates at reduced prices, or
they were left without them on account of Albanian outlaws using the right
to adopt abandoned lands, upon which the Turkish authorities looked with
affinity.⁸
The culmination of anti-Serbian disposition was the murder of consul
Luka Marinkovic in Pristina in June, 1890. The Serbian government
maintained, upon information received from Serbs in Pristina, that an
Albanian conspiracy was responsible, but the Porte tried to present the
murder as a display of Muslim intolerance toward Christian foreigners.
Serbia demanded of the Porte to undertake drastic measures against the
ethnic Albanians, and the Russian ambassador to Constantinople, supporting
the Serbian demands, warned the Turkish officials that anarchy would spread
to such dimensions that any step taken toward pacification would be
difficult to effect. But the Porte had not the slightest intention to
intercept the unbridling ethnic Albanians. Pressured by the Serbian and
Russian diplomacies, the murderers of the Serbian consul, muhadjirs from
Prokuplje, were severely punished, but the inspirators of the assassination
were never found. The Serbs who appeared as witnesses at the trial fled to
Serbia fearing vengeance.⁹
The situation in Kosovo did not change much after the arrival of the
new consul Todor P. Stankovic. The consulate was no longer the target of
attack, instead, reports sent to Belgrade brought new black lists of
numerous atrocities. Stating forbidding numbers of terror committed upon the
Serbs, Stankovic underscored that due to the flaring of anarchy and weak
connections with agents in regions remote from Pristina, he had been able to
discover only about an eighth of the committed crimes. He warned that the
Turkish authorities in the Pristina sanjak extended scarcely more than a
degree from the city districts. Since he had lived in Metohia before the
Eastern crisis, Stankovic took to comparing figures of the population census
at the beginning of the seventies with those of the nineties and reached a
figure pointing to three quarters of the total population inhabiting the Pec
nahi being driven out by ethnic Albanians.¹⁰ Following accounts
related by some Serbs from Pec in 1907, twenty years earlier around 20,000
Serbs moved to Serbia and Montenegro before the Albanian terror, while 300
Albanian families from Malissia were settled in there place by Pec notable
Hadji Mula Zeka.¹¹
The Serbian emissary to the Porte endeavored through diplomatic means
to protect the Serbian populace in Old Serbia. However, it was all futile.
He met with no compassion in Yildiz, the sultan's court, nor with the
Turkish ministers. Having scrutinized the situation, Stojan Novakovic warned
the government in May, 1891, that the sultan, and perhaps the Porte, "were
working on destroying our element and strengthening the Albanian one. This
activity began right after the war during the Albanian League and has not
been ceased since."¹²
Some progress to bridle the Albanian anarchy in Kosovo and Metohia was
made through intermediation of the Russian diplomacy in 1892. It requested
of the Porte to curb the anarchy, secure public safety and protection for
the Christians. When the European press took more interest in events taking
place in Old Serbia, news of violence committed upon the Serbs reached the
European public. The Porte ordered the authorities in the vilayet to end all
pursuit of the rayah, punish the bandits and stop the killings among ethnic
Albanians on account of blood feuds.¹³
Official Serbia, torn asunder by internal dissension and impeded by its
political duties to Austria-Hungary, was unable to aid its compatriots in a
more decisive manner. Activities on national affairs evolved solely through
diplomatic legations, often owing to the personal initiative of an official.
Unable as diplomatic representatives of a small country to effect
anything more tangible for their people, the Serbian consuls wielded all
their faculties to promote education. The extent of lawlessness and
increasing distrust toward everything that was Serbian resulted in some
schools closing down, and the hindering and impeding of efforts undertaken
to promote education. Todor Stankovic earned great merits as a consul in the
opening new schools in Kosovo and parrying Bulgarian propaganda. Branislav
Nusic, a renown Serbian comedist, who worked several years at the consulate
in Pristina, helped open the first Serbian bookstore and renovate of a
primary and secondary school in Pristina. The promotion of education in 1893
was regarded as a considerable success in Serbia, since through the Serbian
schools Serbian nationality was indirectly recognized, presented in all
regulations as rum millet, i.e. a religious category belonging to the
Constantinople Patriarchate. The success was even more greater since the
Bulgarian Exarchate, and under its influence the Turkish authorities,
continually strove to present the Serbian schools as Bulgarian. Under the
imperial irada of 1893 and the regulation on education of 1896, the Serbs in
Kosovo and Metohia could freely open schools and thus indirectly acquire
recognition of their nationality.¹⁴ However, insurmountable lists
of oppression upon the Serbs often exceeding all known ways of torture with
their brutalities, continued to arrive in the seat of the Serbian
government. Within only six months Nusic reported on the devastation of
eight Serbian churches and the persecution of priests.¹⁵
Extremely dissatisfied and disturbed by the development of political
conditions and the position of Serbs in Old Serbia, the Serbian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs considered the possibility of wielding a more favorable
influence on the educational and national development of Old Serbians by
reorganizing the network of consulates and uniting national actions.
Slobodan Jovanovic, one of the greatest Serbian historians and lawyers, then
young official at the Ministry, was sent in 1894 on a tour to visit
consulates in Turkey, while Branislav Nusic, the vice-consul in Pristina,
obtained approval to travel through the region between Prizren and Scutari.
Jovanovic informed that there was little the consul could do to protect
the people from Albanian violence; that it was isolated and continually
under surveillance; and proposed a move to Mitrovica, which had a railroad
track and livelier merchants contacts. But, consequential to the serious
violence and the helplessness of the Serbian consul before the authorities,
he observed growing disagreements and quarrels among the people and that
some citizens of Pristina strive to adapt to the hard conditions by
cooperating with Turkish authorities.¹⁶ Traveling through Metohia
and north Albania, Nusic noted that the Serbs in Pec and the vicinity were
extremely estranged; the breach was so deep that they informed against each
other to the authorities.
Disharmony among the Serbs, as an expression of an insufferable
political situation and continual living under extraordinary conditions,
dangerously undermined their ability of a joint resistance against Albanian
terror and the abuse of Turkish authorities. Nusic wrote on it in his book
on the life of Serbs in Kosovo: "Public life in Turkey is a bad example of
citizenry virtues since it is regulated by laws that are bad, or very good
but not enforced, or even worse, enforced upon people whose prejudices and
vices are stronger than law. While the law applies to one, it fails to apply
for another [...]. Conditions like these compel the people to contrive
conditions for peace and survival. Thus upon encountering these people one
often comes across reservation and dishonesty, traits not indigenous to
these people. Frequently betrayed and exposed, more often innocently
destroyed, it has became distrustful and will rarely reveal its inner
feelings."¹⁷
The Serbs were not very successful in courts either. A qadi boasted in
1891 of having solved two cases out of one thousand, for a period of over 18
years, in favor of the Serbs. When the litigants were Serbs, he made his
decision according to which side gave him a bigger bribe. ¹⁸
1 B. Perunicic, Zulumi aga i begova u kosovskom vilajetu, pp. 48-50..
2 Ibid., p. 52.
3 Ibid., p. 62.
4 D. T. Batakovic, Memoari Save Decanca o visokim Decanima 1890.
godine, Mesovita gradja, XV (1986), pp. 117-136.
5 B. Perunicic, Pisma srpskih konzula iz Pristine 1890-1900, p. 30.
6 Ibid., pp. 40-41, 67-73.
7 B. Perunicic, Zulumi ago i begova u kosovskom vilajetu, pp. 69-78.
8 D. Mikic, Drustvene i ekonomske prilike kosovskih Srba, p. 42.
9 B. Perunicic, Pisma srpskih konzula iz Pristine 1890-1900, J.
Popovic, op. cit., Pp. 251-153.
10 B. Perunicic, Pisma srpskih konzula iz Pristine 1890-1900, pp.
94-97.
11 B. Mikic, Nastojanje Srba na otvaranju ruskog ili engleskog
konzulata u Peci 1908. godine, Obelezja, 1 (1977), p. 154.
12 Istina o Kosovu, Beograd 1988 (M. Vojvodic).
13 Ibid.
14 Istorija srpskog naroda, VI/1, p. 301.
15 Zaduzbine Kosova, pp. 631-636; B. Perunicic, Pisma srpskih konzula
iz Pristine, pp. 152-188, 190-191.
16 R. Ljusic, Izvestaj Slobodana Jovanovica o poseti srpskim
konzulatima u Turskoj iz 1894. godine, Istorijski glasnik, 1-2 (1987), pp.
193-215.
17 B. Nusic, Opis zemlje i naroda, Beograd 1986 , pp. 88.
18 "Velika Srbija", No 51, Beograd, 8/20. XII 1891.
Religious, Educational and Economic Conditions
Serbian national gatherings in Turkey were possible only under the wing
of the church. Since plans for restoring the Pec Patriarchate could not be
realized, Serbia and Montenegro undertook a joint action in the mid-90's,
demanding for the bishopric chairs in the Raska-Prizren and Skoplje
Eparchies to be occupied by metropolitans of Serbian nationality. The
transition of these two Eparchies to the rule of Serbian metropolitans
through ecclesiastical institutions, would strengthen national and political
activity in Old Serbia.
Following the death of Greek Metropolitan Melentije, a Serb,
Archsyncellus Dionisije Petrovic (1896-1900) was consecrated the
Raska-Prizren bishop with the joint effort of the governments of Serbia and
Montenegro, bolstered by the Russian diplomacy in Constantinople. Carrying
out orders from the Serbian government, the new metropolitan implemented a
wide reorganization in ecclesiastical and educational institutions, opened
new schools, renewed teaching staff, created new church-school communities,
and, in keeping with the orders of the Serbian government, united the
activities on national affairs.¹ Serbia endeavored to open a
consulate in Prizren to enable facile communication with the metropolitan.
Due to great resistance from ethnic Albanians who threatened to burn Serbian
towns and sent critical protests to the Porte, the consulate was never
opened.²
The national, ecclesiastical and educational activity pursued by
Dionisije and his successor Nicifor Peric (1901-1911) reflected mostly in
the opening of new schools and invigorating the educational autonomy of the
Serbs. Turkish administrators and Austro-Hungarian diplomats regarded them
as agents of "Great Serbian propaganda" and tried to obstruct every move
they made. The Turkish authorities were determined to limit the religious
and legal rights of Serbs in Old Serbia. Considering schools seedbeds of
national propaganda, Turkish authorities endeavored to impose a compulsory
study of the Turkish language and to implement a rigorous supervision of the
curriculum and teachers in Serbian schools.³
The metropolitans also clashed with the administration of church-school
communities, who, being unused to central church governing, showed no
appreciation for measures undertaken by the former, thus giving cause for
misunderstandings and mutual suspicion. The harshest conflict occurred when
the administration of the Visoki Decani monastery was deferred to Russian
monks from Mt. Athos. With the principle agreement from the Serbian
government, Metropolitan Nicifor negotiated in 1903 to defer the
administration of Decani to the monks of the Russian skits St. John the
Eloquent on Mt. Athos. The Russian monks were brought to protect the Serbs
in Metohia from Albanian oppression, to restore monastic life in the
impoverished monasteries and to bar Austro-Hungarian influence and Catholic
propaganda. As far as the protection of Serbs was concerned, the Russian
diplomacy was expected to provide assistance aside to the monks of Mt.
Athos. The agreement concluded in 1903 without instructions from the Serbian
government caused many misunderstandings. The Russian monks usurped power of
the monastery. The metropolitan and Serbian government endeavored to
supplement the agreement and limit their administration, causing a breach
between the Serbs of Metohia, those who were followers and those who opposed
the Russian monks. A dispute between the Russian and Serbian government
entailed. Dissension and quarrels resulting from the Decani issue
considerably affected national activity in Metohia.⁴
After the Eastern crisis the Serbian farmers were faced with new
troubles. Emigration to Serbia and the settlement of the muhadjirs disturbed
relations in villages. The muhadjirs and various other tyrants, unhampered
by the Turkish authorities, assailed Serbian estates, committing brutalities
of all sorts. Toward the end of the eighties, when economic pressure had
become too hard to bear, entire villages were preparing for emigration to
Serbia, particularly in the Ibarski Kolasin. The Turkish authorities replied
to complaints lodged by the Serbs: "If you cannot take it, seek better",
thus encouraging emigration.⁵
Even though there were no principle differences between Serbian and
Albanian chiflik farmers, the Muslim and Catholic ethnic Albanians were
nevertheless in a better situation. Overall lawlessness, assails and murders
compelled many Serbs to turn from previously free heirs or herdsmen to
chiflik farmers. Unlike the Serbs, ethnic Albanians were unreliable serfs,
being used to robbery and seizure, and the feudal lords dared not pursue
them. Halil Pasha Mahmudbegovic complained of their obstinacy and
recalcitrance to the Serbian consul: "[...] while we still own Serbian
chiflik farmers you could say we are lords of the chifliks, but when they
move out, and the ethnic Albanians take their places, then we are no longer
lords of the chifliks. When an Albanian settles on a chiflik, he is peaceful
2-3 years, and gives a quarter to his master; but as soon as he builds his
tower, he becomes a greater lord than the real lord."⁶
Collection of the land tithe was leased. The leasees fined the Serbs
without limits, while their complaints remained unanswered. Common hostility
toward the Serbs had spread among Albanian feudal lords. To expand and
reinforce their estates, they assisted the settlement of Albanian chiflik
farmers in spite of sporadic conflicts. In certain regions of Kosovo,
overbearing beys and agas succeeded, through oppression, to compel compact
Serbian villages to massive emigrations. In a village near Pec, the agas
drove out even those Serbs who owned land. In the vicinity of Prizren, by
terrorizing Serbian chiflik farmers for twenty years, ethnic Albanians of
the Kabash clan succeeded in decreasing the number of Serbian houses of a
single village from 40 to nine. In the sanjak of Pristina, particularly in
Lipljan and Gracanica, where the inhabitants were solely Serbs, until 1904,
feudal lords drove away the Serbs and settled Albanian chiflik
farmers.⁷
Serbian town-dwellers, mostly merchants and craftsmen, lived
comparatively safely in towns. The main obstacle for expanding their
businesses was the regard of the Muslim trade district. With the renewal of
Muslim fanaticism in 1897, ethnic Albanians and Muslims began the boycott of
Serbian goods, lasting intermittently until 1912. Upon the initiative of
Metropolitan Nicifor, Rector of the Prizren Seminary, and a series of
notable Serbs in Prizren, an idea was initiated to found a Serbian monetary
bureau to revive staggering businesses. With financial support from the
Belgrade capital, the Serbian government, the consulate in Pristina and
support from Russian consuls in Prizren and Mitrovica, the first monetary
bureaus sprang up. In Prizren in 1901 the "St. George Church Fund" was
founded to aid operations of the Serbian trade district. In subsequent years
similar funds or societies in Pristina were founded ("St. Nikola Church
Fund"), in Mitrovica (St. Sava Church Fund) in Fenzovic ("St. Tzar Uros
Church Fund"), and many merchant-guild societies were founded in Gnjilane
and Vucitrn. With their unification around 1912 the first Serbian banks
emerged in Kosovo. ⁸
1 N. Raznatovic, Rod vlade Crne Gore i Srbije na postavljanju srpskih
mitropolita u Prizrenu i Skoplju 1890-1902. godine, Istorijski zapisi, XXII,
2 (1965), pp. 218-275; Istorija srpskog naroda, VI/1, pp. 303-305;
Archimandrite Firmilijan Drazic was appointed administrator of the Skoplje
metropolitan in 1897, and as Serbian metropolitan, in 1902.
2 D. T. Batakovic, Pokusaji otvaranja srpskog konzulata u Pristini
1898-1900, Istorijski casopis, XXXI (1984), pp. 249-250.
3 Istorija srpskog naroda, VI/1, pp. 305-307.
4 D. T. Batakovic, Decansko pitanje, Beograd 1989 (with earlier
literature).
5 D. Mikic, Drustveno-politicki razvoj kosovskih Srba u XIX veku, pp.
247-248.
6 T. P. Stankovic, Putne beleske po Staroj Srbiji 1871-1898, p. 105.
7 D. Mikic, Drustveno-politicki razvoj kosovskih Srba u XIX veku, pp.
250-251.
8 B. Hrabak, Poceci bankarstva na Kosovu, Istorijski glasnik, 1-2
(1982), pp. 57-83.
The Decline in Population
Violence and emigrations caused a continual decline of Serbs in Kosovo
and Metohia since the Eastern crisis until liberation in 1912, despite a
high birthrate. In his book Kosovo, Opis zemlje i naroda (Kosovo, A
Description of the Country and People), (1902), B. Nusic expounded the
reason for emigration most clearly: "Following the Serbian-Turkish war,
emigrations of broad dimensions took place for two reasons. The ethnic
Albanians, citizens of Kosovo, took to avenge themselves upon the Serbs, who
were their rayah, on account of the war. While going to the war and
returning from it, they set fire to Serbian homes, raided their cattle and
to Serbia, the frontier of which was now closer, thus facilitating their
flight. On the other hand, the bulk of ethnic Albanians who were driven out
stayed in Kosovo, there being the closest to the lands they abandoned in
Serbia. These newcomers, known as muhadjirs, inundated Kosovo and drove out
the Serbs from their lands to make space for themselves.[...] Thus the
ethnic Albanians simultaneously flooded Serbian villages from two sides:
from the mountains, by descending toward the Sitnica, and from the Serbian
borders. Today, one could hardly finger out villages void of ethnic
Albanians, whereas countless of villages inhabited by Serbs existed just
until recently. The latter have retained their Serbian names but there is
not a single Serbian house in them."¹
An unreliable, but indicative Turkish state census, listed shortly
before the Eastern crisis in 1873, exhibits the following ethnic and
religious picture: in the Pristina, Vucitrn and Gnjilane kazas (districts),
there were 19,564 Christian and 34,759 Muslim male tax-heads. The Serbs
numbered the most in the Gnjilane kaza: 11,607 to 12,544 Muslims. In the
Vucitrn kaza there were 250 Christian toward 800 Muslim heads, in the
Pristina 400 to 3,000, in Gnjilane 400 to 250. Of 7,850 male Muslims in
Pristina, one half spoke Turkish, the other Albanian. In Pec, of 9,105
persons one third spoke Serbian, the second Turkish and the third
Albanian.²
A list of Serbian homes in the Raska-Prizren Eparchy composed in 1899
by Metropolitan Dionisije, amounts to 8,323 Serbian village houses and 3,035
houses in the towns of Kosovo and Metohia, which comes to 113,580 persons
with the average number of 10 persons per family. In comparison with
official information from the Serbian government that from 1890 to 1900
around 60,000 Serbs emigrated from Kosovo, Metohia and the neighboring
regions to Serbia, statistics show that the number of Serbs in villages had
declined by at least a third since the Eastern crisis. Serbian houses
remained most numbered in towns, where they were comparatively protected
from violence: in Prizren (982), Pristina (531), Pec (461), Gnjilane (407)
and Orahovac (176), and the least in the small towns Djakovica (70) and
Fenzovic (20).³
Statistics of the population of the European vilayet of the Ottoman
Empire carried out in Vienna in 1903, based on official Turkish censuses and
research conducted by consular departments, shows the following ethnic
disposition in Kosovo and Metohia:⁴

Pec sanjak
Pristina sanjak
Prizren sanjak

Orthodox Serbs
23,750
73,400
14,200

Catholic Serbs
-
6,600
-

Muslim Serbs
13,250
43,000
13,000

Muslim Albanians
96,250
73,500
45,300

Catholic Albanians
9,300
50
5,000

Orthodox Albanians
-
-
900

Tzintzars (Romanians)
300
270
2,000

Turks
250
3,000
6,400

Jews
50
350
100

Gypsies
1,350
8,530
4,300

According to Austro-Hungarian statistics, the immediate region of
Kosovo and Metohia was composed of 111,350 Orthodox, 69,250 Muslim and 6,600
Catholics Serbs, totaling 187,200. Albanian Muslims numbered 215,050,
Catholics 14,350, and Orthodox 900, totally 230,300. The Austro-Hungarian
statistics should not be wholely trusted, considering the political interest
of the Dual Monarchy for ethnic Albanians, and the time of its collection:
at the beginning of the reform action in Old Serbia and Macedonia.
The most complete statistic of the population of Kosovo and Metohia is
the census composed by the Serbian consulate in Pristina in 1905. Three
sanjaks were encompassed in the census: the Pristina, Prizren and Pec
sanjaks. The total number of Orthodox Serbs in this particular census
amounted to 10,346 homes with 206,920 inhabitants. Official data, sent by
officials of the Raska-Prizren Eparchy to the consulate, totaled to 10,164
homes.⁵

homes
inhabitants

Orthodox Serbs
10,346
206,920

Muslim Serbs who became Albanians
15,600
390,010

Catholic Serbs
108
1,750

Muslim Serbs from Bosnia
50
1,200

Protestant Serbs
-
1

Catholic Albanians
260
1,560

Albanians
1,000
20,000

Turks
270
3,230

Jews
50
300

Shortly before the liberation of Kosovo in 1912, according to research
conducted by Ivan Kosancic, the number of Serbian houses in the Pristina,
Pec and Prizren sanjaks were the following:⁶
sanjak
in towns
in villages
total

Pristina
1,531
12,517
14,048

Pec
643
3,238
3,026

Prizren
982
1,148
2,400

The stated statistics show a relative increase in the number of Serbian
homes. It is hard to suppose their number increased in the first decade of
the 20th century, since the entire documentation preserved points to an
increase of emigrations to Serbia. The increasing number of Serbian homes
noted by the consulate in Pristina, and subsequently by Kosancic, would more
likely refer to disintegration of family groups, when from one family group,
comprised of 20-30 members, several new hearths were created.
The man of most authority concerning ethnic relations in Old Serbia is
Jovan Cvijic. In 1911 he published the results of his research: in the
Pristina sanjak there were 14,048, in the Pec sanjak 3,826, and in the
Prizren sanjak 2,400 Serbian houses, with around 200,000 inhabitants. If
this data were compared with the statistics from the first half of the
century, indicating the existence of about 400,000 Serbs in Kosovo and
Metohia, then Cvijic's evaluation that from 1878 to 1912, around 150,000
persons moved to Serbia, is quite convincing.⁷
1 B. Nusic, Kosovo, Opis zemlje i naroda, pp. 76-77.
2 V. Nikolic-Stojancevic, Leskovac i oslobodjeni predeli Srbije
1877-1878, Leskovac 1975, p. 10
3 S Novakovic, Balkanska pitanja, Beograd 1906, pp. 515-527; Prepiska o
arbanaskim nasiljima u Staroj Srbiji, Beograd 1899, pp. 136.
4 Haus. Hof, und Staatsarchiv - Wien, Politisches Archiv, XII, k. 272,
Nationalitaten und Religions-karte der Vilajete Kosovo, Salonika, Scutari,
Janina, und Monastir; cf also P. Barti, op. cit., pp. 52-64.
5 B. Perunicic, Svedocanstvo o Kosovu 1901-1913, pp. 246-248; the
consul increased the final number by 20%, (not taken into account in the
above table), believing the information provided by parish regents
inaccurate, since the latter reduced the number of parishoners for the sake
of their income.
6 I. Kosancic, Novopazarski sandzak, Beograd 1912, 16-18; Istorija
srpskog naroda, VI/1, p. 266.
7 J. Cvijic, Osnove za geografiju i geologiju Makedonije i Stare
Srbije, III, Beograd 1911; ibid., Balkanski rat i Srbija, Beograd 1912; cf.
J. Dedijer, Stara Srbija. Geografska i etnografska slika, Srpski knjizevni
glasnik, XXIX (1912), pp. 674-699.
PART TWO: THEOCRACY, NATIONALISM, IMPERIALISM

ANARCHY AND GENOCIDE UPON THE SERBS
This era was marked by anarchy in Kosovo and Metohia. Following the
great Eastern crisis (1878), anarchy encroached the bases of state policy,
and its driving force became genocide upon the Serbs. Developing into a
movement, the purpose of which was to exterminate a people, Albanian anarchy
was adjusted by circumstances, lead by political motives, tribal, economic
or personal gains, displaying itself in various ways. Muslim fundamentalism
and religious fanaticism were interwoven with feelings of national and
tribal belonging. Wavering between lucrative raids, blackmail, abduction and
radical solutions by murder or the routing of entire families, the policy
conceived to exterminate the Serbian people was never doubted. But it never
could be carried out to the end, since every attempt of massive physical
destruction or collective pursuit was threatened by subsequent international
clashes and the military interference of neighboring Christian countries.
Thus the ethnic Albanians applied the method of persistent violence day
after day which, being radicalized in periods of crises, lead to a sure
completion of their purpose - the extermination of Serbs in the Kosovo
vilayet. The decisive turning point came with the Greek-Turkish war (1897).
Recognized as an announcement of the approaching disintegration of the
Ottoman Empire on the Balkans, it moved an avalanche of Albanian violence
upon the Serbs.
Following the Kurds' brutal massacre of the Armenians, the European
public, appalled by the barbaric methods of Sultan Abdul Hamid's policy,
rightfully named him "the bloody Sultan". The Kurds of the Asia Minor
expanses seemed to have proved their act in the same role as the ethnic
Albanians had in the European provinces of the Ottoman Empire. The Greek
Insurrection on Crete in 1896 anticipated a new danger for the safety of the
empire. News on the massacre of Muslim followers upset conservative Albanian
circles in Kosovo. At councils, held in the houses of notables and in
mosques, they confirmed their readiness for vengeance.¹
Pressured by the Great Powers, the Sultan announced a program of new
reforms in 1896, anticipating equality for Muslims and Christians under the
law and the introduction of Christians to administrative bodies. The
announcement of the reforms exacerbated Muslim ethnic Albanians in Old
Serbia and Macedonia. Their leaders, pashas and beys, tribal chiefs and
standard bearers strove to maintain the possession of specially privileged
positions in the structure of the feudal society and to sustain political
supremacy in their regions. The Albanian migrs and notables of southern
Albania, used the announcement of reforms to renew the idea of autonomy.
Feudal circles of Kosovo sent a delegation to Constantinople, headed by Mula
Zeka of Pec, expressing readiness to defend in arms its homeland from
external threat and requested for the reforms not to be implemented in Old
Serbia. Beys in Pristina refused to give any consideration to the reforms,
due to the "Serbian threat". The Sultan accepted their requests without
hesitating.²
The declaration of war upon Crete was threatened by the possible
involvement of Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro in the crisis. The Great
Powers, especially parties holding most direct interest - Russia and
Austria-Hungary, warned the Balkan state not even to think of warfare with
the Turks. The beginning of the Greek-Turkish war in April 1897, accelerated
negotiations between the two powers. The Dual Monarchy and Russia concluded
a secret agreement in May to preserve the status quo on the Peninsula.
Several months subsequently Austria-Hungary came to terms with Italy for
joint influence in Albania.³
The 1897 war with Greece was a test of Albanian loyalty to the sultan.
Around 10,000 Albanian volunteers enlisted in the Turkish army. The
declaration of war stirred Muslim fanaticism among the ethnic Albanians,
thus invigorating identification with the interests of the Ottoman Empire.
It was due to them that Turkish troops penetrated deep into Thessaly, with
Albanian volunteers exceeding in sacking Greek villages. Greece was defeated
but Crete, with the aid of Great Powers, was on its way of achieving
autonomy with the Greek prince as governor.
Albanian volunteers from Kosovo and Metohia regarded the outcome of the
Crete crisis as an announcement of new divisions in the Turkish countries.
Like many times before, they blamed the Serbs as the guilty party,
suspecting their conniving with the authorities in Serbia. Following the
conclusion of the truce, the ethnic Albanians retained their arms, since the
Turks believed they would successfully defend the northern borders of the
empire in case of another war. Embittered by the failure of their rumoring
Serbia's preparation to war with Turkey, the ethnic Albanians then turned
upon the unprotected Serbian populace more severely than ever.⁴
The Turkish authorities and Muslim clergy stirred the apprehensions of
ethnic Albanians with news of imminent war with Serbia. In such an
atmosphere, mass murders, robbery and violence spread to broad dimensions.
The consulate in Pristina reported that following the victory over Greece,
ethnic Albanians "have literally become enraged, perpetrating atrocities
upon the Serbian rayah they never dared do before, even in their wildest
years."⁵
Already next year, in 1898, the terror grew to a general movement to
exterminate the Serbian rayah in Old Serbia. Reports from Serbian consulates
in Pristina and Skoplje indicate that, in its scope and cruelty, this one
exceeded all previous ones. The consul in Pristina, Svetislav St. Simic,
warned that the position "of our [Serbian] people in Kosovo is no better
than the position of the Armenians in Asia Minor in the years from 1894 to
1896".⁶ Lists of hundreds of severe crimes all pointed to the
fact that the Serbs would soon disappear from Old Serbia unless preventive
measures were undertaken. The consuls proposed for people in the Kosovo
vilayet to secretly arm for defense against the tyrants. Frequent border
conflicts effected a strain in Serbian-Turkish relations.
1 A large number of Albanians, especially those from Djakovica, took
part in the Armenian massacre; see V. Berard, Politique du sultan. Pans
1897; for Albanian agitation: B. Perunicic, Pisma srpskih konzula iz
Pristine 1890-1900, pp. 198.
2 D. Mikic, Drustvene i ekonomske prilike kosovskih Srba, pp. 44-45; D.
T. Batakovic, Osnove arbanaske prevlasti, p. 40.
3 S. Skendi, op. cit., pp. 242-244.
4 Ibid., pp. 199-202.
5 B. Perunicic, Pisma srpskih konzula iz Pristine 1890-1900, pp. 269;
Lists of violence, pp. 269-277, 293-299.
6 Ibid., pp. 311.
Serbia's Diplomatic Actions
Political conditions in Serbia did not allow for any broader actions to
protect the Serbs in Turkey. Having returned to the country, King Milan
undertook to govern the foreign policy. Requesting of the sultan religious
concessions in Macedonia, the government of Vladan Djordjevic waged a
Turkophilic policy. The foreign policy course pursued by King Milan, an old
Austrophilic, induced the Serbian government to lose Russian support in the
Porte, gained in 1895-96, during Stojan Novakovic's government. Becoming
again the envoy to Constantinople, Novakovic proposed for the Serbian people
in Kosovo and Metohia to be supplied with guns, and then the issue of their
protection may be raised. When the proposition was not adopted, he then
proposed, to the government, at least diplomatic action with the Porte. With
the assistance of consuls in Pristina (Todor P. Stankovic, then Svetislav
St. Simic) detailed lists of brutalities performed by ethnic Albanians upon
the Serbs in 1897-1898 were collected and submitted as a Serbian note to
Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Tefvik Pasha. Novakovic requested for the
Porte to undertake energetic measures to terminate the pogroms upon the
Serbs and to form an admixed Turkish-Serbian investigating
committee.¹
The note dated May 26 contains the following statement: "During the
past four years the Royal [Serbian] government was compelled more than once
to draw the attention of the imperial government, to the disorder, and
incredible and innumerable violent deeds continuously performed by the
insubordinate and unruly Albanian populace on the Serbian-Turkish border, as
well as on the bordering sanjaks. These crimes and attacks are directed
solely toward the Christians of Serbian nationality, and it seems their
purpose is to exterminate the people from those regions."²
Novakovic underscored that "The ethnic Albanians are well-armed and certain
that no punishment awaits them, giving complete liberty to their cruel
instincts, since there is nothing to hinder their fanaticism and
unrestrained hatred. Crimes and robberies are daily occurrences, and not
only do the perpetrators remain unpunished, they are not even pursued by the
authorities. The number of fugitives fleeing across the border for their
lives is enormous, and increases everyday. According to data the royal
government disposes of, more than four hundred crimes were perpetrated in
the Pristina, Novi Pazar, Pec and Prizren sanjaks within only a few months,
last summer and winter. They were: murder, arson, banditry, desecration of
churches, rape, abduction, robbery, raiding of whole herds. This number
presents only several instances, one fifth at the most, of what really
happened, since most of the crimes are never discovered, since the victims
or their families dare not complain."³ The Porte delayed its
reply so Novakovic requested to be received by the Turkish minister. He drew
the minister's attention to the fact that the development of events
suggested "that everything is carried out under orders from Constantinople
and Yildiz, where a once extant notion was to hoop another Muslim iron ring
around Serbia, like the ones once made of the Cherkezes", underscoring
certain rumors "of an idea to organize a special corps named Hamid's
Albanian army, like the well-known Kurd cavalier regiments".⁴
At the request of Serbia's envoy, the Porte ordered an investigation
committee at the beginning of August, to check the assertions made in the
Serbian notes. The party, headed by the sultan's adjutant, General Saadedin
Pasha, visited certain areas in Kosovo and conducted a superficial
investigation: instead of seeking the perpetrators, it strove to deny the
complaints. The Serbian delegate Todor P. Stankovic was not permitted to
participate in the operation. The investigation conducted with prejudice
produced no results. Russian diplomatic officials, whose attendance was
requested by the Serbian populace, were not permitted to watch its
operation. Stankovic noted that only the British consul to Scutari checked
the assertions made of the oppression, and having been convinced in the
truth of the complaints lodged against the ethnic Albanians, submitted a
report to his government.⁵
The entire investigation was reduced to establishing inaccuracies in
citing the names of victims, perpetrators and places mentioned in the
Serbian notes. Appealing to information received from local authorities, the
Forte's committee maintained that "the attacks ascribed to the ethnic
Albanians are either unfounded or exaggerated", and finally totally
dismissed the Serbian assertions. Novakovic persistently collected
additional data and submitted new notes. He warned that the ethnic
Albanians, following Saadedin Pasha's mission, realizing they had no
punishment to fear, continued performing their vicious deeds upon the Serbs
with more enthusiasm.⁶
Without the support of the Great Powers, Serbia could accomplish
nothing. The attempt to request the intermediation of their ambassadors in
Constantinople was thwarted by Austria-Hungarian Foreign Affairs Minister
Count Goluchowski, expounding that Russia would hinder any action benefiting
Serbia on account of King Milan. The Serbian premier proposed a military
demonstration on the Serbian-Turkish border, but the idea was abandoned at
Goluchowski request.⁷
The diplomatic action was an utter failure. The Porte closed the issue
with a protocolar apology. The Serbian premier, in his letter to Novakovic,
somberly concluded: "The treatment of the Ottoman authorities, and Muslims
in general, toward Christians in the Kosovo vilayet can be observed by the
fact that over 60,000 Serbs fled their fatherlands and left whatever
property they owned, to save their lives, from 1880 until today [June 1899].
This spring the ethnic Albanians killed many Serbs to arrogate their lands
and drive them off, in which they have succeeded considerably, incurring
thus the flight of several hundred souls to Serbia during the last few
months."⁸
Not having met with understanding in Constantinople, the Serbian
government was preparing to internationalize the issue of protecting its
compatriots in Old Serbia. Preparing for the Peace Conference in the Hague
(1899), a "blue book" titled Prepiska o Arbanaskim nasiljima u Staroj Srbiji
1898-1899 (Correspondence on Albanian violence in Old Serbia 1898-1899) was
being compiled, in which the most important acts from correspondence with
the Porte were published in Serbian and French, but were not submitted to
the European public.⁹ Serbian refugees in Old Serbia sent a
complaint of Albanian oppression to the Conference, in the form of a
memorandum, which had previously been published in the Belgrade papers, but
not discussed in the Hague.¹⁰
A French contemporary, while visiting Kosovo and Metohia, witnessed
Serbian sufferings and protection given to the tyrants: "[...] whatever the
complaints of local Slavs and charges brought by the Serbs, whatever
reproaches made by Russia, it is obvious that neither the sultan nor the
Porte would ever get involved against the ethnic Albanians nor would they
restore order in the Kosovo vilayet. The ethnic Albanians in this Slavic
country play and will continue to play the same role as the Kurds in
Armenia. The captives of Islam and the servants of the lord [sultan] would,
under these two bases, enjoy impunity whatever their crimes."¹¹
Political commotion among the ethnic Albanians aggravated the position
of the Serbs and violence increased. At the end of 1898, the autonomist
movement was revived, incited by the sultan's order to collect whatever arms
remained from the previous war. Albanian chiefs feared new reforms and the
possibility of the Great Powers introducing Christian rule, like they did in
Crete. In Pec, at the end of January, 1899, a large assembly of feudal and
tribal notables was held to discuss opposition to reforms and expansion of
tribal self-governing. Through influential beys, the Forte's attitude on the
necessity of joint defense was underscored in case of incursions from Serbia
and Montenegro.¹²
The assembly was immediately with pogroms upon the Serbs in Mitrovica.
In Prizren due of boycott of Serbian goods and threats of massacre the
Serbian downtown was closed. In April 1899, the ethnic Albanians set fire to
Serbian houses in the Verici village of the Pec district. Every day the
consulate received black news sent from Podrimlje and villages near
Pristina. Consul Simic ended one of a series of lists on perpetrated crimes
with the following words: "With such anarchic, truely barbaric conditions
here, it is no wonder the emigration of our people, from these areas to
Serbia, is increasing."¹³
1 Istorija srpskog naroda, VI/1, 322-323; M. Vojvodic, Srbija u
medjunarodnim odnosima krajem XIX veka i pocetkom XX veka, Beograd 1988, pp.
224-225.
2 Prepiska o arbanaskim nasiljima u Staroj Srbiji 1898-1899, Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, Beograd 1899, p. 15.
3 Ibid., 16; in the note supplementation the number of murders, church
raids, rapes and abductions, assaults, robberies and banditries (ibid., pp.
18-27).
4 Ibid., p. 28.
5 T. P. Stankovic, Putne beleske po Staroj Srbiji 1871-1898, pp.
103-104.
6 Prepiska o arbanaskim nasiljima u Staroj Srbiji 1898-1899, pp. 69-78,
87, 129 134-135; S. Jovanovic, Vlada Aleksandra Obrenovica, II, Beograd
1931, p. 76, cf. M. Vojvodic, op. cit., pp. 76-77.
7 S. Jovanovic, op. cit., pp. 76-77.
8 Prepiska o arbanaskim nasiljima u Staroj Srbiji 1898-1899, pp.
135-136.
9 Ibid., French title: Documents diplomatiques, Correspondance
concemant les actes de violence et de brigandage des Albanais dans la
Vieille Serbie (Vilayet de Kosovo) 1898-1899, Ministere des affaires
etrangeres, Belgrade MDCCCXCIX, pp. 1-145; M. Vojvodic, op. cit" pp.
237-238.
10 D. T. Batakovic, Memorandum Srba iz Stare Srbije i Makedonije
Medjunarodnoj konferenciji mira u Hagu 1899. godine, Prilozi za knjizevnost,
jezik, istoriju i folklor vol. LII-LIV (1987-1988, pp. 177-183.
11 V. Berard, La Macedoine, Paris 1900, pp. 138-139.
12 M. Vojvodic. op. cit., pp. 225-226; D. Mikic, Drustvene i ekonomske
prilike kosovskih Srba u XIX i pocetkom XX veka, pp. 46-47.
13 B. Perunicic, Pisma srpskih konzula iz Pristine 1890-1900, p. 407;
details on the violence: 387-489.
Austria-Hungary and the Expansion of Anarchy
During the final years of the 19th century, vital stimuli to the
expansion of Albanian arrogance was given through intelligence networks in
the Kosovo vilayet, by the Austro-Hungarian diplomacy. Following the
occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the military occupation of part of
the Novi Pazar sanjak, which could, under the decrees of the Berlin
Congress, be extended to just beyond Mitrovica", the Dual Monarchy
continually worked on deepening the chasm between Serbs and ethnic
Albanians. Having experienced the unification of Germany and Italy to its
detriment, it could not allow the unification of the Serbs, with the same
consequences. The Kosovo vilayet, which separated two independent Serbian
states, became the key to solve the Balkan issue. With support from Germany,
Austria-Hungary made preparations to take its decisive step over Old Serbia
in Germanic penetration to the East.
Austria-Hungarian influence in the Kosovo vilayet gradually grew
through Catholic missions in north Albania, Metohia and consulates in
Prizren. Skoplje and Scutari. Following the exodus of Serbs in 1878-1881,
the abandoned Serbian estates in Metohia were settled, with the assistance
of Albanian beys, by Albanian Catholics, the so-called Fandas, who were to
become the main bearers of Austria-Hungarian propaganda among their
compatriots of Muslim faith. A certain increase of Catholic inhabitants in
Metohia made room for the opening of new ecclesiastical and educational
institutions which became centers of the aggressive propaganda. Greater
pressure emanating from Jesuit propaganda was also felt by the Serbian
clergy. Phanariote Bishop Melentije freely allowed Catholic agitation to
spread among the Serbs of the Pec and Prizren sanjaks.¹ At the
same time, the European public was presented with publications interpreting
the historical evolution, the ethnic composition and political importance of
Kosovo with seemingly expert argumentation. In a study of the Novi Pazar
sanjak in Kosovo, Theodor Ippen endeavored to support his thesis on the
ethnic unity of all territories with Bosnia, and thus indirectly with
Austria-Hungary, on the basis of historical evidence, therefore denying the
Serbs their character, emphasizing the importance of national individuality
of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo.²
The Balkan policy of the highest political and military circles of the
Dual Monarchy regarded the Albanian populace as an element of outstanding
importance. Anticipating the approaching disintegration of the Ottoman
Empire in the Peninsula, Austria-Hungary was preparing to establish order
and impose its rule as mandator in Europe, as it had already done in Bosnia
and Herzegovina in 1878. Penetration toward the Vardar valley and the
Salonika Bay imposed the formation of autonomous Albania under its
protectorate. An Albanian state like this would render impossible the
unification of Serbia and Montenegro, and would curb influence coming from
Italy.
The Foreign Minister of the Dual Monarchy, Count Goluchowski,
considered it of immense importance to Austro-Hungarian interest for the
ethnic Albanians not to come under foreign influence, and proposed, in case
the Ottoman Empire should collapse, that Austria-Hungary should support a
separate autonomy for Albania, ruled by a foreign prince and under its
protectorate; Serbia would then have to satisfy its aspirations by
concessions made in the Pristina and Skoplje sanjaks. The joint
Austro-Hungarian Minister of Finance Benjamin Kallay, demanded to win over
the Muslim ethnic Albanians of the Kosovo vilayet. He particularly stressed
the importance of propaganda to encompass the Pristina and Skoplje sanjaks,
believing that if conflicts with Turkey should arise, all territories in
which ethnic Albanians were a minority would belong to either Serbia or
Bulgaria.³
In the 1897 negotiations, Russian diplomats were informed that if
status quo on the Balkan Peninsula were to prove untenable, the Dual
Monarchy would demand the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the
division of Turkish lands in Europe, including the formation of an
independent Albanian state between Janina and Scutari Lake under its
protectorate. Aspiring toward their goal, Austro-Hungarian diplomacy
considered the possibility of establishing a religious protectorate over
Catholic ethnic Albanians which would then acquire political dimensions.
Since the close of the 19th century, Franciscans infiltrated by
Austria-Hungary had been checking the Italian and local Catholic clergy even
in Albania.⁴
Wherever there were bribable and ambitious beys in Metohia,
Austria-Hungary built strong bastions by lavishly bestowing money. At the
assembly in Pec, at the beginning of 1899, aside to notables of Turkophilic
and autonomous disposition, those of pro-Austrian inclination appeared as
well. A group of tribal and feudal leaders, headed by the until recently
sultan's favorite Haxhi Mulla Zeka, and Riza Bey Krieziu of Djakovica,
openly recommended closer relations with the Dual Monarchy, as a potential
protector of the ethnic Albanians and against neighboring Serbian states and
possible reforms. The number of Austro-Hungarian followers grew in
accordance with purchases made by Austro-Hungarian agents of Albanian
notables. According to a Russian paper Novoe Vremja, about five to six
million crowns of the Dual Monarchy's annual budget were set aside for
Albanian propaganda and the payment of corrupt Albanian
magnates.⁵
Agitation among the ethnic Albanians was lead through several
directions. In Metohia, where clan chiefs quarreled over domains, agents
were infiltrated, while Austro-Hungarian propaganda was observed to have
spread owing to Bosnian Muslim religious heads. Catholic friars expounded to
Muslim ethnic Albanians that Serbia and Montenegro were outposts on the
Peninsula and that the neighboring Monarchy was their sole protector. Vienna
papers, reporting on events taking place in Old Serbia (particularly the
Politische Korrespondenz), regularly titled their news as coming from
Albania, thus creating the impression that ethnic Albanians in the Kosovo
vilayet comprised the majority of the population and that it was practically
devoid of Serbs.⁶
The dimension of Austro-Hungarian political agitation could not pass by
the Turkish authorities unnoticed. The district chief in Pristina noticed
that Albanian assails upon the Serbs were encouraged by agitators of the
Dual Monarchy. The vali of Kosovo, Hafis Pasha, attributed all Albanian
unrest in Metohia (especially in Prizren 1899, subsequently in Skoplje), to
operations carried out by Austro-Hungarian intelligence services. Their
purpose, he believed, was to cause widespread unrest to provide
Austria-Hungary with an excuse to occupy the Kosovo vilayet.⁷
Even the sultan, when confronted with a warning from the Russian ambassador
that Albanian anarchy was planned, since only Orthodox Serbs suffered, "did
not deny the presence of a foreign party operating through its
agents".⁸Suspicion as to the motives of the Albanian movement
was also spread by Young Turk followers of Albanian origin, who gave
statements abroad that ethnic Albanians were disloyal to the sultan and were
waiting for the opportunity to secede from Turkey. Telegrams were
immediately sent from Pristina, Prizren and other towns in Kosovo and
Metohia, to the padishah with expressions of unequivocal faithfulness and
loyalty.⁹
Foreign witnesses also observed the fatal influence of Austro-Hungarian
propaganda in Old Serbia. A French scholar, Victor Berard, an expert on
political trends in the Ottoman Empire, emphasized "that the mystery
concealing the operation of Austrian agents and their entire propaganda
network raised, in the eyes of blinded ethnic Albanians, this major power to
even greater heights, skillfully interweaving them in the dexterously
devised and woven network of their foreign policy".¹⁰ Bulgarian
historian N. Marenin observed that aside to all the skill of its agents,
Austro-Hungarian propaganda had succeeded with the ethnic Albanians owing to
large amounts of money paid annually to those most prominent and influential
among them. Marenin underscored that a favorable condition for bringing
together the ethnic Albanians and the Dual Monarchy was their mutual
interest to exterminate the Serbian populace in the area between the Drim
river and Mount Kopaonik, i.e. between Serbia and Albania.¹¹
Owing to the instigations of the Austro-Hungarian intelligence service,
total anarchy reigned in Kosovo. Enboldened by protection promised by the
Dual Monarchy and the sultan's confidence, the ethnic Albanians, filled with
renewed energy, dashed to settle accounts with the Serbs. During 1900 and
1902 the crimes attained apocalyptic dimensions. The Pec nahi suffered the
most since Catholic ethnic Albanians exceeded in oppression. Blackmail,
robbery and murder extremely affected the Gnjilane and Pristina region. In
Prizren, the Serbs dared not appear downtown. Schools and churches also bore
the brunt of oppression. The pursuit of Serbian priests became frequent,
ethnic Albanians regarded all distinguished national notables as Serbian
spies and komitadjis. This anti-Serb disposition reached the point when even
certain Turkish officials, in the army, administration, especially within
the circle of religious heads, openly appealed to the ethnic Albanians to
clash with the Serbs, arrogate their lands and force them to flee to
Serbia.¹²
Anarchy attained such dimensions that the Porte was compelled to send
new military contingents. Brigadier General Shemsi Pasha was sent to Kosovo
to consolidate government authority, collect arms and capture the major
violators. He frequently left Pristina to visit the vilayet, calm the ethnic
Albanians, reconcile their quarreling chiefs and, though rarely, intervened
to protect the Serbs. In Vucitrn he was compelled to protect the Serbs
threatened by oppression in the Raznjane village. Raska-Prizren Metropolitan
Dionisije escaped assassination twice, and so moved his seat to
Gnjilane.¹³
A direct consequence of Austro-Hungarian influence was oppression
executed upon the Serbs of the Ibarski Kolasin, in summer 1901. The Ibarski
Kolasin was a woody area with over forty villages to the northwest of Old
Serbia, inhabited almost entirely by Serbs who had preserved a certain kind
of self-government, choosing their own local knez (leader).¹⁴
The extent of oppression compelled the Serbs from all parts of Kosovo
and Metohia to appeal to the consulate in Pristina in 1897, demanding a
secret delivery of arms for protection against the tyrants. Stojan Novakovic
had proposed to arm the Serbian inhabitants gradually and organize them for
defense back in 1896: "ethnic Albanians were evildoers, but they treated
with respect those houses in Old Serbia which they knew had weapons and male
heads."¹⁵ The consul in Pristina supported Novakovic's proposal,
adding that Albanian assails upon the Serbs were encouraged on account of
the latter having no arms, while these deeds left the Serbs
faithearted.¹⁶
After the failure of the diplomatic mission with the Porte to protect
Serbian inhabitants, the government of Vladan Djordjevic began, in spring
1899, the secret delivery of trophy guns remaining from the previous war
with Turkey, to Serbs inhabiting the northern regions of the Kosovo vilayet.
Since the beginning of 1901, exaggerated news of thousands of guns being
smuggled to arm entire Serbian villages caused great alarm among the ethnic
Albanians. The Turkish authorities conducted searches in the north regions
of Old Serbia, and only at the beginning of July, owing to information
procured by Albanian notable Isa Boljetinac, did they discover that most of
the weapons were delivered to the Ibarski Kolasin.¹⁷
Under the leadership of Isa Boljetinac, the ethnic Albanians and Turks
searched the Kolasin villages and forced the people to surrender their arms
under brutalities unheard-of. Many were abused, beaten and wounded; one
Serbian was beaten up and succumbed to wounds inflicted. Several hundred
Serbs were shackled and taken to prisons in Mitrovica and Pristina. The arms
investigation incited ethnic Albanians from other regions to set off toward
Kolasin and seek guns in the villages. From January to August alone, around
six hundred persons fled to Serbia. The disturbed public demanded energetic
action from the government. The arms investigation ended only when Serbia's
demands to the Porte were supported by Russia. Following the energetic
intervention of the Russian ambassador to Constantinople, violence in
Kolasin ceased, the arrested Serbs were set free, and Isa Boljetinac was
moved out of Mitrovica. However, Austro-Hungarian delegates to the Porte
claimed the pogroms in Kolasin were multiply exaggerated.¹⁸
Austro-Hungarian consular officials in Kosovo saw the affair at Kolasin
as a sign of "great Serbian propaganda" in Old Serbia. All political moves
made by the Serbian government in the Kosovo vilayet, including the
inauguration of new schools, and financial help given to teachers and
monastic fraternities, were considered a serious injury to the political
interests of the Dual Monarchy. When Adem Zaim killed Hadji Mulla Zeka in
Pec for tribal dissentions, at the beginning of 1902, Austro-Hungarian
consuls announced that it was a Serbian conspiracy.¹⁹
1 Istorija srpskog naroda, VI/1, p.302; V. Bovan, op. cit.; H.
Schwanda, Das Protektorat stereich-Ungarans uber die Katholiken Albanians,
Wien 1965; passim S. Skendi, op. cit., pp. 238-286.
2 Theodor Ippen, Novi Pazar und Kosovo (Das Alte Rascien), Wien 1892;
ibid, Das Religiose Protektorat Osterreich-Ungarns in der Turkei, Die
Kultur, 3 (1901-1902), pp. 298-310;
3 F. Hauptmann, Uloga zajednickog ministarstva finansija u formiranju
Austro-Ugarske politike prema Albaniji uoci kretske krize, Radovi
Filozofskog fakulteta u Sarajevu, IV (1968), pp. 35-45; H. Kapidzic,
Pripreme za austrougarsko prodiranje u albansko etnicko podrucje iz
Novopazarskog sandzaka, Radovi Filozofskog fakulteta u Sarajevu, VI (1971),
pp. 415-430; cf. N.D. Schnadel, op. cit., pp. 54-74.
4 B. Hrabak, Kultni protektorat Austro-Ugarske nad Arbanasima (1897),
Godisnjak Arhiva Kosova, XXIII (1987), p. 33-54; J. Sliskovic, Albanija i
Macedonia, Sarajevo 1904, p. 80; V. Stojancevic, Diplomatska trvenja konzula
velikih sila u Skoplju no. tamosnje Arbanase katolike pocetkom XX veka,
Istorijski casopis, XVIII (1971), pp. 329-339.
5 V. Stojancevic, Austrougarsko-srpski sukob u kosovskom vilajetu na
pocetku XX veka, in: Jugoslovenski narodi pred Prvi svetski rat, Beograd
1967 pp. 847-876.
6 D. T. Batakovic, Pokusaj otvaranja srpskog konzulata u Prizrenu
1898-1900, pp. 256-257.
7 V. Stojancevic, Prilike u zapadnoj polovini kosovskog vilajeta prema
izvestajima austrougarskog konzula u Skoplju 1900. i 1901. godine,
Istorijski casopis, (XII-XIII) (1961-1962), p. 290-291.
8 V. Corovic, Odnosi izmedju Srbije i Austro-Ugarske u XX veku, Beograd
1936, p. 15.
9 B. Perunicic, Zulumi ago. i begova u kosovskom vilajetu, pp. 169-170.
10 V. Berard, La Turquie et I'Hellenisme contemporain, Paris 1900, pp.
291-292.
11 N. Marenin, Albanija i Albanci, pp. 91-92; cited from P. Orlovic (S.
St. Simic), Stara Srbija i Arbanasi, Beograd 1904, pp. 21-22.
12 Regarding the conference of the Serbian and Bulgarian rulers at Nis,
Austro-Hungarian agitators reported it was secretly being held at Pristina.
Among the Albanians a widespread conviction existed that a joint military
intervention of the two countries was being prepared. The bessa was hastily
given and conference on Joint defense began. (M. Vojvodic, op. cit., pp.
332-333).
13 V. Stojancevic, Prilike u zapadnoj polovini kosovskog vilajeta prema
izvestajima austrougarskog konzula u Skoplju 1900. i 1901. godine, pp.
311-312.
14 M. Lutovac, Ibarski Kolasin, Antropogeografska istrazivanja, pp.
57-188.
15 Spomenica Stojana Novakovica, p. 196.
16 B. Perunicic, Pisma srpskih konzula iz Pristine 1890-1900, pp.
345-346.
17 M. Vojvodic, op. cit., 334; D. T. Batakovic, Istraga oruzja u
Ibarskom Kolasinu 1901, Kosovsko-Metohijski zbornik SANU 1 (1990), pp.
269-284
18 Ibid., cf. S. Skendi, op. cit., pp. 201-202.
19 V. Stojanovic, Austrougarsko-srpski sukob u kosovskom vilajetu, p.
865.
Failure of Reforms
Pogroms in the Ibarski Kolasin sobered the public and ruling circles of
Serbia. In Belgrade, public meetings were organized where demands were made
for the government to initiate the issue of Serbian nationality in Old
Serbia and Macedonia. In disputes announced on the issue of the survival of
Serbs in Old Serbia, Svetislav Simic was the most outstanding.
In his discussion Pitanje o Staroj Srbiji (The Question of Old Serbia)
Simic underscored the danger of Austro-Hungarian agitation among the ethnic
Albanians and emphasized that the destiny of the Serbs and the Slav cause in
the Balkans would unfold in Kosovo.¹
The balance of forces, particularly Austro-Hungarian influence in
Serbia and Russia's failure to confront its agitation in Old Serbia with
more energy, tied the hands of the Serbian diplomacy in its attempts for a
more efficient protection of its compatriots. Following the death of King
Milutin, Vienna's most trusted friend in Serbia, King Aleksandar Obrenovic
took the Russophil course in foreign policy, to calm tempers in the country.
At the same time, at the invitation of the Serbian government, a group of
Albanian notables arrived in Belgrade from Fed and Djakovica, among whom was
the Pec leader Mehmed Zaim. They were lavished with rich gifts in money and
arms and promised assistance if they helped to bring an end to violence upon
the Serbs.²
The Serbian government initiated the issue of protecting Serbs in
Turkey in 1902, and in August, bolteresred by the Montenegrin diplomacy,
authorized its envoy in Constantinople to make the following demands to the
Porte: 1) regular and for all equal application of law; 2) an end to the
policy of encouraging ethnic Albanians. Propositions along this line were
for either disarmament of the ethnic Albanians or allowance for the Serbs to
carry guns; for reinforcement of Turkish garrisons wherever there were
Serbian-Albanian inhabitants admixed; removal of corrupt Turkish officials
and assignment of conscientious ones; inauguration of administrative and
judicial reforms with larger Serbian participation in the administration and
judiciary; implementation of agrary reform. Russia supported Serbia since
none of the bases were touched regarding the status quo established with
Austria-Hungary in 1897.³
To forestall the reform plan of the Great Powers, especially
Austria-Hungary and Russia, which had the right to protect Christians in the
Ottoman Empire under article 23 of the Berlin Congress, the sultan announced
reforms in November 1902. The reform action of Turkey, headed by Hussein
Hilmi Pasha as general inspector, anticipated a more rigorous application of
the law, regulation of agrary duties, dismission of unconscientious
officials and the enlisting of Serbs in the Turkish gendarme. Military
authorities undertook to capture the most wanted criminals.⁴
The dimension of lawlessness and Serbian plight shocked foreign
Journalists. Victor Berard wrote that life in places between Pec, Prizren
and Pristina was marked with violence under the ethnic Albanians, arsons,
rapes, vengeance, and real tribal warfare. Georges Gaulis noticed that due
to the extent of oppression upon the Serbs, Old Serbia was, along with
Armenia, the most wretched country in the world. Bearing witness to Albanian
recalcitrance and their motives, he particularly stressed: "Those of Debar
kill to rob, those of Djakovica kill from shear fanaticism, those of Prizren
kill for their evil instincts, and those of Tetovo kill to try out their
carbines."⁵
Following the Kolasin affair, Russia opened a consulate in Mitrovica to
follow more closely Austria-Hungary's influence over Albanian moves and to
protect the Serbs from violence. The Vienna legation exerted influence upon
the Porte to prolong its inauguration. The ethnic Albanians received the
news of the opening of the Russian consulate with open discontent and acute
opposition. Isa Boljetinac threatened to punish anyone who dared rent his
house to the Russian consul and openly spoke of forcibly routing him from
Kosovo. Following the threats made to its staff, the Russian diplomacy
demanded of the Ottoman authorities to arrest and rout the leaders of
"Anti-Russian demonstrations". Isa Boljetinac agreed, after a lengthy
persuasion from the authorities, to leave for Constantinople, "to visit" the
padishah. The St. Petersburg press underscored the importance of the
consulate opening in Mitrovica, where "at the central point between Old
Serbia and Albania, [Russian] control emerges over ethnic
Albanians".⁶
The announcement of the reform plan, more rigorous application of law,
acceptance of Serbs in the gendarme service and news of the Russian
consulate finally opening in Mitrovica, instigated the ethnic Albanians to
rise. At the beginning of 1903, a large assembly of tribal chiefs was held
at the Lucki Most near Djakovica. The ethnic Albanians blamed solely the
Serbs for all the reforms. It was thus decided "to gradually kill the more
prominent Serbs of the Pec nahi one after another, and compel the others to
flee to Serbia or to be Turkized."⁷
The plans of the participants were to rout the Turkish authorities from
Pec, kill the notable Serbs and then move to Mitrovica to confront the
Russian consul. Severe persecution of the Serbs began immediately. In the
Pec nahi alone ten people were killed within a few weeks. Following the
meeting in Drenica, the ethnic Albanians decided to take to arms. Armed
rebels raided Vucitrn on March 29, ravaged the local Serbian church,
disarmed the Serbs accepted in the gendarme and set off to Mitrovica to rout
by force Russian Consul Grigorie Stepanovich Shtcherbin.⁸
The Russian consul remained in town to supervise Turkish preparations
for defense. Around 2,000 ethnic Albanians attacked Mitrovica on March 30.
Following a decisive resistance of Turkish forces, driven away by artillery
fire, the ethnic Albanians abandoned their plan to take the town. The next
day a Turkish corporal, an Albanian, shot the Russian consul while the
latter was visiting the outskirts of town. The assassin claimed he shot the
consul in vengeance, denying affiliation to any movement, while the severely
wounded consul succumbed to his wounds ten days hence.
The death of the Russian consul demonstrated the extent of Albanian
anarchy, whereas the relation of the sultan and of the high ranking
officials of the Porte toward their bearers was displayed in the stand to
which they adhered. Diplomatic circles in Constantinople expected decisive
measures to be undertaken against the ethnic Albanians. Abdulhamid II
promised he would send military reinforcements to restore order in Old
Serbia and to capture the rebels, but "fearing court revolution from his
Albanian guards", he decided against the announced measures.⁹
Simultaneously, the sultan advised the Albanian leaders, who feared
international conflicts for wounding and killing a Russian consul, to calm
down. Agents of the Dual Monarchy and Catholic friars encouraged the ethnic
Albanians of Mitrovica not to fear Russian retribution and to persevere in
their opposition. The death of the Russian consul was a national tragedy to
the Serbs, who saw in him a protector and a representative of a power they
expected would end this anarchy and violence. The train, bearing the coffin
of the deceased consul, was accompanied by several thousand Serbs, while
funeral services were held in churches throughout Kosovo and
Metohia.¹⁰
Anarchy in Old Serbia and disorder in Macedonia, where Bulgaria
introduced companies to urge a rise and solve the problem of Macedonia to
its benefit, compelled Austria-Hungary and Russia, being the two most
interested major parties, to demand the implementation of reforms. They
announced their reform project in February 1903, while a detailed plan
of the whole operation was designed at a meeting of the two tzars, Nikola II
and Franz Joseph I in Murzsteg, at the beginning of October. Expecting war
in the Far East, Russia strove to retain for a time, the status quo on the
Balkans. Austria-Hungary intended to consolidate its positions with a reform
action. Shortly before the meeting in Murzsteg, Count Goluchowski
elaborated, to the tzar, the plan to divide Turkish lands in Europe:
make Romania as large as possible, a large Bulgaria, a weak Montenegro,
a small Serbia and a free Albania. The Dual Monarchy would, as Golochowski
believed, sooner engage into war than allow for the creation of a great
Serbia or a great Montenegro.¹¹
Succeeding to the throne following the killing of King Aleksandar
Obrenovic (1903), was Petar I Karadjordjevic (1903-1921). The personal
regimes of the last Obrenovices were replaced by the parliamentary monarchy.
The democracy activated a huge political, national and intellectual
potential that was unable to take full swing during the previous regimes.
The termination of dependence upon Austria-Hungary marked an acute turnover
in Serbia's foreign policy, which, relying upon Russia, set off to struggle
for national liberation and the unification of the Serbian people. Conflict
with Austria-Hungary began immediately with the reform issues in Turkey.
The reform action that was to have been implemented in the European
provinces of the Ottoman Empire with the supervision of the Great Powers,
was considered by the Serbs of Kosovo and Metohia a benefical solution
against Albanian terror. Russia intended to secure supervision for itself on
the reforms in Kosovo and Metohia, but the plan was soon thwarted. At
Austria-Hungary's demand, at the beginning of 1904, the Northwest parts of
the Kosovo vilayet, i.e. Kosovo and Metohia, were excluded from the reform
action, explained as being one of an admixed population.¹²
The ethnic Albanians won a great victory with the exclusion of Kosovo
and Metohia from the reform action; there was nothing to intercede their
supremacy and unhamper their dealings with the Serbs. Left to fate, the
Serbs remained the victims of a privileged ethnic populace. The years 1904
and 1905 are remembered by the unheard-of oppression upon the Serbian
population. Turkish authorities undertook no measures whatsoever, the Porte
would not heed the notes of protest sent by the Serbian government. Occupied
with internal unrest and conflicts in the Far East, Russia was unable to
support Serbian protests more decisively. Serbia tried in vain to establish
contact with the ethnic Albanians of Kosovo. In Belgrade, the paper Albania
was inaugurated to propagate Serbian-Albanian amicability, while Nikola
Pasic strove to find adversaries of Austro-Hungarian propaganda among
notables in Metohia. Finding no way to come to any agreement with tribal and
feudal notables, the Serbian government paid some Albanian outlaws to
protect Serbian villages in Metohia; since 1903 Montenegro also requited
ethnic Albanians to protect the Serbs.¹³
The consul to Pristina, Miroslav Spalajkovic, reported at the end of
June 1905, "there was not a day that one or two murders of Serbs were
committed" in Kosovo and Metohia, adding that "nothing was done to stop
Albanian banditry". He was particularly worried since "the reform forces pay
absolutely no attention to these regions". Russian consul to Mitrovica, A.
A. Orlov, assured him he was sending daily reports to the embassy on the
situation in Kosovo and Metohia, but it showed no interest. Believing the
Albanian misdeeds had gone too far, Spalajkovic proposed to the government
to find a way "to interest the public of Russia, England and France in the
wretched situation of Serbs in Old Serbia" and proposed to jar, through the
press, "the passiveness and gross negligence of the official delegates of
Great Powers, whose attention has now been solely diverted to
Macedonia".¹⁴
Stretching from the Pec nahi to the plains of Kosovo and the gorge of
Kacanik, the ethnic Albanians, fearing no sanctions, robbed, blackmailed,
routed and killed the Serbian populace mostly in villages and on roads.
During 1904, from Kosovo alone 108 persons fled to Serbia.¹⁵ The
Serbian consulate in Pristina composed a detailed list of crimes committed
upon the Serbs in 1906 - with names of the perpetrators, victims and types
of oppression. In 1904, of 136 different crimes noted, 46 ended with murder.
Many houses, crops and barns were burned, many people beaten and robbed,
without sparing the children. A group of ethnic Albanians raped a
seven-year-old girl. In 1905, from 281 cases of oppression, 65 Serbs were
killed (at a wedding alone, recalcitrant outlaws killed nine of
them).¹⁶Reports from Serbian agents and consuls display that
Fandas and Catholic ethnic Albanians, standing under the direct control of
Austro-Hungarian propaganda, exceeded in the crimes.¹⁷
Pec and its neighboring regions suffered the most since there was no
Serbian consulate nor foreign power which would, at least just by being
there, somewhat lessen the crimes committed in the town and its immediate
vicinity. In a complaint lodged to the consul, the Serbs of Pec reported
that Albanian chiefs forbade their compatriots to protect the Serbs, "and to
place komitadjis of 2-12 men in every village, so whenever they come across
a Serb they do away with him".¹⁸ Rector of the Seminary in
Prizren sent a list to the consulate in Pristina in 1906, containing the
victims of violence under the ethnic Albanians of Pec and the vicinity - 38
murdered and five wounded in 1905; within the first three months of 1906,
three murdered and one wounded. The perpetrators "of the committed crimes
suffered no punishment whatsoever from the Turkish state
authorities".¹⁹
The Serbs of Mitrovica appealed to King Petar I in 1905, entreating for
a Serbian consulate to be opened in the town for their protection, adding
that if the present situation were to continue, the Serbs would disappear
from these areas. Emphasis was put on the short-lived joy for the expected
introduction of reforms, which incurred "intensified Albanian hostility
toward the Serbs", and, "there is not a single day when a Serb is not swept
from the face of this earth, often many are; we cannot count the number of
robberies and ordinary fights, there are too many of them".²⁰
In summer 1905, Spalajkovic decided to visit Pec and its vicinity with
two officials from the consulate, to convince himself of the horrid news
arriving from there. Turkish authorities attempted to intimidate them with
stories of Albanian ambushes on the roads. Milan Rakic penned in a private
letter: "! should not forget my entering Pec for quite some time. First the
passage through the Turkish quarter and downtown full of somber ethnic
Albanians, a shuddering and ominous silence, then through the Serbian
quarter, full of people, especially children and women yelling "welcome",
throwing flowers at us and crying."²¹ The Turkish authorities
forbade the Serbs and ethnic Albanians to visit the consul and talk to him,
thus the Serbian diplomats returned to Pristina without accomplishing their
task.²²
The external political situation did not allow for Serbia to undertake
greater national action in Old Serbia. Demands for the inclusion of Kosovo
and Metohia in the reform actions were constantly sent to the Great powers.
The aggravated position of the Serbs evinced the necessity to undertake
measures for protecting the inhabitants, beside the educational-political
action, which had achieved good results with its activities at schools and
the restoration of churches. When it had become clear that due to
Austro-Hungarian influence, endeavors to inaugurate reforms in the
northwestern parts of the regions would not succeed, the alternative was to
secretly arm those villages inflicted the most.
Under the private initiative of several notable and wealthy citizens of
Belgrade who organized the first company, comprised of patriot volunteers
and refugees from Old Serbia and Macedonia, to fight Bulgarian komitadjis in
Macedonia in 1902, chetnik action came under the wing of the state gained
further swing in 1904. Kosovo and Metohia were not encompassed by the
chetnik action, although it did instigate organized arms delivery to the
most imperilled Serbian villages. When a chetnik detachment was passing
through Metohia on its way to Macedonia, in 1905, it was discovered and
killed in the village Velika Hoca, the home-town of its leader Lazar
Kujundzic. Fear of mass Albanian vengeance encroached upon the Serbs, thus
compelling Kujundzic's mother to deny the murder of her son before the
authorities. At the demand of Albanian tribes, the houses assisting the
komitadjis were burned in retribution; frightened by the emergence of the
Serbian company, ethnic Albanians were ready to search Serbian villages,
those that resisted would be burnt and their chiefs killed.²³
In summer 1907, another Serbian company passed through Kosovo and was
received by the locals of the Pasjane village. It was soon discovered, and
was destroyed following a pitched battle with the ethnic Albanians and
Turks. The discovery of komitadjis vexed the ethnic Albanians who feared the
expansion of chetnik action and the inclusion of Kosovo and Metohia in the
reform action. Feuding Albanian tribes immediately expressed solidarity.
After confirming their besa, together they set off to search Serbian
villages; many innocent people died in the pursuit for komitadjis and hidden
arms.²⁴ An assembly was held in the large mosque of Prizren; the
ethnic Albanians of Ljuma demanded the extermination of Serbs. Milan Rakic
discovered the demands of the people in Ljuma: "[...] for the assembly to
determine the day when all ethnic Albanians would rise in arms and carry out
a general massacre of Serbs. The reason stated by the people of Ljuma for
the extermination of Serbs was that peace among the ethnic Albanians was
impossible as long as there were Serbs in these regions, since the Serbs
were always complaining to foreigners, bringing about bidats - reforms -
with their complaints, and recently, they had started to infiltrate
companies from Serbia."²⁵ The assembly decided that the Serbs
were to be killed secretly, one by one; Albanian companies were to be formed
to rout the chetniks from Serbia, and attacks upon Serbian state territory
would be repeated in retribution. New persecutions ensued
immediately.²⁶
Complaints from Pec, Vucitrn, Gnjilane and other regions in Kosovo
showered the Serbian government and its consulates in Pristina and Skoplje.
The ecclesiastical-educational community and fraternity of the Pec monastery
sent an elaborate petition to the Montenegrin government in 1907, demanding
Montenegro and Serbia to open a consulate for the protection of the people:
"In the town of Pec there are 500 houses at most and around 4,000
Orthodox souls; the Pec nahi numbers around 1,200 homes plus, amounting to
about 16,000 souls of Serbian nationality. Together with Djakovica and its
vicinity, the number totals around 20,000 souls plus. It is known - and
people still remember, that during the past 25 years the same number of
families and souls were moved out, mostly to Serbia, and many died, all due
to oppression under the fanatical savage ethnic Albanians - Muslims and the
rotten savage Fandas, who are of Catholic faith [...] They are the most
dangerous evildoers, haiduks and oppressors, who are systematically
eradicating the Serbs from these regions; forcing them to move; killing them
like wild animals; burning their houses, barns, villages and mercilessly
stealing their food, seizing, plundering, fleecing - blackmails of 2,5,10,
20 and 50 Turkish liras; abducting men, women, children and girls to
slavery. Well, those are the means through which they operate. In this
manner alone, the Fandas came from that savage Malissia and settled more
than 300 houses during the past 20 years, arriving naked and barefoot, while
today most of them are wealthy men; on account of settling on the
foundations of Serbian houses, occupying Serbian homes, fields and pastures,
while still robbing and taking by force. There is also oppression upon the
Serbs under Fandas and ethnic Albanians, most of which were Turkized
60,100-200 years ago on account of the oppression, to keep their
lands."²⁷
Montenegro failed to open its consulate in Pec. Serbia strove for at
least one of the Great Powers (Russia, Great Britain or France), to open a
consulate in Pec, but this initiative bore no fruit either.²⁸ The
Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs made several proposals to establish
contact with the ethnic Albanians, but none were adopted, since all attempts
performed on terrains soon failed. Even the plan of vice-consul Milan Rakic
had no visible effect; in 1907, he believed the best solution was to place
Albanian guards over Serbian villages.²⁹
Violence ceased intermittently, particularly in 1907 when
Austria-Hungary aimed to expand the reform action to the Presevo and
Gnjilane districts, ethnic Albanians began to abhor the expansion of
Austro-Hungarian influence which seriously threatened to imperil their
supremacy in Old Serbia. News of the Austro-Hungarian army arriving in
Kosovo brought several thousand ethnic Albanians together in Ferizovic
simultaneous to the breaking out of the Young Turk Revolution. Tribal chiefs
arrived from all regions of Kosovo and Metohia. The conference lasted two
weeks, and due to the agitation of the Young Turks, a telegram was sent from
the conference to the sultan, demanding the restoration of the
constitution.³⁰
1 P.O. (S. St. Simic), Pitanje o Staroj Srbiji, Beograd 1901.
2 V. Stojancevic, Prilike u zapadnoj polovini kosovskog vilajeta, pp.
314-315.
3 V. Corovic, op. cit., 18-19; Istorija srpskog naroda, VI/1, pp.
323-324.
4 V. Stojancevic, Prilike u zapadnoj polovini kosovskog vilajeta, pp.
31, 317-325.
5 G. Gaulis, La mine d'une Empire, Abdul-Hamid ses amis et ses peuples,
Paris 1913, 325-326; details 325-356; V. Berard, La Macedoine, 101-125;
ibid., Pro Macedonia, Paris 1904; ibid, La mart du Stamboul, Paris 1913. Cf.
D. T. Batakovic, Les Francois et la Vielle Serbie, in: Rapports
franco-yougoslave, Zb. radova Istorijskog instituta, vol. 10, Belgrade
J1989, pp. 138-150
6 D. T. Batakovic, Pogibija ruskog konzula G. S. Scerbine u Mitrovici
1903. godine, Istorijski casopis, XXXIV (1987), pp. 311-312 (with older
bibliography); S. Martinovic, Decembarski i Becki program reformi u Turskoj
1902/1903. godine i stav Rusije prema Albancima, Obelezja, 3 (1985), 63.
7 V. Corovic, Diplomatska prepiska Kraljevine Srbije, I, Beograd 1933,
597-599, cf. British documentation in: Further correspondence Respecting The
Affairs Of South-Eastern Europe, Turkey, 3 (1903), London 1903.
8 D. T. Batakovic, Pogibija ruskog konzula G. S. Scerbine, pp. 312-313.
9 Ibid., p. 318-319.
10 Ibid., p. 320-323.
11 V. Corovic, Borba za nezavisnost Balkana, Beograd 1937, pp. 123-125.
12 B. Perunicic, Zulumi ago i begova, pp. 306-312.
13 Conflicts among clans in Metohia did not abate. At one moment Bairam
and Murtez Cur sent a message to King Petar I that he and 10,000 fellow
tribesmen from the Krasnici clan were enemies of Austria-Hungary. The offer
to cooperate was not accepted. See: Dj. Mikic, Albansko pitanje i
srpsko-albanske veze u XIX veku (do 1912), pp. 150-151.
14 B. Perunicic, Svedocanstvo o Kosovu 1901-1913, pp. 267-269.
15 Ibid., pp. 227-228.
16 Zaduzbine Kosova, pp. 672-690.
17 Ibid., pp. 696-197; B. Perunicic, Zulumi ago. i begova, pp. 350-355.
18 Zaduzbine Kosova, p 672-690.
19 Ibid, p. 697; settlements were one of the reasons for emigration
from the Kosovo vilayet to the USA: J. Pejin, Iseljavanje iz kosovskog
vilajeta i drugih krajeva pod Turcima u SAD 1906-1907 godine, Istorijski
glasnik, 1-2 (1985), pp. 49-54.
20 B. Perunicic, Svedocanstvo o Kosovu 1901-1913, pp. 255.
21 M. Rakic, Konzulska pisma, pp. 55-56, cf. B. Perunicic, Svedocanstvo
o Kosovu 1901-1913, 252-253; Savremenici o Kosovu i Metohiji, pp. 374-375.
22 M. Rakic, op. cit., pp. 57-60, 315-317; Savremenici o Kosovu i
Metohiji, pp. 374-376.
23 M. Rakic, op. cit., pp. 41-46, 304-313, a considerable number of
literary works wrote about the killing of the company and the heroic act of
Lazar Kujundzic's mother. The most reknown is a drama called Lazarevo
vaskrsenje, by Serbian literary Ivo Vojnovic from Dubrovnik.
24 M. Rakic, op. cit., pp. 131-136,138.
25 Ibid., p. 135.
26 Ibid., pp. 135-136.
27 B. Perunicic, Svedocanstvo o Kosovu 1901-1913, p. 289.
28 D. Mikic, Nastojanje Srba na otvaranju ruskog ill engleskog
konzulata u Fed 1908. godine, pp. 161-165.
29 M. Rakic, Konzulska pisma, pp. 94-106.
30 Z. Avramovski, Izvestaji austrougarskih konzula u Kosovskoj
Mitrovici, Prizrenu i Skoplju o odrzanoj skupstini u Ferizovicu, Godisnjak
Arhiva Kosova, II-III (1970), pp. 310-330; B. Hrabak, Kosovo prema
mladoturskoj revoluciji 1908, Obelezja, 5 (1974), pp. 108-126.

Young Turk Regime
The Young Turk Revolution in 1908, the annexation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and the proclamation of Bulgaria's independence, essentially
altered the balance of forces in the Balkans. The reform action of the Great
Powers had ceased. The Young Turks restored the Constitution of 1876,
proclaimed equality of all subjects of the empire, regardless of religion
and nationality, and announced radical political and social reforms. The
promises of the Young Turks were greeted by the Serbs as an opportunity for
national affirmation and free political organization. In Skoplje, seat of
the Kosovo vilayet, the Serbian Democratic League was formed on August 10,
with a temporary central committee presided over by Bogdan Radenkovic. The
formation of district committees ensued immediately at meetings in Pristina,
Vucitrn, Mitrovica, Gnjilane and Urosevac, of which the most distinguished
national representatives, teachers, priests, craftsmen and merchants were a
part. The paper Vardar was founded in Skoplje to propagate the principles of
the League, writing on the position of Serbs. Vardar devoted special
attention to oppression, because after the expiration of the besa confirmed
in Ferizovic, the ethnic Albanians again began to assail the Serbs. The
League and the paper pledged for the decrees of the constitution to be
applied upon ethnic Albanians as well, who recognized the new regime but
displayed no readiness to support the law.¹
Having reached an agreement with the Young Turks, the Serbs stated
their candidates in several districts to the election campaign for the
Turkish Parliament. In Kosovo and Metohia they aimed to become candidates
for envoys in the Pec, Prizren and Pristina sanjaks, but the mandate was
received only in Pristina where Sava Stojanovic was elected. At the assembly
in Constantinople (272 seats), two more Serbian envoys entered, from Skoplje
(Aleksandar Parlic) and Bitolj (Dr. Janicije Dimitrijevic), while Temko
Popovic of Ohrid was elected senator.² A large assembly of
Ottoman Serbs was held in Skoplje on the Visitation of the Virgin in 1909,
with 78 delegates present, 44 from Old Serbia and 34 from Macedonia; the
Organization of the Serbian People in the Ottoman Empire was established,
which was to grow into a representative body of all the Serbs in the Ottoman
Empire.³
The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908, by which the decrees
of the Berlin Congress were partially violated, and the project to build a
railway through the Novi Pazar sanjak, announced the unconcealed purpose of
Austria-Hungary to rule the Balkan Peninsula. The meetings held against the
annexation were attended also by ethnic Albanians. Frightened by
Austro-Hungarian aspirations, many Albanian notables made attempts to
approach the Serbs.⁴ Bairam Cur of Djakovica proposed to Bogdan
Radenkovic a joint confrontation to the annexation, while the
Mahmudbegovices of Pec negotiated with Serbian diplomats. Simultaneously
though, Austro-Hungarian followers among the ethnic Albanians severely
opposed this approach toward the Serbs. While comparative peace reigned in
Gnjilane and Pristina, oppression upon the Serbs in the Pec nahi continued.
The ethnic Albanians spoke in a threatening voice that the proclamation of
the constitution was only temporary and that they would never allow the
infidels (djaurs) to enjoy the same rights as the Muslims.⁵
Notwithstanding individual crimes, the situation in Kosovo and Metohia
was tolerable until the unsuccessful coup d'etat in Constantinople, in April
1909. Abdulhamid II attempted to depose the Young Turks, and, having been
defeated, was compelled to renounce the throne. His brother Mahmud V Reshad
was proclaimed sultan. Within the Young Turk leadership, a pan-Ottoman
inclination prevailed, which considered all subjects of the empire an
inseparable Ottoman whole. The Serbian organization was renamed the
Educational-Charitable Organization of Ottoman Serbs, but its operation was
soon limited. Under various decrees and laws, the activities of many Serbian
societies were forbidden, lands were confiscated from churches and
monasteries, the work of schools and religious committees was hindered. The
law on the exchange of deeds and the inheritance of estates greatly upset
the Serbs, since many of the real owners fled to Serbia in the preceding
period. Many of the estates were divided among the muhadjirs (Muslims who
settled in Kosovo after the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina). The new
laws also upset chiflik farmers, whom the agas could drive off the land and
settle Muslims instead, or exact double taxes.⁶
At the beginning of the Young Turk reign, ethnic Albanians, like other
peoples in Turkey, founded national clubs and educational societies that
became seats of national congregation and political agitation. Autonomist
inclinations revived. The pan-Ottoman ideology of the Young Turk leadership,
centralization of administration, introduction of regular military service
and a new tax policy ruffled the ethnic Albanians. Instead of protection
from Abdulhamid II who tolerated anarchy, they were confronted with the
resolute Young Turks who had no understanding for their special rights. The
first conflicts in Kosovo and Metohia arose in 1909 when the Turkish
authorities attempted to execute a list of the population for conscription
and the collection of taxes. At the anniversary of the Revolution in 1909,
the ethnic Albanians held a congress in Debar, where the demand for
introducing military obligation was rejected, the issue of creating a
separate autonomous region encircling all territories on which ethnic
Albanians lived was brought up, and intolerance toward the neighboring
Serbian countries was expressed with acute emphasis.⁷
Despite gulfs in religious differences, political disagreements,
unequal economic interests, owing to the centralist measures of the Young
Turks, a high degree of national solidarity was soon attained within the
leadership of the Albanian movement. Persistent strivings of the Young Turks
to introduce military service and new taxes exacerbated ethnic Albanians of
all confessions, having been exempt of them during the reign of Abdul-hamid
II. Skirmishes between regular armies and the rebellious ethnic Albanians
soon proved the power of invincible clans, and the Young Turks were soon
compelled to concessions. The punitive expedition of Djavid Pasha in fall
1909, and the too rigorous measures in north Albania did not bring the
desired results.⁸
Another Albanian insurrection broke out in spring 1910, after the
repeated attempt of the authorities to collect taxes. Opposition in Kosovo
and Metohia was particularly strong in the Djakovica and Lab region. Turkish
troops, commanded by Torgut Shefket Pasha, mercilessly crushed the
insurrection and undertook to seize arms, but pacification was only a
temporary solution. Albanian committees increased agitation to create an
autonomous Albania and fomented discontent among ethnic Albanians in all
regions of the empire. Insurrections in Yemen and Lebanon, disorder in Crete
and the Italian incursion on Tripoli put the Young Turks in a difficult
position. The Malissors used the new clashes to rise in north Albania.
Montenegrin King Nikola I, in line with the Malissors, supplied the rebels
with arms and provided shelter for refugees, expecting the Albanian
insurrections to weaken Turkey. Among the 3,000 ethnic Albanians hiding in
Montenegro were leaders form Old Serbia, Isa Boljetinac and Suleyman Batusa.
A memorandum (Red Book) was sent from Cetinje to the Great Powers and the
Young Turks demanding recognition of the Albanian nation and autonomous
Albania.⁹
In fall 1911, Boljetinac requested arms from Serbia, and the
Montenegrin government proposed to Belgrade to aid the insurrection before
another power benefited from it. Serbian Premier Milovan Milovanovic
regarded the Albanian insurrection and its ties with Montenegro
suspiciously. Fearing that Austria-Hungary would introduce the army to
restore order in the Kosovo vilayet, Milovanovic believed that flaring the
insurrection was not in the interest to Serbs.¹⁰
The Serbs soon found themselves cleaved between the Young Turks and
ethnic Albanians. The Young Turk authorities oppressed the Serbs more
severely than the preceding ones. After the proclamation of extraordinary
conditions and drumhead court-martial (urfia) in May 1910, an action to
seize arms was executed, with many people beaten, while several Serbs died
as a result of the hits inflicted. Local tyrants made avail of the disorders
and uprisings to sack Serbian homes.¹¹ When Sultan Mahmud V
Reshad arrived in Kosovo in summer 1911 to offer amnesty, another wave of
violence was tossed upon the Serbs. The settling of accounts was accompanied
by murders, abduction, robberies, arson and oppression. Since July to
November 1911,128 robberies, 35 arsons, 41 banditries, 53 abductions, 30
blackmails, 19 examples of frightening, 35 murders, 37 attempts to murder,
58 armed assails upon property, 27 examples of fights and abuse, 13 attempts
to Turkize and 18 examples of serious injuries inflicted were recorded in
Old Serbia.¹² The disastrous extent of violence urged Serbian
consuls to make energetic demands from the government to arm the Serbs in
Kosovo again.
Yet, events rapidly followed one another. The Young Turk regime was in
a state of crisis, new elections were announced. Belgrade expected the Young
Turks would win the elections, so instructions were sent to Kosovo upon that
line. After a large conference of Serbs in Skoplje, in March 1912, a new
electoral agreement was concluded with the Young Turks. The ethnic
Albanians, exacerbated opposers of the Young Turk regime, began anew their
attacks upon the Serbs. Their chiefs urged the masses on; the frightening of
Serbs, blackmail and murders were resumed.¹³
The general Albanian insurrection had begun preparations in January
1912. Hasan Pristina and Ismail Kemal of south Albania supervised the
preparations. Pristina's task was to gather the people and collect the arms,
while Kemal was to contact Albanian committees and propagate Albanian
interests in European centers. It was settled that the insurrection in the
Kosovo vilayet was to begin in spring, and then it was to spread to other
regions inhabited by ethnic Albanians. In July 1912, the insurrection spread
over all of Kosovo; refusing to shoot Muslims, the rebels were joined by
officers, soldiers and gendarmes. The vali of Kosovo personally returned to
the ethnic Albanians arms seized two years before. War with Italy, uprisings
and unrest all over the empire and danger of international involvement
compelled the sultan to replace the Young Turks, dissolve the Parliament and
yield to the demands of the ethnic Albanians.
Yet, they would not surrender. Around 15,000 rebels, dissatisfied with
the pacifying promises of the sultan, moved south and took Skoplje. The
committee sent from Constantinople to enter into negotiations, was given
requests by Hasan Pristina, in the name of the insurrection, comprising 14
articles: special laws for Albania based on the common law; the right to
carry arms, amnesty for all rebels; assignment of officials who speak the
Albanian language and are familiar with their customs in four vilayets
(Kosovo, Scutari, Bitolj and Janjevo); recognition of the Albanian language
as official; curriculum and religious schools in the native tongue;
ethnic Albanians to serve in the army only on this territory; building
of roads and railtracks, additional administrative divisions; trial for the
Young Turk government. After a week of negotiating with the authorities,
which accepted most of the conditions, the rebels dispersed.¹⁴
The leadership of the insurrection was comprised of people of different
political affiliation and social status. On the one hand there were the
military commanders of the insurrection, prominent tribal chiefs and former
outlaws (Bairam Cur, Isa Boljetinac, Idriz Sefer, Riza Bey Krieziu), among
whom there were followers of the old system and Austrophils. On the other
hand, there were former diplomats and unhappy politicians (Hasan Pristina,
Jahia Aga, Hadji Rifat Aga and Nexhib Draga), who held differed views on the
future of ethnic Albanians both as compared to the first group and among
themselves. Their official petitions did not contain demands for the
territorial autonomy of ethnic Albanians, nor was the Porte ready to comply
to such a demand. Abhorring intervention of the Balkan states, Hasan
Pristina and Nexhib Draga, the major negotiators, were satisfied with the
resolution of the Albanian issue within the framework of Ottoman
legitimitism.¹⁵
The attitude of the rebels toward the political status of the Serbs in
Old Serbia was, despite individual cooperation, basically one of
intolerance. The Skoplje paper Vardar warned that the Serbs in Old Serbia
did not mind that Turkey had met with the national demands of the ethnic
Albanians: "We only think it unfair that we Serbs are excluded, whose
desires and interests, like in this case, as always, remain
heedless".¹⁶
The Serbian government strove to use the Albanian insurrection to
further weaken the Turkish system and its leadership and to drive out
Austro-Hungarian influence in its leadership. The consul of Pristina
negotiated with influential leaders - Bairam Cur, Isa Boljetinac and Riza
Bey, while sons of Boljetinac were guests of the Belgrade government. Many
leaders were paid large sums out of funds of the Serbian government or they
were given arms. Owing to this, in a draft of demands, an article was
inserted which anticipated the recognition of rights demanded by the ethnic
Albanians to apply to Serbs as well. Due to the insistence of several of the
leaders, particularly of the pro-Austrian affiliated Hasan Pristina, this
article did not enter the official Albanian requests.
The Albanian national movement felt, despite periodical aid from
Montenegro and Serbia and constant negotiations and political reliance upon
them, in the bases of its seemingly contradictory aspirations, profound
intolerance for Serbs in the Kosovo vilayet, as the most permanent
component. The fact that no one even thought of recognizing the right of the
Serbs to national institutions and independent political activity, was
displayed by the escalation of Albanian violence in 1912. Periodical
attempts of individual tribal chiefs to approach distinguished Serbian
representatives in Turkey were merely tactical acts of conformation without
permanent political importance. Intolerance toward the people which, though
thinned out, were still the majority, was exhibit in all plans and programs
of Albanian leaders. Ever since the reign of the Albanian League, until the
beginning of the second decade of the 20th century, the Serbs in Kosovo,
Metohia and the neighboring regions, were deprived of the most fundamental
rights to human freedom and even minimal civil rights. Albanian and Young
Turk confrontation, fear of the involvement of the Balkan states and
Austria-Hungary only temporarily suppressed their voluminous intentions with
the Serbs.
1 Istorija srpskog naroda, VI/1, pp. 330-333.
2 Elaboration: D. Mikic, Mladoturski parlamentarni izbori 1908. i Srbi
u Turskoj, Zbornik Filozofskog fakulteta u Pristini, XII (1975), pp.
154-209.
3 Rod narodne skupstine otomanskih Srba, Skoplje 1910; Istorija srpskog
naroda, VI/1, pp. 335-338.
4 Istorija srpskog naroda, VI/1, pp. 335-336.
5 Zaduzbine Kosova, p. 704.
6 Istorija srpskog naroda, VI/1, 340-342; see elaborate documentation:
B. Perunicic, Zulumi aga i begova, pp. 460-529.
7 I. G. Senkevic, Osvoboditelnoe dvizenie albanskogo naroda v 1905-1912
gg, Moskva 1959, pp.. 140-145; S. Skendi, op. cit., pp. 391-394.
8 Ibid.
9 D. Bogdanovic, Knjiga o Kosovu, pp. 159-160.
10 V. Corovic, Odnosi izmedju Srbije i Austro-Ugarske u XX veku, pp.
350-351;
more elaborate: B. Hrabak, Arbanaski prvak Isa Boljetinac i Crna Gora
1910-1912, Istorijski zapisi, XXXIX (1977).
11 M. Rakic, Konzulska pisma, 201-214; Zaduzbine Kosova, pp. 707-708.
12 Zaduzbine Kosova, 716; additional documentation, pp. 717-728.
13 Istorija srpskog naroda, VI/1,345-347, cf. Dokumenti o spoljnoj
politici Kraljevine Srbije, V/2, Beograd 1985.
14 B. Hrabak, Arbanaski ustanci 1912, Vranjski glasnik, XI (1975), pp.
339 passim.
15 Ibid., pp. 323-324.
16 Ibid., p. 325, Serbian agent in Kosovo, renowned writer Grigorije
Bozovic, observing the Albanian movement in summer 1912, noted the
following: "The negative aspect of this movement as far as the Serbs are
concerned, is that the Arnauts are on the verge of becoming a nation, and
they wish to settle their issue in Kosovo, and that they are neither the
conquerors nor the conquered. We fall between them and the Young Turks, and
both will throw their rage at us. A positive move is that the Albanians are
beginning to unfetter themselves from Turkish fanaticism; Muslim solidarity
and hypnosis are slackening; they are very aware that they are at enmity
with the Turks and, most important, they speak of Serbia with sympathy and
regard it an amicable country." (Ibid, pp. 320.)
PART TWO: THEOCRACY, NATIONALISM, IMPERIALISM

LIBERATION OF KOSOVO AND METOHIA
The development of events in Turkey, particularly war with Italy and
disorder in Old Serbia and Macedonia, had created a peculiar disposition in
the Balkan states. Albanian insurrections accelerated the conclusion of the
Balkan alliance. Since February until August, the alliance between Serbia,
Montenegro, Bulgaria and Greece was definitely confirmed. Realizing the
impossibility of a peaceful solution to the Christian issue in Turkey, the
allies decided to war. Owing to Russia's diplomatic moves, Central Powers
consented to the Balkan states handling the destiny of the Balkan Peninsula.
Estimating a certain victory for the Turkish army, Austria-Hungary calmly
awaited war. The road leading to the realization of a historical mission -
the liberation of compatriots under Turkish rule, opened in autumn, 1912.
Beginning with October, the allies declared war to Turkey, the official
reason being Turkey's denial to pronounce new reforms (with concessions
equal to those given to the ethnic Albanians), the supervision of which
would have been entrusted to the Balkan states.¹
Shortly before the war, Serbia endeavored to win over the ethnic
Albanians and isolate them from military operations. In a secret mission in
Kosovo, two most distinguished intelligence officers Dragutin Dimitrijevic
Apis and Bozin Simic aimed to come to an agreement with Isa Boljetinac and
Idriz Sefer for ethnic Albanians not to take part in the upcoming
war.² Serbian Premier Nikola Pasic offered the Albanian leaders a
"contract on the association of Serbs and ethnic Albanians in the Kosovo
vilayet", whereby within the framework of the Serbian state organization,
they were warranted freedom of religion, Albanian language in schools and
society, administration of Albanian communities and administrative
districts, preservation of the common law and finally, a special Albanian
assembly to enact laws on religious, judicial and educational matters. At an
assembly held in Skoplje on October 10, (and subsequently in Pristina and
Debar), the ethnic Albanians decided to defend their Ottoman fatherland in
arms and use weapons obtained from Serbia against its army.³
Commanding the third Serbian army for action in Kosovo was General
Bozidar Jankovic, who had previous contact with the ethnic Albanians, which
might have influenced their decision. A military announcement mentioned
amiable disposition toward the ethnic Albanians providing they deserved it
through proper conduct. Yet Austro-Hungarian agitators encouraged both
Muslim and Catholic ethnic Albanians to move against the Serbian army,
promising that troops of the Dual Monarchy are on their way from Bosnia to
assist them.⁴
Isa Boljetinac received 63,000 guns from the Turkish authorities to
organize resistance toward the Serbian army. Despite Boljetinac's strong
agitation that "Islamism is in jeopardy", and the need to defend "Turkish
soil", only 16,000 ethnic Albanians appeared at the frontier. They were
committed with the defense of Kosovo together with a Turkish corps. Well
armed and equipped, the Serbian army advanced toward Kosovo in exaltation.
The feeling that the "Serbian covenant thought" was coming to life with the
liberation of Kosovo, bleeding five centuries under Turkish reign, had
created a remarkably high morale for combat. Identical feelings were born by
Montenegrin units advancing towards Pec and Djakovica.⁵
Combats with the ethnic Albanians were severe only in the first
skirmishes. The Serbian artillery easily scattered Albanian bashibazouk
companies without encountering serious resistance. Following their defeat,
Bairam Cur, Riza Bey and Isa Boljetinac fled to Albanian Malissia. After the
liberation of Pristina (October 22), and victory in Kumanovo (October
23-24), war was resolved for Old Serbia and Macedonia. In Kosovo and
Metohia, Serbs greeted the Serbian and Montenegrin armies with exhilaration.
The entire third army attended a formal liturgy at Gracanica to mark the
liberation of Kosovo. Military authorities issued proclamations in Pristina
and other towns for ethnic Albanians to quiet down and surrender arms;
however, anti-Serbian agitation from tribal leaders drove many to flee
and shelter in the mountains. Realizing they would not be persecuted after
surrendering their arms, ethnic Albanians in Drenica and the Pec region
finally laid down their guns. Serbian officers kept repeating that the Serbs
were warring Turkey and not the ethnic Albanians. In the newly liberated
areas Serbia established civil rule and administration. Kosovo and Metohia
became part of the Lab, Pristina and Prizren district. Montenegro divided
liberated Metohia into the Pec and Djakovica district.⁶
The liberation of Old Serbia was not, however, the final goal of the
Serbian armies. The political and economical hoop encircled around Serbia,
held tight by Austria-Hungary since the .Kg War (1906-1911), and the
annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina induced Serbian diplomacy to resolve
the issue of its political and economic independence by gaining free exit to
the Adriatic Sea, a plan similar to one made by Ilija Garasanin. The
determination of the Serbian government to advance toward the Adriatic
coast, to an ethnically Albanian area, was based on the evaluation that
ethnic Albanians were "not a people, but tribes split up and mutually
estranged, without a common language, alphabet and religion". The government
was supported by the court, by civil parties, the army and the widest
public.⁷
While Montenegrin troops besieged Scutari, Serbian regiments from Old
Serbia entered Albania and occupied its northern ports. In the land of the
Mirdits, Serbian troops were greeted cordially, whereas they were forced to
penetrate Dukadjin toward the Adriatic Sea with arms.⁸
Reports of Serbia's glorious victories were received with anxiety in
Vienna. Austro-Hungarian diplomacy warned Serbia not to advance its army
further from Prizren. To prevent Serbia's exit to the sea, the Viennese
government sent special emissaries to Albania to spread the idea of
autonomy, and even called one of the most important Albanian leaders from
Constantinople, Ismail Kemal. Through the Viennese press, he demanded an
independent "Great Albania", encompassing the towns Bitolj, Janina, Skoplje,
Pristina and Prizren. Embarking an Austrian ship, Kemal set off to Valona to
proclaim independence of Albania. Gathering feudal and tribal leaders from
the southern regions to his side, on November 28, 1912, Kemal proclaimed the
formation of an independent Albanian state. The provisional government in
Valona was a toy in Vienna's hands devoid of any influence with the people.
All documents, including the proclamation of independence, were written in
the Turkish language; not one member of his cabinet knew how to write in the
Albanian tongue. Ismail Kemal consigned the military formation to refugee
leaders from Old Serbia, Riza Bey Krieziu and Isa Boljetinac.⁹
Kemal's government sent messages to Serbian troops to withdraw from the
territory of the new state. The Serbian army established civil rule north of
the Durazzo-Elbasan-Struga line. The situation in Albania was on the verge
of anarchy. The temporary government proclaimed an energetic severing of all
ties with Turkey. Subsequent to the Young Turk coup d'etat, the mid-Albanian
Muslim populace was disposed to Albania remaining within the framework of
the Ottoman Empire. Rumors spread among the people that the Young Turks were
advancing with large armies to reoccupy Albania. To the north, the Catholic
Mirdits negotiated with Montenegro and Serbia on the creation of an
autonomous state. The Mirdit mbret Bib Doda requested permission from the
Serbian army for his fellow tribesmen to loot the Muslims. Within the Mata
region, malcontents took down the Albanian flag and threatened to call the
Serbian army;
in some places there was agitation to resist the Serbs. Ismail Kemal's
government soon disintegrated. Disorder and mutual conflicts began within
the first months following the proclamation of the independent Albanian
state.¹⁰
Austria-Hungary considered the emergence of the Serbian army on the
Adriatic Sea a serious injury to its interests. Belligerent military circles
in Vienna proposed to attack Serbia whose northern borders remained
unguarded. During December all tokens pointed to an upcoming
Austro-Hungarian - Serbian war. After conferring with the Russian and
Italian diplomacy, the Serbian government pronounced the following
statement:
"We do not desire to raise the issue of our emergence at sea ourselves,
but rather to let the matter remain within the hands of the Great Powers
when war ends and peace is concluded. We should not disapprove of the
creation of autonomous Albania if Europe should agree to it. We only believe
that Albania will not abide by peace necessary to both the Balkan allies and
the whole of Europe. Our desire is to have a port on our territory - yet we
leave this issue for the Great Powers to resolve, when they solve other
matters that will unfold from peace."¹¹
The Austro-Hungarian incursion on Serbia was prevented by a conference
of ambassadors of the Great Powers convoked in London toward the close of
1912, at the initiative of the French and British diplomacy.
Representatives of the Balkan states began peace negotiations with the
Ottoman Empire. The conference of ambassadors argued the issue of Serbia's
emergence at sea and the status of Albania, which would then enter into
regulations of peace with Turkey. While Russia supported Serbian demands for
Adriatic ports, Austria-Hungary's intention at the conference was to
struggle for a larger Albania. France and Great Britain accepted the
formation of Albania but feared Austro-Hungarian and Italian superiority in
it. Thus the very first day the conference opened, the ambassadors reached
the following agreement: "Autonomous Albania guaranteed and controlled
exclusively by six powers under the sovereignty or suzerainty of the sultan.
The exclusion of every Turkish element from the administration is
understood." Ensuring the frontiers of Albania and Montenegro were
"neighbored all the way", Serbia was denied emergence to the Adriatic Sea.
As compensation, it was given a free and neutral trade port on the Albanian
coast, to which Serbian goods would arrive by railway secured by
international gendarmes under European control. Peace in Europe was saved,
but, as Poincares pointed out: "Serbia paid the highest bill".¹²The border issue presented a more serious problem. Since December
1912. several plans were in diplomatic emulation. Serbia demanded the
borders to be drawn west of the Ohrid Lake and the Crni Drim river, so that
Decani, Djakovica, Prizren, Debar and Ohrid would remain in its composition.
Montenegro demanded north Albania until the Maca river, with Scutari, Medua
and Alessio. Greece demanded north Epirus where the Albanian populace lived
admixed with the Greek one. Autonomous Albania was to have been constituted
from the remaining areas. The Austro-Hungarian proposition, contrary to the
Serbian one, suggested the creation of Great Albania. The Monarchy demanded
that Djakovica, Debar, Korcca, Janina and Struga belong to Albania, and "in
the first round" both Pec and Prizren, as "compensational objects". It left
Struga, Ohrid and Debar to Bulgaria if it were to make any claims. Italy
supported Montenegrin claims but acutely opposed Greek ones. Russia and
France maintained a medial solution by which Albania's frontier toward
Serbia should stretch along the watershed of the Beli and the Crni Drim
rivers to Ohrid. The Albanian delegation demanded the formation of
"ethnical" Albania, inclusive of the towns Pec, Mitrovica, Pristina, Skoplje
and Bitolj.¹³
The standpoint of the Serbian delegation was most wholly revealed by
the aide-memoir submitted to the ambassador conference on January 8,
1913. It explicitly stated that Serbia was not opposed to the formation
of autonomous Albania, but that its whole centuries-long struggle for
national survival under Turkish rule, and subsequently for state
independence from 1804 until 1912, would prove to have been senseless if
those regions with admixed Serbian-Albanian populaces, where forceful
Islamization, Albanization and the routing of Serbian inhabitants had been
urged on for centuries, were to belong to Albania. Supporting its attitudes
with historical, ethnographic, cultural and ethical rights, the Serbian
delegation underscored that Kosovo and Metohia, where the towns Pec, Decani
and Djakovica lay, were since time immemorial the sacred land of the Serbs,
and that under no condition would any Montenegrin nor Serbian government
consent to their belonging to someone else.¹⁴
The Serbian government was adamant in its defense of Kosovo, Metohia
and west Macedonia. The entrance of either of these regions into autonomous
Albania would create a new seedbed of conflicts through which
Austria-Hungary would exert pressure upon Serbia. Stojan Novakovic, the
first delegate at the conference of ambassadors, believed that by "demanding
Prizren, Djakovica, Pec for Albania, Austria-Hungary desired to renew the
barrier between Serbia and Montenegro, between Serbia and the
sea".¹⁵ Pasic kept underscoring that he would never abandon Debar
and Djakovica whatever the decision of the Great Powers, and that "only a
stronger military force could rout the Serbian army from these regions". In
a subsequent letter addressed to the Great Powers/Pasic underlined bitterly:
"The lands and sanctity of Old Serbia are being taken away and given to one
who has been devastating them until today."¹⁶
Serbia was forced to withdraw its troops from the Adriatic coast.
Austria-Hungary gave in to Russia's demands, so Debar and Djakovica remained
part of Serbia, while its demand to include Scutari in the new Albanian
state was accepted, though the town was still besieged by Montenegrin and
Serbian troops. The final agreement was reached on April 10, 1913, while the
structure of Albania continued to be discussed in the months to follow. At
the end of July, the Austro-Hungarian - Italian proposition was accepted by
which Albania was to become a sovereign state with a hereditary prince. An
International Control Committee was formed whose duty was to organize life
in the country with the aid of Dutch officers. As the hereditary Albanian
prince, among numerous candidates, an Austro-Hungarian was chosen, German
Prince Wilhelm von Wied, cousin of the Romanian queen, interpreted in
Belgrade as another attempt of Austria-Hungary to close the hoop around
Serbia by way of Albania, Bulgaria and Romania.¹⁷
1 Prvi balkanski rat, Beograd 1959,147-176; cf. D. Bogdanovic, Knjiga o
Kosovu, Ep. 165-176.
2 C. Popovic, Rod organizacije "Ujedinjenje ili smrt" - Pripreme za
Balkanski rat, Nova Evropa, 1 (1927), pp. 313-315; M. Z. Jovanovic, Pukovnik
Apis, Beograd 1957, pp. 649-651; Savremenici o Kosovu i Metohiji 1852-1912,
pp. 351-353, 381-383.
3 Dj. Mikic, Albanci i Srbija u balkanskim ratovima 1912-1913,
Istorijski glasnik, 1-2 (1986), p. 60; more elaborate in: D. D. Stankovic,
Nikola Pasic i stvaranje balkanske drzave, M. misao, 3 (1985), pp. 157-169.
4 D. Mikic, Albanci i Srbija u balkanskim ratovima, p. 61.
5 J. Tomic, Rat no. Kosovu i Staroj Srbiji 1912. godine, Novi Sad 1913.
6 Prvi balkanski rat, pp. 46-417, 464-469-496; D. Mikic, Albanci i
Srbija u balkanskim ratovima, p. 63.
7 The only opposition came from the leadership of the Socialdemocratic
party headed by Dimitrije Tucovic. Concerned only for their narrow party and
political interests, they used the entrance of the Serbian army into Albania
to settle their accounts with the government policy and civil parties (cf.
D. Tucovic, Srbija i Albanija, Beograd 1914).
8 I. Balugdzic, Kad se stvarala Albanija, Srpski knjizevni glasnik, 52
(1937), pp. 518-523; D. Djordjevic, Izlazak Srbije na Jadransko more i
Konferencija ambasadora u Londonu 1912, Beograd 1956, pp. 11-12, 83-85.
9 V. Corovic, Odnosi izmedju Srbije i Austro-Ugarske u XX veku, pp.
396-401; D. Djordjevic, op. cit., p. 86.
10 Dj. Mikic, Albanci i Srbija u balkanskim ratovima, pp. 68-70.
11 V. Corovic, Odnosi izmedju Srbije i Austro-Ugarske u XX veku, pp.
410.
12 D. Djordjevic, op. cit., pp. 133-134.
13 Ibid., see M. Vojvodic, Skadarska kriza 1913, Beograd 1970.
14 Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici Kraljevine Srbije, VT/1, 136-142; D.
Bogdanovic, op. cit., pp. 172-173.
15 Ibid., V/3, doc. 500.
16 Ibid., VI/1, 260, 379, 380; D. Bogdanovic, op. cit., p. 173.
17 D. Djordjevic, op. cit., pp. 141-143.
Albanian Incursions into Serbia
The situation in Albania and the border area toward Serbia was marked
by anarchy, disorders and conflicts during 1913 and the first half of 1914.
The commander of Scutari, Essad Pasha Toptani, surrendered the town to the
Montenegrins on April 23,1913; in return, he was enabled to advance south
with his army and military equipment and take part in the struggle for
power. Already three mutually conflicting governments existed in Albania. As
one of the most powerful landholders, Essad Pasha relied on the Muslim heads
of mid-Albania. By wielding his influence between Durazzo and Tirana, he saw
an opportunity to candidate himself for the still vacant Albanian throne,
taking into consideration requests of the Albanian majority that did not
want a Christian ruler. Already on May 5, 1913, he informed the Montenegrin
prince of his intention to pronounce himself prince of Albania, expressing
his wish to cooperate with the Balkan allies. He told the Serbian diplomat
in Durazzo, Zivojin Balugdzic, that he wanted an agreement with Serbia.
Hesitant at first, the Serbian government consented to cooperate with Essad
Pasha, evaluating that "his overall behavior displayed an earnest wish for
an agreement with Serbia, which he regarded as the focus for mustering
Balkan forces".¹
The second Balkan war was triggered off by Bulgaria in July, 1913.
Dissatisfied with its territorial gains, it prepared to war its former
allies. It sought support with Albania: ethnic Albanians gathered around
Ismail Kemal were promised considerable territorial expansion if they
advanced onto Serbia. Thus Sofia counted on the Albanian insurrection
leading to the proclamation of autonomous Macedonia and its annexation to
Bulgaria. Thus, somewhere in Macedonia, an Albanian-Bulgarian border would
have been established. Conditions for armed incursions were favorable:
around 20,000 ethnic Albanians who fled Old Serbia and Macedonia found
themselves on Albanian soil, while their leaders Hasan Pristina and Isa
Boljetinac sat in the government at Valona. Austro-Hungarian and Italian
emissaries and agents, mostly the clergy and teachers, suppressed Essad
Pasha's influence and appealed to the ethnic Albanians to rise against the
Serbs.²
Individual surprise attacks on the most forward Serbian units and
border stations began already during the second Balkan war. In the meantime,
detailed preparations for a large incursion into Serbia were underway.
Shipments of arms sent by the Viennese government kept arriving to Albania.
Bulgarian komitadjis trained ethnic Albanians for guerrilla warfare. Small
renegade groups were infiltrated into Serbian territory during May and June
1913 to check their guerrilla skills. Informed of the preparations for
attack, the Serbian government sent Bogdan Radenkovic to try to influence
his former friends among the Albanian leadership, but he returned without
accomplishing his task.³
When the Serbian army was forced to withdraw to the restriction line
behind the Crni Drim, a signal was given for a full force attack. At the end
of September 1913, around 10,000 ethnic Albanians invaded Serbian territory
from two directions - west Macedonia and toward Djakovica and Prizren. The
initiator of the attack was Austria-Hungary. Ismail Kemal ordered the
refugee Albanian leaders, Bairam Cur, Isa Boljetinac, Riza Bey and Elez
Jusuf to attack Serbia with their parties, promising that with the aid of
the Dual Monarchy and Italy, all conquered territories would belong to
Albania. Essad Pasha refused to join them and warned Serbia not to approve
of their action.⁴
The infiltrated companies were headed by Albanian leaders and Bulgarian
officers in coaction with the Bulgarian komitadjis. Weak Serbian border
troops and several gendarmes units were unable to withstand the attack. On
the southern stretch, commanded by Bulgarian komitadjis, the companies
managed to take Debar, Ohrid and Struga and advance toward Gostivar. To the
north, Isa Boljetinac, Bairam Cur and Kiasim Lika took Ljuma, besieged
Prizren and shortly occupied Djakovica. At the beginning of October, two
divisions, the Troops of new regions, advanced from Skoplje and, having
routed the ethnic Albanians from Serbian territory, crossed to Albania to
continue their pursuit.⁵
The Vienna press published elaborate articles on great victories gained
by the ethnic Albanians and demanded a revision of the borders. Ismail Kemal
demanded an exclusion of those regions encircled by the insurrection from
the Serbian state and proposed a plebiscite that would be implemented by the
infiltrated companies. When the incursion was checked, the Vienna press
spread rumors of alleged reprisals committed by Serbian troops upon the
innocent Albanian people. Austro-Hungarian diplomacy endeavored to prove
that an insurrection had broken out within Serbian territory, subsequently
joined by ethnic Albanians from the other side of the frontier.⁶
To emphasize his pro-Serbian orientation, Essad Pasha took advantage of
the commotion resulting from the incursion, and in Durazzo, on September 23,
proclaimed himself Governor of Albania. Before the European public, which
blamed the external activities of the Serbian army for the incursion, Serbia
intended to compromise the government in Valona by proving that two of its
ministers, Isa Boljetinac and Hasan Pristina, were the organizers and
leaders of the incursion. Again the issue was brought up that the borders
determined by the London conference of ambassadors were unfavorable for
Serbia, since the outlaw seedbeds around Debar and Ljuma demanded by the
Serbian delegation were seriously imperiling Serbian territory.⁷
Wilhelm von Wied arrived in Albania in March 1914. Pressured by the
International Control Committee, Essad Pasha was compelled to enter a united
government, but did receive two of its most important spheres of activity,
the Ministry of War and Internal Affairs. Discontent of the Muslim Albanian
populace with the government of the infidel prince culminated in a
pro-Turkish uprising lead by Hadji-Qamil Feiza, a Young Turk officer
originally from Elbasan. Incited by Muslim fanaticism and the unsettled
agrarian issue, the uprising caused general anarchy. Austro-Hungarian and
Young Turk agents inflamed discontent among the Muslim masses. Essad Pasha
first supported the uprising, but was forced to emigrate to Italy in May,
1914, having been checked by the prince's followers.⁸
Simultaneously, with the aid of Austro-Hungarian secret services,
Albanian leaders Bairam Cur and Isa Boljetinac were preparing for another
incursion into Serbia. At the end of March, 1914, several hundred ethnic
Albanians crossed the border, having received news that an uprising against
the Serbs broke out in some villages near Orahovac. The uprising spread to
four villages. Cur and Boljetinac planned to bring members of the
International Control Committee to the rebelling areas, where the local
ethnic Albanians would express their wish for Djakovica, Pec, Prizren and
regions until the railway Urosevac (Ferizovic) - Mitrovica, to be annexed to
Albania, as promised by Austria-Hungary. Tension at the borderline did not
cease.⁹
1 I. Balugdzic, op. cit., 521-522; D. Mikic, Albanci i Srbija u
balkanskim ratovima, pp. 75; more elaborate documentation: Dokumenti o
spoljnoj politici Kraljevine Srbije, VI/2, Doc. No 75, 77, 80, 86, 93, 100,
105, 124, 130, 135.
2 Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici Kraljevine Srbije, VI/3, Doc. No 194,
239, 253,
3 B. Hrabak, Arbanaski upadi i pobune na Kosovu i u Makedoniji od kraja
1912. do kraja 1915. godine (Nacionalno nerazvijeni i nejedinstveni Arbanasi
kao orudje u rukama zainteresovanih sila), Vranje 1988, pp. 33-38.
4 Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici Kraljevine Srbije, VT/3, Doc. No 406,
cf. Doc. No 347, 351, 359, 378, 379, 418.
5 B. Hrabak, Arbanaski upadi i pobune na Kosovu i u Makedoniji, pp.
52-64.
6 Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici Kraljevine Srbije, VI/3, Doc. No 407,
408, 409.
7 B. Hrabak, Arbanaski upadi i pobune na Kosovu i u Makedoniji, pp. 57.
60-61.
8 B. Hrabak, Muslimani severne Albanije uoci izbijanja rata 1914,
Zbornik za istoriju Matice srpske, 22 (1980), pp. 52-53.
9 B. Hrabak, Arbanaski upadi i pobune na Kosovu i u Makedoniji, p. 93.
In World War One
The direct cause leading to World War One was the assassination of
Austro-Hungarian heir to the throne, Franz Ferdinand, in Sarajevo, by
Serbian students (on St. Vitus' Day, June 28th, 1914), thus symbolically
marking the commencement in the outcome of Austro-Hungarian and Serbian
confrontation. Serbia's victories in the Balkan wars proved its military,
political and economical strength; in the Yugoslav provinces of the Dual
Monarchy, national movement grew, turning to Belgrade as the pillar of
national and South-Slavic assemblage. War with Serbia turned over from a
considerable delay of punitive expedition to a war to destroy the Serbian
state. The Viennese diplomacy found reliable allies first with Albania and
then with Bulgaria.¹
The opening of the war found the borderline between Serbia and Albania
unrestful and unconsolidated. Essad Pasha, follower of Balkan cooperation,
was in emigration, while civil war raged in Albania. The insurgents, called
"Ottomans", demanded a Muslim for a ruler, and for the flag, and the
character of state administration to be Ottoman. Refugee Albanian leaders
from Kosovo, organizers of the previous incursion into Serbia, did not take
part in the uprising; they awaited the opportunity to incite a rebellion and
seize Kosovo, Metohia and west Macedonia from Serbia.
Two days before war was declared to Serbia, consular officials in
Albania received orders from Vienna to assist the Albanian insurrection on
Serbian territory. Bairam Cur, Hasan Pristina and Isa Boljetinac obtained
money, arms and ammunition from Austro-Hungarian consuls to prepare for the
insurrection. In Constantinople, a contract was concluded for
Austria-Hungary to finance and urge the insurrection, while the Young Turks
would handle the propaganda, military organization and operations of the
insurrection. Incursions onto Serbian territory and the Albanian
insurrection in Kosovo, Metohia and Macedonia were to have been the basis
for opening another front against Serbia, which had, after the
Austro-Hungarian attack, distributed its troops along the border with the
Dual Monarchy. The at first small-scale attacks were recorded already at the
beginning of August, 1914. Turkish and Austro-Hungarian association was
growing closer, thus sealing the destiny of Prince Wilhelm von Wied. After
several unsuccessful attempts to crush the insurrection, abandoned by his
volunteers, the prince left Albania for good at the beginning of September,
1914.²
Shortly before the war, Serbia strove to win over some of the chiefs of
mid and north Albania for cooperation. The agents cruised Albania
endeavoring to make contact with dissatisfied chiefs. It was soon disclosed
that Albanian tribal and feudal chiefs were inconstant, bribable and
unreliable, that they easily changed sides for money and, being without a
clear political conception and strong national awareness, cared most of all
about their personal and tribal interests. Internal political polarization
between them was determined by religious affiliation which ascended over
national feelings.³
Incursions into Serbia, though mostly skirmishes with bordering
stations and gendarmes never ceased since the war began. Even though small
in number and always rapidly checked, they increasingly disturbed competent
circles in Serbia. Informed of preparations for new incursions of broader
dimensions, on the delivery of arms to Albania and the arrival of Young Turk
and Austro-Hungarian officers to join Albanian companies at the
Serbian-Albanian borderline, the government sought a way to neutralize the
preparations for the insurrection. Military circles proposed a preventive
military intervention.⁴
With the departure of Prince von Wied, no one held power in Albania. At
an assembly, a senate of rebelling towns in mid and north Albania chose
Essad Pasha for their leader, while the Serbian government immediately
appealed to him to take over rule. Nikola Pasic contracted with him an
agreement of friendship, aid and customs union, in Nis, mid-September, 1914.
Aided by Pasic's government, supplying him with money and arms, Essad Pasha
mustered around 5,000 Albanian volunteers, crossed over to Albania and
entered Durazzo at the beginning of October without strife. He immediately
formed a government and proclaimed himself Premier of Albania and Supreme
Army Commander.⁵
At the beginning of November, Turkey engaged at war on the side of the
Central Powers and declared Holy War (jihad) to the Entante and its allies.
Essad Pasha was considered an enemy to Islam, being a friend to Serbia, and
therefore, an ally of the Entante. The declaration of jihad caused a new
pro-Turkish insurrection of Muslim-fundamentalist forces, this time against
Essad Pasha. The rapidly spreading insurgent masses were lead by Young Turk
officers. The entire movement was of anti-Serbian orientation; the
insurgents demanded the restoration of Albania under the sovereignty of the
Ottoman Empire, with Kosovo, Metohia and west Macedonia included in its
composition. Greece and Italy benefited from the new opportunities. The
Greeks took north Epirus, while Italian troops first occupied the island
Sasseno and then Valona.⁶
Essad Pasha's position in Durazzo was becoming increasingly uncertain.
Thus the Premier appealed to the Serbian government more than once for
military intervention in Albania. In December, 1914, Serbia successfully
withstood an Austro-Hungarian offensive. The Serbian government feared that
following their defeat north, the Austro-Hungarian state and military
circles would urge the ethnic Albanians to war Serbia, which imposed
preventive military action as a solution.
Incursions of broader dimension announced Hasan Pristina's attempt to
organize an insurrection in Serbia in February, 1915, with a company
numbering around 200 men. Three bordering villages on Serbian territory
joined the insurgents, but in the first clash with a stronger Serbian unit,
Hasan Pristina's company was crushed and banished to Albania.⁷
Pro-Turkish insurgents besieged Essad Pasha in Durazzo and demanded of him
to recognize the sultan's power and declare war to Serbia. Pasic thus
believed it was best to intervene immediately rather than wait for
Austro-Hungarian and Young Turk officers to muster an Albanian army against
which a whole Serbian army would be forced to fight. When a Serbian diplomat
reported at the end of May that Essad Pasha's position was desperate, and
since Albanian companies had then attacked the Serbian border at two places,
the Serbian government decided to move its army and take strategic positions
in Albania. Around 20,000 Serbian soldiers invaded Albania from three
directions. In only ten days the Serbian troops crushed the rebellious
movement, took Elbasan and Tirana and liberated the besieged Essad Pasha in
Durazzo. A special Albanian regiment was formed from Serbian troops in
Albania to implement thorough pacification in Albania and consolidate Essad
Pasha's position.⁸Essad Pasha did not succeed in establishing
power in all the northern and middle regions of Albania. In the Mirdit
region, Isa Boljetinac, Bairam Cur and Hasan Pristina were hiding, while in
the Mat region, pasha's relative Ahmed Bey Zogu strove to come to an
agreement with the Serbian military authorities; at his personal request he
went to Nis for negotiations with Pasic.⁹
Serbia's military intervention met with general complaints in allied
circles, especially with Italy, whose claims to the Albanian coast,
warranted by a secret London Treaty (1915), were thus jeopardized by the
entrance of Serbian troops. Pasic replied to protests sent by ally
diplomacies that it was only a matter of temporary action and the troops
would withdraw after consolidating Essad Pasha's regime. To secure Serbian
positions in Albania after the war was over, the Serbian government
contracted a secret agreement in June, 1914, in Tirana, anticipating an
actual union between the two countries. Essad Pasha consented to rectify the
border to Serbia's advantage, and in return received warranty of Serbia's
support for his choice of ruler to Albania.¹⁰
The beginning of the German - Austro-Hungarian offensive against Serbia
in autumn, 1915, Bulgaria's engagement in war on the side of the Central
Powers and its attack on Serbia, forced the Serbian army to war on two
fronts and withdraw to the interior of the country. Bulgaria's incursion
into Macedonia threatened to cut off the retreat of the Serbian army to
Greece. Its retreat and Bulgaria's penetration into the depths of Macedonia
emboldened ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, Metohia and Macedonia. Masses of
ethnic Albanians recruited into the Serbian army became deserters, and many
joined the Bulgarians who gave them arms. With Austro-Hungarian
advance-guards, they attacked Serbian soldiers whom they awaited in the Ibar
valley.
When the Serbian army reached Kosovo, followed by many refugees,
various diversions and surprise attacks on field trains were effected. In
many villages ethnic Albanians refused to provide food for the refugees and
soldiers. In Istok, on November 29, 1915, a company of Serbian soldiers
lagging behind was massacred. Near the St. Marko monastery in the vicinity
of Prizren, ethnic Albanians of the Kabash clan deceitfully disarmed and
then killed 60 Serbian soldiers. After the Serbian army retreated from Pec,
ethnic Albanians pillaged many Serbian homes and sacked shops.
Austro-Hungarian guards prevented them from entering the hospital in Pec, in
front of which they gathered to massacre the wounded soldiers. They set
ambushes near Mitrovica, killed soldiers and looted refugees. Serious crimes
were committed in Suva Reka and other regions of Kosovo.¹¹
At the end of November, after the Bulgarians cut off all connections
with Salonika, the Serbian Supreme Command decided to withdraw the army to
Albania and make the necessary reorganizations there. The withdrawal of the
Serbian army through Albania, in winter 1915-1916, has been retained as the
"Albanian Golgotha". With the entrance of the Serbian army into Albania,
Essad Pasha issued an announcement appealing to the Albanian people to help
the amicable army and sell their food. In regions under his immediate
control, Albanian gendarmes considerably helped to ease the withdrawal of
the starving army, inflicted by disease, through impassable mountains
covered with snow. Essad Pasha's gendarmes took care of overnight stays,
food supplies and guarded the roads.
The regions to which Essad Pasha's authority did not stretch,
particularly Ljuma, Mirdits, Drims and partly in Mati, the Serbian army was
forced to clear with guns, on its way toward the Adriatic Sea. In Mirdits,
Mat and other regions, Catholic friars called to the ethnic Albanians to
confront the Serbian army in arms. Rumors spread that Prince Wilhelm von
Wied was arriving from Prizren with Austro-Hungarian troops, ethnic
Albanians avoided confrontation with large military formations; they
preferred to wait in ambush in high gorges for lagging soldiers and
refugees, and then and murder them. The heaviest battles were waged in the
Mirdits by a Combined Regiment of the Serbian army that fell into ambush at
the gorge of the Fani river. Around 800 ethnic Albanians commanded by a
Catholic friar let the army pass through only after they were given large
quantities of supplies from the field train. In places where there were no
armed assaults, the ethnic Albanians refused to rent rooms for overnight
stay and sell food.¹²
General chaos encircled the withdrawal of the Serbian army, with Essad
Pasha endeavoring to restore order with his gendarmes; but chaos and fear
caught hold of his people and disobedience ensued. Still, most of his troops
protected the Serbian army during its retreat and, whenever necessary,
fought together with it against Albanian companies that joined
Austro-Hungarian and Bulgarian troops. After much turmoil and long marches
toward the south, the Serbian army was transferred by allied ships from
Albania to Corfu. Squeezed in between Bulgarian and Austro-Hungarian troops,
Essad Pasha was forced to submit to the Italians; escorted by a Serbian
emissary, with a thousand most devoted followers, he crossed over to Italy
by boat.¹³
Kosovo and Metohia were divided into two Austro-Hungarian occupational
zones: Metohia entered the General Government "Montenegro", while a smaller
part of Kosovo with Kosovska Mitrovica and Vucitrn became part of the
General Government "Serbia". The largest part of Kosovo (Pristina, Prizren,
Gnjilane, Urosevac, Orahovac) was included in the composition of the
Bulgarian Military-Inspectional region "Macedonia".¹⁴
In Metohia and Kosovo, Austro-Hungarian authorities aimed to win over
the Albanian and Muslim populace: schools and the local administration were
conducted in the Albanian language. Albanian inhabitants were obviously
privileged. The occupational authorities of the Dual Monarchy immediately
established contact with the leaders. Many refugee chiefs returned from
Albania, while beys from Kosovo and former Turkish officers from Sandzak
cooperated most closely with the new authorities. Hasan Pristina and Dervish
Bey handled the conscription of volunteers who were assigned either to the
Bosnia-Herzegovinian gendarmes or the Turkish corps fighting at the front in
Galicia. A bulk of Albanian volunteers entered the service of
Austro-Hungarian military command in Kosovska Mitrovica and served in small
posse regiments. At the beginning of 1917, Dervish Bey was nominated as
commander of a distinct volunteer battalion (a force of 400 men), comprised
mainly of ethnic Albanians.¹⁵
The Bulgarian occupation of Kosovo has been retained by its great
oppression, internment of civilians, forced Bulgarization, and the
persecution and murder of priests. The former Raska-Prizren Metropolitan
Nicifor, was interned in Bulgaria and killed. Serbian priests suffered the
most, being persecuted and murdered on both occupational zones by ethnic
Albanians and Bulgarians. Bulgarian authorities assigned ethnic Albanians
and Turks to all village communities as chiefs, officials and gendarmes, who
helped their compatriots to raid and plunder without disturbance, to win
trials against Serbs in courts, and murders were often hushed up. In certain
villages, Turks and ethnic Albanians oppressed the Serbs of Kosovo in
conjunction.¹⁶
In the area between Juzna Morava and Kopaonik, a komitadji movement had
been growing since 1916, under the leadership of Kosta Vojinovic-Kosovac of
Mitrovica, which at the beginning of 1917 turned into a large national
insurrection with its seat at Toplica. ethnic Albanians took part in
persecuting Serbian komitadjis in the Mitrovica district. The armed
resistance was aided by many Serbs from Kosovo. Attempts made by insurgent
leaders to win over ethnic Albanians through negotiations failed. Albanian
companies attacked the insurgents, and in October, 1917, special Albanian
and Turkish units were formed to fight them.¹⁷
After being transferred to Corfu, the Serbian army, reorganized and
supplemented by volunteers, was disposed along the Salonika front along with
allied troops. Crossing over from Italy to Paris, with the aid of the French
diplomacy, Essad Pasha arrived at Salonika and formed a new Albanian
government which acquired the status of an emigrant ally cabinet, owing to
Serbian and French intermediation. A special army unit was formed from
around 1,000 gendarmes (Essad Pasha's camp and Albanian archers), and
disposed in juxtaposition to the Serbian Ohrid regiment as part of the
French East Army. Premier Nikola Pasic's idea was to admix the forces with
Serbian ones and direct operations toward Kosovo and north
Albania.¹⁸
In autumn, 1918, subsequent to the penetration of the Salonika Front, a
widespread national insurrection developed in Serbia. When the
Austro-Hungarian troops abandoned the line Skoplje-Pristina, the
insurrection spread to Kosovo and Metohia. French and Serbian troops
commanded by General Tranier emerged in Kosovo at the beginning of October,
liberating Pristina, Prizren, Gnjilane and Mitrovica. Serbian komitadji
companies, lead by Kosta Milovanovic Pecanac, met with French troops in
Mitrovica and immediately set off to Pec. Serbian komitadjis surrounded the
town, compelling the considerably stronger Austro-Hungarian troops to
surrender; then the French cavalry trotted into town. Divisions of the
second Serbian army also arrived in Kosovo and established civil and
temporary martial law.¹⁹
After the arrival of Serbian and French units, the Albanian people bore
themselves coldly and with reserve. When the bodies of troops continued to
advance toward Montenegro, ethnic Albanians began to assail solitary
soldiers at the end of October. The reason was the injunction given by
Serbian military authorities to collect all state property left from the
Bulgarian administration. Obtaining supplies from communities with arms left
behind, the ethnic Albanians began to assail Serbian civil and military
authorities, while the injunction to surrender arms met with heavy
resistance. Community seats, villages and small military garrisons were
attacked, while during November entire villages in Drenica and around Pec
deserted the Serbian authorities. Until mid-December, Serbian forces crushed
Albanian resistance and carried out the action of disarmament with great
difficulty.²⁰
The Austro-Hungarian monarchy was disintegrating. In Belgrade, on
December 1, 1918, the union of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was proclaimed
into one kingdom under the Karadjordjevic dynasty. In Kosovo, the military
and civil authorities had no time to celebrate. The Albanian resistance,
helped by agitation from Albania, with Italy behind it, announced a new,
kacak (outlaw) movement.
World War One forestalled the formation of a clear policy for ethnic
Albanians within Serbian borders, even though all those that had not taken
part in rebellions against the Serbian authorities were warranted civil
rights. Two Balkan and one world armed clashes, which deepened the old and
created new hatreds between Serbs and ethnic Albanians, had direct political
aims, being supported by the warring sides, above all Austria-Hungary and
Turkey, and in Albania by allied Italy. Yet Serbia had, on the contrary,
persistently striven to create a counterbalance to the anti-Serbian movement
helped by Vienna and Constantinople, through cooperation with Essad Pasha
and a series of tribal chiefs in mid-Albania, and to build a foundation that
would bring ethnic Albanians and Serbs closer. Contracts signed with Essad
Pasha in 1914 and 1915 were, first, a draft of possible ways of contact (a
real union with small territorial concessions), second, security in case the
destiny of Albania would again be resolved without Serbia's participation
when the war was over.
Essad Pasha Toptani's fate, whose political plans for the future of
Albania were based on support and cooperation with Serbia, displayed a
prevailing strong anti-Serbian disposition among ethnic Albanians, who would
benefit from the aims of the Serbian army to capture and include within the
composition of the new state Scutari with the neighboring Serbian villages.
Due to widespread Italian influence, under whose wing a temporary Albanian
government was formed, Essad Pasha's repeated attempts to regain power in
Albania, where he still had many followers, produced no positive results.
Despite delegates supported by Italy in the name of Albania, with Serbia's
assistance Essad Pasha brought another unofficial delegation to the Peace
Conference in Paris, April 1919, and, appealing to the legitimacy of his
government and the declaration of war to the Central Powers, requested
permission to return to his country. His struggle ended with shots fired by
assassin Avni Rustemi on June 13,1920 in Paris.
1 .More elaborate: A. Mitrovic, Srbija u prvom svetskom ratu, Beograd
1985. passim
2 Ibid., 218-224; B. Hrabak, Arbanaski upadi i pobune na Kosovu i u
Makedoniji, pp. 124-145.
3 B. Hrabak, Muslimani severne Albanije uoci izbijanja rata 1914, pp.
49-80; D. T. Batakovic, Podaci srpskih vojnih vlasti o arbanaskim prvacima
1914, Mesovita gradja, XVII-XVIII (1988), pp. 185-206.
4 B. Hrabak, Arbanaski upadi i pobune na Kosovu i u Makedoniji, pp.
147-151.
5 D. T. Batakovic, Esad-pasa Toptani i Srbija 1915. godine, in: Srbija
1915, Beograd 1986, 300-306; for details see: B. Hrabak, Elaborat srpskog
ministarstva inostranih dela o pripremama srpske okupacije severne Albanije,
Godisnjak Arhiva Kosova, II-III (1966-1967), pp. 7-35.
6 M. Ekmecic, Ratni ciljevi Srbije 1914, Beograd 1973, 377, pp.
383-385; cf. J. Swire, Albania, The Rise of A Kingdom, London 1930. passim
7 A. Mitrovic, op. cit., pp. 225-226.
8 M. Ekmecic, op. cit. p. 344; for more details see: D. T. Batakovic,
Secanje generala D. Milutinovica na komandovanje albanskim trupama 1915.
godine, Mesovita grada, XIV (1985), pp. 115-143
9 Ahmed Zogu attempted to impose himself upon Serbian competitive
authorities as Esad-pasha's rival. He promised, given the necessary
warrants, he would turn to Serbia's side. An agent of the Serbian government
accompanied him always; more elaborate: D. T. Batakovic, Ahmed-beg Zogu i
Srbija, in: Srbija 1917, pp. 165-177.
10 D. T. Batakovic, Esad-pasa i Srbija 1915. godine, 308-310; cf. Sh.
Rahimi, Mareveshjet e qeverise serbe me Esat pashe Toptanit gjate viteve
1914-1915, Gjurmime albanologjike, VI (1976), pp. 117-143. "
11 P. Kostic, Crkveni zivot pravoslavnih Srba u Prizrenu i okolini u
XIX veku, pp. 141-143; B. Hrabak, Stanje na srpsko-albanskoj granici i
pobuna Arbanasa na Kosovu i Makedoniji, in: Srbija 1915, pp. 80-85; idem.,
Arbanaski upadi i pobune na Kosovu i u Makedoniji, pp. 186-195.
12 O. Boppe, Za srpskom vojskom od Nisa do Krfa, Zeneva 1918; P. de
Mondesir, Albanska golgota, memories and war pictures, Beograd 1936; Kroz
Albaniju 1915-1916, Beograd 1968.
13 D. T. Batakovic, Esad-pasa Toptani i Srbija 1915. godine, pp.
315-124.
14 A serious crisis broke out in 1916 over the issue on dividing
occupational zones between Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary (Istorija srpskog
naroda, VI/2, Beograd 1983, pp. 146-148).
15 A. Mitrovic, op. cit., pp. 329-393.
16 J. Popovic, Kosovo u ropstvu pod Bugarima, Leskovac 1921; on the
persecution of the clergy: Zaduzbine Kosova, pp. 745-750.
17 More elaborate in: M. Perovic, Toplicki ustanak 1917, Beograd 1973;
A. Mitrovic, Ustanicke borbe u Srbiji 1916-1918, Beograd 1987.
18 Petar Opacic, Solunska ofanziva 1918, Beograd 1980, pp. 358-375.
19 B. Hrabak, Ucesce stanovnistva Srbije u proterivanju okupatora 1918,
Istorijski glasnik, 3-4 (1958), 25-50; ibid., Reokupacija oblasti srpske i
cmogorske drzave arbanaskom vecinom stanovnistva u jesen 1918. godine i
drzanja Arbanasa prema uspostavljenoj vlasti, Gjurmime albanologjike,
191969), pp. 255-260; A. Mitrovic, Ustanicke borbe u Srbiji 1916-1918, pp.
520-522.
20 B. Hrabak, Reokupacija oblasti srpske i cmogorske drzave, pp.
270-279.
PART TWO: THEOCRACY, NATIONALISM, IMPERIALISM

SERBIAN GOVERNMENT AND ESSAD PASHA TOPTANI
I
The study of Serbo-Albanian relations in the first decades of the 20th
century is merely one chapter in a history long marked with conflicts which
in their strongest current bore traits of lasting political confrontation
and religious intolerance which had deepened over the centuries. Thus the
need for precisely defining in perspective the processes under study,
imposes itself as the primary obligation. Favoring a national and
ideologically neutral reflection is not simply an implicit inclusion of
historiographical principle, but an aspiration enabling a stratified account
of never unambiguous historical content, instead of a reduced image of the
past. Viewed from that angle, the figure of Essad Pasha Toptani, whom entire
Albanian historiography condemned as the biggest traitor of his own people
(for cooperating with Serbia), emerges in a different light, ideologically
impartial, alien to every industrious work on history.¹
The era delimited with the beginning of the Balkan Wars and the end of
the Paris Peace Conference was marked by a fresh surge of old conflicts
between the Serbs and Albanians. The centuries-long commitment of most
Albanians in the Ottoman Empire to an Islamic structure of society (where
the Muslim belonged to a privileged status to which the Christian was
necessarily subordinate), was a major obstacle to any attempt at creating
more permanent political cooperation, and achieving national and religious
tolerance. In the first decade of the 20th century, the Albanian national
question began to undermine the very foundations of Ottoman rule in the
Balkans; subsequent to the great uprisings against the Young Turk
pan-Ottoman policy, it was supposed to end with the creation of an
autonomous Albanian unit within the frame of the Empire - in the spirit of
the decisions reached by the Albanian League in Prizren in 1878. Demands
were made to the Porte that an autonomous Albania be formed from the Kosovo,
Scutari, Bitolj (Monastir) and Janina vilayets - ethnically mixed areas to
which all the surrounding Balkan states (for many a good reason) lay claim.
Rejecting cooperation offered by the Balkan allies, primarily Serbia and
Montenegro, the leadership of the Albanian national movement decided, by
defending Turkey, to stand by the idea of an ethnic, Great
Albania.²
The proclamation of the independent state of Albania in Valona on
November 28, 1912, showed that despite the tremendous success of the Balkan
Allies at war against Turkey, the balance of forces in the Balkans depended
on the will of the most influential big power in the peninsula -
Austria-Hungary. Created primarily with support from the Dual Monarchy,
Albania was to serve as a dam to Serbia's major war objectives in the First
Balkan War - obtaining a territorial access to the Adriatic Sea at the
coastal belt between Durazzo and St Giovanni di Medua.
Serbia's diplomacy watched with strong suspicion the development of the
situation in Albania. Territorial access to the Albanian coast was jointly
assessed by all relevant political factors (the court, the government, the
army, the civil parties and public opinion) as the only possible way to
avoid the fatal embrace of the Dual Monarchy. By encroaching upon ethnically
different land, in Northern Albania, Serbia violated a principle to which it
appealed there until - the principle of nationality. State reason tipped the
balance which was justified by strategic needs and a historical right as
well as by the struggle for survival imposed by Austria-Hungary.
In fall, 1912, the Serbian troops took Allesio, Elbasan, Tirana and
Durazzo with quick actions and little resistance; the men ecstatically
jumped into the Adriatic, rejoicing over Serbia's sea. The ultimatum
presented by Austria-Hungary, threatening to attack the northern borders of
Serbia, compelled the Serbian government to renounce the access. The Great
Powers acknowledged the creation of the autonomous state of Albania at the
Conference of Ambassadors in London (1912-1913), initially under the
sovereignty and suzerainty of the sultan, and subsequently under their
control. Serbia was given trade access to the sea via a neutral and free
port in the north Albanian coast. The Montenegrin army, bolstered by Serbian
troops, managed to take Scutari after exhausting battles and many victims,
but was forced under a decision reached by the Conference to abandon it and
surrender it to the international forces.³
The new state was a cat's-paw in the hands of Vienna. The ministers of
Ismail Kemal's (Qemalli) provisional government were forced to draw up the
declaration on independence in Turkish, and write the provisions in Turkish
letters, since none of the government members were literate in the Albanian
Latin alphabet. The markedly pro-Austrian orientation of Kemal's government
did not meet with support from the wider population, which was through
centuries-long traditions attached to the Ottoman state and its ideology.
Muslims were in the majority in Albania (around 70% of the population), and
to them the only acceptable solution to the national question was to set up
a state under the rule of the Turkish prince, a demand which the government
in Constantinople was quick to point out. In northern Albania, the Catholic
Mirdits strove to create an independent state under the wing of the Catholic
powers: King Nikola I of Montenegro merely nurtured their demand for
independence. To the south, northern Epirus had little in common with the
tribes of central and northern Albania, being under Greek influence and of
Orthodox majority.⁴
Religious and tribal differences, an insufficiently formed national
awareness, a completely underdeveloped economy, illiterate masses and their
ignorance in politics held meager promises for a future stable state
community. Albanian tribal and feudal chiefs, who were accustomed to
reversing their positions and allies under the Turks for a handsome
gratuity, demonstrated neither enough political maturity nor national
solidarity. Clashes of different conceptions on the future of the country,
the involvement of the Great Powers and strife over power between regional
chiefs drew Albania into a whirlpool of civil war, even before its status
was defined and its borders fixed. Austria-Hungary benefited mostly from the
anarchy, with its consular and intelligence agencies encouraging a vengeful
policy of Albanian officials, flaring up old hatred between the Serbs and
Albanians, and building outposts for undermining and then destroying the
Serbian administration in the newly-liberated territories - Old Serbia and
Macedonia.⁵
The strengthening of influence by the Dual Monarchy in Albania, which
was threatening to become a tangible means of political and military
jeopardy to Serbia, disputes over demarcations and the status of individual
adjacent regions instructed the Serbian government to seek among prominent
Albanian tribal chiefs those who would be ready to resolve the issues within
the Balkan framework. The figure most suitable for that purpose emerged -
Essad Pasha Toptani, a Turkish general who gave Scutari over to the
Montenegrins in April 1913, and was allowed in return to leave the town with
his army and all their weaponry to become involved in the struggle over
power in central Albania.
1 K. Frasheri, The History of Albania, Tirana 1964, pp. 183-212; A.
Buda (ed.), Historia e popullit shqiptar, II, Prishtine 1969, pp. 371-516;
S. Polio - A. Puto, {ed.),Histoire de I'Albanie, Roanne 1974, pp. 181-212;
M. Qami, Shqiperia ne mareredheniet nderkombetare (1914-1918), Tirane 1987,
pp. 43-45, 107-112, 240-243,280-281, 313-315.
2 S. Skendi, Albanian National Awakening (1878-1912), pp. 438-463; P.
Barti, op. cit, pp. 173-184; B. Hrabak, Arbanaski ustanci 1912 godine, pp.
323-350; B. Mikic, The Albanians and Serbia during the Balkan Wars, in: East
Central European Society and the Balkan Wars (ed. B. K. Kiraly - D.
Djordjevic), New York 1987, pp. 165-196; Kosovo und Metochien in der
serbischen Geschichte, Lausanne 1989, pp. 311
3 Z. Balugdzic, op. cit, pp. 518-523; D. Djordjevic, Izlazak Srbije na
Jadransko more i Konferencija ambasadora u Londonu 1912, pp. 83-86; M.
Vojvodic, Skadarska kriza 1913. godine, pp. 125-137; 145-151. Cf Ismail
Qemalli. Permbledhje dokumentesh 1889-1919, Tirane 1982. An elaborate
insight in the documents is also provided by the Dokumenti o spoljnoj
politici Kraljevine Srbije 1903-1914, VI/1, Doc. Nos. 135, 389-393, 395,
411, 415, 460, 495-496, 506, 521, 527; VI/2, Doc. Nos. 23, 43, 80,
87-89,108,124.
4 M. Ekmecic, Ratni ciljevi Srbije 1914, pp. 372-377; J. Swire,
Albania, The Rise of a Kingdom, pp. 183-240, D. Mikic, op. cit. pp. 185-191;
M. Schmidt-Necke, Entstehung und Ausbau der Konigsdiktatur in Albanien
(1912-1939), Munchen 1987, pp. 25-40.
5 V. Corovic, Odnosi Srbije i Austro-Ugarske u XX veku, pp. 396-410; M.
Gutic, Oruzani sukobi na srpsko-albanskoj granici u jesen l913. godine,
Vojnoistorijski glasnik, 1 (1985), pp. 225-275; B. Hrabak, Arbanaski upadi i
pobune na Kosovu i u Makedoniji od kraja 1912. do kraja 1915, pp. 185-206.
II
The career of Essad Pasha Toptani (born in Tirana, 1863) was similar to
the careers of the biggest Albanian feudal lords. As the owner of vast
chifliks in central Albania, Essad Pasha quickly climbed up the Turkish
administrative hierarchy. At the opening of the century he was a gendarmery
commander in the Janina vilayet. He supported the Young Turk movement in
1908, and represented Durazzo as deputy to Turkey's Parliament; in 1909 he
was entrusted with the ungrateful duty of handing Sultan Abdulhamid II the
decree on his deposition. Prior to the Balkan wars, he held the post of
gendarmery commander in the Scutari vilayet where he successfully engaged in
trade with the Italians, giving them concessions for the exploitation of
forests. He took over command of Scutari in early 1913, demonstrating all
the qualities of a great military leader. He decided to surrender the city
only when the garrison, broken by famine and disease, decided, together with
the city chiefs, to stop resisting. The London Ambassadorial Conference of
the Great Powers had already decided that Scutari remain within the Albanian
composition. In those circumstances, surrendering Scutari in late April 1913
on honorable conditions was a wise political decision.¹
Essad Pasha evaluated that to rely chiefly on Austria- Hungary when
Italy and Greece were laying open claims to the territory of the Albanian
state, would be fatal to his country's survival. By cooperating with the
center of the Balkan alliance - Serbia - and through it with Montenegro, he
was seeking foundations to build a stable Albanian state with a Muslim
majority, in which he would rely on the large beylics in the central and
northern parts of the country. Essad Pasha possessed the characteristically
Muslim trait of distrusting fellow-countrymen of another religion. The
bearing of the northern Albanian Catholic tribes, which aspired to separate
from Albania, and the pro-Hellenic orientation of the Orthodox Albanian
population in northern Epirus, were the reasons why he consented to adjust
the border to the benefit of Serbia, Montenegro and Greece: he believed that
an Albania smaller than the one stipulated in 1913 would, once homogeneous
in religion, be a much more stable country. The development of international
circumstances urged a closer cooperation with Serbia: Albanian territories
were an object of aspiration and, when World War I broke out, compensation
in the cabinets of big European powers.³
Already in early May, 1913, Essad Pasha informed the Montenegrin king
of his intentions to proclaim himself King of Albania, and of his readiness
to cooperate with the Balkan alliance. He said the Albanians owed their
freedom to the Balkan peoples and that he would establish with them the
borders of Albania without the mediation of other powers. Essad Pasha told
Serbian diplomat Zivojin Balugdzic at a meeting in Durazzo, that he wanted
an agreement with Serbia. Hesitant at first, the Serbian government
consented, assessing that the Pasha had showed by his bearing that he really
wanted an agreement with Serbia, which he regarded, Balugdzic quoted, as the
nucleus for mustering Balkan forces.⁴
It was crucial to the Serbian government shortly before the Bulgarian
attack to neutralize preparations in Albania against raids into Serbian
territory - especially in Kosovo, Metohia and western Macedonia. Around
20,000 men were in arms in the Albanian territory, mostly refugees from Old
Serbia and Macedonia whose leaders, Hasan Pristina and Isa Boljetinac, were
close associates of Ismail Kemal. They strove to fight the influence of
Essad Pasha, agitating an attack on Serbia and stirring up an uprising of
the Albanian people there.
The Bulgarian komitadjis trained Albanians for guerrilla actions, with
money and arms coming from Austria-Hungary. Essad Pasha refused to join them
and warned the Serbian government not to approve of their
action.⁵ At the end of September, 1913, a forceful raid was
carried out into Serbian territory. The around 10,000 Albanians, who charged
into the territory from three directions, were lead by Isa Boljetinac,
Bairam Cur and Kiasim Lika. Aside to them, Bulgarian officers also commanded
troops. Their troops took Ljuma and Djakovica, and besieged Prizren. They
were crushed only after two Serbian divisions were sent to the border.⁶Essad Pasha used the crushing of the pro-Austrian forces to proclaim
himself (with the support of Muslim tribal chiefs and the big beylics in the
central parts of the country) governor of Albania in Durazzo, in late
September, 1913. Vienna assessed the act as positive proof of his
pro-Serbian orientation. Official Serbia simultaneously helped a number of
other small tribal chiefs who resisted Kemal's government, directing them
towards cooperation with Essad Pasha. The alliance between the Serbian
government and Essad Pasha was not stipulated in a special treaty: Pasic
nevertheless ordered that his followers be aided in money and arms. To the
Serbian prime minister, Essad Pasha served as a counterbalance to the
great-Albanian circles around Ismail Kemal. The new prince of Albania,
Wilhelm von Wied, backed the revanchist aspirations of Albanian leaders from
Kosovo and Metohia. As the most influential man in his government, Essad
Pasha held two important portfolios - the army and interior ministries. When
the unresolved agrarian question, urged by Young Turk officers, grew into a
massive pro-Turk insurrection against the Christian prince, Essad Pasha
supported the insurgents and in a clash with the Prince sought backing at
the Italian mission. After the arrest in Durazzo, Essad Pasha left for
Brindisi under protection of the Italian legate in Durazzo at the end of May
1914. After his departure, border raids into Serbia assumed greater
dimension and intensity.⁵
The threat Albania posed for Serbia abruptly increased at the beginning
of the world war. The relationship between different political trends within
the Albanian society towards the Central powers and the Entente powers was
to a large extent determined by their commitment towards Serbia. The
pronounced tendency towards pro-Austrian political circles grew with the
continuous influx of Albanian refugees from Serbia. Their revanchist policy
was the prime mover of a strong anti-Serbian movement in the war years, and
became after its end a basis for national forgather.
1 For details see: D. T. Batakovic, Esad-pasa Toptani i Srbija 1915,
pp. 299-303 (with earlier literature).
2 D. T. Batakovic, Esad-pasa Toptani, Srbija i albansko pitanje
(1916-1918), in: Srbija 1918, Zb. radova Istorijskog instituta, 7, Beograd
1989, p. 346
3 Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici Kraljevine Srbije, VI/2, Doc. No 135,
Z. Balugdzic, op. cit., 521-522.
4 0 B. Hrabak, Arbanaski upadi i pobune na Kosovu, pp. 52-64.
5 Ibid, pp. 33-38, 60-61.
6 D. T. Batakovic, Esad-pasa Toptani i Srbija 1915. godine, p. 305.
III
The beginning of the "Great War" left open the question about a precise
demarcation between Serbia and Albania. The International Demarcation
Commission discontinued work in mid-1914, thus state borders in areas of
dispute remained to be fixed. War caught unguarded the Serbo-Albanian
border. Austria-Hungary, not heeding for money, prepared fresh raids into
Serbian territory. Paši rightly anticipated the intention
ofVien-na's diplomacy to open, aided by the Young Turks, another front and
flank Serbian lands: he feared that the Albanian leaders financed by Vienna
-Hasan Pristina, Isa Boljetinac (Bollletini), Bairam Cur (Curri) and Riza
Bey Krieziu - would "attack Serbia when they receive orders from Turkey or
Bulgaria and weaken Serbian military action on the other side".¹
Concerned with reportings about incessant unrest in the border belt and
endeavors to fomcnt an Albanian uprising in Serbia, military circles in the
New Region Troops in Skoplje proposed preventive military action.
Essad Pasha strove to preserve an independent position, crossing thus
from Italy to France. He planned to confront, with the help of the Entente,
Austria-Hungary's efforts to completely subjugate his country. He made
inquiries from Paris on the conditions upon which the Serbian government
would aid his return to Albania. In 1914, Paši imposed the following
conditions: that he sign a political-customs treaty with Serbia on a joint
defense, that Albania acknowledge the customs union at the chiefs' assembly,
and that a solution be reached at the following stage on forming a personal
or real union with Serbia. Essad Pasha confirmed by cable his acceptance in
principle of Paši's conditions and immediately set off to
Serbia.²
The Serbian government policy towards Albania was aimed at pre-venting
subversive actions from Albania and creating preconditions to exert
influence at the end of the war on the demarcation of its borders,
particularly in the strip towards Serbia. Shortly before Essad Pasha's
arrival to Serbia, Pasic was interested in learning the stand of the Entante
Powers towards Albania: would they oppose "if Albania as a Turkish-
Bulgarian-Austrian instrument now attacked the Serbian border - could we now
not only fend them off, but incapacitate them for attacks in connection with
Turkey, occupy certain Strategie points and bring them under our influence
until the time comes when Europe would again resolve that issue, and
probably reach a better solution, which would ensure peace in Europe and the
Balkans".³
Essad Pasha obtained permission in Athens from the Greek diplomacy to
work in agreement with the Serbian government. At the same time he secured
backing from Italy, which hoped to have an open road to permanently
occupying Valona (Viore) once his regime was established in Albania. The
government in Rome saw Essad Pasha as the most appropriate figure to oppose
growing Austro-Hungarian and Turkish influence on conditions in
Albania.⁴
Essad Pasha did not give up his claim to the Albanian throne. He warned
the Serbian consul in Salonika that it would be perilous to Albania if its
prince came from the sultan's family, as that would, through detrimental
influence from Constantinople, open new hostilities towards Serbia and other
Balkan states. He thus pointed out himself as the most appropriate figure to
rule Albania. He sent messages to Pasic on the need for them to conclude a
special treaty before his departure for Albania.⁵
Upon arriving in Nis, Essad Pasha signed a secret alliance treaty with
Pasic on September 17. The 15 points envisaged the setting up of joint
political and military institutions, but the most important provisions
focused on a military alliance, the construction of an Adriatic railroad to
Durazzo and guarantees that Serbia would support Essad Pasha's election as
the Albanian ruler. The treaty left open the possibility that Serbia, at the
invitation of Essad Pasha, carry out a military intervention to protect his
regime. The demarcation between the two countries was to be drawn by a
special Serbo-Albanian commission. Essad Pasha was to confirm the treaty
only upon being elected ruler, with consent from the National Assembly: this
left maneuvering space for revising individual provisions. Serbia was
obligated to finance Pasha's gendarmery and supply the necessary military
equipment by paying off 50,000 dinars per month.⁶
After the defeat of Prince Wilhelm von Wied in clashes with pro-Turk
insurgents and his escape from Albania, anarchy broke out in the country.
The insurgents hoisted the Turkish flag, demanding that the country preserve
its Muslim quality. The senate of free towns in central Albania invited
Essad Pasha to take over power. With over 4,000 volunteers mustered in the
vicinity of Debar, Essad Pasha marched peacefully into Durazzo at the
beginning of October 1914, set up his government and proclaimed himself
supreme commander of the Albanian army. He did not question the ties with
Constantinople, and the consent in principle to the sovereignty of the
sultan over Albania. As the lord of central, particularly Muslim parts of
the country, Essad Pasha was compelled to approve of the pro-Turkish beylics
who had invited him to take over power. His first measures were directed at
protecting the Serbian border from raids of troops lead by Young Turk and
Austro-Hungarian officers in the northern parts of the country. He informed
the Serbian government of his move on the Catholic tribes to subdue Scutari
and capture Albanian leaders Isa Boljetinac, Bairam Cur and Hasan Pristina
who were in hiding in the northern parts of Has region.⁷
Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria believed that under the rule of
Essad Pasha Albania would come closer to the Powers of the Entante on a
European war. Germany and Austria-Hungary immediately recalled their legates
in Durazzo, and Bulgaria withdrew its diplomatic agent. At the same time
Austro-Hungarian and Young Turk officers stepped up joint work on a
preparation to raid Serbia. In keeping with the provisions of the Nis
agreement, Essad Pasha undertook action to prevent the troops from crossing
over to Serbian territory, but he was soon thwarted by a new pro-Turk
insurrection.⁸
In early November 1914, Turkey engaged in a war with the Central
powers, and included among the enemies of Islam Essad Pasha Toptani, as an
ally to Serbia and therefore the Entente. The declaration of jihad stirred
up a new pro-Turk insurrection of the Muslim population. The "Board for
Uniting Islam" from Constantinople called for another conquest of Kosovo:
"Hey Muslims! The until recently part of our fatherland - Kosovo - where the
Holy Tomb of Sultan Murad lies, where the flag of the crescent moon and star
fluttered, now flies the flag of the hateful Serb, who is turning mosques
into churches and seizing everything you have. That low people is forcing
you to fight in arms against allies and Mohammedan regents".⁹ The
illiterate Albanian mob was easily fanaticized with pro-Turk and pan-Islamic
slogans, thus the insurgents succeeded in winning over part of Essad Pasha's
followers. With regular supplies of money, arms and ammunition from
Austria-Hungary, the insurgents, commanded by Young Turk officers, posed an
increasing threat to Essad Pasha's territory. The entire movement gained an
expressly anti-Serbian character: demands were made that regions Serbia had
liberated in the first Balkan war be annexed to autonomous Albania under
Turkish sovereignty. Italy and Greece cleverly benefited from the whole
confusion:
Italian troops disembarked on Sasseno island, and then took Valona and
the hinterland, while Greek units marched into northern Epirus and set up
full authority there.¹⁰
Essad Pasha's position in Durazzo continuously deteriorated. Pressured
by the success of the insurgents, he called the Serbian government more than
once to intervene in Albania. A tacit agreement with Italy to fend off
Austria-Hungary occasionally provided money. Not only did he request guns
from Greece, but demanded that its troops encroach upon those regions where
his enemies mustered.¹¹
The Serbian government ordered in December 1914 that preparations begin
for a military intervention in Albania. As the allied diplomacies at the
time exerted strong pressure upon the Serbian government to make territorial
compensation for Bulgaria, offering in return some substitutes in Albania,
Pasic wanted to incapacitate further bargaining over Macedonia with an
intervention in Albania. Yet only the Russian diplomacy approved his plan.
Legate Miroslav Spalajkovic from St Petersburg informed in early January
1915 that the Russian diplomacy was not opposed to a Serbian intervention in
Albania as long as it did not affect the course and scope of operations
against Austro-Hungarian troops. There was even mention that the Russian
diplomacy hoped an occupation of some parts of Albania would "this time be
constant and definitive".¹² When Serbian armies broke off an
Austro- Hungarian offensive in the north, Pasic's government feared that
politicians and military circles in Vienna would use the lull to open war
against Serbia.
Raids organized sporadically by fugitive leaders of the Albanian
movement in Kosovo and Metohia, and carried out in co-action with Young
Turks and Austro-Hungarian officers, were not of wide scope, but roused
nervousness among Serbian military circles on the Albanian border. The
insurgents besieged Essad Pasha in Durazzo and demanded of him to
acknowledge the sultan's rule and declare war on Serbia. Pasic then
evaluated it was wiser to intervene immediately than wait for a bulk army to
muster in Albania with which an entire Serbian army would be forced to
fight.¹³
The allied diplomacies warned the Serbian government that military
intervention in Albania would strike an unfavorable response. The Russian
diplomacy advised Serbia to be content with the occupation of the strategic
points it had already occupied and refrain from actions that Italy might
regard as measures directed against its interests.¹⁴
In late May, 1915, the Serbian diplomatic representative in Durazzo
informed that Essad Pasha's position was critical: two new raids into
Serbian territory had taken place. Despite warnings from the allies, Pasic
decided on a military intervention.¹⁵ Over 20,000 Serbian
soldiers armed with guns marched into Albania from three directions at the
beginning of June, and took Elbasan and Tirana - the hotbeds of rebellion -
suppressed the Young Turk movement, liberated the besieged Essad Pasha in
Durazzo and turned over the captured insurgent leaders. A special Albanian
Detachment was set up to implement a thorough pacification of Albania and
consolidate Essad Pasha's rule. The regions inhabited by Mirdits, where Isa
Boljetinac, Hasan Pristina and Bairam Cur were in hiding, remained out of
reach for the Serbian troops; Ahmed Bey Zogu, lord of the Matis, who was the
closest relative to Essad Pasha, attempted to reach an agreement with the
Serbian government on his own, contrary to the Pasha: he set off to Nis on
his own accord for negotiations with Pasic.¹⁶ The Montenegrin
army took advantage of the favorable situation and marched into Scutari,
officially still under international regime.
Serbia's military intervention roused strong disapproval from the
allied diplomacies, especially Italy, whose claims to the Albanian coast and
central parts of the country, guaranteed under the secret London Treaty,
ensured its domination in Albania. Pasic replied to protests from the allies
that a temporary action was at stake and that the Serbian troops would
withdraw as soon as Essad Pasha's rule was consolidated.¹⁷ The
Serbian prime minister evaluated that the timing was right to permanently
tie Albania to Serbia, through Essad Pasha.
Serbian Internal Minister Ljubomir Jovanovic arrived in Tirana and on
June 28,1915, at St Vitus' Day, signed a treaty with Essad Pasha on a real
union between Serbia and Albania. Essad Pasha obligated himself to adjust
the border to Serbia's advantage on the strip between Podgradec and Has.
Serbia was to acquire the towns of Podgradec, Golo Brdo, Debarska Malissia,
Ljuma and Has to Spac, until the international powers drew the new borders.
Joint institutions envisaged an army, customs administration, national bank
and missions to other countries. The Serbian government was to place at
Essad Pasha's disposal experts to set up the authorities and state
institutions. With Serbia's help, Essad Pasha was to be elected prince of
Albania by an assembly of chiefs, he was to draw up a constitutional draft
in agreement with Serbia and form a government of people who would represent
the idea of Serbo-Albanian unity. The treaty anticipated that the Serbian
army remain in Elbasan and perhaps in Tirana until the provisions of the
treaty were executed, to persecute and destroy joint enemies. If Essad Pasha
was to learn of Italy's intent to occupy Durazzo, he was under the
obligation to call the Serbian army which would do so before the Italian
troops.¹⁸ The Tirana Treaty was the best political option for
Pasic's government in resolving the Albanian question. It stipulated to the
end Serbia's war aims towards Albania. The real union was a political form
allowing Serbia to influence the fate of those Albanian regions to which it
lay claim prior to and during the Balkan wars. Expecting that the fate of
Albania would again be discussed at a peace conference at the end of the
war, the Serbian government wanted a tangible ground with the union project
when putting forth its demands on Albania.
The Austro-Hungarian-German offensive on Serbia and Bulgaria's
engagement in the war with the Central powers helped - with frequent news
about the defeats and withdrawal of Serbian troops - the mustering again of
Essad Pasha's opponents in northern Albania. It was proposed at an assembly
in Mati that Serbia be attacked when a favorable condition rose and Albania
be expanded to Skoplje. Ahmed-bey Zogu, who through a commissioner, had
constant connection with the Serbian government, opposed their plans. No
joint action against Serbia took place but clashes
A decision by the allies to deliver to Serbia aid in arms and
ammunition via Albanian ports suddenly increased the importance of Essad
Pasha's alliance. Already at the beginning of November 1914, Essad Pasha
examined with the Serbian representative in Durazzo the possibility of
keeping Albania a safe base for the Serbian army. Fearing another pro-Turk
insurrection, Essad Pasha requested of the Serbian government that a French
or British regiment disembark in Durazzo and be deployed to strategic
positions throughout the country; he would in return prepare detachments to
aid the Serbs in combating the Bulgarians. The Serbian prime minister,
however, proposed that Essad Pasha receive a battalion of the Serbian army
in Durazzo to thus prove that Serbo-Albanian interests stood before the
interests of the Entante Powers. Pasic feared that Italy would use the
plight of Serbian armies in the north to land its troops in Albania and
occupy the whole territory. Pasic pointed out to Essad Pasha that the
Entante Powers considered him a friend and a "kind of ally", and that after
their victory his alliance would be rewarded with guarantees from the
powers.¹⁹
1 Arhiv Srbije, Beograd. Ministarstvo inostranih dela, Strogo
poverljivo (further in text: AS; MID, Str. pov.), 1914, No 233. For details
on joint work among Austro-Hungarian Young Turk and Bulgarian services in
Albania see: A. Mitrovic, Srbija u Prvom svetskom ratu, pp. 218-229.
2 B. Hrabak, Muslimani severne Albanije uoci izbijanja rata 1914.
godine, pp. 53, 66-67.
3 AS, MID. Str. pov. 1914, No 233.
4 G. B. Leon, Greece and the Albanian Question at the Outbreak of the
First World War, Balkan Studies, 1/11 (1970), pp. 69-71.
5 AS, MID, Str. pov., 1914, No. 290, 308. Essad Pasha also had
arrangement with Montenegrin diplomats on principle to settle the
controversials border issue by agreement, thus from Athens he requested of
the Serbian government to inform Cetinje that he would "leave for Montenegro
later on, as he had promised". (Ibid, No. 250)
6 Sh. Rahimi, Marreveshjet e qeverise serbe me Essat pashe Toptanit
gjate viteve 1914-1915, Gjurmime Albanologjike, VI (1976), pp. 125-127; D.
T. Batakovic, Esad-pasa Toptani i Srbija 1915. godine, p. 307.
7 AS, MID, Str. pov. 1914, No. 438
8 D. T. Batakovic, Esad-pasa Toptani i Srbija 1915. godine, p. 307.
9 M. Ekmecic, op. cit., p. 387. The insurgents in northern Albania
declared holy war against Serbia. Public Record Office London (later in text
PRO, FO), vol. 438/4, No. 1071
10 G. B. Leon, op. cit., 78-80; M. Ekmecic, op. cit., 385-386. Cf P.
Pastorelli, Albania nella politico estera italiana 1914-1920, Napoli 1970,
pp. 19-32; James H. Burgwyn, Sonnino e la diplomazia italiana del tempo doi
guerra nei Balcani nel 1915, Storia Contemporanea, XVI, 1 (1985), pp.
116-118.
11 G. B. Leon, op. cit., p. 79
12 AS, MID. Str. pov., 1914, No 863, tel. M. Spalajkovic to MID, St.
Peterburg 25. 12. 1914 / 7. 01. 1915. Cf. B. Hrabak, Albanija od julske
krize do proleca 1916. godine na osnovu ruske diplomatske gradje, I,
Obelezja 5 (1973), pp. 71-75.
13 AS, MID, Str. Pov., 1914, No. 810, 877; B. Hrabak, Elaborat srpskog
ministarstva inostranih dela o pripremama srpske okupacije severne Albanije
1915. godine, Godisnjak Arhiva Kosova, II-III (1966-1967), pp. 7-35
14 Arhiv Jugoslavije, Beograd, 80-2-604. Tel. M. Spalajkovic from St.
Petersburg, 23. 04/6. 05. 1915, No 704; PRO FO, vol. 438/3, No. 100, 118.
15 The most vicious raid into Serbian territory was lead at the about
200 persons to stir up the tribes around Prizren, but his host was crushed
near the village of Zur. The Serbian government informed the allies that
around 1,000 armed ethnic Albanians had crossed the border (PRO, FO, 438/5,
No. 53; A. R,195
16 Essad Pasha complained about the conduct of the Serbian military
authorities who pursued their own policy in Mati and other regions and
attempted to agitate among individual Albanian chiefs for acknowledging as
ruler of Albania a Serbian prince. (D. T. Batakovic, Secanja generala
Dragutina Milutinovica na komandovanje albanskim trupama 1915. godine,
Mesovita grada, XIV (1985), pp. 128, idem, Ahmed-beg Zogu i Srbija, in:
Srbija 1916. godine, Zb. radova Istorijskog instituta, 5, Beograd 1987, pp.,
165-177). Cf. M. Ekmecic, op. cit., pp. 394-395.
17 Pro, Fo, vol. 371, Nos. 184, 187, 200, 624,; vol. 438/5, No. 75;
vol, 438/6, No 1444; M. Ekmecic, op. cit., pp. 392-394; A. Mitrovic, op.
cit., pp. 230-232,
18 Sh. Rahimi, op. cit., pp. 137-140; D. T. Batakovic, Esad-pasa
Toptani i Srbija 1915. godine, pp. 309-310.
19 Ibid, pp. 313-314.
IV
The retreat of the Serbian army into Albania in late 1915 and early
1916 put the alliance of Essad Pasha to a serious test. In regions whereto
his authority did not extend, particularly Catholic tribes in the northern
parts of the country, the Serbian troops were forced to shoot their way
through to the Adriatic ports where allied ships were waiting for them.
Essad Pasha's gendarmery aided the Serbian army, secured safe passageways,
accommodation and food, and engaged in skirmishes with Albanian regiments
that attacked Serbian units and pillaged unarmed refugees. Essad Pasha
issued a special proclamation calling Albanians to help the Serbian army,
and informed military commanders about the advancement of enemy forces, the
emergence of rebellious regiments and the mood of individual
tribes.¹
The "Albanian Golgotha" was the greatest war trial of the Serbian
people. Of the 220,000 soldiers which broke through Albania towards Corfu
and Bizerta, only 150,000 reached the destination; of about 200,000 refugees
spread along Albanian crags and marshes by the coast barely a third (60,000
people) escaped death.² Serbia's losses would have been much
heavier were it not for Essad Pasha and his followers during the retreat and
embarkation.
During the retreat Essad Pasha maintained contact with the Serbian
government. He rejected Pasic's proposals to proclaim his treaty with the
Serbian government and admit Serbian officials in his administration,
explaining that his enemies were already calling him Essadovic because of
his alliance with Serbia. He wanted the allies to guarantee that Italy would
not occupy entire Albania after the retreat of the Serbian army. Realizing
that Austro-Hungarian troops would soon take Durazzo, Essad Pasha proposed
to Pasic that he be conveyed to Corfu with his government and gendarmes, so
as to be able, when the allied offensive was launched, to take up positions
on the left flank of the Serbian army and operate towards Albania. At the
demand of the Italian diplomacy, Essad Pasha and several hundred gendarmes
crossed at the end of February 1916 to Brindisi escorted by Serbia's charge
d'affaires. Prior to his departure, he declared war on the Central powers,
thus taking upon himself full responsibility for his cooperation with Serbia
and the Entente powers.³
Despite promises that he would be recognized as the Albanian prince,
and faced with open endeavors by the Italian government to exert complete
influence over him, Essad Pasha continued on to France to seek backing from
the allied diplomacy. Political circles in Paris admitted him as the prime
minister of a legitimate government. Military experts evaluated that Albania
was a reservoir of good soldiers which could be winged over for the allied
cause by Essad Pasha only. In late August, Essad Pasha reached Salonika in a
French vessel. Through the mediation of the Serbian and Greek diplomacies,
his government acquired the status of an exiled alliance cabinet. Essad
Pasha's camp was set up at the Salonika battlefield from 1,000 gendarmes and
followers under the command of Albanian officers. Deployed to positions
towards Albania, he operated within the composition of the French eastern
army. According to Pasic's intentions, his camp was to operate mixed with
Serbian troops towards Kosovo and northern Albania.⁴
During work in Salonika, Essad Pasha continuously strove to obtain firm
promises from France and Great Britain that when the war was over rule over
Albania would not be given to Italy, and that he would be allowed to
reinstate his administration in the country. At the end of 1916, Korea was
proclaimed an autonomous republic under the protection of French military
authorities, and power was given to the local liberals. Essad Pasha
complained to Pasic about the actions of the French military command, and
warned of Italy's web of intrigues, emphasizing that he had tied his fate to
Serbia. He feared that the Italian troops in Argirokastro were preparing an
assassination. Instead, General Giazzinto Ferrero proclaimed the state of
Albania, in early June, 1917, under the Italian protectorat.⁵
The Serbian government followed with anxiety the consolidation of
Italian positions in Albania. Immediately after the protectorate was
proclaimed, the Serbian government protested to the allied powers calling on
the decisions of the Ambassadorial Conference in London, to which Italy was
a signatory, and warned that the one-sided proclamation of Albanian
independence violated the "Balkans to the Balkan peoples" principle. The
news that the Italian military authorities were promising the Albanians
considerably wider state borders than those established in London in 1913
aroused particular concern. Pasic therefore made it especially clear that
the Italian protectorat resembled a similar attempt by Austria-Hungary to
"secure for itself a protectorat over Albania, and indirectly over the other
Balkan peoples by creating a new Great Albania to the detriment of other
Balkan peoples".⁶
Essad Pasha also protested to the Italian government. Dissatisfied with
the development of the situation, he resolved to set off for Switzerland,
the center of various Albanian committees, and through the French government
to secure backing from the British diplomacy which supported Italy's policy
in Albania. He obtained no guarantees in Paris, and failed to secure backing
from the Geneva committees, tied firmly to Austria-Hungry which financed
them.⁷
Increasingly insecure about winning support from the allies and
concerned over implications that his special obligations towards Serbia were
no longer a secret, Essad Pasha demanded of Pasic that the government
provide more money and secure after the war his administration in Albania
within the borders drawn by the Conference of Ambassadors in London. On his
return to Salonika at the beginning of 1918, Essad Pasha in talks with
Regent Aleksandar linked the distrust of the French diplomacy with the
Tirana Treaty and Italy's endeavors to compromise France. In talks with
other Serbian diplomatic officials, Essad Pasha complained that the
provisions in the Tirana Treaty impeded him in political work. Finally, he
made a demand to the Serbian government to procure permission from the
French military authorities for introducing his administration in the Korea
Republic, where Italians were freely agitating against him. The French
command, however, dissolved the Korea republic in February 1918, and took
over command of Essad Pasha's units, which held the front between Podgradec
and Shkumbi River, due to low combat morale.⁸
The Serbian government strove to aid Essad Pasha as appreciably as
possible within its means. Its policy towards Albania was, in principle, to
any thwart plans on foreign protectorates and reinstate the regime that
existed prior to the withdrawal of the Serbian army. The Serbian government
protested several times against the consolidation of Italian positions in
Albania, striving to give as much prominence as possible to Essad Pasha and
prepare the conditions for his return to power. Essad Pasha realized himself
that Serbia was his last outpost and that without its support he had no
chance with the allies to win back his return to the country. Thus in a
message to US President Woodraw Wilson in the summer of 1918, he said that
only a future Yugoslav state could guarantee for the integrity and
independence of his country.⁹
In the event that Pasha's return to power was not possible, Pasic was
preparing to leave open the question of the border with Albania. (The
Entente had prior to the breakthrough of the Salonika front signed an
agreement in Paris on the division of spheres of interest whereby Albania
was ceded to Italy.) In early November 1918, Pasic sent the following
message: "Our policy in Albania is to establish, if possible, the situation
as it was prior to the evacuation, when Essad Pasha was the Albanian prime
minister, and occupy territories from the Mati river beyond and in agreement
with the tribal chiefs, reestablish local administration which will act on
the instructions of our authorities."¹⁰
He called Essad Pasha - at the time in France seeking backing - to
return to Salonika and at the same time demanded that territories taken in
Albania be occupied by mixed allied forces: he proposed also that the
Albanian camp be used, mixed with Serbian officers. The French command,
however, disbanded Essad Pasha's troops on October 12. By a decision of the
interallied Supreme War Council, Albania was to be controlled by the Italian
army up to the Maca river.¹¹
Still, the Serbian prime minister did not rule out the possibility that
the situation would develop enabling the return of Essad Pasha to Albania,
to the region north of the Mati river which Serbia considered its sphere of
interest. Italy persecuted Pasha's followers in the occupied parts of the
country, and at one particular time made a demand to France for his
internment. It all ended with the withdrawal of the French representative to
his government.¹²
1 Ibid, pp. 315-317.
2 Veliki rat Srbije za oslobodjenje i ujedinjenje Srba, Hrvata i
Slovenaca, vol. XIII-XIV; Kroz Albaniju 1915-1916, Beograd 1968; M. M.
Zivanovic, O evakuaciji srpske vojske iz Albanije i njenoj reorganizaciji na
Krfu (1915-1916) prema francuskim dokumentima, Istorijski Casopis (XIV-XV),
pp. 231-307.
3 D. T Batakovic, Esad-pasa Toptani i Srbija 1915. godine, pp. 321-324.
4 D. T. Batakovic, Esad-pasa Toptani, Srbija i albansko pitanje
(1916-1918), pp. 348-349.
5 AS, MID, Str. pov., 1917, No. 232 Memoire: Proglas protektorata
Italije nad Albanijom i uopste rad Italije 1917 Krf, D. T. Batakovic,
Esad-pasa Toptani, Srbija i albansko pitanje (1916-1918), pp. 350-351; P.
Pastorelli, op. cit., pp. 36-41; I documenti diplomatici italiani, Quinta
serie, vol. VI, Roma MCMLXXXVIII, NOs, 119, 390, 394, 427, 438, 445, 448,
831.
6 AS, MID, Str. pov., 1917, No. 182. Pasic's note dated 30. 05/13.
06.1917.
7 D. T. Batakovic, Esad-pasa Toptani, Srbija i albansko pitanje
(1916-1918), pp.
8 Ibid, pp. 353-358.
9 Ibid, pp. 359.
10 Ibid, pp. 360.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid, pp. 361-362; B. Hrabak, Reokupacija oblasti srpske i
crnogorske drzave s arbanaskom vecinom stanovnistva u jesen 1918. godine i
drzanje Arbanasa prema uspostavljenoj vlasti. Gjurmime albanologjike, 1
(1969), pp. 262-265, 285-286.
V
After the war, Italy became the main rival of the Kingdom of Serbs,
Croats and Slovenes in Albania. Rome strove to use the disintegration of the
Dual Monarchy to step up its positions in the Balkans and turn the Adriatic
Sea into an Italian lake. Albania was in its schemes the country wherefrom
Italian influence would be wielded onto the neighboring regions. The Italian
troops occupied the largest part of Albania and, by meeting the demands of
various committees (particularly the Kosovo Committee) in annexing to
Albania Metohia, Kosovo and western Macedonia, they presented themselves as
the protector of the interests of all the Albanian people. An interim
government of Turhan Pasha Permeti was set up in Durazzo under the wing of
Italy at the end of December 1918, which was ready to recognize as its ruler
a prince from the House of Savoy. At the Peace Conference in Paris, Italy
strove to secure the possession of Valona and hinterland and obtain a
mandate over the other parts of Albania.¹ The envoys of the
pro-Italian Durazzo government demanded at the Peace Conference a revision
of the 1913 borders - they wanted Prizren, Djakovica, Pec, Pristina,
Mitrovica, Skoplje, Tetovo and Debar to be included in the composition of
the Albanian state.²
The policy of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes towards Albania
did not deviate much from that of Pasic's government. Belgrade evaluated
that the consolidation of Italian positions in Albania would be a source of
continual threat to Kosovo, Metohia and the neighboring regions. Head of the
delegation to the Conference, Nikola Pasic, also shaped the policy of the
new state as regards Albania. In order to repress Italian influence in the
Balkans, he demanded the restoration of Albania within the 1913 borders, as
an independent state with autonomous and national rule. If the Great Powers
should nevertheless decide to divide the Albanian territories among the
neighboring states, the delegation demanded that the Yugoslav state be given
northern Albania from the Veliki Drim to Scutari.³
Under the aegis of the Kingdom of Serbs Croats and Slovenes, Essad
Pasha brought his delegation to The Peace Conference in Paris. Having
submitted a memorandum to the Conference at the end of April, he called on
the legitimacy of his government, its allied status in Salonika and the
declaration of war on the Central powers. Seeking the restoration of
independent Albania within the 1913 borders, Essad Pasha demanded to be
recognized as the only legal representative of his people.⁴
The Peace Conference, however, did not officially discuss the fate of
Albania as it was formally considered a neutral state during the war. The
question of its future was being resolved at the Ambassadorial Conference of
the Great Powers. The diplomatic circles of the Western allies assessed that
Albania was insufficiently nationally constituted and that its development
had to be under the control of a big power. As time passed, the
representatives of the Great Powers saw the solution to the Albanian
question in granting a mandate to Italy - its troops controlled the largest
part of the Albanian territory and its diplomats persisted on the allies
meeting the provisions taken over by the 1915 London Treaty.⁵
Pasic evaluated that the Albanian question was to be resolved soon. He
strove to set it apart from its natural linkage with the Adriatic question,
which was considered an object of compensation. Even though France and Great
Britain paid heed to the interests of the Kingdom of Serbs Croats and
Slovenes, Pasic believed that the key role in resolving the Albanian
question would be assumed by United States President Woodraw Wilson and
Italy. He persistently maintained the stand that the Delegation of the
Kingdom of Serbs Croats and Slovenes demanded the restoration of Albania
within the 1913 borders, and that border alteration towards Serbia and
Montenegro be resolved in agreement with the tribes that lived there. If the
stand prevailed that the provisions of the London Treaty should be met,
Pasic demanded - as a Great Power was coming to the Balkans and in the
immediate vicinity of the Yugoslav state - stronger strategic borders as
compensation, "The Glavni (Veliki) Drim from the sea to the confluence of
the Crni Drim, then the Crni Drim up to a point beneath Debar, to the
confluence of the Zota river left of the Crni Drim, encompassing entire
Ohrid Lake with the watershed to remain on our side."⁶
Since Valona and the hinterland was being ceded to Italy under the 1915
London Treaty, as well as protectorat over central Albania, while Northern
Albania was intended for Serbia and Montenegro, Pasic proposed that the
northern Albanian tribes be given the right to self-determination, "to say
themselves if they wish to join the central Muslim Albania under the Italian
protectorat, or to form a separate small state - some sort of small 'buffer
state', or if they desire to join our state as a small autonomous
state".⁷ Thus from the beginning of 1919, petitions of individual
Catholic tribes demanding to be annexed to Serbia were collected at the
border belt, with backing from the military and civil authorities of the
Kingdom of Serbs Croats and Slovenes.⁸ This way Pasic wanted to
parry the pro-Italian delegation to the Peace Conference and deputies of the
American Albanian society "Fire", which demanded the forming of a Great
Albania inclusive of considerable regions of the former Serbian and
Montenegrin state. Thus he supported those groups of Albanian delegates in
Paris that maintained it would be the most benefitial for Albania if it came
to terms with the Kingdom of Serbs Croats and Slovenes, and accepted a
border alteration to its advantage, in keeping with the wish of the local
population. Pasic set out they believed that their independence "would best
be ensured if they entered into an alliance with us, especially to set up a
customs union. The group comprises Essad Pasha's followers and those
opposing the Italian protectorat".⁹
On the ground, particularly those areas in Albania under occupation (by
agreement with the French army, after the Austro-Hungarian troops were
driven out) - Pishkopeja, Gornji and Donji Debar and Golo Brdo - the Serbian
military authorities, and subsequently those of the Kingdom of Serbs Croats
and Slovenes, tried to help organize Essad Pasha's followers. A committee in
Debar was entrusted with the task of setting up rule in the border areas and
preparing the conditions for Pasha's return to the country. His
commissioners exerted the strongest influence in regions between Golo Brdo
and Gornji Debar, in Podgradec and Starova while deep into the country, in
the central parts, Italian troops gradually and successfully checked Essad
Pasha's followers. Despite continuous dissipation, Essad Pasha still enjoyed
considerable support especially among the old Muslim beys, who viewed with
distrust the consolidation of Italian positions in central
Albania.¹⁰
Beside the Conference, Italy and Greece signed in late July 1919 a
secret treaty - the so-called Tittoni-Veniselos Treaty - on the division of
the Albanian territory. At the beginning of December the allied powers
recognized Italy's sovereignty over Valona and the hinterland, and offered
it a mandate to set up administration in the remaining part of Albania under
the control of the League of Nations. The same memorandum envisaged and
defined territorial compensations to the advantage of Greece. Pasic again
set out that in that case the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes had to
stand by their demand for more favorable borders towards Albania. He
proposed that the region of the entire length of the Mace river to the Crni
Drim be demanded as the maximum, and the stretch along the Crni and Veliki
Drim rivers to their confluence as the minimum.¹¹
Cooperation with Essad Pasha never ceased for a moment. The delegation
of the Kingdom of Serbs Croats and Slovenes backed his demands that he be
paid war reparations as an ally to the Entante Powers and thus indirectly
acquire an allied status. Pasha's followers in the country dissipated and
gathered again, depending on current circumstances, and were unsparingly
helped in actions against those supported by the Italians. He sent messages
several times to his followers that he was returning to the country and
advised them to act in cooperation with Serbia and to decisively oppose the
Italian occupation.¹²
While a bitter diplomatic battle over Albania's destiny was being waged
at the Conference, a movement rose against the Italian occupation in the
country. The government in Durazzo was condemned and replaced at a national
congress of Albanian chiefs in Ljusnje in early 1920, and strong protests
were lodged with the Peace Conference and Italian parliament. The delegates
demanded the creation of a Great Albania; command over the army was
entrusted to Bairam Cur.¹³ Essad Pasha's followers who convened
at the People's Assembly in March made strong demands that the Italian
troops be routed. Ahmed Zogu, the interior minister in the government of
Suleyman Delvina, strove to neutralize Essad Pasha, sending to that end
special emissaries to Paris at the end of May. The delegation offered Essad
Pasha the post of prime minister, on the condition that he abandon
aspirations to rule Albania.¹⁴ At the time Bairam Cur lead a
decisive battle against the detachments of Pasha's followers. Finally, on
June 13, 1920, an Albanian student, Avni Rustemi, by order of Lushnje
government, killed Essad Pasha in front of the Continental Hotel in Paris,
believing that as an ally to Serbia and then to the Kingdom of Serbs Croats
and Slovenes, he had betrayed the interests of the Albanian people. Essad
Pasha was buried with the last honors in the Serbian army cemetery in Paris.
1 P. Pastorelli, op. cit., pp. 63-86; V. Vinaver, Italijanska akcija
protiv Jugoslavija na albansko-jugoslovenskoj granici 1919-1920. god.,
Istorijski zapisi, XXIII, 3 (1966), pp. 477-515; Z. Avramovski, Albanija
izmedju Jugoslavije i Italije, Vojnoistorijski glasnik, 3 (1984), pp.
164-166.
2 Arhiv Jugoslavije, Delegacija Kraljevine Srba Hrvata i Slovenaca na
Konferenciji mira u Parizu (later in text: AJ, Delegacija), f-27, No 296; D.
Todorovic, Jugoslavija i balkanske drzave 1918-1923, Beograd 1979, p. 50.
3 The Question of Scutari, Paris 1919; A. Mitrovic, Jugoslavija na
Konferenciji 1919-1920, Beograd 1969, pp. 169-176; Documentation in: B.
Krizman - B. Hrabak, Zapisnici sa sednice delegacije Kraljevine SHS na
mirovnoj konferenciji u Parizu 1919-1920, Beograd 1960, pp. 321-324, 365-366
4 Memoir prsente la Conference de la Paix Paris par son Excellence
le general Essad Toptani prsident du gouvernement d'Albanie, Paris 16 Avril
1919. (Essad Pasha's correspondence with the Serbian government and his
letter addressed to the Conference in: A3, Delegacija, f-27. The same file
contains the memoirs of Leon Krajewski dated January 2, 1919, focusing
mainly on Essad Pasha's relations with France)
5 AJ, Delegacija, f-27, No 7289; P. Pastorelli, op. cit., pp. 189-225;
D. Todorovic, op. cit, pp. 53-64. Cf P. Milo, L'attitude du Royame
serbo-croato-slovene a I'egard de I'Albanie la Conference de la paw. a
Paris (1919-1920), Studia Albanica, 1 (1989), pp. 37-57.
6 AJ, Delegacija, f-28, Pasic to Prime Minister; A. Mitrovic,
Jugoslavija na Konferenciji mira, pp.
7 Ibid
8 D. Todorovic, op. cit., pp. 49. The originals of a number of
petitions (submitted to the Peace Conference) on the annexation of the
northern Albanian tribes to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes are
kept in: AJ, Delegacija, f-28.
9 Same as footnote 49.
10 AJ, Delegacija, f-27, Nos. 5504, 5376, 6275, 6451, 6589.
11 Z. Avramovski, op. cit., p. 167.
12 AJ, Delegacija, f-27, Nos. 5504, 5376, 6275, 6451, 6589.
13 Ibid, Nos. 5484 - 5489; i. Avramovski, op. cit., pp. 169-170.
14 AJ, Delegacija, f-28, Nos. 6724, 6725.
VI
The cooperation of the Serbian government and subsequently the
government of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes with Essad Pasha is
an important chapter in the history of Serbo-Albanian relations. It was the
first joint effort to resolve issues of dispute between two peoples in the
Balkans to the Balkan peoples principle, in a manner that was, with certain
territorial concessions to Serbia, and subsequently to the Kingdom of Serbs,
Croats and Slovenes, to wipe out old hotbeds of mutual conflict. The
strategic aspirations of the Serbian government to curb the influence of
Great Powers in Albania did not emanate solely from old aspirations to
permanently master northern Albania, but from actual political estimates
that under the influence and protectorat of a Great Power, the Albanian
state would pursue the course of maximalist and national claims to
territories that were inhabited, aside to the Serbian people, by Albanians
-- Kosovo, Metohia and western Macedonia.
PART THREE: RELIGION AND CIVILISATION

KOSOVO AND METOHIA: CLASH OF NATIONS OR CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS
Kosovo and Metohia is the native and ancestral land of the Serbs. The
Serbian Jerusalem, which spread over an area of 10,800 km2, is covered with
a dense of about 200 medieval monasteries, churches and fortresses. Kosovo
was the scene of the famous battle held on St. Vitus Day (June 28) in 1389,
when Serbian Prince Lazar and the Turkish emir Murad both lost their lives.
The Ottoman's breakthrough into the heart of Southeast Europe also marked
the beginning of the five centuries long clash of two civilisations:
European (Christian) and Near Eastern (Islamic). The conflict, alive to this
day, is generated in the visible layer also in the clash of the two nations:
the Serbs, mainly Orthodox Christians, and the ethnic Albanians, mainly
Muslims.
The oath of Prince Lazar, derived from the New Testament tradition of
martyrdom that it was better to obtain freedom in the celestial empire than
to live humiliated in the oppression of the earthly kingdom, became during
the centuries of Turkish rule, the key of Serbian national ideology. The
Kosovo oath, woven into the national epos, became the basis upon which the
Serbs built the cult of resisting and not accepting injustice. The Kosovo
pledge was like a flag raising rebellions against the Ottomans and heading
towards its final aim: the restoration of the Serbian national state. Many a
generation of Serbs received its first notions of itself and the world by
listening to folk poems describing the Kosovo sufferings: the apocalyptical
fall of Serbian Empire, the tormentous death of Prince Lazar, the betrayal
of Vuk Brankovic, the heroism of Milos Obilic who, consciously sacrifying
himself, reached the tent of the emir and cut him down with his sword.
Withdrawing in front of the Turks towards west and the north, the only
political tradition of the Serbs was the Kosovo pledge. Through the Pec
Patriarchate, the historical traditions of the Serbs crystalized into a epic
tradition of an exceptionally national character. Even before the creation
of modern nations, the Serbs found in the Kosovo covenant firm basis for a
future national integration.
When the firsts national revolution in the Balkans broke out in Serbia
in 1804, during the Napoleonic wars, its leaders dreamed of a new battle of
Kosovo with which they would reestablish the lost empire. The historicism of
the romantic epoch only blended harmoniously with the already clearly formed
picture the Serbs had of their past and the tasks that were assigned to them
as a nation. The influence of the Kosovo covenant, functioning towards the
creation of national conscience, continued throughout the entire 19 century.
It the two Serbian states, Serbia and Montenegro, independent since 1878,
the Kosovo ideology (called also the covenant Serbian thought") was
institutionalized, conformed the needs of state nationalism: their national
program had as its final revenge of Kosovo and the restoration of the large
Serbian state in the center of the Balkans. The centuries-dreamed-of fight
with the Turks occurred in the fall of 1912. The Serbian army liberated
Kosovo in a few week, while the forces of Montenegro marched triumphantly
into Metohia. Negotiations on the final unification of the two Serbian
states were interrupted by World War I. Serbian students from Bosnia and
Herzegovina (occupied by Austria-Hungary 1878), inspired by the Kosovo idea,
like new Obilic heroes, assassinated the heir to the Habsburg throne on St.
Vitus Day in 1914, in Sarajevo.
The Kingdom of Serbs Croats and Slovenes, later named Yugoslavia, was
created on the remnants of Austria-Hungary after the Great War ended. A
union of South Slav peoples was created instead of unified Serbian national
state. The Serbs, almost all of them, found themselves within the framework
of one state for the first time in history. It should have been the
guarantee of their civil and national rights. Having underestimated the
influences of thousand-year-long civilisational differences, the Serbs,
although representing the relative majority, found themselves faced with
unsolvable problems regarding differences in religion, historical
traditions, political mentality and national aims. The case of ethnic
Albanian minority in Kosovo and Metohia is a paradigmatic example of the
impossibility of overcoming civilisational gaps caused by the erosive force
of history.
The Kosovo and Metohia were, in the moment of liberation in 1912, a
backward agricultural community with mixed Serbian and ethnic Albanian
population, devastated by the raging of tribal anarchy. Serbs, however, even
then made almost half of the entire population in spite of the huge waves of
emigration in the previous period (about 150,000 from the region Kosovo,
Metohia and the neighboring Raska and northern Macedonia). The Pan-Islamic
policy of Abdulhamid II (1878-1909) made Kosovo and Metohia, beside Armenia,
"the most unfortunate land in the world", as witnessed contemporaries from
Victor Berard and George Gaulis to H. N. Brailsford to Frederick Moore. The
Kurds were crushing the Armenians in Asia Minor, and ethnic Albanians in the
European provinces were dealing in the same way with the unreliable
Christian subjects of Sultan: Serbs, Greeks and Bulgarians. The three
centuries long domination of Islamized ethnic Albanians in the Balkans,
culminated at the beginning of the 20th century. Living for centuries with
the gun in hand, the tribes of ethnic Albanians discovered in the plains of
Kosovo and Metohia the space for their further biological expansion. Islam
granted them the right to persecute Christians, lower grade citizens, and
stay unpunished. In time, a strange conviction settled itself among the
ethnic Albanians' tribes that Islam was the religion of free peoples and
Christianity that of slaves. In the Kingdom of Serbia, constitutional
monarchy with multiparty system and democratic institutions, the ethnic
Albanians mostly minded the fact that their yesterday serfs now became not
only their equals, but the ruling class in the state as well.
Islam marked strongly the national emancipation of ethnic Albanians and
defined their civilisational image. Although not fanatical believers, ethnic
Albanians have also built their national identity on the basis of Islamic
traditions, in fierce opposition to the neighboring Christian states. The
national elite from Catholic and Orthodox tribes in the north and south of
today's Albania did not succeed in imposing Europe-shaped solutions in the
fight for a national state: the Muslim majority dominated in all phases of
the development of the Albanian state. The rule of the founder of Communist
Albania, Enver Hoxha, in spite of the decree banning all religions in the
country, showed that it owed most to solutions represented in the past by
national leaders with Islamic background. His regime, created by mixing
oriental feudalism and Stalinist type of communism, was the ideological
framework accepted without hesitation as a political model for national
movement by ethnic Albanians in communist Yugoslavia.
In the inter-war period, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, by colonizing the
rich but uncultivated spaces of Kosovo and Metohia, tried not only to return
the Serbian character to these areas, but also to establish modern European
institutions, as it did in other provinces of the Yugoslav state. The ethnic
Albanian population on Kosovo found it most difficult to adjust to the civil
order in the Europe-organized state where, instead of status of absolute
privilege during the Ottoman rule, they received only civil and political
equality and with the former rayah at that-people whom they had only
recently treated as serfs.
World War II showed that the national breach developed from the
religious one: after driving the colonists out and burning down their homes,
the ethnic Albanians, mostly Muslims, set fires to and robbed many Orthodox
churches, and Orthodox cemeteries were constantly desecrated.
The development of political circumstances in communist Yugoslavia
suited the further ethnic Albanians' national emancipation. Biologically
exhausted (1,200,000 in World War I in Serbia only, and at least that many
in World War II, now coming mostly from Vojna Krajina in Croatia,
Montenegro, Herzegovina and Bosnia), and, after the brutal destruction of
the civil class, politically decapitated, the Serbs became pawns in the
hands of the new regime. Accepting Yugoslavia again as an inevitable
solution to their national question, the Serbs did not realize for a long
time that a national integration of other nations was going on in the
communist Yugoslavia and almost entirely to their disadvantage. The Kingdom
of Yugoslavia was organized as a centralist state of French type. The
communists on the other hand thought that centralism in that "Versailles
creation" was the most typical expression of the "Greater Serbian hegemony".
Tearing apart the political domination of Serbs in Yugoslavia, the
communist created several federal units dividing Serbian lands after the
World War II. The communist authorities in 1945 forbade with a special
decree all forcibly moved out colonists to return to Kosovo, Metohia and
Macedonia and their estates were mostly confiscated and afterwards granted
to emigrants from Albania. The ethnic Albanians, however, in the divided
Serbian state, have been given not only schools and cultural institutions
but full political power. The communists were making amends for the sins of
the "Greater Serbian hegemony" in the inter-war period.
During the World War II, the majority of ethnic Albanians from
Yugoslavia accepted, under the wing of fascist Italy, the creation of the
satellite "Greater Albania" and thus cooperated in large numbers with the
fascist and Nazi military authorities, unmistakably showing that they were
in favor of the unification with Albania; notwithstanding this, their
secessionist tendencies were completely revitalized after the war. A plan
existed to form a Balkan federation (Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania under
the leadership of Tito), and that is why Tito supported the large
colonization of Albanians from Albania and promised Kosovo to Enver Hoxha if
he entered the joint federal state. After the split with USSR and Cominform
in 1948, Albania, turned into Yugoslavia's toughest enemy. The relations
were normalized as Yugoslavia's insistence only in 1971, when an unusually
lively and wide exchange of ideas and functionaries began between Kosovo and
Albania. Under auspices of Albanian regime a 19th century type of national
romanticism mixed with Albanian version of Marxism-Leninism, religious
intolerance and almost racial prejudice towards Slavs became the essence of
the ethnic Albanian's national movement in Kosovo and Metohia. Ideological
and theocratic monism along with the strong tribal traditions as heritage of
Ottoman empire fit well into a ideological monism of totalitarian ideology
of communist Albania.
Kosovo and Metohia has already then been an autonomous province on its
way towards acquiring the attributes of a state within Yugoslav federation.
The confederalization of communist Yugoslavia, finalized with the 1974
Constitution, excluded both provinces (Kosovo and Vojvodina) from Serbian
authority, turning them into state entities with almost independent
governments. In order to legalize formally the Albanization of the Province,
the ethnic Albanian communist leadership threw out of its name the word
Metohia (of Greek origin meaning church-owned land). It turned out that the
hundreds of attacks the ethnic Albanians made upon Orthodox believers,
priests monks and nuns, churches and monasteries, and the annexation of
monastery property in the post-war period, were manifestations of centuries
deep religious and national intolerance.
The restoration of religious life of the Muslims in Kosovo and Metohia
was conducted parallely with the Albanization. New mosque sprang up (about
700 mosques were built in Yugoslavia under communist rule, more than during
the several centuries long Ottoman dominion; at the same time, about 500
Catholic and 300 Orthodox churches were erected); the Muslim clergy's
primary demand from the believers was for them to have as many children as
possible. The highest birth-rate in Europe derived also from religious
traditions of ethnic Albanians. Instead of a political emancipation and
economic progress of the ethnic Albanians' minority, the local communist
leadership in Kosovo and Metohia and the Islamic institutions (including
Bekteshi order, widely spread among ethnic Albanians), had the same aim:
pushing out the Serbs; the modernization of Kosovo and Metohia for which the
federation had put aside huge sums, turned out to be symbolic. The enormous
resources from the federal funds which were intended for the economic and
cultural development (these amounts reached the sum of over 1 million US
dollars per day in the late seventies and in the eighties) were spent in a
similar way as the help the Third world countries received from the European
states. Instead of economy, the communist-national oligarchy spent the money
on propaganda of secession ideology and used it for joint political action
with communist Albania.
At the same time, the friendship of the Yugoslav communist leadership
with the Third World Muslim countries helped a lot create a suitable climate
for the penetration of Muslim fundamentalism which, for ethnic Albanians,
mainly signifies traditional framework of civilization. Albania, formally
atheistic, watched with favor upon the biological expansion of ethnic
Albanians in Yugoslavia and the support of Islamic institutions and
officials, because it all led to a final goal: the creation of the Greater
Albania. Being the nation with the highest birthrate in Europe (28 promils),
ethnic Albanians soon became the majority in Kosovo and Metohia. Another
200,000 native Serbs, faced with constant physical and political pressure,
looked for a safer life outside the Province. The Serbs in Kosovo and
Metohia became, in their own state, a persecuted and unprotected minority.
From making almost a half of the population after World War II, the number
of Serbs in Kosovo and Metohia dropped to 15-20% of the population.
One year after Tito's death, in March 1981, ethnic Albanians announced
their rebellion against Yugoslavia by setting a fire at the Pec
Patriarchate, a complex of medieval churches, where the throne of the
patriarch of Serbian Orthodox Church is formally located. It surfaced again
that religious intolerance remained the deepest layer of their obsession
against the Serbs. Several days later they came out into the streets
demanding that the Province gets republic status so that they could acquire
one more right which only republic (according to a Leninist principle) hold:
the right to self-determination up to secession. The Yugoslav communists
have for the first time openly shown the true face of their national policy
in the case of Kosovo and Metohia: in their ideology every appearance of the
Serbian national identity was considered as the biggest danger for the
internal equilibrium of the regime: all other national movements were
watched with complacency. Delegations of Serbs from Kosovo and Metohia were
coming, for almost an entire decade, to the National Assembly in Belgrade,
asking the highest state bodies for protection, pointing to the ties between
the ethnic Albanian oligarchy, the Albanian secret police (Sigurimi) and the
radical currents in Muslim circles. It was ascertained that the local ethnic
Albanians' authorities in Metohia entered Serbian medieval monasteries in
new land-registry books as mosques, while the private land of the Serbian
refugees-peasants, was entered as the ownership of those very ethnic
Albanians (mostly emigrants from Albania) who usurped them in the first
place with the political support of the local authorities. Attacks on
Serbian churches an the demolishing of Orthodox monuments became an everyday
form of expressing Albanian national identity. Significant sign of religious
influence on everyday life of ethnic Albanians is new architecture of
private houses: almost all are surrounded by two or three meters high walls
which, according to Muslim traditions, are hiding Albanian women from eyes
of strangers. Similar picture gives a architecture of public buildings, from
libraries to hotels: all of them are shaped with strong Muslim tradition.
All recent researches on religion in Yugoslavia shows that ethnic
Albanians, mainly Muslims, are the most religious population: 70% of entire
population; 34% of Serbs are religious, 53% of Croats, 60% of Slovenes and
only 37% of Bosnian Muslims. Among intellectuals 61% of ethnic Albanians,
15% of Serbs and 19% of Bosnian Muslims are religious; in lower classes 85%
of ethnic Albanians, 48% of Serbs and 60% of Muslims in Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
The persecution of the Serbs in Kosovo and Metohia and their
innumerable appeals to the Serbian and Yugoslav public, managed to shake the
Serbs out of their comfortable Yugoslavism. It appeared that Yugoslavism was
only an ideological framework consistently neutralizing the political,
economic, cultural and the entire national potential of the Serbs. They
evoked from the forbidden past their Kosovo pledge, once again discovering
the essence of their national identity. The awareness of the vital Serbian
interests being threatened, spread under the influence of the oppositional
intellectuals and with the crucial support of unofficial media. The support
which was arriving to Kosovo ethnic Albanians from all Muslim countries, and
even from Muslim intellectuals in Bosnia and Herzegovina, showed that the
question was far more than an ethnical and interstate conflict over the
territory. Becoming aware of the nation being endangered, Serbs began to
return to the national and political traditions, culture and religion,
realizing that once again, like in the age of the Ottoman rule, their lands
will be the scene of the final phase of the centuries-long clash between the
basically Islamic concept of society and the European-shaped Serbian
civilization.
Unfortunately, the Serbian movement in Kosovo was skillfully used by
new communist leadership in Serbia who in 1987 introduced the populist
policy to preserve the old bureaucratic structure upon rediscovered national
ideals. But the accelerated disintegration of the Yugoslav federation showed
that narrow interest of the ruling communist and post-communist national
lites hid underneath a heap ethnic tensions which could hardly be overcome
by democratic means.
A deep driving force of all tectonic disturbances in Kosovo and Metohia
emerged from layers beneath the deceptive communist reality and the
inheritance of centuries long conflict of different nations: a clash of two
civilizations, the Christian and the Islamic, which found cohabitations
difficult even in other European countries where Islamized population is
usually a minority.
Ethnic strife in Kosovo and Metohia are, for many influential Serbian
intellectuals, only stirred up foam on the surface of the sea whose
invisible currents hide its true contents. Although the clash between these
two mutually excluding points of view will be taking place under the
protection of different ideological premises adjusted to the demands of the
political situation, the clash of civilisations as a powerful process of "la
longue duree", remains the framework which will, maybe even permanently,
determine the further flow of history in this entire region. It is only to
be hoped that the influential rays of the European integration, based on
democratic institutions, market economy and civil sovereignty will, in the
long run, turn out to be the more stable than the challenges fixed by
historical heritage.
FIGURES:
Otoman Vilayets
Serbia 1804-1913
Comunist Yugoslavia: Federal Organization
Settling of Albanian tribes

Fig. 1: Ottoman Vilayets

Fig. 2: Serbia 1804-1913

Fig. 3: Comunist Yugoslavia: Federal Organization

Fig. 4: Settling of Albanian Tribes

Популярность: 8, Last-modified: Sun, 07 Dec 2003 08:10:23 GmT

District	Muslims	Christians	Total
Prizren	49,000	29,000	78,000
Pec	34,000	31,000	65,000
Djakovica	31,000	21,000	52,000

	All town-dwelling Serbs	All town-dwelling ethnic Albanians
	Catholics	Muslims	Catholics	Muslims
Pec	510	10,540	100	400
Djakovica	2,600	1,200	450	16,500
Prizren	16,800	-	2,150	4,000
All:	19,900	11,740	2,700	20,950
Total	Serbs: 31,650	ethnic Albanian: 23,650

bairak	villages	Albanians	Serbs	Serbs	Albanians
Mala Hoca	24	827	284	-	30
Poluzje	28	434	4	223	22
Suva Reka	42	691	294	-	45
Ostrozub	33	1,052	5	-	45
Sredska	32	502	488	900	-
Opolje	21	985	-	-	-
Gora	31	-	-	2,167	-
Sirinic	15	157	786	-	-
Total	226	4,646	1,861	3,740	142

	Pec sanjak	Pristina sanjak	Prizren sanjak
Orthodox Serbs	23,750	73,400	14,200
Catholic Serbs	-	6,600	-
Muslim Serbs	13,250	43,000	13,000
Muslim Albanians	96,250	73,500	45,300
Catholic Albanians	9,300	50	5,000
Orthodox Albanians	-	-	900
Tzintzars (Romanians)	300	270	2,000
Turks	250	3,000	6,400
Jews	50	350	100
Gypsies	1,350	8,530	4,300

	homes	inhabitants
Orthodox Serbs	10,346	206,920
Muslim Serbs who became Albanians	15,600	390,010
Catholic Serbs	108	1,750
Muslim Serbs from Bosnia	50	1,200
Protestant Serbs	-	1
Catholic Albanians	260	1,560
Albanians	1,000	20,000
Turks	270	3,230
Jews	50	300

sanjak	in towns	in villages	total
Pristina	1,531	12,517	14,048
Pec	643	3,238	3,026
Prizren	982	1,148	2,400